Curt Doolittle

Theme: Operationalism

  • TRUTH THAT EXISTS : PERFORMATIVE: TESTIMONIAL I can describe performative truth

    TRUTH THAT EXISTS : PERFORMATIVE: TESTIMONIAL

    I can describe performative truth as extant. Can you describe platonic truth as extant? No? I didn’t think so. What you mean is that you are seeking the most parsimonious testimony you could possibly give. You use this obscurant term called ‘The Truth’. You say, ‘I seek The Truth’. But that is analogistic – because if we don’t know what it is that you’re seeking except as vague general idea. But the operational definition of ‘the truth’ is the ONLY one that can be stated. And it can ONLY be stated as testimony. Because only humans can reduce complexity to symbolic statements interpretable by humans. So when you use the platonic term ‘The Truth’, you are using a heavily loaded allegorical substitute for what is operationally performed: ‘the most parsimonious testimony I can give’.

    (Yep we are there on that one. I just gotta work on the information thing a bit.)

    Source date (UTC): 2014-07-31 05:03:00 UTC

  • Truth Telling (Witness).

    [N]ow, let us say in scenario (a) you observe a traffic accident. In scenario (b) you are standing outside of a building and hear noises inside. In scenario (c) you report on a stress test you performed. In scenario (d) you propose a theory of the behavior of a set of gasses under pressure. In scenario (e) you propose a solution the explanation of a particular trade cycle. Giving witness in these cases, and in all cases, requires giving a sequential record of OBSERVATIONS, containing the information observed, without the addition of imaginary and hypothetical content. Now, why is it that we rely upon all sorts of physical **instrumentation**, to extend our perception, improve our memory, reduce that which we cannot perceive to an analogy to experience which is open to perception and **comparison**? Why is it that we rely upon all sorts of conceptual **instrumentation** to test our own thoughts and perceptions: experience, reason, math, and logic? Because our memories are reconstructed from fragments every time, and because it is extremely difficult for us to compartmentalize memories – our minds evolved to do just the opposite, which is why we can construct generalizations of similar phenomenon much better than we can (like chimps) remember past events. So truthful testimony is recitation of observation of differences which we call measures in terms which if repeated wold lead to the same conclusion. In other words, the operationalists in all fields failed, (Poincaré being first, Brouwer, Bridgman, Mises being the first in each specialty) for the same reason that I am having a bit of difficulty making this very important point: that we do not know if you speak the truth, and you do not know if you speak the truth, if you cannot convey your argument as an extant (real and possible) construction of physical and mental operations, producing changes (or not) in state according to independent scales (measures), which if repeated would produce the same result. Meaning: that operationalism is a MORAL AND ETHICAL constraint. And the assumption of moral and ethical conduct in fields of inquiry rapidly expanding beyond human scale, was an artifact of the past. Poincare, Brouwer, Bridgman and Mises were all trying to express in necessary terms that which was ethical and moral. Like ‘free speech’ at human scale (where the cost of speaking and publishing are high) the threat only emerged when the population involved and the problems involved expanded such that ‘honor’ (threat of outcast) was not sufficient a moral boundary. The same is true for political speech in mass market period after 1870, and accelerated with radio, television, and the internet: honor has no operational meaning because there is no peer group to ostracize anyone using norms. Instead, at scale, just as we require laws at scale, and the market at scale, or we require relativity at scale when the speed of light matters to the calculation versus the instantaneous perceptions we make use of at Newtonian scale, our political institutions, and moral and ethical institutions, lagged behind our technological means of publishing falsehoods. [W]e educated folk with our high mindedness (smart people bias) argue that the market corrects the truth over time. But this isn’t demonstrably true – and we have a lot of data to prove it. That is because negative information and lies spread faster than positive information and truths. The reason is that negative information that we can cheat with spreads faster than positive information that prevents us from cheating. It is much more expensive and lower incentive to produce truths and falsehoods because they are cheaper to construct and distribute faster. So just as in the market for goods and services, we see market failure, in the market for truth and fallacy we see market failure. People in both the market for goods and services and the market for truth and fallacy, commit fraud for personal gain. The small scale response, the human scale response (solution), is to rely upon an authority to set rules. The catallatic response (solution) is to define the conceptual commons as a community property, to which all of us are owners, and allow all individuals to bring suit against what we believe to be fraud. This does not require people who bear witness to speak the truth, which as we know from both popper and our examples above, is impossible, because causal density in all observations is a long exhausting chain. But it requires that we bear good witness. We cannot be held accountable for err if we bear true witness. If I have a sport camera and record an accident, that does not mean it is ‘true’ in the sense that all the causal information is present. It means that I can bear witness with it. And, that is speaking truthfully. (ALSO: I think it might be obvious now how theorizing can be intentionally performed as a means of distorting the truth, and furthermore for the purpose of outright lying. We cannot assume that the scientist much less the ordinary man, and certainly less, those who seek power to alter the state of affairs by other than market means, are honest. This is a fallacy that is embedded in the act of argument: we assume the other person is honest. Because in history, the only reason not to stick a pointy metal object into someone, is when, like family members, they are honest with you. ) Now, I try to refrain from throwing out my theory until I can support it pretty thoroughly. But at this point, it should be pretty clear from the above paragraphs that I have pretty much put the problem of the 20th century to bed. I didn’t realize the severity of impact that the cosmopolitans had on western civilization precisely because we did not understand the uniqueness of our truth-telling culture, or that we assume aristocratic truth from others, and that those who sought status in our culture also had to demonstrate aristocratic truth. But one can blame one’s aggressors (germans, french, jews) or one can blame one’s self (anglos) for failing to look into the mirror and solve the problem. I solved the problem. Too late maybe. But I solved it.

  • Truth Telling (Witness).

    [N]ow, let us say in scenario (a) you observe a traffic accident. In scenario (b) you are standing outside of a building and hear noises inside. In scenario (c) you report on a stress test you performed. In scenario (d) you propose a theory of the behavior of a set of gasses under pressure. In scenario (e) you propose a solution the explanation of a particular trade cycle. Giving witness in these cases, and in all cases, requires giving a sequential record of OBSERVATIONS, containing the information observed, without the addition of imaginary and hypothetical content. Now, why is it that we rely upon all sorts of physical **instrumentation**, to extend our perception, improve our memory, reduce that which we cannot perceive to an analogy to experience which is open to perception and **comparison**? Why is it that we rely upon all sorts of conceptual **instrumentation** to test our own thoughts and perceptions: experience, reason, math, and logic? Because our memories are reconstructed from fragments every time, and because it is extremely difficult for us to compartmentalize memories – our minds evolved to do just the opposite, which is why we can construct generalizations of similar phenomenon much better than we can (like chimps) remember past events. So truthful testimony is recitation of observation of differences which we call measures in terms which if repeated wold lead to the same conclusion. In other words, the operationalists in all fields failed, (Poincaré being first, Brouwer, Bridgman, Mises being the first in each specialty) for the same reason that I am having a bit of difficulty making this very important point: that we do not know if you speak the truth, and you do not know if you speak the truth, if you cannot convey your argument as an extant (real and possible) construction of physical and mental operations, producing changes (or not) in state according to independent scales (measures), which if repeated would produce the same result. Meaning: that operationalism is a MORAL AND ETHICAL constraint. And the assumption of moral and ethical conduct in fields of inquiry rapidly expanding beyond human scale, was an artifact of the past. Poincare, Brouwer, Bridgman and Mises were all trying to express in necessary terms that which was ethical and moral. Like ‘free speech’ at human scale (where the cost of speaking and publishing are high) the threat only emerged when the population involved and the problems involved expanded such that ‘honor’ (threat of outcast) was not sufficient a moral boundary. The same is true for political speech in mass market period after 1870, and accelerated with radio, television, and the internet: honor has no operational meaning because there is no peer group to ostracize anyone using norms. Instead, at scale, just as we require laws at scale, and the market at scale, or we require relativity at scale when the speed of light matters to the calculation versus the instantaneous perceptions we make use of at Newtonian scale, our political institutions, and moral and ethical institutions, lagged behind our technological means of publishing falsehoods. [W]e educated folk with our high mindedness (smart people bias) argue that the market corrects the truth over time. But this isn’t demonstrably true – and we have a lot of data to prove it. That is because negative information and lies spread faster than positive information and truths. The reason is that negative information that we can cheat with spreads faster than positive information that prevents us from cheating. It is much more expensive and lower incentive to produce truths and falsehoods because they are cheaper to construct and distribute faster. So just as in the market for goods and services, we see market failure, in the market for truth and fallacy we see market failure. People in both the market for goods and services and the market for truth and fallacy, commit fraud for personal gain. The small scale response, the human scale response (solution), is to rely upon an authority to set rules. The catallatic response (solution) is to define the conceptual commons as a community property, to which all of us are owners, and allow all individuals to bring suit against what we believe to be fraud. This does not require people who bear witness to speak the truth, which as we know from both popper and our examples above, is impossible, because causal density in all observations is a long exhausting chain. But it requires that we bear good witness. We cannot be held accountable for err if we bear true witness. If I have a sport camera and record an accident, that does not mean it is ‘true’ in the sense that all the causal information is present. It means that I can bear witness with it. And, that is speaking truthfully. (ALSO: I think it might be obvious now how theorizing can be intentionally performed as a means of distorting the truth, and furthermore for the purpose of outright lying. We cannot assume that the scientist much less the ordinary man, and certainly less, those who seek power to alter the state of affairs by other than market means, are honest. This is a fallacy that is embedded in the act of argument: we assume the other person is honest. Because in history, the only reason not to stick a pointy metal object into someone, is when, like family members, they are honest with you. ) Now, I try to refrain from throwing out my theory until I can support it pretty thoroughly. But at this point, it should be pretty clear from the above paragraphs that I have pretty much put the problem of the 20th century to bed. I didn’t realize the severity of impact that the cosmopolitans had on western civilization precisely because we did not understand the uniqueness of our truth-telling culture, or that we assume aristocratic truth from others, and that those who sought status in our culture also had to demonstrate aristocratic truth. But one can blame one’s aggressors (germans, french, jews) or one can blame one’s self (anglos) for failing to look into the mirror and solve the problem. I solved the problem. Too late maybe. But I solved it.

  • The Central Argument: Western Testimonial Truth vs Platonic Truth

    (the central argument)( profound)

    [T]he central argument regarding truth:

    1) … is that giving witness to one’s observations, is testable by reproduction of a set of operational definitions. That operational definitions produce the equivalent of names, just as positional numbering provides quantities with names. Such names are insulated from deception, distraction, loading, framing and overloading. Theories are not. While we cannot demonstrate the absolute parsimony of a theory (that we know of), we can demonstrate that we truthfully conveyed our observations. In other words, we can testify truthfully to an ordered set of facts, even if we cannot testify truthfully to parsimony of a theory.

    2) … that physical science is a narrow and special case of human activity, and popper was defining truth for that special case – a definition which is not applicable outside of the special case, and even inside the special case, he made questionable use of the term in order to retain its moral loading for purely social reasons. Justifiable social reasons, but social reasons none the less.

    3) ….that it is possible to state instead that all outputs of scientific investigation are true, if they are truthfully represented – where ‘scientific investigation” refers to the use of the scientific method, regardless of field of inquiry. But that we seek the most parsimonious statement of a theory, and we can never know that we have obtained it, we can only develop consensus that we cannot cause it to fail. This is, as far as I know, the best non-platonic description of truth available. Everything else is a linguistic contrivance for one purpose or another – possibly to obscure ignorance, and possibly to load ideas with moral motivation. Scientists load their contrivance of truth, and mathematicians load their contrivance of numbers, limits, and a dozen other things – most of which obscure linguistic ‘cheats’ to give authority to that which is necessary for the construction of general rules. (ie: the problem of arbitrary precision).

    4) … that popper did no investigation into science or the history of science prior to making his argument, and that as yet, we do not have a systematic account of the history of science. However, what history we do have, both distant and recent, is that science operates as I have suggested: by criticism upon failure via overextension. The reason being that it is economically inefficient (expensive) to pursue criticism rather than to extend a theory to its point of failure then criticize it. And as far as we know, this is how science works, and must work, because it is how all human endeavors must work. Because while a small number of scientists may seek the ‘truth’ whatever a platonist means, what scientists try to do is solve problems – ie: to manufacture recipes for useful cognition.

    5) … that popper’s advice was merely moral given that the scale of inquiry in all human fields had surpassed that of human scale, where tests are subjectively verifiable. (I think this is an important insight because it occurred in all fields.) Einstein for example, operationalized observations (relative simultaneity for example) over very great distances approaching the speed of light using Lorenz transformations. And as Bridgman demonstrated, the reason Einstein’s work was novel was because prior generations had NOT been operationalizing statements ,and as such, more than a generation and perhaps two were lost to failure of what should have been an obvious solution. (See the problem of length, which I tend to refer to often as the best example.) I addressed this in a previous post, and what popper did was give us good advice, and while he made an argument that appears logical, like most rational arguments, unsupported by data, it is not clear he was correct, and in fact, it appears that he was not. The question is not a rational but empirical one.

    6) … and I am not terribly interested in criticizing popper, any more than criticizing any other philosopher I admire, since popper unlike Misesian Pseudoscience, or Rothbardian Immoral Verbalisms, was engaged in a moral attempt both in politics and in science, and perhaps in science as a vehicle for politics, to prevent the pseudoscientific use of science – particularly by fascist and communists, to use the findings of science as a replacement for divine authority by which to command man. What popper did, particularly with his platonism, was to remove the ability for the findings of science to be used as justification for the removal of human choice. Popper, Mises, and Hayek were responsible for undermining pseudoscientific authoritarianism. Of the three popper is perhaps less articulate (possibly to obscure his objective), but certainly not wrong, so to speak. While mises’ appeal to authoritarianism (which is part and parcel of jewish culture) was entirely pseudoscientific, by claiming that economics was deductive rather than empirical, and justifying it under apriorism, instead of as I’ve stated, understanding that he was merely trying to apply operationalism to economic activity, which would merely demonstrate that Keynesian economics was immoral, not unscientific.

    But Popper, Mises, Hayek, Bridgman and Brouwer, did not find a solution to restoring the western aristocratic conditions for public speech.
    They too were a lost in platonism a bit. Bridgman and Brouwer did understand that something was wrong, and were very close,b ut they could not make the moral argument. We have had a century now of attacks by verbal contrivance and we can demonstrate the destruction of our civilization by way of it. So the moral argument is no longer one of undemonstrated results. WE have the results. And we have a generation of men, myself included, trying to repair it.

    One must speak truthfully, because no other truth is knowable. Intellectual products that are brought to market must be warrantied just as are all other products that are brought to market, and the warranty that you can provide is operational definitions (recipes, experience), not theories (psychologism, projections). And if you are not willing to stand behind your product then you should not bring it to market. Because you have no right to subject others to harm.

    Intellectuals produce ideas (myself included), that is our product. We are paid in measly terms most of the time, for our product, but that is what we do. But it is no different from hot coffee or dangerous ladders, or defective gas tanks.

    And given that one particularly prolific group of people has created marxism, socialism, postmodernism, libertine-libertarianism, and neoconservatism, it is about time we stopped allowing them to ship lousy products into society.

    And rather than regulate them by government, the common law and universal standing will allow punishment of those who bring bad products to market.

    OBSCURITY
    I am entirely capable (as above) of writing clearly, but it is tedious when most logical connections appear to be obvious to the informed person. I will cop out to being lazy, particularly when I have no idea whether the others involved in the debate will be worthwhile. But it’s not that I can’t drill down to necessary arguments. OK? It’s just a lot more work than incrementally testing an idea and making sure that others follow the breadcrumbs….

    CLOSING
    I am pretty sure the above analysis is correct. It’s going to be very hard to demonstrate otherwise: that popper used a pragmatic theory of truth, just like all of us do. But there is only one possible extant truth, and that is testimony. All else is but moral rule, not logical necessity. OK? That’s just how it is. Period, end of story.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Philosophy of Aristocracy
    The Propertarian Institute
    Kiev, Ukraine

  • The Central Argument: Western Testimonial Truth vs Platonic Truth

    (the central argument)( profound)

    [T]he central argument regarding truth:

    1) … is that giving witness to one’s observations, is testable by reproduction of a set of operational definitions. That operational definitions produce the equivalent of names, just as positional numbering provides quantities with names. Such names are insulated from deception, distraction, loading, framing and overloading. Theories are not. While we cannot demonstrate the absolute parsimony of a theory (that we know of), we can demonstrate that we truthfully conveyed our observations. In other words, we can testify truthfully to an ordered set of facts, even if we cannot testify truthfully to parsimony of a theory.

    2) … that physical science is a narrow and special case of human activity, and popper was defining truth for that special case – a definition which is not applicable outside of the special case, and even inside the special case, he made questionable use of the term in order to retain its moral loading for purely social reasons. Justifiable social reasons, but social reasons none the less.

    3) ….that it is possible to state instead that all outputs of scientific investigation are true, if they are truthfully represented – where ‘scientific investigation” refers to the use of the scientific method, regardless of field of inquiry. But that we seek the most parsimonious statement of a theory, and we can never know that we have obtained it, we can only develop consensus that we cannot cause it to fail. This is, as far as I know, the best non-platonic description of truth available. Everything else is a linguistic contrivance for one purpose or another – possibly to obscure ignorance, and possibly to load ideas with moral motivation. Scientists load their contrivance of truth, and mathematicians load their contrivance of numbers, limits, and a dozen other things – most of which obscure linguistic ‘cheats’ to give authority to that which is necessary for the construction of general rules. (ie: the problem of arbitrary precision).

    4) … that popper did no investigation into science or the history of science prior to making his argument, and that as yet, we do not have a systematic account of the history of science. However, what history we do have, both distant and recent, is that science operates as I have suggested: by criticism upon failure via overextension. The reason being that it is economically inefficient (expensive) to pursue criticism rather than to extend a theory to its point of failure then criticize it. And as far as we know, this is how science works, and must work, because it is how all human endeavors must work. Because while a small number of scientists may seek the ‘truth’ whatever a platonist means, what scientists try to do is solve problems – ie: to manufacture recipes for useful cognition.

    5) … that popper’s advice was merely moral given that the scale of inquiry in all human fields had surpassed that of human scale, where tests are subjectively verifiable. (I think this is an important insight because it occurred in all fields.) Einstein for example, operationalized observations (relative simultaneity for example) over very great distances approaching the speed of light using Lorenz transformations. And as Bridgman demonstrated, the reason Einstein’s work was novel was because prior generations had NOT been operationalizing statements ,and as such, more than a generation and perhaps two were lost to failure of what should have been an obvious solution. (See the problem of length, which I tend to refer to often as the best example.) I addressed this in a previous post, and what popper did was give us good advice, and while he made an argument that appears logical, like most rational arguments, unsupported by data, it is not clear he was correct, and in fact, it appears that he was not. The question is not a rational but empirical one.

    6) … and I am not terribly interested in criticizing popper, any more than criticizing any other philosopher I admire, since popper unlike Misesian Pseudoscience, or Rothbardian Immoral Verbalisms, was engaged in a moral attempt both in politics and in science, and perhaps in science as a vehicle for politics, to prevent the pseudoscientific use of science – particularly by fascist and communists, to use the findings of science as a replacement for divine authority by which to command man. What popper did, particularly with his platonism, was to remove the ability for the findings of science to be used as justification for the removal of human choice. Popper, Mises, and Hayek were responsible for undermining pseudoscientific authoritarianism. Of the three popper is perhaps less articulate (possibly to obscure his objective), but certainly not wrong, so to speak. While mises’ appeal to authoritarianism (which is part and parcel of jewish culture) was entirely pseudoscientific, by claiming that economics was deductive rather than empirical, and justifying it under apriorism, instead of as I’ve stated, understanding that he was merely trying to apply operationalism to economic activity, which would merely demonstrate that Keynesian economics was immoral, not unscientific.

    But Popper, Mises, Hayek, Bridgman and Brouwer, did not find a solution to restoring the western aristocratic conditions for public speech.
    They too were a lost in platonism a bit. Bridgman and Brouwer did understand that something was wrong, and were very close,b ut they could not make the moral argument. We have had a century now of attacks by verbal contrivance and we can demonstrate the destruction of our civilization by way of it. So the moral argument is no longer one of undemonstrated results. WE have the results. And we have a generation of men, myself included, trying to repair it.

    One must speak truthfully, because no other truth is knowable. Intellectual products that are brought to market must be warrantied just as are all other products that are brought to market, and the warranty that you can provide is operational definitions (recipes, experience), not theories (psychologism, projections). And if you are not willing to stand behind your product then you should not bring it to market. Because you have no right to subject others to harm.

    Intellectuals produce ideas (myself included), that is our product. We are paid in measly terms most of the time, for our product, but that is what we do. But it is no different from hot coffee or dangerous ladders, or defective gas tanks.

    And given that one particularly prolific group of people has created marxism, socialism, postmodernism, libertine-libertarianism, and neoconservatism, it is about time we stopped allowing them to ship lousy products into society.

    And rather than regulate them by government, the common law and universal standing will allow punishment of those who bring bad products to market.

    OBSCURITY
    I am entirely capable (as above) of writing clearly, but it is tedious when most logical connections appear to be obvious to the informed person. I will cop out to being lazy, particularly when I have no idea whether the others involved in the debate will be worthwhile. But it’s not that I can’t drill down to necessary arguments. OK? It’s just a lot more work than incrementally testing an idea and making sure that others follow the breadcrumbs….

    CLOSING
    I am pretty sure the above analysis is correct. It’s going to be very hard to demonstrate otherwise: that popper used a pragmatic theory of truth, just like all of us do. But there is only one possible extant truth, and that is testimony. All else is but moral rule, not logical necessity. OK? That’s just how it is. Period, end of story.

    Curt Doolittle
    The Philosophy of Aristocracy
    The Propertarian Institute
    Kiev, Ukraine

  • CENTRAL ARGUMENT: WESTERN TRUTH VS PLATONIC TRUTH (the central argument)( profou

    CENTRAL ARGUMENT: WESTERN TRUTH VS PLATONIC TRUTH

    (the central argument)( profound)

    On this topic, ‘truth’, my central argument…

    1) … is that giving witness to one’s observations, is testable by reproduction of a set of operational definitions. That operational definitions produce the equivalent of names, not descriptions. Such names are insulated from deception, distraction, loading, framing and overloading. Theories are not. While we cannot demonstrate the absolute parsimony of a theory (that we know of), we can demonstrate that we truthfully conveyed our observations. In other words, we can testify truthfully to an ordered set of facts, even if we cannot testify truthfully to parsimony of a theory.

    2) … that physical science is a narrow and special case of human activity, and popper was defining truth for that special case – a definition which is not applicable outside of the special case, and even inside the special case, he made questionable use of the term in order to retain its moral loading for purely social reasons. Justifiable social reasons, but social reasons none the less.

    3) ….that it is possible to state instead that all outputs of scientific investigation are true, if they are truthfully represented – where ‘scientific investigation” refers to the use of the scientific method, regardless of field of inquiry. But that we seek the most parsimonious statement of a theory, and we can never know that we have obtained it, we can only develop consensus that we cannot cause it to fail. This is, as far as I know, the best non-platonic description of truth available. Everything else is a linguistic contrivance for one purpose or another – possibly to obscure ignorance, and possibly to load ideas with moral motivation. Scientists load their contrivance of truth, and mathematicians load their contrivance of numbers, limits, and a dozen other things – most of which obscure linguistic ‘cheats’ to give authority to that which is necessary for the construction of general rules. (ie: the problem of arbitrary precision).

    4) … that popper did no investigation into science or the history of science prior to making his argument, and that as yet, we do not have a systematic account of the history of science. However, what history we do have, both distant and recent, is that science operates as I have suggested: by criticism upon failure via overextension. The reason being that it is economically inefficient (expensive) to pursue criticism rather than to extend a theory to its point of failure then criticize it. And as far as we know, this is how science works, and must work, because it is how all human endeavors must work. Because while a small number of scientists may seek the ‘truth’ whatever a platonist means, what scientists try to do is solve problems – ie: to manufacture recipes for useful cognition.

    5) … that popper’s advice was merely moral given that the scale of inquiry in all human fields had surpassed that of human scale, where tests are subjectively verifiable. (I think this is an important insight because it occurred in all fields.) Einstein for example, operationalized observations (relative simultaneity for example) over very great distances approaching the speed of light using Lorenz transformations. And as Bridgman demonstrated, the reason Einstein’s work was novel was because prior generations had NOT been operationalizing statements ,and as such, more than a generation and perhaps two were lost to failure of what should have been an obvious solution. (See the problem of length, which I tend to refer to often as the best example.) I addressed this in a previous post, and what popper did was give us good advice, and while he made an argument that appears logical, like most rational arguments, unsupported by data, it is not clear he was correct, and in fact, it appears that he was not. The question is not a rational but empirical one.

    6) … and I am not terribly interested in criticizing popper, any more than criticizing any other philosopher I admire, since popper unlike Misesian Pseudoscience, or Rothbardian Immoral Verbalisms, was engaged in a moral attempt both in politics and in science, and perhaps in science as a vehicle for politics, to prevent the pseudoscientific use of science – particularly by fascist and communists, to use the findings of science as a replacement for divine authority by which to command man. What popper did, particularly with his platonism, was to remove the ability for the findings of science to be used as justification for the removal of human choice. Popper, Mises, and Hayek were responsible for undermining pseudoscientific authoritarianism. Of the three popper is perhaps less articulate (possibly to obscure his objective), but certainly not wrong, so to speak. While mises’ appeal to authoritarianism (which is part and parcel of jewish culture) was entirely pseudoscientific, by claiming that economics was deductive rather than empirical, and justifying it under apriorism, instead of as I’ve stated, understanding that he was merely trying to apply operationalism to economic activity, which would merely demonstrate that Keynesian economics was immoral, not unscientific.

    But Popper, Mises, Hayek, Bridgman and Brouwer, did not find a solution to restoring the western aristocratic conditions for public speech.

    They too were a lost in platonism a bit. Bridgman and Brouwer did understand that something was wrong, and were very close,b ut they could not make the moral argument. We have had a century now of attacks by verbal contrivance and we can demonstrate the destruction of our civilization by way of it. So the moral argument is no longer one of undemonstrated results. WE have the results. And we have a generation of men, myself included, trying to repair it.

    One must speak truthfully, because no other truth is knowable. Intellectual products that are brought to market must be warrantied just as are all other products that are brought to market, and the warranty that you can provide is operational definitions (recipes, experience), not theories (psychologism, projections). And if you are not willing to stand behind your product then you should not bring it to market. Because you have no right to subject others to harm.

    Intellectuals produce ideas (myself included), that is our product. We are paid in measly terms most of the time, for our product, but that is what we do. But it is no different from hot coffee or dangerous ladders, or defective gas tanks.

    And given that one particularly prolific group of people has created marxism, socialism, postmodernism, libertine-libertarianism, and neoconservatism, it is about time we stopped allowing them to ship lousy products into society.

    And rather than regulate them by government, the common law and universal standing will allow punishment of those who bring bad products to market.

    OBSCURITY

    I am entirely capable (as above) of writing clearly, but it is tedious when most logical connections appear to be obvious to the informed person. I will cop out to being lazy, particularly when I have no idea whether the others involved in the debate will be worthwhile. But it’s not that I can’t drill down to necessary arguments. OK? It’s just a lot more work than incrementally testing an idea and making sure that others follow the breadcrumbs….

    CLOSING

    I am pretty sure the above analysis is correct. It’s going to be very hard to demonstrate otherwise: that popper used a pragmatic theory of truth, just like all of us do. But there is only one possible extant truth, and that is testimony. All else is but moral rule, not logical necessity. OK? That’s just how it is. Period, end of story.

    And yes it’s not worth your time (or mine) to continue if we must resort to color by numbers. The central argument is either advanced or not. Otherwise it’s just a waste of time. But thank you for your help, as always.

    Curt Doolittle

    Source date (UTC): 2014-07-28 02:22:00 UTC

  • Demonstrating Truthful Speech

    —“if you produce an operational definition then you can be shown to have spoken truthfully, (given witness) even if the truth content of your theory cannot be determined to be true – ever. Moreover, that if you do not produce an operational definition of your argument, then we cannot tell you are speaking truthfully or whether you are engaging in deception, or because of your lack of discipline and diligence you are committing error. “—

  • Demonstrating Truthful Speech

    —“if you produce an operational definition then you can be shown to have spoken truthfully, (given witness) even if the truth content of your theory cannot be determined to be true – ever. Moreover, that if you do not produce an operational definition of your argument, then we cannot tell you are speaking truthfully or whether you are engaging in deception, or because of your lack of discipline and diligence you are committing error. “—

  • Operationalism Isn't A Truth Test, It's A Test Of Truth Telling. 🙂

    (worth repeating) From my notes….

    –“An operational definition is produced by defining a process of operationalization and recording the results of operating that process; in order to define a variable, term, or object in terms of a set of tests needed to determine its existence, duration, and quantity or quality. Operational definitions define changes in state as those operations necessary to change state; define unobservable entities concretely in terms of the physical and mental operations used to measure them; and ensures that the definition of each observable and unobservable entity has been uniquely identified with the instrumentation used to define it. Just as the operational naming of numbers via positional numbering gives a unique name to every number, this process of operationalization gives a unique name to an extant entity consisting of the definition for that step, rather than consisting of an analogy that approximates it in some form or other. Operationalism is a process of granting unique names.”–

    This ensures that we are discussing names of extant entities rather than allegories, functions, experiences, or imaginary projections. Operationalism is not a truth test, it is a test of truth telling.

  • Operationalism Isn’t A Truth Test, It’s A Test Of Truth Telling. 🙂

    (worth repeating) From my notes….

    –“An operational definition is produced by defining a process of operationalization and recording the results of operating that process; in order to define a variable, term, or object in terms of a set of tests needed to determine its existence, duration, and quantity or quality. Operational definitions define changes in state as those operations necessary to change state; define unobservable entities concretely in terms of the physical and mental operations used to measure them; and ensures that the definition of each observable and unobservable entity has been uniquely identified with the instrumentation used to define it. Just as the operational naming of numbers via positional numbering gives a unique name to every number, this process of operationalization gives a unique name to an extant entity consisting of the definition for that step, rather than consisting of an analogy that approximates it in some form or other. Operationalism is a process of granting unique names.”–

    This ensures that we are discussing names of extant entities rather than allegories, functions, experiences, or imaginary projections. Operationalism is not a truth test, it is a test of truth telling.