Theme: Operationalism

  • Operational – Empirical Ratio – Empirical Economically empirical. Experimentally

    Operational – Empirical

    Ratio – Empirical

    Economically empirical.

    Experimentally Empirical

    Ratio – Historical

    Ratio – Moral

    Moral / Religio-moral

    A-rational Sentimental.

    Expressive

    … Ok I can write the operational method now, showing that the scientific method consists of a subset of that method.

    Took me almost a year an a half to figure this out. 🙁 and in retrospect it should have been obvious.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-26 07:50:00 UTC

  • WHERE HOPPE MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO ABANDON APRIORISM I just figured out where

    WHERE HOPPE MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO ABANDON APRIORISM

    I just figured out where Hans missed the irrefutable argument against apriorism, and the necessity of operationalism. He looked it in the face so to speak, and didn’t understand it.

    He must not have understood why Bridgman was demanding Operationalism, or why Brouwer was demanding Intuitionism. (same thing – different names).

    I could make a career out of this single issue…. fascinating.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-25 03:55:00 UTC

  • AGAIN – IT”S NOT THAT I DON’T UNDERSTAND… ABANDON RATIONALISM AND LEAVE CHILDH

    AGAIN – IT”S NOT THAT I DON’T UNDERSTAND… ABANDON RATIONALISM AND LEAVE CHILDHOOD BEHIND.

    —“If I understand Curt’s argument orrectly, operationalism has a long history in Austrian economics. Hayek called it scientism, Mises called it panphysicalism and posivism, and Menger called a version of it “The Historical Point of View in Economic Research.”—

    Not quite. if mises had correctly understood the difference between logic and science, he would have understood that he was attempting in economics what had been done in physics and mathematics, and that his praxeology was a failed attempt to state operationalism in the context of economics. Instead he mistakenly denied that economics must be practiced empirically and tested operationally to know if in fact, economic theories were internally consistent, because they consisted entirely of rational actions. However instead he misunderstood the properties of axiomatic systems, and declared economics axiomatic, rather than theoretic. He probably made this mistake because he failed to grasp the problem of arbitrary precision in the construction of general rules. I know his work very well, and Mises was not sophisticated in these matters.

    If you want to read, you can, in the SEP, on Operationalism, Operationism, Intuitionism, Reverse Russian Mathematics, and the problems of decidability as well as that of the debate between the various factions that resulted in the current state of theory in mathematics.

    —“No Austrian to my knowledge has argued that operationalism and economic reasoning are equivalent or that one is superior to the other. Instead, the argument made by the Austrians is Methodological Dualism.”—

    Well I know that, but it just means that they’re wrong, and have been proven wrong by subsequent events. The difference between the social sciences and the physical sciences is only in that the decidability of all social (economic) propositions is ascertainable by subjective experience. In other words, given proximately equal knowledge, we can empathize with any economic statement, and determine whether what a rational actor would do. This is required for humans to understand intent, and understanding intent is required for cooperation. Lastly human incentives except at the margins are marginally indifferent. So for these reasons all propositions are decidable by man. Tn other words, we know the first cause, at some level of precision, of all human action. Whereas in the physical science we are unable to rely on mere sense perception or sympathy for the purpose of decidability. All human knowledge regardless of context is theoretical, because all human knowledge is that is non-tautological must be hypothetical. Since all axiomatic statements are by and of necessity tautological, then they are useful for the purpose of modeling within some specified precision, where such precision is determined by the utility of the action (context.)

    —“It seems to me that he is confused about Austrian economics.”—

    As you can see, quite not. There are a few men living that can debate me on this subject and I know them, and they know me. ( And they aren’t fans. )

    —“Curt seems to rely totally on the post-Misesian ethics of Murray Rothbard and other anarcho-capitalist as a source for his understanding of Austrian economics.”—

    Not sure where you are getting that idea from. If you were to restate that as that I am trying to expose and refute the rothbardians, and that mises’ errors were compounded by Rothbard for his ideological purposes, and that if we were to restate mises as I have as merely a visionary but failed operationalist, then I would agree with all that.

    —“He neglects the tension between the anarcho-capitalists and other writers who label themselves Austrian economists. He particularly neglects the pre-Rothbardians, Hayek and Mises.”—

    I actually state (as does even wikipedia) that the Misesian program is not ‘austrian’, but cosmopolitan, and it is the cosmopolitan program that has been discredited, and that the original Austrian program has been fully incorporated into current economics, save for the still open dispute over the business cycle; and that just as rothbard (somewhat dishonestly) appropriated the term libertarian, the rothbardians have appropriated the term “Austrian” through successful propagandizing. So successfully that the classical liberals (namely the team at GMU), as well as the the think tanks other than the rothbardian advertising machine (mises.or) have had to distance themselves from the term. (A fact which the GMU crowd laments now and then.)

    —“I deny that the rationalist program demonstrated success in philosophy,” I don’t think that anyone ever claimed that Austrian critiques had much success in philosophy. On the contrary, in his introduction the Human Action, Mises denies that the new economics, [which, in my opinion had, up that time, been best expressed by the Austrian economist], had influenced philosophers.”—

    Probably my fault but I cannot see the the connection between my statement and your response. Sorry. I didn’t claim that Austrian critiques had success in philosophy, I claimed that rationalism (in Kantian, broader german, and cosmopolitan, and therefore Misesian form) has proven to be a vehicle for dishonesty, and error. I don’t argue that Mises was dishonest, I argue he was wrong, because the problem was a very hard one. It’s rothbard I’m not sure about.

    —“the capacity of humans to perceive, remember, compare, and judge is extremely limited”— >”This general statement does not apply to the geniuses. “—

    You are kidding right? Up here in the rarified air we all rely on numbers, the narrative, pencil and paper, the need for cartesian representation…. I really don’t know where you’re getting that from… Furthermore it’s disprovable by Mises rather absurd errors alone, or by Poincare’s failure to eliminate the frame of reference, even though he had correctly understood the consequence of the Lorenz transformations. I mean… where do I start? We can measure it. It’s simple. …

    —“But that is not the important point. I wrote “You deny that distinctly human minds have a logical structure. The logical structure is simple and universal.”—

    You would need to (a) define ‘minds have’ in some existential terminology. (b) define ‘logical structure’ in some form other than metaphorical, ‘logical structure’ is an existential statement (c) that if the structure is simple and universal why haven’t stated what it is, in simple universal terms. I am fairly current cognitive sciences and experimental and evolutionary psychology. So I will understand it if you state it.

    —“We define a human mind as distinct from that of its nearest non-human mind in terms of means and ends.”—

    I think you mean that we observe that humans plan, and that, humans are capable of planning, and that planning requires we are capable of means (inputs and operations) and ends (outputs). (The statement ‘we define…’ is an axiomatic one, but the statement that follows is empirical.)

    —“The human mind, we reason aprioristically, has ends,”—

    I think you mean that given our observations, we deduce, induce or guess, that human beings demonstrate that the act to pursue ends, and therefore the human brain is capable of conceiving of ends.

    —“it perceives what it regards as realistic means of attaining them, and it expects that if it applies those means, its utility will be greater than if it does not. “—

    Yes, I think that is correct.

    —“This mental operation is carried out by the natural scientist and by ordinary people in their everyday lives.”—

    “—

    The act of planning is demonstrated by all people we know of, and we cannot observe individuals who we consider to demonstrate expected human behavior who cannot.

    Yes, but this tells us nothing about the limits to that process, nor the numerable cognitive biases that we have documented, nor the reasons that we require recorded observations, instrumentation and operational language in order to ensure that what we imagine is that which others can replicate.

    —“To deny the logical structure is tantamount to denying that human beings are distinct in that it can reason about how to achieve what they regard as their ends.”—

    But then I never did deny this straw man, right? I denied that rationalism dependent upon reason independent of the scientific method constituted in empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism and testimonial truth, have been demonstrated to provide greater success in all walks of life and in all fields, than rationalism, and that rationalism had been used moreover to conduct the vast majority of ethical, moral, pseudoscientific, political, economic, platonic and mystical deceptions.

    —“Curt may reject this argument,”—-

    You haven’t made an argument. You’ve merely stated the straw many that people are capable of SOME reason, but not impugned the argument that people are ONLY capable of SOME reason and measurably, very little of it, and that we can measure it consistently. And that the vast majority of errors, and lies have been conducted using the rationalist method.

    —” but you should not advance the hypothesis that it is dishonest or that one who makes it is a liar. “—

    But you have just done an elaborate job of demonstrating that I am correct, by misrepresenting my position, arguing against a straw man, pretending that you are reliant upon axiomatic (closed) argument. And you have avoided the central argument that I have put forward by doing it.

    SO HOW DO I KNOW? How am I to assume that you can conduct this elaborate a set of mistakes, without attributing mistakes of this number and severity to lying? WHereas, if you stated the same argument as a sequece of human actions, or even vaguely analytically so that each staetment was testable, then I could at least know you were TRYING to speak truthfulfly.

    Now, because I can deduce that you’ve been fooled by the use of overloading by the advocates of the rationalist fallacy, and I can tell that you are not fully cognizant of what you’re saying, I know that just as a child has been taught that which he believes to be right, but lacks the ability to refute, that you’re just propagating someone else’s lie, rather than lying yourself. (I knew that all along really, because you can only be fooled by the rothbardian misesian fallacies if you morally intuit that they are correct even if you cannot criticize them sufficiently to falsify them.) In other words, you have learned an elaborate means of justifying your cognitive biases.

    SO IF YOU TALK LIKE A LIAR, AND YOU”RE TELLING A LIE, HOW DO I KNOW YOUR INTENTIONS? Whereas if you talk as an honest man in the language of science, which is mischaracterized as ‘the scientific method’ since that method has nothing necessarily to do with the practice of physical science, and everything to do with ensuring that one is making honest testimony regardless of subject matter.

    So yes I was taunting you so that you would create an emotional association with this argument and ponder it.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-23 11:06:00 UTC

  • “Hayek did not disagree with Mises because he used words to express his ideas. “

    —“Hayek did not disagree with Mises because he used words to express his ideas. “—

    Words consist of names (extant observable), experiences (unobservable, extant), allegories(unobservable in-extant). Words can be used to convey truth, or meaning, or truth and meaning, or falsehood and meaning. If I speak in names, (operational descriptions are unique just as positional numbers are unique) then I can speak in names of extant entities. Otherwise nothing else is observable. It is very hard to err, lie, or add imaginary content.

    Conversely if I speak in analogies and allegories, I can convey meaning to those with asymmetric information (less), but I can also load and frame that meaning, and with effort, overload our reason (via suggestion). And if I speak in analogies I cannot make a truth claim. What I **CAN** do is first convey meaning by analogy, then restate the idea operationally, and convey truth. And this is, it turns out, the only honest way of conveying understanding truthfully.

    So, as an example of deception and error, your statement that I relied upon the category ‘words’ was dishonest, when my argument relied upon the category ‘analogies’.

    –“You deny that distinctly human minds have a logical structure.”–

    Well aside from the fact that ‘mind’ is the name of an experience that requires time to produce changes in state, and brain is the name of the extant organ, this is a very poor sentence, but I will try to repair it by restating it as: the acts of daydreaming, thinking, reasoning, calculating and computing demonstrate that humans are capable of the practice of logical argument. Therefore humans are capable of logical thought.

    Now, again, you have used fuzzy language to make a dishonest statement. Instead, what I have said is that the capacity of humans to perceive, remember, compare, and judge is extremely limited, and that we must rely upon instrumentation both logical and physical to assist us in all but the most trivial of comparisons. (I don’t know how it is possible to refute this.) I have furthermore stated that language, unless operationally articulated, is so imprecise that error, bias, loading, framing, overloading, wishful thinking and the addition of imaginary content, that reason independent of empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism and testimonial truth (stated in e-prime for that matter) is not only insufficient a technology for the prevention of error, bias, loading, framing, overloading, wishful thinking, and the addition of imaginary content, but that if we look at the evidence throughout history, the primary function of rationalism is to justify, deceive, frame, and overload, and that humans do not seem to be easily able to detect errors when communication takes place in this method.

    So your entire paragraph on rationalism is an example of how one can attempt to use reason to justify the black or white fallacy: that you levy an accusation of denying that the capacity to reason logically, exists, when I merely state that the capacity to reason independent of empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism, and testimonial truth is extremely limited, (as evidenced by the failure of your own argument), and that is after accusing me of saying that reason cannot be used for honest discourse, rather than the fact that the vast majority of lies, deceptions and fallacies have been created using rationalism.

    —“But a method of doing the natural sciences is not the only logic that, in a pragmatic sense, has succeeded in helping humankind achieve progress. The logic of the classical economists has also succeeded. “—

    I stated that it is extremely hard to lie, cheat, steal, add imaginary content, frame, load, overload, and err, using the scientific method as constituted in empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism and testimonial truth. But it is very easy to conduct a dishonest argument that postulates straw men, and black or white fallacies using rationalism.

    The data suggests that the only reason to rely upon rationalism is to lie. That is because most liars rely upon rationalism. The reason scientists rely upon the method (more accurately as empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism, and testimonial truth), is because it is harder to err, bias and lie. So if any given argument can be conducted both in the language of liars, and in in the language of truth tellers, then why would one defend use of the language of liars?

    The most troubling thing about rationalism, is that it does not help correct those people who are telling lies, but who are not desirous of lying.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-23 08:42:00 UTC

  • GETTING CLOSER TO CORRECTING THE CRITICAL RATIONALISTS —“We can only know when

    GETTING CLOSER TO CORRECTING THE CRITICAL RATIONALISTS

    —“We can only know when we speak falsehoods. We cannot know when we speak the truth. Therefore all we can ever do is testify truthfully. And we can only testify truthfully, even if we desire to, by operational description, because we ourselves are the victims of error, bias, wishful thinking, habit, and deception. So to speak truthfully is only possible if we limit ourselves to operational actions and measures. This does not convey ‘meaning’ which is what others often desire. We can either leave the derivation of meaning to others, or we can construct the meaning by way of analogy. The problem is, that when we construct an analogy, we must add information external to the facts. To convey meaning is not to convey the truth. One can convey meaning by analogy, but then one must provide operational descriptions in order to prove that one has not erred, biased, imagined, or lied. This argument, is the simplest reduction that I know of for the arguments of the intuitionists(mathematics), Operationists (psychology), and Operationalists (physics), and Praxeologists (economics). It is a moral restatement of the mathematical argument for the requirement of Reverse Russian Mathematics in order to make a truth claim. Speaking truthfully is merely a matter of whether we can testify to their existential possibility of their construction as well as the theory’s existential correspondence with demonstrable reality .”—

    I think that when I was arguing with critical rationalists earlier in the year, I could not distill this argument down this far. Neither Poppers ‘meaning’ nor David’s formal logic solve this problem. As such I stipulate that this is the correct solution to the critical rationalist problem, and that as Alex has argued, popper was a cosmopolitan, and he was a victim of the vast legacy of cosmopolitan errors. He was half right but he was not right enough.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-22 11:23:00 UTC

  • “Truth defeats gossip, operationalism defeats obscurantism, testimony defeats pl

    –“Truth defeats gossip, operationalism defeats obscurantism, testimony defeats platonism, but only declaring the normative commons as shareholder property rights allow us to punish the use of gossip, obscurantism and platonism; and only punishment for such thefts provides an incentive against their use.”–

    Punish evil.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-22 10:12:00 UTC

  • CAN YOU GUESS? FOUR DIFFERENT POLITIES, FOUR DIFFERENT STRATEGIES. If a group of

    CAN YOU GUESS? FOUR DIFFERENT POLITIES, FOUR DIFFERENT STRATEGIES.

    If a group of people evolved under a sufficient language, so that it was possible to speak operationally, so that one could testify to the truth of a statement, then what would that culture look like? Would that behavior be captured in their genes? If so, then how?

    If a group of people evolved under a deficient language, so that it was impossible to speak sufficiently operationally so that one could testify to the truth of a statement, what would that culture look like? Would that behavior be captured in their genes? If so, how?

    If a group of people evolved specifically to use language to conduct loading, framing, overloading, and deception in order to lie cheat and steal, what would that culture look like? Would that behavior be captured in their genes? How?

    If a group of people evolved specifically to use behavior, not language, to conduct theft by preying upon empathy and altruism, such that they were unable to even distinguish the truth necessary for testimony, and would never give it, even if they did, then what would that culture look like? Would that behavior be captured in their genes? If so, then how?

    Truth, morality, and productivity, represents one end of the evolutionary spectrum. But, does that mean that it is the optimum COMPETITIVE strategy, even if it is the optimum ECONOMIC strategy? Or is it an evolutionary dead end, because it is so weak at competing?


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-21 08:05:00 UTC

  • ECONOMICS IS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE – ALL DISCIPLINES MUST BE CONSTRUCTED AS EMPIR

    ECONOMICS IS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE – ALL DISCIPLINES MUST BE CONSTRUCTED AS EMPIRICAL SCIENCES – AND THOSE THAT ONE ARGUES OTHERWISE DEMONSTRATE EMPTY VERBALISM ON THE PART OF THE ADVOCATE.

    (from elsewhere)

    a) to be classified as a science a discipline must practice the scientific method: observation (measurement to overcome limits to perception and memory), tests of external correspondence (experiments), tests of internal consistency (logic).

    b) empiricism (observation) is not equal to experimentation (positivism).

    c) economic properties are not deducible from first principles, and we have dozens of examples, the most common of which is sticky prices.

    d) humans are able to cooperate because of sympathetic intention, and could not do so without it. That is, we can (as can dogs, but not apes) understand intentions. We are also marginally indifferent in our incentives. As such we can test the rationality of incentives. Therefore all economic statements are empirically testable by sympathetic experience (the reduction of stimuli to that which we can perceive by our senses.) Or what is called ‘instrumentalism’.

    e) as such economics does not differ from any other scientific discipline in that we require instrumentation (both mechanical and logical) to reduce that which we cannot experience to that which we can experience, and upon experiencing, make a comparison. We simply need less instrumentation to perceive the data than we do in most other fields.

    f) the purpose of which is to develop general rules of arbitrary precision that we can use to model that which we cannot experience directly, from fragmentary information that we can experience directly.

    g) All statements of external correspondence are and always must be theoretical (in the spectrum intuition->hypothesis->theory->law.

    h) Since all hypothetical statements must include arbitrary precision, all general rules are limited by some scale or another(greater or lesser), beyond which the theory fails. In other words, all phenomenon demonstrate a distribution. That which does not is merely tautological.

    i) All axiomatic statements consist of constructions, with deterministic consequences, not observations – because all information that can exist, exists in the axioms.

    Ergo, economics is an empirical science as are all disciplines. All thought is empirical, hypothetical, theoretical, and bound by one or more axis of arbitrary precision. Logical MODELS consist of general rules. Axiomatic systems are TAUTOLOGICAL. Their value is in their tautology: which allows us to test the internal consistency of our statements.

    Mises failed to grasp operationalism which is why he had to create a lot of verbalist nonsense by equating verbal definitions with the properties of reality, so that he could justify his failure.

    (Honestly in retrospect, it’s amazing that like marx he could create that much nonsense – enough nonsense to overload the gullible.).


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-14 03:48:00 UTC

  • FROM ELSEWHERE: CLASSIFYING ONE’S SELF AS ‘AUSTRIAN’: INVESTIGATION VERSUS EXPLA

    FROM ELSEWHERE: CLASSIFYING ONE’S SELF AS ‘AUSTRIAN’: INVESTIGATION VERSUS EXPLANATION.

    I think most people who self identify as austrian outside of their employment:

    (a) mean that they use the austrian model of incentives and partial knowledge to understand the world we live in.

    (b) are merely using “I am” for the purpose of brevity, rather than the fully articulated: “I practice austrian economic models when I think of social questions.”

    The thing is, we can test statement (b), and have tested it, and it turns out that people can actually make use of that model, and that their use of that model is highly predictive, and highly explanatory.

    So given that the misesian austrian program (versus the christian austrian program) evolved as a legal-rational one, rather than an empirical one, I am not sure that the average person who uses the Austrian model is not practicing Austrian thought. I disagree that he is practicing empirical investigation, but I agree that he is practicing rational explanation.

    So given that to ‘be’ something is a verbalism (obscurantism using the verb to-be), and that Austrian thought falls into both empirical study, and rational explanation, I think that the debate as to whether one self identifies as Austrian or not, is simply a verbal criticism in itself.

    The empirical economist investigates phenomenon, and the rational modeler explains phenomenon by deduction from incentives. And both classify themselves as Austrian but fail to distinguish between the two schools of Austrian methods.

    Unfortunately Mises (and all the fruitcake-fringe at the Mises institute) conflate the empirical attempt at defining general rules, and the deductive application of general rules (modeling) for the purpose of explanation.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-13 20:46:00 UTC

  • MISES, HAYEK, ROTHBARD, AND THE AUSTRIAN PROGRAM (from elsewhere) Gabriel Zanott

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/06/21/mises-praxeology-as-the-failure-to-develop-economic-operationalism-yes/UNDERSTANDING MISES, HAYEK, ROTHBARD, AND THE AUSTRIAN PROGRAM

    (from elsewhere)

    Gabriel Zanotti is correct that (1) the hard core of the Austrian scientific research programme: is the study of dispersed knowledge. But Austrians also retain the remaining thesis of the Austrian program (2) that the business cycle (whether government intervention amplifies and extends booms and busts.) And (3) the Austrian program is perhaps best understood as an effort to develop a legal philosophy of economics rather than rational or empirical. Failure to understand this distinction is probably why the movement failed.

    The following might be life altering for those of you who are deeply engaged in philosophy?

    A) Mises’ program can best be understood as a failed effort to develop Economic Operationalism. He intuited it, but was not skilled enough to solve it, as did Bridgman and Brouwer in science and mathematics. (See my post at: http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/06/21/mises-praxeology-as-the-failure-to-develop-economic-operationalism-yes/ )

    B) Hayek succeeds in grasping that a legal philosophy is what is needed for the formation of a free society such that we produce the optimum economic outcomes – unfortunately he fails (as does Popper, Mises, and Rothbard, and even Hoppe) to solve the underlying cause, which is that property and morality are identical expressions given the structure of the family in relation to the structure of production. Hoppe correctly determines that property is the unit of commensurability and compatibility in all human cooperation (social systems) but his generation lacked the science to demonstrate that all human moral intuitions (instincts and norms) can be expressed as property rights, or to map them to the various family structures. (See my post here: http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/09/28/the-evolution-of-cooperation/ for condensed list, although I discuss this topic daily.)

    D) Rothbard an best be seen as an attempt to give us a religio-moral code, and an formal-institution-free society, rather than a legal system of formal institutions, and a legal philosophy. Rothbard writes as a cosmopolitan ideologist using the same arguments as marxists, socialists and neo-conservatives: to express Jewish ethics in christian legal terms. And, yes, Rothbard writes simply and accessibly. He excites our moral sentiments. But just as Hayek’s legal framework will produce beneficial ends, Rather than the high trust polity of the northern europeans advocated by Hayek using the formal institution of law, Rothbarian ethics using the informal institution of belief (moral religion) would produce the low trust levantine polity of the middle east. So while few self identified libertarians will like or appreciate it, Rothbard is probably as damaging to the liberty movement as Hayek was beneficial. As far as I know I have put Rothbard to bed permanently. (See: http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/06/20/rendering-rothbardian-fallacies-intellectually-embarrassing-and-argumentatively-impossible/ )

    Roula Robinson above, is largely correct: only western-into-europeans of the north sea region invented liberty as we know it (universalist liberty), by evolving it. And only the English managed to implement it as a formal system of legal institutions. And only Americans wrote it down in a constitution (Rather poorly it turns out). But that does not mean that once a formal institution is understood (universal individual property rights, rule of law, organic evolution of that law), it cannot be spread and adopted. However, the point I think Emmanuel Todd has demonstrated most convincingly, is that family structure and structure of production, determine moral intutions (as well as our genetics). So diversity turns out to be a ‘bad’, if diversity means a diversity in family structure. (See http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/08/26/how-do-family-structures-vary/ , or any of these: http://www.propertarianism.com/?s=family&submit.x=0&submit.y=0 )


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-13 20:24:00 UTC