Theme: Science

  • CAN I GET HELP WITH HISTORY OF MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY? (edited) (request for he

    CAN I GET HELP WITH HISTORY OF MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY?

    (edited) (request for help) (foundations of mathematics)

    Need a mathematical historian. Someone very well versed in teaching theory.

    I am going to say this badly because I don’t know the correct way to ask it:

    0) the classical construction of mathematics is an operational and (identity, counting and measurement) and analog one. It is the practical uniting of counting, measurement, geometry, and algebraic logic (deduction).

    1) The ZFC+AC argument (the set argument) converts the practice of math from one of dimensions (space and analog) to one of sets (binary). This allows the excluded middle. It is a very artful way of solving the problem, by simply returning to the very basics of the origination of counting. But the set solution is achieved by removing scale and therefore contextual utility from the calculation, leaving us with no means of external reference for choice of precision. I see this solution as useful, but a fabrication.. a ‘trick’. Whereas, one could just say ‘precision of N’, and increase or decrease that precision as needed. (Although this approach would require tagging variables or numbers I think, or maybe prevent us from reducing ratios including real numbers.) The solution to the problem of scale and context (analog representation) by converting to binary (set membership) representation is actually very interesting one. The question is, was it knowingly made, or what this solution achieved without understanding that the problem of context and scale was solved by effectively reducing math from analog (related to the real world scale) and binary (independent of real world scale). I can’t figure it out from the literature.

    2) The constructivist argument relies on a binary proof. (“Russian Recursive Mathematics”) This method disallows the excluded middle. (and double negation). It is a higher standard of proof. However, I don’t understand why we could not construct a syntax for the explicit preservation of scale (correspondence with whatever context we have in mind) and thereby retain correspondence as well as the excluded middle. (I am not sure about double negation. I haven’t thought it through yet.)

    3) Computational mathematics is both operational and binary.

    But why aren’t these three methods a spectrum – just like description, deduction, induction, abduction, guessing and intuitive choice? I mean, at the early end of the spectrum (0, 1) we require deduction, and at the later end of the spectrum (2,3) we require computability. The reason we have a problem with (1) and (2) is because they give upon correspondence (context). And with that we lose the use of context for determining the precision of a calculation.

    Deduction in context is always easier because we have information with which to make a choice (precision). But outside of context we cannot use external information, so we must rely on a binary choice (or decidability). Deduction is a very different problem from computation.

    Or, can we say then, that the foundations of mathematics have been wrongly divorced from correspondence and context by cantor through ZFC? When we could just say that binary is a universal substitute for arbitrary precision? I mean, that’s the functional equivalent of it?

    I need a frame of reference within the language of mathematics to talk about this issue and I don’t know how to get to it. I don’t even know how to ask this question any better than this?

    Was the solution to the foundations of math, culminating in ZFC+AC, understood as providing a solution to creating independence from the problem of correspondence and scale at the expense of ‘truth’ while retaining ‘proof’ and internal consistency?

    Or stated this way: Did mathematical philosophers understand that they were divorcing ‘departmental mathematics’ from physics (cause and correspondence) and logic (truth) by adopting ZFC+AC, thereby creating a study of pure relations independent of context?

    I have worked through both sides of the debate to the best of my ability.

    Why can the reason that sets work – reduction to binary in order to escape the burden of retaining context – simply be stated openly? I mean, if all it does is render scale infinitely variable, then that explains why ZFC works, and all these platonic devices are necessary: they create deducibility and computability. And it’s not ‘wrong’ per se, in the sense that it doesn’t produce correct calculations independent of context, or rather, independent of SCALE and therefore independent of correspondence. But it does sort of render mathematics platonic and almost magical rather than computational and rational.

    In that sense, we get to logically state WHY these methods work and when and when not they are applicable. The excluded middle is a problem of scale (analog, and correspondent values).

    In the end, the set method is useful because is just SO MUCH LESS BURDENSOME, but that’s all.

    But still, teaching people operational mathematics, and higher criteria of proof under constructive math, and then explicitly stating that we can move to sets at the expense of correspondence in order to obtain the ability to practice double negation and the excluded middle is not a problem, it’s a tool not a truth.

    I don’t need to solve this problem for my work. But since math is the gold standard, and contains this particularly burdensome problem, if I can describe the consequences in mathematics of non-operational language leading to platonism, I can explain why non-operational language in ethics, likewise leads to platonism.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-03 16:05:00 UTC

  • “Information is that which is sufficient to cause a change in state.”

    “Information is that which is sufficient to cause a change in state.”


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-03 13:23:00 UTC

  • THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IS THE SUBJECTIVE VALUE OF THE DI

    THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IS THE SUBJECTIVE VALUE OF THE DIFFERENT OUTPUTS.

    (expanded and edited)

    It has nothing to do with method.

    The difference between physical science and engineering, as between mathematics and computer science, is simply the UTILITARIAN VALUE we attach to either:

    (a) the product of the test;

    OR

    (b) the extension of deductive power that results from the test.

    The purpose of engineering is to satisfy human wants given the demonstrated physical properties of the universe.

    The purpose of computer science is to satisfy human wants given the demonstrated physical properties of the universe. The purpose of physical science is to satisfy human wants given the demonstrated physical properties of the universe.

    That, in the last case, of physical sciences, as in the case of mathematics, the ‘human wants’ are largely the desire to know the additional properties of something,and the outputs of the tests are but a byproduct, is not materially different from engineering where the outputs of the tests (production) are what is desired, while the advancement in our theories is but a byproduct.

    That in computer science, biological research, or engineering, we place equal or higher value on the production of our tests, than we do on the advancement of our general theories, is a statement about the relative value of the various outputs, not statement about any difference in method.

    This can be restated as “the products of our tests in some fields finance further expansion of knowledge, and in other fields the products of our tests do not produce intermediate products that finance our further expansion of our theories.”

    That is the only difference.

    That is the answer you know. Everything else is nonsense.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-03 12:47:00 UTC

  • ON POPPER’S POSITION VS ACTION AND INSTRUMENTATION (reposted from cr page for ar

    ON POPPER’S POSITION VS ACTION AND INSTRUMENTATION

    (reposted from cr page for archiving)

    All we can say is x set of recipes have y properties in common, and all known recipes have z properties in common, and therefore we will likely find new recipes that share z properties.

    Logic is one of the instruments we use to construct recipes. Logic is a technology. Just as are the narrative, numbers, arithmetic, math, physics, and cooperation.

    These are all instrumental technologies or we would not need them and could perform the same operations without them.

    Science, as in the ‘method’ of science, is a recipe for employing those instruments ‘technologies’. Science is a technology. It is external to our intuitions, and we must use it like any other technology, in order to extend our sense, perception, memory, calculation, and planning.

    So I simply view ‘fuzzy language’ as what it is. And statements reducible to operational language as the only representation of scientific discourse.

    Theory means nothing different from fantasy without recording, instrument, operations, repetition, and falsification. A theory is a fantasy, a bit of imagination, and the recipes that survive are what remains of that fantasy once all human cognitive bias and limitation is laundered by our ‘technologies’.

    Recipes are unit of commensurability against which we can calculate differences, to further extend and refine our imaginary fantasies.

    Just as we test each individual action in a recipe against objective reality, we test each new fantasy against the accumulated properties stated in our recipes.

    From those tests of fantasy against our accumulated recipes, we observe in ourselves changes in our own instruments of logic. Extensions of our perception, memory, calculation – knowledge – is the collection of general instruments that apply in smaller numbers, to increasingly large categories of problems. (This is the reason Flynn suspects, for the Flynn effect as well as our tendency to improve upon tests.)

    It is these general principles (like the scientific method) that we can state are ‘knowledge’ in the sense of ‘knowledge of what’ versus ‘knowledge of how’ (See Gifts of Athena). Recipes are knowledge of ‘what’. General principles of how the universe functions are knowledge of ‘how’. Popper failed to make the distinction of dividing the problem into classes and instrumentation.

    And he did so because, as I have stated, he was overly fascinated with words, and under-fascinated with actions. And while I can only hypothesize why he is, like many of his peers, pseudo-scientifically fascinated with words, rather than scientifically fascinated with actions, the fact remains, that he was. And he, like Mises and Hayek and their followers, failed to produce a theory of the social sciences.

    CR is the best moral prescription for knowledge because it logically forbids the use of science to make claims of certainty sufficient to deprive people of voluntary choice.

    Popper justified skepticism and prohibited involuntary transfer by way of scientific argument. A necessary idea for his time. In science, he prohibited a return to mysticism by reliance on science equal to faith in god.

    But that is his achievement. He was the intellectual linebacker of the 20th century. He denied the opposition the field.

    But prohibition was not in itself an answer.

    Instrumentalism is necessary. Calculation is necessary. Reduction of the imperceptible to analogy to experience is necessary. Morality consists of the prevention of thefts and discounts. Actions that produce predictable outcomes, not states of imagination.

    That is the answer.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-02 13:08:00 UTC

  • ENDING MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM : BECAUSE IT’S IMMORAL (ISN”T THAT ENOUGH OF A REA

    ENDING MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM : BECAUSE IT’S IMMORAL (ISN”T THAT ENOUGH OF A REASON?)

    (reposted from elsewhere for archival purposes)

    Math was constructed from, and must, of necessity, consist of a series of operations. And consequently, all mathematics is reducible to a few simple operations. (Which is why computers can calculate.) In practice. everything we can think of can be reduced to adding or removing one, and the test of equality.

    (As an aside, this is why we can explain more possibilities with mathematics than the physical universe can demonstrate in reality: because the universe does not have this level of freedom due to the apparent complexity of its interacting forces.)

    The act of adding and subtracting the symbols we call numerals and positional numbers, is an obvious and common example of creating symbols to replace what would be tedious and incomprehensible repetitions.

    This necessity to use symbols to condense information into usable components (categories) is what our brains need to do. Imagine trying to do all operations by counting? It would be impossible. We could not function without these symbols.

    Furthermore, describing mathematical equations and proofs as operations is both verbally and syntactically burdensome. And since these operations are largely simple, and can be accurately reduced to symbols (named functions) there is little value in articulating them as operations.

    So mathematicians have developed a multitude of symbols and names for what are not extant objects, but names of functions (sets of operations) – just as every other discipline creates heavily loaded terms in order to allow informationally dense communication with fewer words.

    Most ‘numbers’ are anything but: they are names, glyphs and symbols, for functions that consist of large numbers of operations. “The natural numbers exist in nature, but all else is the work of man.”

    The reason for this complexity is that quantitative, and directional relationships are expressed as ratios, and while some ratios are reducible to numbers, others are not. Those that are not reducible must be expressed as functions. We have not invented a mathematical system that can circumvent this problem. It is possible such a thing cannot be done.

    Now aside from the practical utility of creating symbols, that obscure the operations, there is a practical value in using these names by disconnecting these names from their operations and from correspondence with any given scale.

    That is, that disconnection allows one to use the logic of mathematics independent of cause, correspondence and scale, to explore ONLY the properties of the relations between the entities in question. And this turns out to be extremely useful for deducing what causes we do not now.

    And this extraordinary utility has been responsible for the fact that the discipline has laundered time, causality and scale (precision) from the discipline. But one cannot say that a mathematical statement is true without correspondence with the real world. We can say it is internally consistent (a proof), but not that it is true (descriptive of reality via correspondence).

    Mathematics when ‘wrong’ most recently, with Cantor’s sets, in which he used imaginary objects, infinity, the excluded middle and the the axiom of choice, to preserve this syntactical convenience of names, and in doing so, completed the diversion of mathematics from a logic of truth (external correspondence), to one that is merely a logic of proof (internal consistency).

    Cantor’s work came at the expense of correspondence, and by consequence at the expense of truth. ie: mathematics does not determine truths, only proofs, because all correspondence has been removed by these ‘contrivances’, whose initial purpose was convenience, but whose accumulated errors have led to such (frankly, absurd) debates, .

    So the problem with mathematical platonism, which turns out to be fairly useful for the convenience of practitioners, is not so much a technical problem but a MORAL ONE. First, mathematicians, even the best, rarely grasp this concept. Second, since, because it is EASIER to construct mathematical proofs than any other form of logic, it is the gold standard for other forms of logic. And the envy of other disciplines. And as such mathematical platonism has ‘bled’ into other envious fields, the same way that Physics has bled into economics.

    Worse, this multi-axial new mysticism has been adopted by philosophers from Kant to the Frankfurt school to the postmodernists, to contemporary totalitarian humanists as a vehicle for reinserting arational mysticism into political debate – as a means of obtaining power.

    Quite contrary to academic opinion, all totalitarianism is, is catholicism restated in non-religious terms, with the academy replacing the church as the constructor of obscurant language.

    I suspect this fairly significant error is what has plagued the physics community, but we have found no alternative to current approaches. Albeit, I expect, that if we retrained mathematicians, physicists, and economists to require operational language in the expression of mathematical relations, that whatever error we are making in our understanding of physics would emerge within a generation.

    No infinity can exist. Because no operation can be performed infinitely. We can however, adjust the precision and scale of any proof to suit the context, since any mathematical expression, consists of ratios that, if correspond to reality, we can arbitrarily adjust for increasing precision.

    Mathematics cannot claim truth without correspondence.

    Correspondence in measures is a function of scale and the UTILITY of precision, in the CONTEXT of which the operation is calculated (limit).

    A language of mathematics that is described independent of scale in given context, can be correctly stated. It need not be magian.

    Fields can still be understood to be imaginary patterns.

    But the entire reason that we find such things interesting, is a folly of the mind, no different from the illusion of movement in a film.

    The real world exists. We are weak computers of property in pursuit of our reproduction and amusement. We developed many forms of instrumentalism to extend our weak abilities. We must use instruments and methods to reduce to analogies to experience, those things which we cannot directly do so.

    It’s just that simple.

    AGAINST THE PLATONIC (IMAGINARY) WORLD

    Why must we support imaginary objects, as extant? Especially when the constructive argument (intuitionist) in operational language, can provide equal explanatory power?

    Why must we rely on ZFC+AC when we have recursive math, or when we can explain all mathematics in operational language without loss of context, scale, precision and utility? Just ’cause it’s easier.

    But that complexity is a defense against obscurantism and platonism. So it is merely a matter of cost.

    I understand Popper as trying to solve a problem of meta ethics, rather than anything particularly scientific. And I see most of his work as doing the best he could for the purposes that I’ve stated.

    Anyone who disagrees with me would have to disagree with my premies and my argument, not rely on the existence of platonist entities (magic) in order to win such an argument.

    That this is impossible, is at least something that I understand if no one else yet does. I don’t so much need someone to agree with me as constantly improve my argument so that I can test and harden it until it is unassailable or defeated.

    I think that defeating this argument is going to be very, very, difficult.

    TIME AND OPERATIONS (ACTIONS) IN TIME

    One cannot state that abstract ideas can be constructed independent of time, or even that they could be identified without changes in state over time. Or that thought can occur without the passage of time. Or consciousness can occur without the passage of time.

    Whether I make one choice or another is not material. This question is not a matter of choice, it is a matter of possibility. I can make no choice without the passage of time.

    I think that the only certain knowledge consists of negations, and that all the rest is conjecture. This is the only moral position to take. And it is the only moral position since argument exists for the purpose of persuasion, and persuasion for cooperation.

    I keep seeing this sort of desire to promote the rather obvious idea that induction is nonsense – yet everyone uses it, as a tremendous diversion from the fact that induction is necessary for action in real time, whenever the cost of not acting is higher than the cost of acting.

    Description, deduction, induction, abduction, guessing and intuitive choice are just descriptions of the processes we must use given the amount of information at our disposal. Science has no urgency, and life threatening emergencies do.

    Popper (and CR-ists for that matter) seem to want to perpetuate either mysticism, or skepticism as religion, rather than make the very simple point that the demands for ‘truth’ increase and decrease given the necessity of acting in time.

    I guess that I could take a psychological detour into why people would want to do this. But I suspect that I am correct (as I stated in one of these posts) that popper was, as part of his era, trying to react against the use of science and academia to replace the coercive power of the church. So he restated skepticism by establishing very high criteria for scientific truth.

    And all the nonsense that continues to be written about his work seek to read into platonic tea leaves, when the facts are quite SIMPLE. (Back to Argumentation Ethics at this point.) The fact is that humans must act in real time and as the urgency of action increases so does the demand for truth. Conversely, as the demand for cooperation increases, the demand for truth increases. Finally at the top of the scale we have science, which in itself is an expensive pursuit, and as such one is forbidden to externalize costs to other scientists. (Although if we look at papers this doesn’t actually work that well except at the very top margin.)

    THE QUESTION IS ONE OF COOPERATION

    The problem is ECONOMIC AND COOPERATIVE AND MORAL, not scientific.

    It’s just that simple. We cannot disconnect argument from cooperation without entering the platonic. We cannot disconnect math from context without entering the platonic. We cannot disconnect numbers from identity without entering the platonic.

    Each form of logic constrains the other. But the logic that constrains them all, is action. Without action, we end up with the delusions we spend most of philosophical discourse on. It’s all nonsense.

    I understand the difference between the real and the unreal, and the necessity of our various logics as instruments for the reduction of that which we cannot comprehend (sympathize with) to analogies to experience that we can comprehend ( sympathize with).

    Which is profound if you grasp it.

    THE PROBLEM OF SYMBOLS AND ECONOMY OF LANGUAGE

    If you cannot describe something as human action, then you do not understand it. Operational language is the most important, and least articulated canon of science.

    I do not argue against the economy of language. I argue against the loss of causality and correspondence that accompanies repeated use of economizing terms.

    ( I am pretty sure I put a bullet in this topic along with apriorism in economics. )

    MORAL STANDARDS OF TRUTH

    Requiring a higher standard of truth places a higher barrier on cooperation.

    This is most important in matters of involuntary transfer, such as taxation or social and moral norms.

    Religions place an impossible standard of truth. This is why they are used so effectively to resist the state. Religious doctrine reliant upon faith is argumentatively inviolable.

    As such, no cooperation can be asked or offered outside of their established terms. … It’s brilliant really. Its why religious groups can resist the predation of the state.

    I would prefer instead we relied upon a prohibition on obscurant language and the requisite illustration of involuntary transfers, such that exchanges were easily made possible, and discounts (thefts) made nearly impossible.

    This is, the correct criteria for CR, not the platonic one that is assumed. In this light CR looks correct in practice if incorrect in argument.

    (There. I did it. Took me a bit.)

    Curt Doolittle


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-02 10:44:00 UTC

  • ON STATING POPPER SCIENTIFICALLY: AS ACTION Popper, like most Jewish philosopher

    ON STATING POPPER SCIENTIFICALLY: AS ACTION

    Popper, like most Jewish philosophers, is overly fascinated by words, and under fascinated by actions. I haven’t quite figured out the cultural fascination with pseudoscience in that community, but I’ll leave that to others who hypothesize that the Talmudic discipline of memorizing meaningless nonsense

    Popper tries to give us categories of thinking without solving the problem of acting. We do not require additional modes of platonic thought, whether Popperian (verbal), Platonic (imaginary), or Religious (Supernatural). We have a mode of thought: action, which we call ‘science’: demonstrated correspondence with reality.

    As such, theories are recipes for actions that produce outcomes. These sets of ACTIONS (recipes) help us IMAGINE what are IMAGINARY causes, relations and properties , that we might further attempt to reduce to actions by theory and test.

    This categorization as actions (operations) prohibits platonic ideas from clouding discourse, and divides theories into imaginary recipes that we must test and falsify and those which we have tested the outcome, (reproduced) and falsified (tested the internal statements).

    I would clarify the Popper quote above saying INSTEAD that:

    “Theories are recipes consisting of actions that we duplicate by the use of instrumentation to determine correspondence between imagination and reality. Those forms of instrumentation that test correspondence are:

    0) narrative (sequences in time)

    1) logic (words),

    2) numbers (counts),

    3) measures (relations)

    3) math (ratios),

    4) physics (causes),

    5) economics (cooperation)

    6) praxeology (rational incentives and actions).”

    Each additional recipe reduces to analogy to experience, the external world which we cannot sense, perceive, count, measure, determine the causes of, and act upon without such instrumentation. As such each recipe extends our perception.

    Unfortunately, these recipes are socially constructed organically in a network of dependent assumptions both conscious, unconscious and metaphysical, almost entirely dependent upon the forms of instrumentation used to extend perception and calculation. And we must reassemble entire networks of objects, causes, relations and properties, when we improve our instruments. This is why we construct and destruct paradigms.

    And the fantasy that we hold ‘beliefs’ is verbal and arbitrary, when what we hold are ‘incentives’, investments and opportunities that are not arbitrary or easily disposed of. This difference between verbal and platonic ‘belief’ and praxeological incentives in objective reality is another influential factor in failing to grasp the ‘stickiness’ of paradigms, being even greater than the stickiness of prices, contracts, careers, and Patterns of Sustainable Specialization and Trade.

    Also unfortunately, given that learning stresses individuals, and that such paradigmatic shifts impose high costs on adherents, all people, in all walks of life, from professors to ordinary laborers, fight paradigmatic change whenever possible since it will of necessity reduce the value of their current paradigmatic mastery. People Will Not Change Ever by Means of Argument. EVER on any sufficient investment that they have made, whether material or intellectual. This applies in every walk of life from the moral to the philosophical to the political, to the scientific, and entrepreneurial. Although the entrepreneurial leaves them less choice.

    This is why science only advances with the death of prior paradigmatic advocates. Just as our political theory and institutions will only advance upon the death (none too soon) of the boomer generation.

    But, that does not eliminate the fact, that our knowledge does increase and our correspondence with reality increases along with it, and we adapt our actions more closely to a more expansive reality.

    At some point, the MARGINAL INDIFFERENCE of further knowledge (recipes) means that no further benefit can be gained from any available action, and as such, it is possible to CHOOSE BETWEEN THEORIES. Meaning that at any given point the number of available theories open to exploitation given instrumentation available, and the marginal difference in value, DOES give us reasons to choose between theories. Which is precisely why we are apparently, so good at choosing them. And the errors we do make, (mysticism in the 20th century in science and philosophy) can be prevented by adhering to scientific discipline: expression in operational language: the language of science. Of RECIPES for actions that with any given set of instrumentation, allow us to test the correspondence of our imaginations with reality, and without which we cannot test or even conceive of such a reality as exists.

    I think this description of actions, is more accurate than the verbal and allegorical description of the imaginary that Popper gives us.

    There is a very clear relationship between our inability to introspect upon our own mental processes, and imagination, platonism, and spiritualism. And this relationship tends to force us in philosophy to reduce all philosophical statements to an infinitely recursive discourse on norms. Introspection and intuition are cheap. Reason is more expensive, and instrumentalism is vastly more expensive. However, science: cataloguing sequences of actions using instrumentation that limits the distortion between our imagination and objective reality by extending our ability to sense, perceive, remember, and calculate, is, as in all sciences, a method for the prevention of error.

    Popper himself did not solve this problem. He just solved enough of it to tell us how to solve it for him.

    The distinction may appear subtle, but it is not. Mathematical platonism, which we falsely use as the gold standard for reason, has infected pretty much all of analytic philosophy, and I’m not sure it hasn’t infected physics. And my argument, like Hayek’s is that the 20th century was an age of mysticism because of the return to platonic analogy and loss of an emphasis on action.

    (I know I tend to aggravate you with these comments, but there is a method to my strategy. And I appreciate your ideas even if my thoughts annoy you. 🙂 )


    Source date (UTC): 2013-12-30 10:18:00 UTC

  • I really do like the idea of a limit to computation, I think the Anthropic princ

    http://hplusmagazine.com/2013/12/27/video-friday-brainfood-seth-lloyd-on-the-universe-as-quantum-computer/While I really do like the idea of a limit to computation, I think the Anthropic principle, strong especially, but weak as well, is religion, not science. I don’t yet see any evidence that measurement or observability is always within our grasp, nor that determinism is sufficient that deduction can serve to render the unobservable predictable, other than for general rules. It’s not that it isn’t, it’s that I don’t yet grasp why it’s necessary, and unless it’s necessary, such statements are far closer in structure to prior anthropocentric ideas than those that have disabused anthropocentric ideas. So I can’t really state it. I would argue possibly instead, that any mind capable of introspection, which can make use of sufficient instrumentation to detect causal relations, can reduce those causal relations to analogies to experience. This basically argues that intelligence and instrumentalism are capable of perceiving any reasonably deterministic order. I am extremely suspicious of the argument that the rules of the universe are fungible. And it appears instead, that we fail to understand the properties of the universe and as such our model will suit nearly any math we throw at it. For this reason, we know our model is wrong. I suspect that because our model is wrong, so is the anthropic principle.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle


    Source date (UTC): 2013-12-29 10:53:00 UTC

  • ON PRAXEOLOGY AS ADVOCACY OR SCIENCE Why would we suppose that a science of huma

    ON PRAXEOLOGY AS ADVOCACY OR SCIENCE

    Why would we suppose that a science of human action would advocate liberty? Or, would the science of human action, not advocate liberty, but simply EXPLAIN all possible human incentives, and the means of cooperation possible within those, whether those incentives produced liberty or not?

    (Riddle on that one a bit.)


    Source date (UTC): 2013-12-27 14:53:00 UTC

  • On The Limits Of The Misesian Criticism

      “Mises’s contention came in setting the context for Human Action by explaining why people have had such a hard time accepting the validity of (Austrian) economics as a field of knowledge–it does not fit in with anything else.” – Konrad Love you man, but I want to clean this up a bit. And I hope you will forgive me for using your statements as a jumping off point to articulate this subject a little more clearly than is usual in our field. 2) The first is your statements (a) “put into context” and (b) “human action”. Praxeologically speaking, any statement regarding human action, not stated as human action, is untestable by praxeological analysis. As such, if you can’t say something in operational terms, then it is possible that you are mistaken, or misled, since only such operational language opens any statement to praxeological testing. Mises was trying to refute socialism. He was frustrated because there was not empirical means of demonstrating that it wouldn’t work. So he had to rely on rational deduction. He was attempting to show (as was popper by very different means) how socialism was impossible – particularly, the socialist method of production. Praxeology was his attempt to use the very clear, irrefutable, sympathetic test of the rational incentives of actors given their need to act in real time, to refute the theory that humans would act by the same means without money and prices. Without money and prices, and the incentives that they make possible, humans cannot rationally act. He suggested, and argued poorly, that humans literally could not think, in the same way that we would be radically impaired in our thinking, without the use of numbers, numeric operations, ratios, measurements, and the syllogism. As such, if people cannot cooperate rationally using property, money, prices and time, then in fact, no science of economics is therefore possible. We cannot conduct a science predicated on a unit of measure dependent upon property and prices, if neither property nor prices no voluntary cooperation exist. That is non-logical. We should note that this is an argument, now proven, both logically and by evidence, that the socialist method of production does not work, precisely as Mises predicted, because Calculation and it’s obverse, Incentives, are impossible. But this is a limited criticism. We must understand that the limit of Misesian criticism, is the socialist mode of production. It does not mean that progressive taxation, especially by simply increasing transaction costs at the high end, and redistributing the fees on those costs to consumers, or investing them into infrastructure violate the ability of people to think, plan, and coordinate their actions. The science of economics can in fact exist, if the logical method of measurement that it depends upon: voluntary cooperation using property, money and prices, does exist/ So the Misesian critique of economics as a discipline dependent upon human action is a refutation of the socialist mode of production, but it is not a refutation of the democratic socialist redistributive method of production. (Although I am not sure anyone else has said so this clearly. I haven’t run across it if so. Caplans ‘Why I am not..” is an obscurant, and meaningless argument which he later took the teeth out of himself : there is no difference between economic calculation and incentives. They are mutually dependent concepts. An argument which I forgive him for, and attribute to the folly of his youth. ) 2) The second problem you put forth is that people have a problem understanding Austrian Economics. And I’m afraid that’s just not demonstrably true. (a) the argument from the mainstream economics profession is that the insights of the Austrians have been fully integrated into mainstream economics. (b) The only remaining dispute that separates Austrian economists from mainstream economists today, is the theory of the business cycle, where by continuous distortions of the money supply, while long term neutral in affect on price, are non-neutral on the Sustainable Patters Of Specialization and Trade – largely due to little more than the fact that humans due to the process of youth, maturity, reproduction, decline in learning capacity (or increase in required repetitions), as well as normal aging, mean that not only are prices, and contracts ‘sticky’ but so are human lives and relations. And while we may ameliorate the problems caused by the stickiness of prices,we appear to have very little control over contracts, and the accumulated impact on individuals in the business cycle means that such cycles, the longer that they are perpetuated, force their members to become increasingly sticky, and if more than four years to nine years in duration, that it is no longer possible for individuals to transition at anywhere near the same quality of life. This may in fact be another argument against immigration which only exacerbates this problem severely. The last argument, and the one made by conservative advocates of Austrian economics, is not just the utility of the lost human capital, but the loss of moral capital, and the increase in demand for the state as insurer, now that the individual citizens have been placed at risk by the use of credit and insurance by the state, rathe than allowing the natural, and frequent cycle of PSST to discourage people from over-investing in any given pattern, and instead, developing dynamic risk protection given the constant reordering of such patterns. 3) The point being the one I articulated in my first response to your post: that the Austrian method makes visible the involuntary transfer of property, and the behavior of individuals within patterns of sustainable specialization and trade IF WE MEASURE patterns of sustainable specialization and trade as our category of measurement. (industry networks are the highest level of meaningful aggregation). And investment in trade policy and industrial policy should outweigh any interest in monetary policy. If only because those policies have been in use since the dawn of human cities, and appear to have worked well. Whereas, the use of Keynesian aggregates and monetary policy does not localize distortions and those distortions that are caused by such policy are not measured, or even measurable. Just as Einstein did not invent relativity(actually, constancy), Keynes did not invent his ideas either – he adapted them from Marx, and cut out the references to prevent criticism of what he had accomplished via even greater obscurant language than Marx: the forcible involuntary transfer of wealth and the consequential empowerment of the government as the vehicle for such transfer. All of which was justified as a means of decreasing unemployment. The sacrifice of the west for reduction of unemployment and facilitation of the expansion of the reproduction of the lower classes that had been held in check by private property and manorialism for more than 2500 years. The great weakness of human reason is our inability to disentangle multiple axis of complex relations. Only analysis of the voluntary transfer of property allows us to disentangle heavily loaded propositions and reduce what appears to be many competing and overlapping axes of causality to one simple factor: whether property, which is the necessary device for cooperation, has been voluntarily expropriated or voluntarily exchanged. CLOSING This is probably worth sharing or saving for later reference. Affections Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev  

  • On The Limits Of The Misesian Criticism

      “Mises’s contention came in setting the context for Human Action by explaining why people have had such a hard time accepting the validity of (Austrian) economics as a field of knowledge–it does not fit in with anything else.” – Konrad Love you man, but I want to clean this up a bit. And I hope you will forgive me for using your statements as a jumping off point to articulate this subject a little more clearly than is usual in our field. 2) The first is your statements (a) “put into context” and (b) “human action”. Praxeologically speaking, any statement regarding human action, not stated as human action, is untestable by praxeological analysis. As such, if you can’t say something in operational terms, then it is possible that you are mistaken, or misled, since only such operational language opens any statement to praxeological testing. Mises was trying to refute socialism. He was frustrated because there was not empirical means of demonstrating that it wouldn’t work. So he had to rely on rational deduction. He was attempting to show (as was popper by very different means) how socialism was impossible – particularly, the socialist method of production. Praxeology was his attempt to use the very clear, irrefutable, sympathetic test of the rational incentives of actors given their need to act in real time, to refute the theory that humans would act by the same means without money and prices. Without money and prices, and the incentives that they make possible, humans cannot rationally act. He suggested, and argued poorly, that humans literally could not think, in the same way that we would be radically impaired in our thinking, without the use of numbers, numeric operations, ratios, measurements, and the syllogism. As such, if people cannot cooperate rationally using property, money, prices and time, then in fact, no science of economics is therefore possible. We cannot conduct a science predicated on a unit of measure dependent upon property and prices, if neither property nor prices no voluntary cooperation exist. That is non-logical. We should note that this is an argument, now proven, both logically and by evidence, that the socialist method of production does not work, precisely as Mises predicted, because Calculation and it’s obverse, Incentives, are impossible. But this is a limited criticism. We must understand that the limit of Misesian criticism, is the socialist mode of production. It does not mean that progressive taxation, especially by simply increasing transaction costs at the high end, and redistributing the fees on those costs to consumers, or investing them into infrastructure violate the ability of people to think, plan, and coordinate their actions. The science of economics can in fact exist, if the logical method of measurement that it depends upon: voluntary cooperation using property, money and prices, does exist/ So the Misesian critique of economics as a discipline dependent upon human action is a refutation of the socialist mode of production, but it is not a refutation of the democratic socialist redistributive method of production. (Although I am not sure anyone else has said so this clearly. I haven’t run across it if so. Caplans ‘Why I am not..” is an obscurant, and meaningless argument which he later took the teeth out of himself : there is no difference between economic calculation and incentives. They are mutually dependent concepts. An argument which I forgive him for, and attribute to the folly of his youth. ) 2) The second problem you put forth is that people have a problem understanding Austrian Economics. And I’m afraid that’s just not demonstrably true. (a) the argument from the mainstream economics profession is that the insights of the Austrians have been fully integrated into mainstream economics. (b) The only remaining dispute that separates Austrian economists from mainstream economists today, is the theory of the business cycle, where by continuous distortions of the money supply, while long term neutral in affect on price, are non-neutral on the Sustainable Patters Of Specialization and Trade – largely due to little more than the fact that humans due to the process of youth, maturity, reproduction, decline in learning capacity (or increase in required repetitions), as well as normal aging, mean that not only are prices, and contracts ‘sticky’ but so are human lives and relations. And while we may ameliorate the problems caused by the stickiness of prices,we appear to have very little control over contracts, and the accumulated impact on individuals in the business cycle means that such cycles, the longer that they are perpetuated, force their members to become increasingly sticky, and if more than four years to nine years in duration, that it is no longer possible for individuals to transition at anywhere near the same quality of life. This may in fact be another argument against immigration which only exacerbates this problem severely. The last argument, and the one made by conservative advocates of Austrian economics, is not just the utility of the lost human capital, but the loss of moral capital, and the increase in demand for the state as insurer, now that the individual citizens have been placed at risk by the use of credit and insurance by the state, rathe than allowing the natural, and frequent cycle of PSST to discourage people from over-investing in any given pattern, and instead, developing dynamic risk protection given the constant reordering of such patterns. 3) The point being the one I articulated in my first response to your post: that the Austrian method makes visible the involuntary transfer of property, and the behavior of individuals within patterns of sustainable specialization and trade IF WE MEASURE patterns of sustainable specialization and trade as our category of measurement. (industry networks are the highest level of meaningful aggregation). And investment in trade policy and industrial policy should outweigh any interest in monetary policy. If only because those policies have been in use since the dawn of human cities, and appear to have worked well. Whereas, the use of Keynesian aggregates and monetary policy does not localize distortions and those distortions that are caused by such policy are not measured, or even measurable. Just as Einstein did not invent relativity(actually, constancy), Keynes did not invent his ideas either – he adapted them from Marx, and cut out the references to prevent criticism of what he had accomplished via even greater obscurant language than Marx: the forcible involuntary transfer of wealth and the consequential empowerment of the government as the vehicle for such transfer. All of which was justified as a means of decreasing unemployment. The sacrifice of the west for reduction of unemployment and facilitation of the expansion of the reproduction of the lower classes that had been held in check by private property and manorialism for more than 2500 years. The great weakness of human reason is our inability to disentangle multiple axis of complex relations. Only analysis of the voluntary transfer of property allows us to disentangle heavily loaded propositions and reduce what appears to be many competing and overlapping axes of causality to one simple factor: whether property, which is the necessary device for cooperation, has been voluntarily expropriated or voluntarily exchanged. CLOSING This is probably worth sharing or saving for later reference. Affections Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev