Theme: Science

  • MATH HAS BEEN FRUITFUL BECAUSE IT IS THE MOST SIMPLE DOMAIN “Naturalists are mot

    MATH HAS BEEN FRUITFUL BECAUSE IT IS THE MOST SIMPLE DOMAIN

    “Naturalists are motivated by the thought that scientific or mathematical standards are the most successful standards we possess.” -S.E.P.

    This is backwards. Philosophical naturalists are skeptical about the current state of science and mathematics, just as they are about the current state of academic philosophy.

    The reason math is the most successful tool we possess is that it is the SIMPLEST of the logics, because math is the tool of constant relations, almost all of which are self defined. (The more math I understand the more ridiculous I find claims about it.) (and its cheap)

    The reason physics is the next most successful tool we possess is that is the next most simple tool we possess for the study of existing constant CAUSAL relations. (And it’s costly)

    The reason biological (genetic) science are the next most successful tool we possess is that after physics, it is the next most simple tool we possess, and both properties and causal relations are extremely complex to determine. (it has been very costly)

    The reason economics (cooperation) is less successful, is that economics does not consist of constant relations, nor CAN it consist of constant relations, nor can we collect data about it at a granular enough level, nor is it testable without altering the course of the experiment. So mathematics fails to assist us in forecasting economics, because science as structured holds to the criteria of prediction. However, it is nothing to be proud of that math and science are predictable, any more than after observing a stone rolling downhill, that further stones will run downhill, since math is the study of constant relations, and the natural world of the physical sciences, outside of evolutionary biology consists of constant relations.

    We do not yet have the equivalent of a mathematics of non-constant relations sufficient to assist in forecasting rather than simply narrating, the economy. However, given that we invent the future, it is very unlikely that we can forecast anything other than the crudely obvious, most of which is in-actionable.

    I would love to be proven wrong, but this appears very unlikely without some external mechanism for thinking about greater systems of causal relations than humans can perceive. Such that if we did possess this technology, and it was capable of useful prediction, it would be indistinguishable from the creation of those outcomes.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-09 12:20:00 UTC

  • MATH: THE LANGLANDS PROGRAM (getting closer) OK. Gotta say. This is a bit on the

    http://publications.ias.edu/rpl/MORE MATH: THE LANGLANDS PROGRAM

    (getting closer)

    OK. Gotta say. This is a bit on the hard side. Most philosophy is nonsense, so it’s a matter of just sifting through it for a few fragments of gold. And I think I get number theory as well or better than anyone else. It LOOKS to me that I understand it correctly, given that Turing was so clear at operationalizing and demystifying math. (and Petzold helped too. And for me at least, not to forget Poincaré and Mandelbrot.) But the number of terms I have to learn here is just overtaxing my short term memory and I’ll probably have to write my own glossary just to make sure that I actually understand it all.

    Anyway, I don’t really have to understand or work on the mathematical problem – and I wouldnt be good at it. (Actually it’s like crack for nerds, and I’m afraid of being addicted to it.) I do have to understand the relevant language well enough that I can address mathematical platonism thoroughly.

    Work, work, work…. lol

    http://publications.ias.edu/rpl/

    Arthur, James (2003), “The principle of functoriality”, American Mathematical Society. Bulletin. New Series 40 (1): 39–53,

    Bernstein, J.; Gelbart, S. (2003), An Introduction to the Langlands Program, Boston: Birkhäuser

    Gelbart, Stephen (1984), “An elementary introduction to the Langlands program”, American Mathematical Society. Bulletin. New Series 10 (2): 177–219,

    Frenkel, Edward (2005). “Lectures on the Langlands Program and Conformal Field Theory”

    Gelfand, I. M. (1963), “Automorphic functions and the theory of representations”, Proc. Internat. Congr. Mathematicians (Stockholm, 1962), Djursholm: Inst. Mittag-Leffler, pp. 74–85

    Harris, Michael; Taylor, Richard (2001), The geometry and cohomology of some simple Shimura varieties, Annals of Mathematics Studies 151, Princeton University Press

    Henniart, Guy (2000), “Une preuve simple des conjectures de Langlands pour GL(n) sur un corps p-adique”, Inventiones Mathematicae 139 (2): 439–455,

    Kutzko, Philip (1980), “The Langlands Conjecture for Gl2 of a Local Field”, Annals of Mathematics 112 (2): 381–412,

    Langlands, Robert (1967), Letter to Prof. Weil

    Langlands, R. P. (1970), “Problems in the theory of automorphic forms”, Lectures in modern analysis and applications, III, Lecture Notes in Math 170, Berlin, New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 18–61

    Laumon, G.; Rapoport, M.; Stuhler, U. (1993), “D-elliptic sheaves and the Langlands correspondence”, Inventiones Mathematicae 113 (2): 217–338,


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-09 04:19:00 UTC

  • IGNORANCE OF MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY – CONTINUED I’ve been working my way throug

    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-mathematics/LESS IGNORANCE OF MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY – CONTINUED

    I’ve been working my way through this reading list and it turns out that plenty of people have written on the subject, but it’s not clear that they understand the underlying problem of correspondence (even if they use the term ‘external authority’). And the best author in the space is incorrect, and the matter apparently isnt settled.

    So, now it’s off to articulate the solution to this particular problem, even in mathematics. That will sort of anchor the legitimacy of my argument in favor of operational language in all disciplines.

    Sigh.

    Roman is pushing me to publish and not to spend time outside of Politics and Ethics. But my instinct tells me that my argument (calculation) seems to invite the solution to unifying the ‘logics’ and, as I’d hoped, eliminating platonism as well as obscurantism.

    If in fact, the innovations that I’m adding to political ethics are largely in the realm of requiring calculability and operational language, then it would seem to me that I should also ground operational language and calculability.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-08 04:16:00 UTC

  • MEDIA ARE MOSTLY IN STUPID MODE” (judith curry) “In a word. No.”

    http://judithcurry.com/2014/01/07/is-global-warming-causing-the-polar-vortex/”THE MEDIA ARE MOSTLY IN STUPID MODE”

    (judith curry)

    “In a word. No.”


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-07 19:17:00 UTC

  • ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY – EVENTUALLY, IT WILL LOOK LIKE THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD Academ

    ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY – EVENTUALLY, IT WILL LOOK LIKE THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

    Academic philosophy is pretty much a zombie profession. It’s actually humorous to read how bad the papers are. Every few months I just grab a dozen or two and read through them.

    And the consequences speak for themselves: the funding for philosophy departments, and administration’s tendency to group them in with religion has led to the progressive decline of departments.

    Conversely, economics and psychology together have pretty much taken over the social sciences. And that was probably a deterministic outcome, when late in the 19th century the analytical movement made the choice to try to make philosophy into a science, it was a pretty sizable bet that failed. And it was followed by a flurry of attempts to justify socialism in an effort to stay relevant. That failed too.

    It’s not that the study of philosophy has no value, it’s that except for very notable exceptions (Dennett) where philosophers are trying to integrate ethics and the product of scientific investigation, it’s pretty barren – like the study of medieval and ancient literature.

    **And given what I’ve learned from my own work, I’d argue that we can, within at most two generations, solve the problem of the logic of the social sciences. And when we do, I suspect that philosophy will, in practice, look not very much different from the scientific method, with each of the logical systems we have developed: language, logic, math, physics, and economics (cooperation), merely specializations for isolating one property of the universe or another, so that we are capable of reducing it to analogy to experience and therefore understanding it.**


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-07 17:37:00 UTC

  • ITS GENETICS YOU KNOW. I think we are up to something absurd like 20 papers a we

    ITS GENETICS YOU KNOW.

    I think we are up to something absurd like 20 papers a week basically confirming the nature side of the nature nurture debate.

    You can screw up your kids, but you can’t really make them materially better than your genes. So the whole trick is really, not to screw them up. 🙂 Which is pretty good, since evolution wouldn’t have been very good to us if we were dependent on pedagogy.

    JUST LIKE CONSERVATIVES HAVE ALWAYS ARGUED.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-07 14:57:00 UTC

  • THE JOY OF MATH (rumination) My long term business partner Jim was a math guy. W

    THE JOY OF MATH

    (rumination)

    My long term business partner Jim was a math guy. Worked at JPL. That kind of thing. Loves numbers the way I love philosophy.

    Math is an endlessly fascinating puzzle. I prefer to solve problems instead of puzzles. In fact, because of a deliberate choice in college, I intentionally eschewed all puzzles as ‘character flaws’.

    The difference between puzzles and problems is whether the outcome causes material benefit or harm in real time. And that’s partly because you know that puzzles are solvable, and that problems often are not. So you know if you stick with a puzzle it can be solved. But with a problem, you are working against a clock that will run out, and you don’t know in advance that it can be solved.

    But that that doesn’t mean that I’m not easily seduced by puzzles. A video game, or a computer game, is a puzzle, not a problem. Puzzles are entertaining.

    Jim used to say that he couldn’t get too interested in math because it was just such an entertaining puzzle, but it didn’t produce anything. And in the end it wasn’t a good use of his time.

    It’s like crack. Puzzles really are like crack – addictive. And I’m getting that feeling again, working on this rather strange little problem of philosophy. Math is the nerd’s equivalent of world of warcraft, and it may be the ultimate game of world of warcraft – how do we create deductions of all possible relations? It’s fascinating. Is it possible to create a description of all possible relations (a proof)? I don’t see why not. There may not be a route from every position in every field to every other position in every other field; but their might be, and I can’t understand, even if circuitously how their couldn’t be. I mean, maths is just an enormous truth table.

    And intuitively I would much rather solve a puzzle. The reason being that all the information needed to solve the puzzle is present. I don’t have to go out and perform empirical tests to guarantee what I sense and what I record are causally related. In math the study of pure relations, independent of time, and under formalism, independent of correspondence and context, I don’t have to concern myself with the cost of tests, the passage of time, or contextual constraints on relations OTHER than whether I can construct a proof (deduction) for those relations.

    But it’s incredibly interesting. And just like suppressing the desire to play videogames, I feel like I have to suppress my desire to play with math. Not because it’s unimportant, but because in the division of labor, my particular craft is not pure relations, but those actions which result in the possible and preferable cooperation between individuals and groups in increasingly great numbers.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-06 08:43:00 UTC

  • HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS? Need a mathematical historian. Boole onward, through Hil

    HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS?

    Need a mathematical historian. Boole onward, through Hilbert and Broewer.

    When Boole, Frege, Peano Russell, Hilbert et al, developed boolean algebra and set theory, cumulating in ZFC+AC, theory did they understand WHY their solution worked, but was now disconnected from reality, correspondence, and truth?

    I can’t find anything but it’s got to be there. It looks like it starts with Frege? How did they categorize the problem?

    Is this one of those things like property rights, that we didn’t understand the cause, but talk about incessantly?

    Or is the reason that boolean (binary), and sets, solve the problem of precision in context?

    Someone smarter than I am had to solve this already….. But if not Broewer, who?


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-04 16:27:00 UTC

  • DAVID MILLER : CONFUSING FACT AND VALUE ==DAVID MILLER== Regarding theories: –“

    http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/associates/miller/oxdocs/science-tech.pdfCONTRA DAVID MILLER : CONFUSING FACT AND VALUE

    ==DAVID MILLER==

    Regarding theories:

    –“they are nothing more than conjectures or guesses about the unknown state of the world.”–

    –“the principal function of experience in science is to eliminate mistakes”–

    –“The principal function of science in technology is again to eliminate mistakes.”–

    –“Neither experience in science, nor science in technology, can determine that a problem has been solved in an ideal way. The best that they can tell us is that we could have done worse.”–

    -David Miller

    ==COMMENT AND CRITICISM==

    I want to state David Miller’s arguments somewhat differently, by converting them from the language of perception and experience, to the language of action and economics in time. The reason is that objective language assumes discounts that are the equivalent of something more than platonism and less than magic.

    COSTS

    Solving something an ‘ideal way’ cannot be stated without consideration of time and cost. As such, the ‘idea way’ that something can be done to satisfy a need is the ideal at that is available at the lowest cost at that moment in time.

    Induction was a biological necessity given that costs for organisms competing in nature are extremely high, and kept high through competition, just as costs of time and opportunity are very high in the market due to competition.

    But, induction tells us only about available opportunities for further action, neither about (a) the probability of expanding explanatory power, or about (b) the limit of utility in expanding explanatory power.

    Induction as a statement of PROBABILITY is an example of the ludic fallacy. If we could determine probabilities that would mean the set of possible permutations would be finite. But given that we have no idea what the ideal solution is to most problems we cannot conduct probabilities. But this criticism is not the only one available. Since efficiency of any given figure action in any given future where we have more knowledge, is determined by the total cost of arriving at that minus the intermediate rewards of production. Further, there are points at which no further increase in precision (efficiency) provides a return that covers the cost of the investment, until we invent additional utility to be obtained from the investment that has been made to date.

    However, for the purposes of action, our guesswork is informed by induction as a means of identifying opportunities for expansion of our efforts, and it does tell us what further actions are available for us to investigate, and test.

    THE LOGICS AS INSTRUMENTATION

    The principle function of the ‘logics’ and ‘methods’ is to reduce error through physical and logical instrumentation. That instrumentation allows us to test our imagination (or theories) against the real world, and limits our mind’s biases in the interpretation of those real world stimuli. This testing is made possible by reducing that which we could not sense without instrument and method, to analogy to experience which we can sense, perceive, compare and test given the help of symbol, measure, instrument and method.

    CERTAINTY OF FALSEHOOD, UNCERTAINTY OF TRUTH

    While we cannot prove that a general statement about the world are true, we can prove that specific instances of statements about the world are false. As such, we can say that science has demonstrated X to be false, but we cannot state that science has demonstrated X to be true. We can say however, that given our current knowledge the current candidates for truth available for further action are A, B and C. And we can also say that any further refinement of A,B or C would not sufficiently change the current argument about X, such that it would make any difference at this moment.

    TRUTH CANNOT BE USED FOR ARGUMENT, ONLY FALSEHOOD

    You cannot be sufficiently certain of anything such that you can use it in an argument to demand my agreement. You can only seek to obtain my consent by eliminating the possibility or desirability of my position in contrast to yours. This constrains science to voluntary consent, and does not allow science to override the contract for voluntary cooperation we enter when we enter into debate.

    THE FALSE MYSTIQUE OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY.

    **The difference between physical science and engineering, as between mathematics and computer science, is simply the UTILITARIAN VALUE we attach to either (a) the product of the test and (b) the extension of deductive power that results from the test. In either case the method is the the same.**

    Scientific language is LOADED with these value judgements, and it is this LOADING of scientific language with VALUE JUDGEMENTS that generally distracts us (pretty much all of us) from the fact that there is no difference at all in our actions or methods no matter what theory we pursue, but there is a great difference in which products we value.

    Science can be LOADED with this language because unlike other fields, science ignores costs in exchange for pursuing truths. Whereas, in all other disciplines, costs and utility are the equivalent of truth, since truth is time dependent for the purpose of satisfying human wants and desires.

    ***By failing to articulate our ideas in operational language we hide these incentives, and reasons from our discourse. And we are rapidly confused when we argue as if they are differences in fact, when they are but a difference in value.***

    As such:

    **As opportunity costs decrease, demand for truth increases.**

    **As opportunity costs increase, demand for utility increases.**

    This is the supply demand curve for truth and utility.

    An individual who seeks to estimate his own costs and utility is different from another individual demanding costs from third parties regardless of utility.

    A DIFFERENCE ONLY IN VALUE OF OUTPUTS

    It is a subjective preference, but not a difference in method. All theorizing is the same. We may not make truth claims about our theories, but that does not mean that we cannot LOGICALLY choose how to act on them.

    IGNORING COSTS AS CHEAP STATUS SIGNALING

    I guess I should say more clearly that I see scientific pursuit of truth independent of opportunity cost, and necessity for production, as one of the ultimate signs of conspicuous consumption and privilege.

    The same applies to progressives who ignore the cost of norms and treat them as non-existent, as a means of signaling their conspicuous consumption.

    One of the externalities produced by western aristocratic philosophy, and its permanent placement in our values, is the demonstration of one’s independence from the market for norms, and the market for production, as the ultimate source of signaling their conspicuous consumption. This is the level that all artists, journalists, and public intellectuals all seek as well.

    REWARDS FOR ORGANIZING PRODUCTION, INFORMATION, RENTS AND STATUS SEEKING

    Unfortunately, the material rewards for ORGANIZING PRODUCTION in the private sector, and ORGANIZING EXTORTION in the private sector, are more materially rewarding, than organizing RENTS and STATUS SEEKING in the non-commercial sector.

    Just as economists should be better trained as philosophers, most philosophers would better trained if they understood economics. And both would be better of if they understood all human behavior was in fact, economic: equilibrium exchanges in pursuit of signals, opportunities, alliances, and mates.

    So as far as I can tell, the scientific method is a continuous one independent of any form of problems solving, and argument to the contrary is the use of obscurant language to ridicule others for the fact that they must pay costs in time, and that scientists can signal their privilege of acting independently in time – and nothing else.

    Science may be useful for signaling purposes, but we should not let our signaling purposes interfere with our understanding that all theoretical processes work the same, and must work that way, and that the criticism that we make of one another is over the ECONOMICS of using knowledge for the purpose of persuasion and signaling.

    As such, the output of any process can be easily categorized as (a) amusement, (b) production (transformation), (c ) knowledge and (d) signal , – or some combination of all four, in exchange for material and/or opportunity costs in real time. But truth, and honesty, and ethics dictate that we understand that any process we follow consist in the value we attach to each output and who benefits from each output at the cost of whom?

    — Curt Doolittle


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-04 08:08:00 UTC

  • WHY ISN’T ARISTOTLE OUR PROPHET? (sketch) Or is he the god of science and reason

    WHY ISN’T ARISTOTLE OUR PROPHET?

    (sketch)

    Or is he the god of science and reason? Are we a polytheistic people after all?

    “WE DO”: The people in the upper 20% want to know how to think and act

    “WE CAN”: The people in the middle 30% want to imitate the upper 20%.

    “WE CAN’T”: The people in the lower 50% want to know how to endure.

    Who are the prophets?

    ARISTOCRACY

    Alexander or Ceasar or Aurelius. (force)

    Aristotle. (knowing, science) (words)

    Da Vinci. (creating, art and craft) (actions)

    MIDDLE CLASSES

    [State] Jefferson?

    [Trade] Smith?

    LOWER CLASSES

    Jesus and Marx? (rejection, resistance)

    Will Durant was pretty much wrong about his heroes. He picked all warm fuzzy middle class consensus builders. I have to go with Murray’s analysis instead.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-01-04 05:04:00 UTC