THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NORTH SEA AND THE LEVANT.
Action vs verbalism
Operations vs meaning
Testimony vs Platonism
Recipe vs allegory
Promise vs convenience
Warranty vs irresponsibility
Innovation vs criticism
Landholding vs migrants
Commons vs parasitism
Honest Debate vs loaded gossip
Warriors vs priests
Liberty vs authority
Public truth vs private pragmatism.
Source date (UTC): 2014-10-06 05:02:00 UTC
REFORMING PHILOSOPHY: ITS ALL CALCULATION NOW. ALGORITHMS WIN OVER SET OPERATIONS.
That any general rule,
Requires a utilitarian context (a ‘question’)
AND
That answering that question,
Requires an hypothesis{intuition,->hypothesis, ->theory, ->law}
AND
Any hypothesis,
Requires a test of verbal construction,
Requires tests of internal consistency,
Using the instruments of logical operations{identity, ->category(logic proper), ->scale, ->relation, ->time, ->cause, ->cooperation}
AND
Requires tests of external correspondence,
Using the instruments of physical operations {a sequence of actions},
Recorded as a sequence of actions and measurements(observations)
That can be followed and reproduced by others,
AND
Requires Warranty,
Provided to the self, or to others, consisting of:
Tests of falsification recorded
Using instruments of physical and logical operations.
Recorded as a sequence of actions and measurements(observations),
That can be reproduced by others.
AND
Requires Warranty,
Provided to the self and others, consisting of:
Testimony to the truthful witness of all the above.
This algorithm applies in all cases of human construction of general rules. There is no need for any other model except to lower the standard, and to obviate the individual from warranty.
Philosophy suffers, possibly catastrophically, from verbalism: syllogism and set operation, rather than algorithmic operations. These verbalisms rely on extant meaning of words, themselves general rules. These words carry properties and relations whenever used. We use only some subset of those properties and relations in any context.This means that the use of words can add informational content to any statement that would not be extant if expressed as an operation.
As such philosophy as a discipline tolerates polluted (extra information) that obscures, incorrectly weights, confuses and conflates theories. The majority of errors come not from comparisons (calculations) but from information external to the operation included in the language. This is why defining terms is so important. It is equivalent to using pure ingredients in chemistry.
As far as I know, once we have solved the problem of ethics, morality, and politics, we possess all necessary logical instrumentation, and philosophy is a closed domain in which all statements can be represented logically through operations.
As far as I know, if we follow what originated as the scientific method, but is simply the algorithmic application of instruments both mental and physical: “THE method”, no other method is needed.
Worse philosophy, outside of science, appears to be extremely useful for the purpose of conducting interpersonal, social, political, and economic, fraud. In fact, the singular purpose of the vast majority of philosophy, has been used for the purpose of justifying these categories of fraud: justifying takings.
Apriorism, as we have seen in Mises and Rothbard, can be abused, can be used to state pseudoscience (misesian praxeology), and to state immorality as moral (Rothbard), and requires no warranty. And all products in the market, whether physical operations (goods and services) or mental operations (hypothesis) can cause negative externalities that impose costs upon others.
When our theories were confined to human action at human scale, mythology was adequate, and even when our investigation of the physical world was limited to human scale, our reason was largely adequate. Because humans can test arguments at human scale. But all theories exceeding human scale (human perception) require instrumentation. And instrumentation is required for any operation that is not possible to conduct with human sense perception alone.
So, while it may be true that relying upon apriorism is useful. It is also true that constructing and publishing a theory in that manner is an avoidance of providing warranty to your ideas. And labeling your ideas as a black-market product that may have dangerous, keynesian levels, freudian levels, cantorian levels, rothbardian levels, of side effects.
And any moral man should seek to prosecute you in every possible venue for the pollution of the commons.
(I think I can wrap it all together even better, but I’m getting there.)
Source date (UTC): 2014-09-29 04:52:00 UTC
WHAT IS THE NEXT ITERATION AFTER CRITICAL RATIONALISM?
(worth repeating)
I consider myself a critical rationalist as far as it goes. But:
1) I practice the art with much higher technical standards necessary to reduce or eliminate error and deception. In my view I practice philosophy as science not rationalism. It is possible that I have come to see all rationalism as justification. I am not yet certain. I do however understand the very great difference between daydreaming, thinking, reasoning, calculating and computing. And that reason is vastly inferior to calculation. And that if I am correct, and property provides us with commensurability then moral and political conflicts are marginally calculable.
2) I do not believe that CP is empirically true although it is logically true. Only formal study will answer this question but at present the evidence certainly appears to bear out my bias.
3) I do not believe criticism is as productive a means of innovation as exhausting theories and reforming them – which is why scientists practice exhaustion not criticism. The reason is scientists pursue goals (problems), not knowledge for its own sake (puzzles).
4) There is no difference between any method of investigation or production other than the value attributed to different outputs of the method we call the scientific method.
5) Although I believe Miller’s loosely correct, I also believe his emphasis on formal logic (sets) is not equal in value to operational articulation, and is likewise subject to verbalism. In fact, in large part I see the era of set operations involving language as passé, and that like law, functions and operations defeat sets and set membership. In fact, I see Cantorian sets as one of the great disasters of intellectual history.
(Not that anyone here is going to follow what the hell I’m talking about…)
Source date (UTC): 2014-09-26 08:47:00 UTC
MORE ON HUMAN SCALE
You know, empiricism (observation) and instrumentalism (instrumental observation) are demarcated by the limits of our sense perception. But the process is essentially the same.
I would prefer to get the point across that the reason we require instrumentalism is that once we pass beyond our sense perception, we also pass beyond human scale.
I consider economics to be instrumental : a discipline for measuring that which is directly unobservable, and therefore only indirectly observable.
Just as I consider all logics to be instruments, and any human action that does not require such instruments within human scale.
This distinction turns out to be terribly important once we realize just WHY Bridgman was so concerned about operationalism, why Poincare so concerned about mathematical platonism, why Brouwer was so concerned about mathematical operationalism and intuitionism, and why **I** am so concerned about both verbal operationalism and testimonial truth, and it’s opposite: the use of verbalisms (obscurant analogies), loading and framing.
Because we have been systematically applying the methods, including mathematical methods, but more importantly, the philosophical methods, that we developed during the era of human scale where we could reason without instruments, to the era of post-human scale where we cannot sense perceive without instruments. And there is a vast difference in the properties of human scale and post-human scale measurements.
Most important of these, at least in economics, is morality. Morality is a local phenomenon and macro economics is NOT. Just as we cannot apply the morals of the famly to the extended order, we cannot likewise apply the rules of the extended order to the family.
Now, if we apply the rules of the family to the extended order our efforts will be non-predictive. That is merely an empirical or perhaps epistemological criticism. But when we apply the rules of the extended order (non-moral) to the rules of the family and tribal (moral) then we commit suicide.
Macroeconomics as I understand it is merely a secular christian crusade against aristocracy by the Cathedral. It is not we who are conquering the cathedral. But the out-group nations who understand that the cathedral’s immorality is socially destructive religion, both for it’s hosts (us) and everyone touched by it.
Source date (UTC): 2014-09-16 13:04:00 UTC
http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/06/21/mises-praxeology-as-the-failure-to-develop-economic-operationalism-yes/Well, OK, I can work with this. Thanks. But first we have to get by some criticisms that bother me, before we get to the central argument. But by the last paragraph “CLOSING” that argument should be a bit clearer. You may or may not agree with what I’ve stated; but at least you will understand why I am so interested in your line of reasoning.
THREE CRITICISMS OF “PHILOSOPHICAL IMPERIALISM”
1) –“if you were to state it plainly and succinctly, then I might understand it.”—
This statement is always troubling to me, since if Hegel, Heidegger and Nietzsche were so influential, not to mention Darwin (who is widely misunderstood), why is it that a particular set of ideas must be, or even CAN be, plainly and succinctly stated? Cantor is widely understood in USE, but the fact that he substitutes frequency for quantity and thereby eliminating time, thus fabricating infinity is not. Mathematicians rely on mathematical platonism without understanding why, and thereby the causal reasons why their math ‘works’ despite its presumed abandonment of operational correspondence. Is Popper plainly and succinctly stated – if so then why do we need such constant ‘clarification’ of his ideas? Is the three worlds truth plainly stated or is it merely a useful a analogy for conveying meaning?
Meaning (analogy to experience) is quite different from correspondence independent of experience. As such meaning is self referential. Truth can be stated independently of the transfer of meaning. Constructing a bridge between meaning (extant experience) and in-extant experience is not a property of truth but of the complexity of accumulating interstitial relations. Is Critical Preference plainly stated? Is Critical Rationalism plainly stated? Since I spend quite a bit of time on this subject, and Agassi and a dozen others must constantly attempt to promote these ideas, when why is “plain statement” not merely a cover for ‘low investment cost by resorting to familiar analogy’.
CP may be morally true (Popper’s objective being moral), and it may be logically true if we ignore the evidence, but it is not empirically true as far as we can tell, nor is it how scientists functionally operate. And while that research has not been done, nor was even given casual consideration by Popper, the evidence to date does not reflect the theory. So meaning is not a test of anything other than the relative position of two speakers. The cost of bridging the difference is merely a choice of opportunity costs between investments.
That fairly obvious statement made, I think I can probably get to the point within this email – or at least close enough.
2) —“In any case, empiricism is a philosophical theory”—
Empiricism is a philosophical justification for stating a proposition in human language. Observation, hypothesis, action and observed consequence existed and were widely used prior to philosophy, and quite certainly, prior to language. So, again, this is a fallacious constraint. One does not require philosophy except as a common language for the purpose of efficiently conveying shared meaning. I could, if I look at history, argue that the purpose of philosophy is purely justificationary and nothing more. Or as Durant argued given his study of it, that it consists largely of erroneous verbal imagination, whereas history does not – it is a record of man’s demonstrated actions. However as a means of organizing similar systems of thought it has proven adequate for meaningful discourse, if, like string theory, insufficiently constraining to constitute a test of honest testimony (abstracted as ‘truth’). I organize my work into metaphysics, epistemology, truth, ethics, politics and aesthetics. But that is more a matter of protocol or good manners than necessity. Philosophy makes no claim on truthful testimony as to mans actions and observations.
3) –“Whether it is or not, what you write seems more about sociology and anthropology.”–
That would seem an immaterial criticism would it not? Is not the consequence of that criticism methodologically induced ignorance? One way to address this question is whether philosophy as practiced (not as proposed) is used in practice as is religion (a means of achieving shared belief and therefore shared ends), or whether it is used as is geometry or say, physics, (to achieve descriptive correspondence with reality regardless of what we believe) so that we can act in accordance with it. I don’t do dogma so to speak. So either we make true propositions or we do not. In making true propositions we do not get to define the boundaries of the method, without of necessity mandating falsehoods. Methodological boundaries are crutches for justifying ignorance: selection bias.
ON TO THE CENTRAL PROPOSITION
–“All libertarians tend to get morality right. “—
This doesn’t seem to be true does it? Then did Rothbard get morality right? In other words, is the combination of aggression against intersubjectively verifiable property a test of morality? Furthermore, when you say ‘imposed cost’, that incomplete statement requires that we know what it is imposed against. So, without a definition of property (or some substitute), no test of aggression or imposition is meaningful. The definition of property one relies upon determines the scope of that which we aggress or impose upon.
–“I aimed to get liberty right.”–
This is what I am curious about. If we evolve a set of affairs and give it a name, and then describe it’s causal properties, and give that set of properties a name, then I can understand that. I can understand defining liberty as a state of affairs described objectively, or a set of actions taken, or the experience of an individual in response to circumstances. What I can’t understand quite yet (and that may be because I am looking for something that isn’t there) – is if there is a distinction between an objectively moral state of affairs which we can experience and act to produce, and a state of liberty that we can experience and act to produce. Is there a difference, or are morality and liberty descriptions of the same phenomenon from objective and subjective points of view?
–“You do not say what you think [philosophy] is, as I have.”–
Well, (aside from that statement’s questionable use of the verb to be), first, this lack of clarity is because I am being timid with this topic since it is one of the central problems I am struggling with: whether philosophy is a very loose form of calculation: whether the various forms of calculation (identity, naming, counting, relations, logic, causality, cooperation, AND philosophy) are antecedent to philosophy, or whether calculation is consequent to philosophy. Second, since I suspect the former, I am working under the assumption that philosophy constitutes a process of calculation in the broader sense, using descriptive language to attempt to compensate for the incommensurability of objects of comparison and the fragmentary knowledge we have of those objects of consideration. In other words, not the normative description of the discipline, but the constituent actions practiced in the discipline, regardless of tradition and opinion. (More on this if you are interested, although the basic question should be obvious). Now, we can approach the definitions of philosophy as traditionally stated (a) a systematic analysis of branches of knowledge, (b) a systemic body of knowledge, or (c) general rules to assist us in taking actions. (Which I take to be degrees of formalism and nothing more). And we can discuss it analogistically and normatively (religion and morality), rationally(in continental and cosmopolitan language), analytically (as the internal correspondence of sets), or scientifically (as a means of incorporating advances in knowledge into our current system of thought such that our ideas correspond increasingly to reality). As far as I know, this set of properties in both spectra are reducible to assisting us in taking action in different spheres of our lives given fragmentary knowledge at any given time.) My question is probably lost, but my concern is not meaning but truth: why is it that philosophy has been such a fertile vehicle for deception (propaganda)? And how can we insulate ourselves from philosophical obscurantism and deception the way we have insulated ourselves from religious mysticism? Not only strictly within philosophy but across the works of public intellectuals as well.
WE NEED TWO DEFINITIONS HERE
“CALCULATION” : The term is generally used to describe a spectrum of methods of reasoning, from the very definite arithmetical calculation of using an algorithm, to the vague heuristics of calculating a strategy in a competition or calculating the chance of a successful relationship between two people. CALCULATION(performed by humans) vs COMPUTATION (which can be performed by computers). Reason then constitutes a subset of calculation using language which consists of heterogeneous objects of comparison. I tend to rely upon \calculation because calculations are largely insulated from framing and loading. This is necessary when we reduce all rights to property rights and all morality to imposed costs. Loading and framing with values are no longer necessary, and can only be seen as attempts at deception.
“CALCULATIVE INSTITUTIONS” – The set of technologies that permit human beings to extend their perception and comparison ability, and therefore their ability to understand and forecast in complexity, particularly within a division of knowledge and labor, as a means of assisting in planning, forecasting, production and decision making. Specifically those institutions include: numbers, counting, arithmetic, accounting, algebra, calculus, statistics, combined with money, numeric time, banking, interest, contract, rule of law, combined with narrative, history, objective truth, combined with property, exchange, trade, markets.
WHY? WHAT PROBLEM IS TO BE SOLVED?
Why? Because Mises failed in economics, Brouwer failed in math, and Bridgman failed in science. (See http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/06/21/mises-praxeology-as-the-failure-to-develop-economic-operationalism-yes/ ). And so did Popper and Hayek for that matter, fail in ethics and politics. And had they not, they would have reversed the fallacy of platonic truth, in favor of performative truth (which I tend to operationalize and clarify as ‘Testimonial Truth’). (See: http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/07/28/the-central-argument-western-truth-vs-platonic-truth/ ) And we very likely could have avoided the current necessity for science to reform itself after a century of pseudoscience. And we would not have been so subject to the deceptions of the marxists, socialists, postmodernists, keynesians, even Rothbard’s immoral libertinism for that matter.
And why does this matter? Because we have just spent a century under the influence of a second wave of mysticism (Marx, Freud, Cantor, Keynes, Mises, Rothbard, Russell, the Frankfurt school, the Postmodernists and their various offspring), constructed by verbalisms (obscurant analogy). If philosophy, distributed by media, can be used to cause such harm, and is no less harmful than mystical religion distributed by Orators and Print, then we are left with the need to reform philosophy the way we reformed religion. We can see that much of science, at least that science which relies upon tests instead of models, and experimental psychology in particular, have largely reformed themselves over the past half century. But despite the failure of the metaphysical program and its usurpation by cognitive science, we seem to have failed to reform the discipline of philosophy. (Hence the trend of university departments being combined with those of religion and literature.)
How did philosophy become such a utilitarian vehicle for deception, pseudoscience, restated religion, obscurantism, framing, loading and overloading such that it was the primary means by which the public was misled? Why did we abandon Grammar, Rhetoric and Ethics and Morality when those three are at at least loosely calculable methods and measures? Why has the systemic attack on western unique preference for (if not unique understanding of) truth-telling been so successful?
REFORMATIONS
As such, (a) what reforms are necessary in philosophy that would defend the body politic from that discipline and its further use as what I think you would call ‘propaganda’ – but that I would call deceptive manipulation (synonyms possibly, but I prefer the pejorative). (b) While reformation of the discipline is not necessarily possible (and possibly not desirable), reformation prohibiting the use of obscurantism, overloading, loading and framing, in our institutions (law, politics, ethics and morality) may be. (c) What institutional protections can be put in place that prevent the use of sophisticated philosophical, argumentative, and pseudoscientific deception via obscurantism, overloading, loading and framing. (Terms which I don’t think I need to define.) (d) Since only one institution appears to be necessary (organic law, limited to the prohibition on free-riding and imposed cost, positively articulated as property rights ), can we use such property rights adjudicable under the common law, under universal standing, to defend against damage to (theft via fraud from) the conceptual commons, the normative commons, the legal commons, and the political commons? And (e), if so, under what linguistic constraints would such law be articulated?
We have for quite some time understood that original intent, strict construction, and operational language, sunsetting can constrain organic law (not regulatory nor legislative), but like aggression or imposed cost, we must start with some theory of property rights to protect with original intent, strict construction, operational language, and sunsetting. As such what is the definition of property that we prevent the imposition of costs against?
Questions:
1) Is there a difference between the actions necessary for the respect of objective property rights, and of the actions necessary for the respect of moral rules? (I think I know this answer: objectively moral statements are universal prohibitions on involuntary transfer, however the allocation of property in any polity reflects its abilities, organization of reproduction – the family, means of production – division of labor, and the formal institutions that insure those property rights – law. )
2) Under what conditions will demand for the state dissipate sufficiently that it is rational for members to form a voluntary polity? What institutions are necessary to eliminate demand for an authoritarian state, and a monopoly bureaucracy? (I am fairly certain this requires a high trust society that suppresses nearly all free riding and imposed cost.)
3) We pay for our norms by forgoing opportunities for benefit. Each of these forgone opportunities is a cost to us. As such we have born a cost for our norms – almost all of which, if criminal, ethical or moral, are prohibitions on involuntary transfer (imposed cost/free riding) OR signals of the promise of avoiding involuntary transfer (imposed cost / free riding). So are not all members of a polity who respect norms simply un-enumerated but factually shareholders in the common asset of normative capital?
4) As such I see the definition of property necessary for the formation of a voluntary polity to be nearly all possible means of involuntary transfer, imposed costs, and free riding.
5) Competitively speaking, what occurs when all groups compete using the same evolutionary strategy? The loser is predetermined by his abilities within the rules of the strategy. And the losers can almost always identify this and change their strategy. So why are property rights prohibiting all imposition of costs/free riding/ involuntary transfers, beneficial to all? What would happen to Gypsies if they took up honorable professions? So why is it we would expect the same moral codes, codified in law, to be universally desirable to all, rather than, as we have now, high trust and low trust societies with more authoritarian and lower scope of property rights, and less authoritarian and greater scope of property rights?
CLOSING
This should be enough to help you understand my line of inquiry, and my interest in your definition of morality, yet uncertainty of your definition of property that can be imposed against. While I agree with your definition of a condition of liberty, I am not yet certain that it’s meaningful unless we also know your definition of property. My definition of property is a general rule of prohibiting all forms of involuntary transfer, free riding and imposed cost (arguably synonyms), within any pair of structures of production and reproduction, and that liberty is the condition within any pair of structures of reproduction and production in which I am free of free riding, imposed costs, and involuntary transfers. And as I understand it, I can find no other means of suppressing impositions other than the organic evolution of the common law positively stated as property rights, whose single cause is the prohibition upon free riding, imposed costs and involuntary transfers, expressed ‘calculatively’ as original intent, strict construction, and sunsetting. Furthermore that all violations of those property rights and impositions of costs (losses) are lost opportunities for productive exchange (gains), and therefore ‘thefts’ (imposed costs). Given that the state and bureaucracy must of necessity be defined as monopolies, and monopolies cannot knowingly construct an environment of voluntary exchange, the state and bureaucracy (once rule of law is established), violate property rights, and every time create conflict by prohibiting voluntary exchange that would in the main, force the lower classes to demonstrate high trust behavior (respect for property rights) in exchange for the production of commons or the receipt of discounts and redistributions. All imposed costs by the state are not only thefts, but thefts of opportunity for productive exchange. (I cannot cover all the streams and eddies of this argument in this short space but it should be sufficient for our purposes.)
As others have noted, I am quite capable of clarity when I choose to be clear. However clarity requires a sufficient frame of reference, and a willing participant to discourse with. Otherwise it is a great deal of effort expended upon trial and error, without known return for both parties.
Again, thank you for your time and patience. I’m very grateful.
Curt Doolittle
On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 7:38 AM, JCL <jclester@gmail.com> wrote:
>I dont think I seriously misunderstand philosophy. 🙂
You do not say what you think it is, as I have.
> Maybe just the opposite. I only misunderstand it if I fail. 🙂 So far I have made it farther than anyone else.
Farther towards what? Can you say in two short sentences, what philosophical problem are you trying to solve and what is your proposed solution?
>But it could be an intellectual dead end. Unfortunately neither of us can know that yet. :).
Whether it is or not, what you write seems more about sociology and anthropology.
>I do agree that I rely on the sciences and their emphasis on external correspondence rather than the logic of internal consistency.
Philosophy cannot be reduced to internal consistency. Science can be used to test and inform theories, but not relied on. In any case, empiricism is a philosophical theory. Therefore it cannot be used to refute philosophy.
>But even that moderate statement may be difficult to parse. And as I suggested, it’s probably a bit much for email. I can only leave breadcrumbs and they aren’t enough of a trail.
Theories that are not a confused muddle can usually be stated plainly, boldly, and succinctly.
>I had hoped to find some common ground because I argue that you are correct and I would like to restate your argument in Propertarian terms if I can understand your reasoning well enough not to misrepresent it.
But I use liberty to explain property, not property to explain liberty. That previous attachment ought to be clear.
>But if the breadcrumbs aren’t enough then the investment required of you is too high and you have no way to know if its worthwhile.
I see little philosophy and little clarity.
>I have, believe it or not, obtained enough insight from our exchange, your work, and postings to understand your frame of reference. I wish you could understand mine. Its lonely out here. ;). Lol
As I wrote, if you were to state it plainly and succinctly, then I might understand it.
>Thanks again. Kudos for getting morality right.
All libertarians tend to get morality right. I aimed to get liberty right.
Jan
Source date (UTC): 2014-09-13 11:32:00 UTC
THE CONSEQUENCE OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM IS PERFORMATIVE TRUTH.
What is the difference then, between the critical rationalist position that we cannot know the truth of a theory, only eliminate error; and the consequential argument that I cannot know that you speak the truth, and therefore must be sure that you speak honestly and without error?
You know; the blade cuts both ways. Just as in science we are constrained to constructing recipes and eliminating error, in all our arguments we are constrained to operational descriptions, and defending against deception.
Not sure how critical rationalists who buy into Popperian platonism feel about that – but I think it is an inescapable consequence of the critical rationalist assertion.
We can construct recipes. We can testify to operations. That’s all we can do. Any narrative we construct is a memory device and nothing more.
Why do we need theories anyway? Justification? If I construct by verbal means, a general rule, that describes common properties of many recipes, then have I really done anything at all other than create a loose description of similar recipes? That description places no constraints on future recipes. Isnt’ this just an artifact of speech? Of verbalism? Isn’t speech a symbolic generalization of many memories? So why should we give such weight to what amounts to a verbal protocol for the purpose of simplifying communication. i mean, wouldn’t it be easier to just transfer memories of related instances? We can’t do that but that’s what our words attempt to do.
Actions not words.
Source date (UTC): 2014-09-12 14:20:00 UTC
… I THINK? CHANGING IT FROM PREFERENCE FOR MEANING TO NECESSITY FOR TESTIMONY?
[I]’ve been reading more on General Semantics and their meme E-Prime, and it’s pretty interesting how they advocate GS/E’ for the purpose of clarity and meaning.
Now, I advocate E’ and Operationalism because one cannot testify to the truth of a statement if one cannot state it in operational language. Because you can’t possibly state that you know what you’re talking about.
So, I think my argument in favor of E’ as a moral and ethical constraint, (and in the case of negative externalities, a criminal constraint) is stronger than the argument for ‘clarity and meaning’.
ON A MY CONTINUED FRUSTRATION WITH A PRIORISM AS A VERBALISM
[I]’ve still got to address the strange a priorist argument that there is something particularly interesting about decreasing precision (making general statements). Yes we can drop properties of many similar instances in order to construct sets of commons properties, and give them names. But this is an inverse of the problem of making general observations and investigating which properties we observe are necessary and which are not.
Some descriptions, if made more precisely have no meaning: “wind” and “wave” are pretty good examples. At human scale they are meaningful statements. below human scale they are not. All statements of precision have maximum and minimum points of demarcation.
I mean, i guess if you start with instrumentalism, you implicitly start with human scale and the problem of precision and arbitrary precision as necessary properties of any description (theory).
I just guess this is one of those things that’s so obvious to me that I can’t imagine a literary alternative because I did not learn philosophy by literary (allegorical) means.
Curt
Analytic was close.
Operational was the answer.
Why did philosophers get it wrong?
Source date (UTC): 2014-08-22 04:40:00 UTC
https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-best-what-comes-after-postmodernism-essays
https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-best-what-comes-after-postmodernism-essays