The vast majority of civilizations evolved to produce #NPC’s en mass. Western Civilization alone evolved to produce AGENCY en mass (Truth, Sovereignty, Reciprocity, Property, Markets). The problem is, we were optimistic about the percentage of HOSTs able to run AGENCY vs SCRIPTS.
Source date (UTC): 2018-10-14 14:38:46 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1051482448775778304
October 12th, 2018 1:56 PM (good read for libertarians esp, but all in general.)
—“Hey Curt, I have a question about a subject I’ve been rolling around in my mind for a while, and you said you’re always happy to answer questions, so here goes: I’m starting from Hoppe’s incentives-based analysis which showed a monarchy is preferable to a democracy when running a State. What’s been bugging me about that, is how do you prevent the fall and decline of a new monarchy, just like the way all other monarchies collapsed?”—
[W]ell, monarchies collapsed because of 1) gunpowder crushing the value of professional warriors who were committed to preservation of the hierarchy, 2) the conversion from agrarian production to trade as the source of wealth, and therefore the rise of middle/upper-middle class power and influence, 3) the failure to adapt to that power change at the rate it was occurring, 4) the french conquest of europe forcing the unification of germany, 5) the use of democracy by the middle class to seize power from the monarchies, by extending the franchise, 6) the communist-socialist movement, attempt to overthrow middle class rule and 7) the american prevention of the restoration of the monarchies after the first and second world wars: “There never would have been a hitler if a Hohenzollern had been on the throne.” I mean. Monarchies are still extant where americans(anglos) or communists(jews) didn’t destroy them. And those are the most successful countries. America wold not be in current position if she had a constitutional monarchy instead of a bureaucratic oligarchical presidency.
—“Since there wasn’t any model I knew of in history (and that’s perhaps a dark spot you could illuminate) which answered this issue, I had to synthesize a new model, injecting some ideas from Moldbug’s formalism. “—
As an aside, Most men, I would give the same advice: “Read more and deduce from a position of ignorance less.”
—“Since the base rationale of running a State as a monarchy is keeping it in trust and for profit why not literally run the monarchy as a corporation? The king can be both the owner and CEO, the aristocracy can be the board of directors, and instead of treating the people like subjects, you treat them like employees, which keeps them more vested in the well being of the organization, aligned with its purposes, and leaves more room for meritocratic advancement.”—
I guess I’m confused but that was Hoppe’s point right? That a monarchy was a privately held corporation and the territory and capital its assets and the people could move between these territories, and monarchies competed for productive talent (the way current states compete for rent seekers). Therefore the monarchy would have intergenerational incentives to preserve and accumulate capital (mutliple-producing-commons), where ‘rentiers’ would try to (and did) consume all that capital – and are now consuming even genetic capital. The problem is the difference between via-positiva (government producing commons), and via-negativa (law producing limitations on actions). As you grow from small to large the monarch like a ceo must distribute the labor of governance until his only remaining function is ‘judge of last resort’ in matters that cannot be resolved by others: usually great questions of the day, and whether to go to war. So the monarchies (france in particular) that modernized (Prussia, most germany, everyone other than france and italy which were endemically corrupt), were able to produce professional administrators (ministers) and bureaucracies (bureaucrats), that worked in the people and monarchy’s interests – and were successful. But as scale increases this becomes increasingly harder. So many small kingdoms (market) that trade is preferable to one large empire that manages (monopoly), except in war, but napoleon and russia set off the wars of expansion, with germany (wwii) trying to reverse that conquest of central europe (german civilization). The problem is in producing those organizations that perform the functions of investor in competitive commons and industries, justice, treasury, insurer of last resort. And the argument is that privately held services do a better job than do bureaucracies because bureaucracies are not subject to market competition. However, like all start ups, it may require a investment in producing the capability before the service is capable of functioning in the market. So the optimum appears to be in creating a monopoly bureaucracy until it is competent, then privatizing that industry by selling it to investors, while retaining majority interest (in control of it). Ergo. yes private market organizations that compete for the accumulation of intergenerational capital are in the long term in the interests of the people within them, just as collectivist corporations that constitute monopolies that consume all capital and intergenerational compaital are in the long term againsts the intersets of the people in them.
—“It also seems rather conductive to promoting a “libertarian social order”.”—
Well that’s his point now, isn’t it? 😉
—“There are also historical small scale examples where this was attempted in the form of company towns or campuses run by corporations, which as far as I know usually turned up pretty well.”–
That’s libertarian nonsense. The only such organizations exist as border regions under the protection of strong states. No examples in history exist otherwise. Fringe players assume risks in order to settle border territories and hold them in the State’s name against settle ment by competitors, and in exchange pay little or no taxes because of the service they are providing the state. This same activity is not possible without state protection. this is why all libertarianism is nonsense: one holds territory because one can fight to hold it from competitors. That is reality. Economies make it possible to afford the men, resources, and tools to fight to hold that territory, and use the surpluses for consumption and capital accumulation.
—“I’m really curious to hear your thoughts on the idea, and if there is any literature on the model”—
Well now you have them. 😉 Your intuition was on but I think you missed hoppe’s point. Hoppe wanted to create ‘free cities’ of germany like rothbard wanted to create ‘free cities’ of ukraine. The similarity is that germany and ukraine were territories under the protection of great powers. And that is the only reason free cities were allowed: to hold (reserve) territory in the name of a power. Hoppe and rothbard both practice the same denialism: war is the most profitable industry for the winner. The military comes first before all other commons. The military makes possible rule of law. Rule of law makes possible commerce. Commerce makes possible wealth. Wealth attracts population and reproduction and trade continuously, and the military capacity and legal capacity must keep pace with the increasing demand by others to conquer and tax that territory.
—“Keep up the excellent work, I really enjoy your posts”—
Hugs. Let’s fight the good fight. 😉
October 12th, 2018 1:56 PM (good read for libertarians esp, but all in general.)
—“Hey Curt, I have a question about a subject I’ve been rolling around in my mind for a while, and you said you’re always happy to answer questions, so here goes: I’m starting from Hoppe’s incentives-based analysis which showed a monarchy is preferable to a democracy when running a State. What’s been bugging me about that, is how do you prevent the fall and decline of a new monarchy, just like the way all other monarchies collapsed?”—
[W]ell, monarchies collapsed because of 1) gunpowder crushing the value of professional warriors who were committed to preservation of the hierarchy, 2) the conversion from agrarian production to trade as the source of wealth, and therefore the rise of middle/upper-middle class power and influence, 3) the failure to adapt to that power change at the rate it was occurring, 4) the french conquest of europe forcing the unification of germany, 5) the use of democracy by the middle class to seize power from the monarchies, by extending the franchise, 6) the communist-socialist movement, attempt to overthrow middle class rule and 7) the american prevention of the restoration of the monarchies after the first and second world wars: “There never would have been a hitler if a Hohenzollern had been on the throne.” I mean. Monarchies are still extant where americans(anglos) or communists(jews) didn’t destroy them. And those are the most successful countries. America wold not be in current position if she had a constitutional monarchy instead of a bureaucratic oligarchical presidency.
—“Since there wasn’t any model I knew of in history (and that’s perhaps a dark spot you could illuminate) which answered this issue, I had to synthesize a new model, injecting some ideas from Moldbug’s formalism. “—
As an aside, Most men, I would give the same advice: “Read more and deduce from a position of ignorance less.”
—“Since the base rationale of running a State as a monarchy is keeping it in trust and for profit why not literally run the monarchy as a corporation? The king can be both the owner and CEO, the aristocracy can be the board of directors, and instead of treating the people like subjects, you treat them like employees, which keeps them more vested in the well being of the organization, aligned with its purposes, and leaves more room for meritocratic advancement.”—
I guess I’m confused but that was Hoppe’s point right? That a monarchy was a privately held corporation and the territory and capital its assets and the people could move between these territories, and monarchies competed for productive talent (the way current states compete for rent seekers). Therefore the monarchy would have intergenerational incentives to preserve and accumulate capital (mutliple-producing-commons), where ‘rentiers’ would try to (and did) consume all that capital – and are now consuming even genetic capital. The problem is the difference between via-positiva (government producing commons), and via-negativa (law producing limitations on actions). As you grow from small to large the monarch like a ceo must distribute the labor of governance until his only remaining function is ‘judge of last resort’ in matters that cannot be resolved by others: usually great questions of the day, and whether to go to war. So the monarchies (france in particular) that modernized (Prussia, most germany, everyone other than france and italy which were endemically corrupt), were able to produce professional administrators (ministers) and bureaucracies (bureaucrats), that worked in the people and monarchy’s interests – and were successful. But as scale increases this becomes increasingly harder. So many small kingdoms (market) that trade is preferable to one large empire that manages (monopoly), except in war, but napoleon and russia set off the wars of expansion, with germany (wwii) trying to reverse that conquest of central europe (german civilization). The problem is in producing those organizations that perform the functions of investor in competitive commons and industries, justice, treasury, insurer of last resort. And the argument is that privately held services do a better job than do bureaucracies because bureaucracies are not subject to market competition. However, like all start ups, it may require a investment in producing the capability before the service is capable of functioning in the market. So the optimum appears to be in creating a monopoly bureaucracy until it is competent, then privatizing that industry by selling it to investors, while retaining majority interest (in control of it). Ergo. yes private market organizations that compete for the accumulation of intergenerational capital are in the long term in the interests of the people within them, just as collectivist corporations that constitute monopolies that consume all capital and intergenerational compaital are in the long term againsts the intersets of the people in them.
—“It also seems rather conductive to promoting a “libertarian social order”.”—
Well that’s his point now, isn’t it? 😉
—“There are also historical small scale examples where this was attempted in the form of company towns or campuses run by corporations, which as far as I know usually turned up pretty well.”–
That’s libertarian nonsense. The only such organizations exist as border regions under the protection of strong states. No examples in history exist otherwise. Fringe players assume risks in order to settle border territories and hold them in the State’s name against settle ment by competitors, and in exchange pay little or no taxes because of the service they are providing the state. This same activity is not possible without state protection. this is why all libertarianism is nonsense: one holds territory because one can fight to hold it from competitors. That is reality. Economies make it possible to afford the men, resources, and tools to fight to hold that territory, and use the surpluses for consumption and capital accumulation.
—“I’m really curious to hear your thoughts on the idea, and if there is any literature on the model”—
Well now you have them. 😉 Your intuition was on but I think you missed hoppe’s point. Hoppe wanted to create ‘free cities’ of germany like rothbard wanted to create ‘free cities’ of ukraine. The similarity is that germany and ukraine were territories under the protection of great powers. And that is the only reason free cities were allowed: to hold (reserve) territory in the name of a power. Hoppe and rothbard both practice the same denialism: war is the most profitable industry for the winner. The military comes first before all other commons. The military makes possible rule of law. Rule of law makes possible commerce. Commerce makes possible wealth. Wealth attracts population and reproduction and trade continuously, and the military capacity and legal capacity must keep pace with the increasing demand by others to conquer and tax that territory.
—“Keep up the excellent work, I really enjoy your posts”—
Hugs. Let’s fight the good fight. 😉
A QUESTION ABOUT HOPPE, AND PRIVATE STATES AS CORPORATIONS
(good read for libertarians esp, but all in general.)
—“Hey Curt, I have a question about a subject I’ve been rolling around in my mind for a while, and you said you’re always happy to answer questions, so here goes: I’m starting from Hoppe’s incentives-based analysis which showed a monarchy is preferable to a democracy when running a State. What’s been bugging me about that, is how do you prevent the fall and decline of a new monarchy, just like the way all other monarchies collapsed?”—
Well, monarchies collapsed because of 1) gunpowder crushing the value of professional warriors who were committed to preservation of the hierarchy, 2) the conversion from agrarian production to trade as the source of wealth, and therefore the rise of middle/upper-middle class power and influence, 3) the failure to adapt to that power change at the rate it was occurring, 4) the french conquest of europe forcing the unification of germany, 5) the use of democracy by the middle class to seize power from the monarchies, by extending the franchise, 6) the communist-socialist movement, attempt to overthrow middle class rule and 7) the american prevention of the restoration of the monarchies after the first and second world wars: “There never would have been a hitler if a Hohenzollern had been on the throne.”
I mean. Monarchies are still extant where americans(anglos) or communists(jews) didn’t destroy them. And those are the most successful countries. America wold not be in current position if she had a constitutional monarchy instead of a bureaucratic oligarchical presidency.
—“Since there wasn’t any model I knew of in history (and that’s perhaps a dark spot you could illuminate) which answered this issue, I had to synthesize a new model, injecting some ideas from Moldbug’s formalism. “—
As an aside, Most men, I would give the same advice: “Read more and deduce from a position of ignorance less.”
—“Since the base rationale of running a State as a monarchy is keeping it in trust and for profit why not literally run the monarchy as a corporation? The king can be both the owner and CEO, the aristocracy can be the board of directors, and instead of treating the people like subjects, you treat them like employees, which keeps them more vested in the well being of the organization, aligned with its purposes, and leaves more room for meritocratic advancement.”—
I guess I’m confused but that was Hoppe’s point right? That a monarchy was a privately held corporation and the territory and capital its assets and the people could move between these territories, and monarchies competed for productive talent (the way current states compete for rent seekers). Therefore the monarchy would have intergenerational incentives to preserve and accumulate capital (mutliple-producing-commons), where ‘rentiers’ would try to (and did) consume all that capital – and are now consuming even genetic capital.
The problem is the difference between via-positiva (government producing commons), and via-negativa (law producing limitations on actions). As you grow from small to large the monarch like a ceo must distribute the labor of governance until his only remaining function is ‘judge of last resort’ in matters that cannot be resolved by others: usually great questions of the day, and whether to go to war.
So the monarchies (france in particular) that modernized (Prussia, most germany, everyone other than france and italy which were endemically corrupt), were able to produce professional administrators (ministers) and bureaucracies (bureaucrats), that worked in the people and monarchy’s interests – and were successful. But as scale increases this becomes increasingly harder.
So many small kingdoms (market) that trade is preferable to one large empire that manages (monopoly), except in war, but napoleon and russia set off the wars of expansion, with germany (wwii) trying to reverse that conquest of central europe (german civilization).
The problem is in producing those organizations that perform the functions of investor in competitive commons and industries, justice, treasury, insurer of last resort. And the argument is that privately held services do a better job than do bureaucracies because bureaucracies are not subject to market competition. However, like all start ups, it may require a investment in producing the capability before the service is capable of functioning in the market. So the optimum appears to be in creating a monopoly bureaucracy until it is competent, then privatizing that industry by selling it to investors, while retaining majority interest (in control of it).
Ergo. yes private market organizations that compete for the accumulation of intergenerational capital are in the long term in the interests of the people within them, just as collectivist corporations that constitute monopolies that consume all capital and intergenerational compaital are in the long term againsts the intersets of the people in them.
—“It also seems rather conductive to promoting a “libertarian social order”.”—
Well that’s his point now, isn’t it? 😉
—“There are also historical small scale examples where this was attempted in the form of company towns or campuses run by corporations, which as far as I know usually turned up pretty well.”–
That’s libertarian nonsense. The only such organizations exist as border regions under the protection of strong states. No examples in history exist otherwise. Fringe players assume risks in order to settle border territories and hold them in the State’s name against settle ment by competitors, and in exchange pay little or no taxes because of the service they are providing the state. This same activity is not possible without state protection. this is why all libertarianism is nonsense: one holds territory because one can fight to hold it from competitors. That is reality. Economies make it possible to afford the men, resources, and tools to fight to hold that territory, and use the surpluses for consumption and capital accumulation.
—“I’m really curious to hear your thoughts on the idea, and if there is any literature on the model”—
Well now you have them. 😉 Your intuition was on but I think you missed hoppe’s point. Hoppe wanted to create ‘free cities’ of germany like rothbard wanted to create ‘free cities’ of ukraine. The similarity is that germany and ukraine were territories under the protection of great powers. And that is the only reason free cities were allowed: to hold (reserve) territory in the name of a power.
Hoppe and rothbard both practice the same denialism: war is the most profitable industry for the winner. The military comes first before all other commons. The military makes possible rule of law. Rule of law makes possible commerce. Commerce makes possible wealth. Wealth attracts population and reproduction and trade continuously, and the military capacity and legal capacity must keep pace with the increasing demand by others to conquer and tax that territory.
—“Keep up the excellent work, I really enjoy your posts”—
Hugs. Let’s fight the good fight. 😉
Source date (UTC): 2018-10-12 13:56:00 UTC
October 11th, 2018 5:47 PM
—“I am to the point where I simply say, “You are stealing from us various things that we value. Everything you say is an excuse to steal. If you don’t think you’re stealing, that makes no difference because *we* believe you’re stealing. And our patience for it is at an end. So you need to think very carefully about who would win a civil war.“— John Mark
—“”The black flag, sir. If the North triumphs, it is not alone the destruction of our property, it is the prelude to anarchy, infidelity and the ultimate loss of free and responsible government on this continent. It is the triumph of commerce, banks and the factory. We should meet the Federal invaders on the outer verge of just and right defence, and raise at once the black flag. No quarter to the violaters of our homes and firesides.” – Stonewall Jackson (“Gods and Generals”)”
via Ely Harman
Source date (UTC): 2018-10-10 20:24:00 UTC
October 10th, 2018 8:24 PM
—“”The black flag, sir. If the North triumphs, it is not alone the destruction of our property, it is the prelude to anarchy, infidelity and the ultimate loss of free and responsible government on this continent. It is the triumph of commerce, banks and the factory. We should meet the Federal invaders on the outer verge of just and right defence, and raise at once the black flag. No quarter to the violaters of our homes and firesides.” – Stonewall Jackson (“Gods and Generals”)”
via Ely Harman
October 10th, 2018 8:24 PM
—“”The black flag, sir. If the North triumphs, it is not alone the destruction of our property, it is the prelude to anarchy, infidelity and the ultimate loss of free and responsible government on this continent. It is the triumph of commerce, banks and the factory. We should meet the Federal invaders on the outer verge of just and right defence, and raise at once the black flag. No quarter to the violaters of our homes and firesides.” – Stonewall Jackson (“Gods and Generals”)”
via Ely Harman
by William L. Benge . LEGITIMATE BOUNDS So then boundaries defining internality vs externality in our case are not any sort of artificial “cultural construct” but derive from actual tests which transpired and were recorded over a very long period of time, and thus gradually formed into the official unique history belonging only to our group, with it’s special peculiar narrative and body of legal and moral precedents which also systematically evolved into wise, time-tested, sensible norms. RIGHTFUL CONSUMPTION V INTERLOPER What we now observe in modernity, however, is disruption and interference with this consumption, via confusion and noise created (and designed with malice) to interrupt/ prevent/ hinder our enjoyment of these benefits and for nefarious ends. For theft. Cultural, habitual theft. The lessers covet our more? O definitely. The boundaries we refer to or hint at/ suggest are not in any way illegitimate, artificial but the opposite. As a concept, these delineations we speak of are immutable. Therefore, anyone offending them must know they do so at a price.
by William L. Benge . LEGITIMATE BOUNDS So then boundaries defining internality vs externality in our case are not any sort of artificial “cultural construct” but derive from actual tests which transpired and were recorded over a very long period of time, and thus gradually formed into the official unique history belonging only to our group, with it’s special peculiar narrative and body of legal and moral precedents which also systematically evolved into wise, time-tested, sensible norms. RIGHTFUL CONSUMPTION V INTERLOPER What we now observe in modernity, however, is disruption and interference with this consumption, via confusion and noise created (and designed with malice) to interrupt/ prevent/ hinder our enjoyment of these benefits and for nefarious ends. For theft. Cultural, habitual theft. The lessers covet our more? O definitely. The boundaries we refer to or hint at/ suggest are not in any way illegitimate, artificial but the opposite. As a concept, these delineations we speak of are immutable. Therefore, anyone offending them must know they do so at a price.