Curt Doolittle

Form: Mini Essay

  • EVEN TESTIMONIALISM WILL NOT HERALD THE END OF HISTORY In lower trust countries

    EVEN TESTIMONIALISM WILL NOT HERALD THE END OF HISTORY

    In lower trust countries people justify their various forms of lying just as we high trust people justify the externalities caused by our combination of linguistic conveniences, methodological habits, variations in morality and ethics, and of course political correctness

    That does not mean that just as we live considerably better than all these lower trust societies, that we world not yet again live better than we do now if we spoke more truthfully than we do now.

    The reasons are not terribly hard to understand. And in simple terms the people you associate with are more important in determining your prosperity and safety than your own abilities.

    So just as the Flynn effect is the product of reducing the bottom and saturating everyone else in scientific general rules, we can likewise expect the same increase by saturating everyone in testimonial speech and reducing the bottom.

    We are not yet at the end of history. There is a long way to go. And perhaps the reson we seem stalled in physics is because we aren’t producing enough patterns in our own behavior to deduce the construction of the rest of the universe.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-23 05:51:00 UTC

  • RESTORING TRUTH: IT”S NOT EASY TRYING TO REGROUND MAN IN REALITY AND FORCING HIM

    RESTORING TRUTH: IT”S NOT EASY TRYING TO REGROUND MAN IN REALITY AND FORCING HIM TO SPEAK TRUTHFULLY: BECAUSE IT’S HARD AND COSTLY

    The attraction of the theological, platonic, ideal, fictional is so great if for no other reason that the mind naturally categorizes unnecessary operationally deterministic detail into names of consequences of those operations.

    In fact, this is what the mind does: generalize. Because our computational bandwidth is limited, and our ability to work with a concept in short term memory is very limited, so we are always struggling to compare the most complex RESULTS using the most simplistic INPUTS. In other words, we generalize so that we can make consequent imaginary associations of different degrees of precision.

    The problem is that each time we generalize we lose information. That’s what generalizing means. We give up detail to create increasingly explanatory categories.

    And each deduction we make from less precise generalizations includes greater potential for association, but also greater potential for error.

    So then, once we have found an answer we then re-evaluate whether that answer is possible by working backward through the detail of each generalization to test it.

    Given that mathematics consists entirely of testable operations this generally isn’t necessary, although that was the purpose of the intuitionistic movement in mathematics.

    But as we move away from mathematics, or as we move to richer and denser ideas in mathematics, we leave behind operational certainty and begin to encounter deductive uncertainty – searching for limits within which an answer might (or must) be found. And as we move farther away we rely upon only non-contradiction, and at last vague associative relation. The reason being that we move from reproducible and necessary operations to mere deductions, to mere non-contradiction, to mere possible association.

    So we fight two battles that are only solvable by reverse-construction: operational definitions from first causes.

    ONE

    In the first we have the mind’s need to generalize as we work with ever more complex topics,

    TWO

    In the second we may teach people operations with generalities rather than the construction of those generalities from first principles – so that they can later test consequent deductions, calculations, rationalizations, imaginary relations.

    THREE

    In the third, we see people that have been taught generalities instead of causalities then create theological, platonic, and other fictional narratives to simplify this causal density and to keep the entire model (system) within their grasp.

    FOUR

    In the fourth, we produce externalities by the use of the language generalizations, by applying the fictional narratives as if they constitute existential or possible operations, by mere verbal association to problems and categories that have no underlying association in causality, only narrative fictional association.

    FIVE

    This process is how the public becomes confused with math, science, biology, economics – and how these confusions end up as policy.

    Sometimes by the equal ignorance and stupidity of policy makers. And sometimes (as we have seen with the pseudoscientific social sciences) by intent to abuse the people’s openness to such narratives and the possibility of deceiving them by suggestion using those narratives.

    THEREFORE

    So if it is my purpose to eliminate the possibility of public error and deception from the commons, such that the people do not pursue fallacies, and cannot be led by fallacies, then we must hold accountable those people who manufacture manufacture research, teaching, manufacture publications, and manufacture ideas, and manufacture policy, by the same standards we hold people accountable in the production of resources, materials, goods, medicines, and services.

    KEEPING OUR DISCOUNTS AND IRRESPONSIBILITY

    Now you will hear from every discipline that they claim that they cannot be held accountable for the use of their products – they refuse to warranty verbal and literary products for the same reason ladder manufacturers, tool manufacturers, toy manufacturers, drug manufacturers, carpet installers, home builders, psychologists, and tax accountants desire not to warranty their services. And they will refuse this reformation the same way that every other externality-causing industry has attempted to refuse warranty of due diligence in informing the customer of the dangers of incorrect use of the product, and themselves of the clarity of articulation and description of the product or service.

    People want to preserve discounts and export costs onto others. Intellectuals are no more immune to parasitic existence than other disciplines. And outside of the financial and political sector producers of ideas are probably the GREATEST exporters of damage onto others because of their lack of warranty of due diligence.

    But that hasn’t and won’t and shouldn’t ask us to force the reformation of every discipline (math and economics and social science, and law in particular) so that the those who profit from the education and distribution of knowledge are held as accountable for it as are the producers and distributors of all other products.

    The informational commons has become as important as any other commons, and the market for information has become more important precisely because it is cheaper and easier to distribute products that harm individuals, groups, societies, and entire civilizations, if not mankind.

    I am convinced that the operational revolution that failed in the last century, and the one that we can yet bring about today, will produce as great an improvement in human thought and society as the scientific revolution has in contrast to the rational, and the rational in contrast to the mystical.

    We are not yet at the end of history. But if we defend the informational marketplace and the informational commons from pollution by error-bias, wishful thinking, suggestion, pseudoscience and deceit, we can bring the end of history one step closer to fruition.

    Truth is enough. But telling the truth is increasingly expensive.

    It is the highest tax that we pay.

    And it produces the greatest returns of any other tax – even more so than the tremendously costly, but beneficial tax, of paying for the institution of private property, and its consequences.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Philosophy of Aristocracy

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-23 01:49:00 UTC

  • INFINITY AND THE FICTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONARY NARRATIVES IN MATHEMATICS infinite =

    INFINITY AND THE FICTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONARY NARRATIVES IN MATHEMATICS

    infinite = **’unknown, because without context of correspondence we cannot determine limits’**, that’s all it means. Because that’s all it *can* mean and not argumentatively convert from mathematics to theology or fictional justification is perhaps a better term.

    The irony is that mathematicians seek precision in their statements and take pride in the precision of their language, but on this subject they do the opposite: obscure.

    There is no difference at all between making theological justificationary narratives, and making mathematically platonic justificationary narratives other than in theology and mathematics, theologians and mathematicians both seek to enforce existing dogma, while at the same time obscuring the fact that they have no idea what they’re talking about, and therefore resort to fictional narrative justification.

    “God gave us the ten commandments” is a fictional justificationary narrative obscuring the lack of causal understanding, and “evolutionary constraints produced natural laws of cooperation at scale” articulates the causal understanding. I can obey those ten commandments and cooperate at scale whether I use the fictional justificationary narrative, or the causal scientific narrative. So the operations I take are identical. What differs is the consequences of using a fictional justificationary narrative and a causally parsimonious narrative – just as what differs in our ability to make consequential deductions from allegorical justificationary narratives, and axiomatic causal properties differs.

    Mathematics is literally full of holdovers from the greek and Christian eras of mysticism as well as the modern era’s rationalism – and mathematicians have not reformed mathematics as science has been reformed. And so mathematics still contain’s is fictional justificationary narratives. This retention of fictional justificationary narratives (the theology of mathematical platonism), does not necessarily inhibit the practice of mathematics any more than obeying the ten commandments inhibits the art of cooperating at scale. What matters is the consequence of teaching mathematics platonically (theologically) and teaching it scientifically (existentially).

    Now, in testimonialism we account for the ethics of externality and we require warranty of truthfulness in public speech. Therefore it would be unethical and immoral (and possibly criminal or at least negligent) for mathematicians to continue to teach or publish or speak in public using theological language while at the same time making proof or truth claims – because one cannot warranty due diligence against externality caused by the false statements.

    So someday we hope we can reform mathematics so that it is taught scientifically not theologically, and as such by superior methods of teaching, we expand the use of mathematics to increasing numbers of people, and export less theology via fictional justificationary narrative into the public domain.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-22 23:42:00 UTC

  • WHY WILL FIAT CURRENCY ALWAYS EXIST? The truth is that fiat currency is such an

    WHY WILL FIAT CURRENCY ALWAYS EXIST?

    The truth is that fiat currency is such an advantage that a people cannot compete without it.

    Competing currencies and commodities exist but they are not anywhere near as price stabilized as fiat money CAN be.

    So we are always going to have it. Probably digital will replace it and it will have to because the abuse of it has gotten out of hand.

    What real purpose does government debt serve over simply printing money and paying with it?

    You pay the price of interest in order to delay the equlibrial neutrality of money working through the economy.

    In other words, the faster new money moves the faster prices in the existing cycle of production adjust.

    Fast adjustment is bad if it interferes with production ( planning ) cycles.

    So instead we pay interest and sell government debt so that we inflate away the interest at about the same rate that prices adjust in the economy.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-21 13:07:00 UTC

  • MUST BE A FULL MOON. (I have a handful of windows open all asking about relation

    MUST BE A FULL MOON.

    (I have a handful of windows open all asking about relationship advice.)

    COST

    Men are emotinally expensive for women, just like women are economically expensive for men.

    CHOICES

    Women are not ‘looser’ than they were in the past, only than in the recent past. What they are is more economically indpendent and men are less valuable to them. Moreover we are now forming relationships largely on shared entertainment interests rather than shared economic necessity. So men are less valuable. So what has occurred is that both sexes are using current economic conditions (that are changing rapidly) to be more selective if they have options, and more impulsive if they don’t.

    JUST NOT THAT INTO YOU

    She’s just not that into you. He’s just not that into you.

    Gender doesn’t matter. It works the same, both ways.

    You can try as hard as you want. But once you figure out that he or she is not as into you as you are into him or her, you’ve found a pretty serious problem.

    Because it will only get worse. Relationships wax and wane. And unless there is enough attraction, the weak parts create easy points of failure. And the person with the lowest interest is the one who will break.

    Both women and men excel at wishful thinking.

    But you can’t wish people to feel other than they do.

    And if you must work hard for their attention, over time, then you will get less and less of it. Not only because they will be less responsive to your desires, but because you will be less willing to work for that attention.

    It is what it is.

    Relationships are only useful for very short romance, or very long security. The middle ground is always disappointing.

    Find someone you want to be with for the long haul.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-21 12:37:00 UTC

  • SILICON VALLEY IS FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE Why? because economic regionalization

    SILICON VALLEY IS FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE

    Why? because economic regionalization is going to win (it has to). Because the USA is losing its dollar advantage (it has to). Because populism (self-defense) is the natural reaction to both (people have to).

    And all the valley leadership are doing is branding themselves as a political Hollywood v2, which can be regulated and taxed into submission.

    Ask Gates what happens when your government turns against you.

    The USA makes the EU look like mother Theresa when they go after you. Because they aren’t necessarily trying to win a case. They are trying to force you to submit through distracting and sewing uncertainty in your management team, the financial market, your shareholders, your employees, and forcing you to bear enormous opportunity, financial, and brand-sentiment costs.

    Ergo, Thiel is correct.

    Some of us understand how easy it would be for example to make the Hollywood lottery effect even more impossible than it is already. The same is for the tech giants of the day.

    The wild west of the internet is on its way to domestication. The dollar is on its way to domestication. Immigration is on its way to domestication. Overseas revenues are on their way to domestication. and the fact that tech is a distracting bright spot of profitability in an economy with few of them is a privilege that the valley takes for granted.

    Time to get on the bus.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-20 13:50:00 UTC

  • DECIDABILITY AND MORALITY While explanatory power is useful – it isn’t necessari

    DECIDABILITY AND MORALITY

    While explanatory power is useful – it isn’t necessarily a test of truth. Whereas testimonial decidability does serve as a test of truth.

    We tend to confused platonic truth (that arrangement of ideas we might possess if we possessed more information than we currently do) where our model is infinitely intertemporal(extends into the future regardless of problem set, with decidable truth, where our model is a problem we seek to solve with the knowledge available, with analytic truth, where we possess all possible knowledge because our model is axiomatic. But this is a confusion of the information present at different points of the present

    The problem for these philosophers of empty verbalism, is that once a theory provides perfect decidability, it’s true by all possible measures. So natural law is ‘true’ even if you don’t like it. Now if you don’t like it, then I (we) can certainly understand why – you lose all opportunity for parasitism.

    Now you might make claims that reciprocal insurance in which you or others become beneficiaries isn’t parasitism. But then we would have to distinguish between accident and choice. And in that analysis, there are very few acts of god other than catastrophic illness and natural disasters that are not your choice. Even those are largely avoidable if you haven’t chosen poorly.

    This is why so many people prefer to hang on pseudo-moral arguments, and pseudo-moral religious arguments: in order to preserve their parasitism.

    When instead, they could simply offer to be better people in exchange for that which they seek>

    And that is the real issue, isn’t it? Self-discipline is a high cost and one that many of us seek to avoid paying by making false moral and religious claims in order to obtain benefits by acts of deception using appeals to our signals of status and self-worth, charity, and altruism..

    Whereas the moral folk, who build good families, object to the vast difference in payments of self-discipline that they contribute to the commons, as well as the material payments they make to those who fail to exercise that discipline. Why? Because they pay double. whereas they would gladly pay money in return for behavior.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-20 09:21:00 UTC

  • STRICTLY CONSTRUCTED LAW AND CONTRACT It’s not that different from programming,

    STRICTLY CONSTRUCTED LAW AND CONTRACT

    It’s not that different from programming, which any reasonably intelligent lawyer that can program a bit will readily observe.

    The Structure of a Program or Contract

    ————————————————————

    Purpose (Whereas these conditions exist)

    Return Value (and whereas we wish to produce these ends)

    Constants and Variables (definitions constructed)

    Objects (constructions from base types / “first principles”)

    Libraries and Includes ( we refer to these libraries, objects, definitions)

    Functions (clauses that can be performed)

    Event Listeners ( criteria that invokes clauses)

    Operations (assignments of value, comparisons of value)

    Termination (termination conditions – no infinite loops)

    The only thing preventing law from strict construction was the definition of the first principle from which all constants, variables, objects, operations, and functions are derived:

    1 – Producitve

    2 – Fully informed

    3 – Warrantied

    4 – Voluntary Exchange

    5 – Constrained to externality of the same criteria.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Philosophy of Aristocracy

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-20 04:18:00 UTC

  • No estamos de acuerdo

    [C]uando decimos “no estamos de acuerdo” estamos usando una falacia retórica. Toda declaración puede ser verdadera, falsa o incompleta, estemos de acuerdo con una o no.

    1. No existen leyes de ciencia en sí. Hay procedimientos que han evolucionado que son utilizados para eliminar error, sesgo, ilusiones y engaños de nuestras hipótesis. Estos procesos no nos dicen si una premisa puede ser verdadera, sólo nos da a entender que puede ser una premisa cierta si sobrevive a una serie de críticas.
    2. Existen intuiciones, hipótesis, teorías, leyes y tautologías porque las hemos construido y hemos demostrado que existen como tal.
    3. Existen premisas no tautológicas, aunque ciertas: en otras palabras, en cualquier declaración de precision arbitraria, debemos buscar límites, porque todas las reglas generales poseen límites. Aquí fue donde Ludwig von Mises fracasó al intentar hacer uso del racionalismo Kantian en lugar del racionalismo crítico de Karl Popper: las ciencias. Ya que no hay premisas ciertas, no hay deducciones ciertas. Ya que hay leyes que podamos deducir de los resultados de igual precisión. Pero estas son imprecisas, y por ende, también lo son nuestras deducciones.
    4. Nosotros podemos construir premisas descriptivas (teorías) que son verdaderas, pero no son ejecutables porque carecen de precisión suficiente. Una regularidad puede ser tan lenta (como los ciclos económicos, políticos, ciclos de generación y ciclos de civilizaciones) que no importa lo que hagamos dentro de ellos porque a la larga, es solamente ruido.

    Ludwig von Mises propone que la historia no es regular y lo hace presumiendo que el intercambio es único porque es subjetivo y momentáneo. Pero también Mises propone que podemos simpatizar con premisas económicas y por ende probar la racionalidad de cualquier incentivo. Este par de propuestas constituyen una contradicción lógica. Ya que nosotros podemos decidir si un incentivo es racional, y podemos probar la racionalidad de las decisiones de toros (así es como ponemos a prueba a los mentirosos en las cortes), luego nuestros juicios son marginalmente indiferentes. Si son marginalmente indiferentes, entonces pueden ser representados como constantes. Así que a un lado del espectro, las decisiones son marginalmente indiferentes y hemos probado esto en miles de formas tanto en la economía como la psicología experimenta. Y al otro lado del espectro de los pretendidos axiomas Misesianos, y sus pretendidas leyes (inflación, neutralidad de la moneda, salario mínimo) son ambas suficientemente imprecisas para no poder ser puestas en ejecución. Cuando de hecho, es posible producir exterioridad adrede cuando de forma intencional se manipulan estos comportamientos causados por información asimétrica y distribución de recursos. Este tipo de distorsiones pueden ser medidas de forma bastante precisa. Así que noe s que estos sistemas no sean regulares (porque si lo son), o que no sean deterministas (que también lo son) o que no sean ejecutables (lo son) y que por ende son científicamente probables. En lugar de ser impermeables a la ciencia en el desarrollo de las reglas generales, éste tipo de acciones son inmorales: Estas acciones tienen como consecuencia transferencias involuntarias de gente con un preferencias de tiempo más largas o más cortas, a aquellas personas que tengan una preferencia de tiempo más alta o más larga. Es decir que no solamente roban sino que privan a los bienes de cambios de comportamiento necesarios para preservar la preferencia de tiempo extendida. Por ejemplo: Mises confundió el robo de la moralidad con una verdad científica. Su segundo gran fracaso fue que no pudo aprehender que intuir (como Bruwer pudo en las matemáticas y Bridgman lo hizo en la física) que la praxeología producía pruebas de construcción, pero que eran insuficientes para deducirlas. Una prueba de construcción es requerida (no sólo en economía pero también en matemática) para demostrar que una premisa económica es existencialmente posible. Es un medio para intentar falsear una declaración. Pero la mayoría de los efectos económicos no son deducibles, sólo son observables empíricamente y luego pueden ser explicados. Son explicados al intentar construirlos a partir de una secuencia de operaciones racionales. Si no pueden ser construidos, entonces no podemos construir prueba existencial de ellos y por ende, esas premisas no pueden ser posibles. Es posible construir pruebas existenciales para acciones humanas en el Keynesianismo. Pero estas pruebas nos dicen que tales manipulaciones son un acto de engaño que tienen como consecuencia transferencias involuntarias (robo). Por ello esas acciones no son científicas. Por ello, Mises está equivocado. El confunde lo inmoral y lo no científico. Confunde el justificarse bajo el contrato de la moral, con premisas candidatas a ser verdad que sobreviven la crítica. Esto es un asunto que no es trivial. Es probablemente una de las premisas filosóficas más importantes del siglo XX que los pensadores no lograron resolver de la misma forma que todos los que estaban antes que ellos. Pero ahora está resuelta. Mises simplemente estaba equivocado. Era un austro-húngaro cosmopolita y sencillamente fracasó. Fracasó peor que Brouwer y Bridgman. Y porque fracasó, también lo hizo Hayek. Hemos sido sujeto de un siglo de engaños  

  • THE NON-OBVIOUS BENEFITS OF MARKET GOVERNMENT (important topic) William Butchman

    THE NON-OBVIOUS BENEFITS OF MARKET GOVERNMENT

    (important topic)

    William Butchman just indirectly reminded me that when I say ‘market government’ is the most likely candidate for creating a beneficial form of ‘post majoritarian rule’ while retaining the benefit of creating non-monopolistic commons:

    a) that groups are not prevented from creating what we call anarchic (private contractual) commons, simply by setting conditions of use for the semi-private property. In other words, the Hoppeian contractual model of commons still exists.

    b) however, by creating a market for the EXCHANGE of commons, we can conduct trades between classes for the construction of commons, thereby obtaining through the exchange of commons what we cannot obtain through either the market, or by the private production of commons.

    c) the importance of this insight is that we are all compelled to think of what commons we can offer to others just as we are compelled to think of what private goods and services we can offer to others. The most common exchange will be behavior and norms for material goods, services, access and various forms of insurance.

    d) and that we can create competing commons (monorail vs trains) where before – only monopoly existed.

    If you can create a commons by wholly private construction, public non-prohibition of private construction, public competition with other common projects, or shared consent via exchange, or shared consent by mutual interest, then you are able to construct commons in every possible means rather than by the one means of majority rule – and that the most effective method of constructing commons is to trade with other classes what you have to supply: labor and good normative public behavior, for knowledge, organization, and wealth.

    While at the same time, no one can create parasitic commons because no such contract can survive the test of natural law that all contracts must survive.

    Furthermore, without monopoly production of commons there is no reason for politicals to pass legislation or regulation, only facilitate the market for the production of commons – which is in all our interests, and requires very little that we ask of man’s character to work other than by natural incentives.

    Again, a legal system that takes its decidability from the natural law and evolves by empirical experimentation via the common law, with universal standing and universal applicability, combined with a market for reproduction (family), a market for production of goods and services (the economy), and a market for the production of commons (government in the loosest sense), is the most empirical and truthful non-parasitic order that we can construct.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Philosophy of Aristocracy

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-19 08:51:00 UTC