Theme: Governance

ON MONARCHS AND MONARCHY VS THEIR ABSENCE

With Bill Joslin

==REACTIONS==

—“This [post] is like Filmer vs Locke, but massively upgraded.”—Oliver Westcott

—“Artfully articulated Curt. A fundamental post.”—Jim Leis

==REACTIONS==

THE DISCUSSION:

–“Whether our current models or monarchy, we’ve managed the Commons via rule of law. “— BIll Bill Joslin

Well, we’ve managed them by rule by legislation, not rule of law. The difference between the ‘liberal’ and ‘monarchical’ order is reducible to the limitation of the monarchy by the common law, and the end of limitation of bourgeoise and the proletariat by the common law. In other words democracy sought to legitimize an END to rule of law, and its replacement with ‘whatever a majority can get away with’.

But I think you mean rule by legislation and so I get your point.

—“In our current models, this makes regulation, legislation a product for sale (incentive for parasitism upon the commons).”—

Yes.

—“With monarchy an incentive for coercion (incentive for predation).”—

Incomplete sentence. Not sure I can guess what you intend. Monarchy has an incentive for predation? How would we measure that? How would we compare the consequences of the constitutional monarchies vs the constitutional republics?

—“Deconflating management of the commons from rule of law (application of force upon the polis) would close the doors to both applications of natural law (humans responding to incentives) which run counter to cooperation or result in cooperation which inspires distrust and retaliation.”—

I think I understand. Deconflating Government(commons) from judiciary(rule of law) restores the separation of rule of law (decidability in matters of dispute), from enforceable contract (legislation), so that legislation cannot circumvent rule of law (under natural law).

—“The VC model, IMO, demonstrates advantage because it separates management from the rule (distribution of capital)… All things requiring applications of force stay in the hands of the judiciary (judicial supremacy) separated from the management of the commons – managers would be held accountable via the granting or removal of budgets based on their performance. “—

Well, yes, but, I tend to think of it as solving the problem of calculability (accountability and measurement), as well as converting from a ‘redistribute the spoils of the private sector under the windfall of colonialism’, to ‘how can we invest in creating returns in the absence of the windfalls of colonialism?” In other words it converts a government from profiting from conquest and immigration to profiting from increases in knowledge, invention, and productivity.

So we end up with an empirical organization very similar to the german princedoms. Which is the same conclusion Hoppe came to. Albeit with his Jewish/Rousseauian vision of man.

—“No more lawmakers – only one law – natural law by which restitutions and punishments are written and rewritten by judges – legislation branches simply become a management staff with no power over the law (only over application of the budget). If they f#ck up, pull their budget (fire them) and give it to the more capable. Establish measures of performance based on the quality of the commons (high-trust vectors like degree of crime, the strength of an economy, degree of polis engagement), peg the budget based on the mean production of the polis (say 20-30% of GDP) – pay managers based on the mode income of the polis. All three provide incentives to increase trust, trade and production of the entire society. “—

Yes.

—“The first principle of any commons creation or preservation is the degree by which it aids in developing agency of the polis (education, critical thinking, physical health, emotional maturity, group loyalty, tendency to cooperate).”—

Yes.

—“Crap food may increase trade and GDP, but impacts good health. Crap cultural products (music, literature, entertainment) may increase trade and GDP but destroys social values, intellect and aesthetic values etc. Miley Cirus would be locked up and Lindsay Sterling or Jenny Wu supported etc. Drinking drugs and porn may increase trade and GDP but dissolve sociability, agency etc, and would be outlawed.”—

This is a choice. From my perspective, if it’s inside the home and invisible to others it doesn’t matter, but it cannot be present in the commons, yes. The more park-like we can make the commons, and the more ‘impulse’ is confined to the privacy of the home, the better.

—“The only way a monarch would provide the above is if that particular monarch chose to operate that way and this to me seems to be precarious and unstable.”—

Not really sure what your definition of monarch is. A christian monarch was always bound by both church, common law, and competitors. And perhaps I am more conscious of (excellent) german princedom’s than (absurd) french monarchy. And it is the former, Lichtenstein, England, Denmark, I am using as my model of ‘monarch’. A judge of last resort. Not a manager.

The problem is judge of last resort domestically and internationally. In other words, group processes regularly fail, and so Veto and Pardon (both via-negativas) must protect against the people’s fashion and the powerful’s folly.

I have seen what has happened with monarchies and those without them and the jury of history is clearly on the side of an individual rather than a group (oligarchy), or a larger group (political class), or an even larger group (priestly caste). If for no other reason than an individual judge of last resort is easier to limit.

However, I would prefer (although I understand others might not) a well-funded monarchy whose objectives were largely ritual and charity. Primarily because it denies the usurpation of that role at the top of the status hierarchy to others with renter’s incentives rather than owner’s incentives.

—“Instead of partially abstracting ruling roles (like the Buddhists do by having their leaders assume the role of an archetype) we should fully abstract(institutionalise, incorporate) these function away from the individual which may assume the role and insulate the functions from arbitrary individual preferences.”—

I think you mean, eliminate discretionary rule. And I think that it is far easier to do so if a judge of last resort exists who defends a position of pure veto and familial legacy than if the position is possible to obtain through positive incentives.

So I see (and I think it is very hard to argue against this) that the christian monarchy under rule of law, under natural law, limited to powers of veto (and pardon – which are the same thing: negations) is a defensive position against the cunning and innovation of individuals using and abusing the processes of institutions.

The purpose of the monarch is not to employ status and power, but to deny status and power. Not via positiva – but via-negativa.

-Curt

=== A FEW QUOTES ===

—“This war would never have come unless, under American and modernising pressure, we had driven the Habsburgs out of Austria and the Hohenzollerns out of Germany. By making these vacuums we gave the opening for the Hitlerite monster to crawl out of its sewer on to the vacant thrones. No doubt these views are very unfashionable….”—

Winston Churchill, 8th April 1945.

—“We should all bear carefully in mind the constitutional safeguards inherent in the monarchy: While the Queen occupies the highest office of state, no one can take over the government. While she is head of the law, no politician can take over the courts. While she is ultimately in command of the Armed Forces, no would-be dictator can take over the Army. The Queen’s only power, in short, is to deny power to anyone else. Any attempt to tamper with the royal prerogative must be firmly resisted.”—

D G O Hughes, letter to The Daily Telegraph, 1st September 1998.

—“The monarchy’s most important constitutional function is simply to be there: by occupying the constitutional high ground, it denies access to more sinister forces; to a partisan or corrupt president, divisive of the nation; or even to a dictator. The Queen’s powers are a vital safeguard of democracy and liberty.”—

Sir Michael Forsyth, speech 26th January, 1999.

—“Parliamentary monarchy fulfils a role which an elected president never can. It formally limits the politicians’ thirst for power because with it the supreme office of the state is occupied once and for all.”—

Max Weber, German economist.

—“The value of a constitutional monarchy is to provide a figurehead to embody a sense of nationhood beyond the divisions of temporal political argument. Republicans, who choose to give the impression that the British enjoy as much power as French peasants in the reign of Louis XVI, believe that in a democracy just about everything that moves has to be elected. This callow approach would result in a polarised and unpleasant society, of which the prime example is the United States.”—

Melanie Phillips, The Sunday Times, 7th November 1999.