THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LAW AND NATURAL LAW IS MEMORIZATION VS CALCULATION
Source date (UTC): 2018-06-20 17:29:46 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1009488490348892164
Theme: Decidability
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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LAW AND NATURAL LAW IS MEMORIZATION VS CALCULATION
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LAW AND NATURAL LAW IS MEMORIZATION VS CALCULATION
Source date (UTC): 2018-06-20 13:29:00 UTC
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Philosophy = Choice of preference and good. Science = existence, description and
Philosophy = Choice of preference and good. Science = existence, description and decidability. As such Propertarianism only states how to measure aesthetic content. However, there is a difference between that which is true, good, and preferable. You may not prefer the truth. 😉
Source date (UTC): 2018-06-14 18:32:01 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1007329830482870277
Reply addressees: @mightyboom_
Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1007028131130216448
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Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1007028131130216448
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by Bill Joslin I think the Propertarian legal frames can be explained simply. Bu
by Bill Joslin I think the Propertarian legal frames can be explained simply. But the difficulty in simplistic explanations pertains to constraining interpretation (free association) which dissolves our value on testimony as a demanding moral good. We can habituate that via law and grounded parables (parables grounded in reality)) (CURT: If you can disassemble that, it’s spot on.)
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by Bill Joslin I think the Propertarian legal frames can be explained simply. Bu
by Bill Joslin I think the Propertarian legal frames can be explained simply. But the difficulty in simplistic explanations pertains to constraining interpretation (free association) which dissolves our value on testimony as a demanding moral good. We can habituate that via law and grounded parables (parables grounded in reality)) (CURT: If you can disassemble that, it’s spot on.)
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by Bill Joslin I think the Propertarian legal frames can be explained simply. Bu
by Bill Joslin
I think the Propertarian legal frames can be explained simply. But the difficulty in simplistic explanations pertains to constraining interpretation (free association) which dissolves our value on testimony as a demanding moral good. We can habituate that via law and grounded parables (parables grounded in reality))
(CURT: If you can disassemble that, it’s spot on.)
Source date (UTC): 2018-06-10 10:53:00 UTC
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A LITTLE DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE LUDIC FALLACY AND WHY I RARELY USE ANY VARI
A LITTLE DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE LUDIC FALLACY AND WHY I RARELY USE ANY VARIATION ON “PROBABLE”.
The Ludic Fallacy consists in the error that probability can be calculated on unclosed systems, whereas outliers are of greater influence on consequences that change state than are regularities that maintain state.
In other words, there are very few conditions under which dice are a model for probability, and the ratio of influence (change) is a log of the tail. Dice are closed systems. There are no outliers. Whereas in all other categories (real world) we are almost always measuring variations in a norm, not possible outliers – which although rare, are far more influential than the regularities we measure. In other words, we get what we measure but what we measure is largely unimportant, because it’s obvious and not influential. What we don’t measure is that which is not obvious and rare, but influential.
When we predict the future we depend upon regularities. but if regularities exist then there is no profit to be made. it is from outliers that profits are made.
This is a via negativa strategy, just as is falsification.
Or stated otherwise, the unimaginable and improbable is more influential than the imaginable and probable.
This is – reductio version – the whole point of Taleb’s work.
And Taleb is, even if he doesn’t succeed, the counter to Keynesian Probabilism, the same way I am counter to Marxist pseudoscience.
Source date (UTC): 2018-06-10 09:21:00 UTC
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Probabilities and Psuedoscience
Keynes’ first work was in probability. He was a successful investor. He used probabilities where the law used operations (Legal transactions). He institutionalized the ludic fallacy: that games with limits mirrors human actions that consistently expand limits. All economies head toward disequilibrium. Growth is in fact an instance of disequilibrium.
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Probabilities and Psuedoscience
Keynes’ first work was in probability. He was a successful investor. He used probabilities where the law used operations (Legal transactions). He institutionalized the ludic fallacy: that games with limits mirrors human actions that consistently expand limits. All economies head toward disequilibrium. Growth is in fact an instance of disequilibrium.
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NOTES: Constant vs contingent vs inconsistent vs non-relations. Recursive Contin
NOTES:
- Constant vs contingent vs inconsistent vs non-relations.
- Recursive Continuous Disambiguation vs Scale of Set of Constant Relations(density)
- Cumulation of association vs falsification of associations
- Computational efficiency.
- State Persistence vs breadth search, vs depth search
- We cannot know the intelligence of distant ancestors.
- Planning a series of steps in sequence must emerge – which requires recursion.
- Consciousness must emerge, meaning, the ability to compare states.
- Cooperation must emerge, meaning, the ability to empathize with intent.
- At some point we must develop sufficient computational ability to manipulate our bodies in some way that allows for unambiguous communication, or a means of continuous disambiguation, that is fast enough for one another to make use of in real time, and easy enough for one another to retain.
- And at some point, given sufficient computational ability, memory, and state persistence independent of recursion, language must emerge.
- At some point the value of such communication much be such that the cost of it is offset by the rewards of it.
- And we should see a cliff in history where there is a dramatic change when we did develop those abilities. And we do see it – rather recently.
But language requires a system of measurement. The system of measurement is limited by our senses. And as such meaning refers to a set of measurements, eventually reducible to analogies to human experience. So while semantic content (measurements) must vary from species to species, grammar (continuous recursive disambiguation) should be universal in the sense that it varies predictably with computational abilities. We can understand a child, a person with 60IQ, 70IQ and so on, up to 200+ IQ. But as far as I can tell the set of measurements (basis of semantics) remain the same, and all that changes is the scope of the state persisted, the depth of recursion, and the density and distance of relations, and the ability to model (forecast). In other words, simple people are in fact simply ‘more simple’ in the density of content of their semantics, use of grammar, and models (Stories) that they can construct with them. So universal grammar as a set of computational minimums and efficiencies, should always exist, and human universal grammar as universal grammar limited to human measurements (semantics), does exist. And any organism with sufficient computational (neural) capacity, should develop some means of communication using some variation of universal grammar, and some sense-perception – action dependent semantics. May 29, 2018 4:28pm