Centralization is achieved by suppression of local parasitism and rents, and levying taxation instead, that is used for that suppression. This drastically reduces transaction costs and associated risks, which in turn produces volume and velocity. The problem of taxation arises when it is not used for the purpose of suppressing local parasitism and rents and instead simply centralizes parasitism and rents.
Theme: Externalities
-
Groups Differ in The Degree of Suppression of Externalization of Costs
—“Why should I be barred from contributing to the growth of another who would in turn contribute to my own growth?”— Bennard Ebanks When doing so imposes costs upon others by externality, who tolerate your presence only under the condition that you do not do so. Groups differ in the degree of suppression of externalization of costs. High trust high performance, homogenous polities are intolerant – and because they are, they have the choice. Low trust, heterogeneous, low performing are tolerant. Because they have no other choice.
-
Groups Differ in The Degree of Suppression of Externalization of Costs
—“Why should I be barred from contributing to the growth of another who would in turn contribute to my own growth?”— Bennard Ebanks When doing so imposes costs upon others by externality, who tolerate your presence only under the condition that you do not do so. Groups differ in the degree of suppression of externalization of costs. High trust high performance, homogenous polities are intolerant – and because they are, they have the choice. Low trust, heterogeneous, low performing are tolerant. Because they have no other choice.
-
“Why should I be barred from contributing to the growth of another who would in
—“Why should I be barred from contributing to the growth of another who would in turn contribute to my own growth?”— Bennard Ebanks
When doing so imposes costs upon others by externality, who tolerate your presence only under the condition that you do not do so.
Groups differ in the degree of suppression of externalization of costs. High trust high performance, homogenous polities are intolerant – and because they are, they have the choice. Low trust, heterogeneous, low performing are tolerant. Because they have no other choice.
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-21 12:07:00 UTC
-
The False Dichotomy of Socialism vs Capitalism
What kind of government? Rule of Law, or Rule by Discretion? It’s an easy question. Natural Law Capitalism (markets in everything, limited by externality) must emerge under rule of law since no other option is available. The only externality is black markets (crime) to profit by imposition of costs by externalities. All other forms of circumventing rule of law by rule of discretion will simply breed special interests, monopolies, rents, and corruption – as well as black markets One of the great intellectual scams of the 19th and 20th centuries is to sell the replacement of rule of law, with arbitrary rule – by selling capitalism (unlimited free trade capitalism that tolerates externalities), versus socialism (discretionary rule socialism that manufactures externalities in volume). There is no alternative to a mixed economy. The alternative is between rule of law mixed economy (dividends to shareholder-citizens), and arbitrary rule mixed economy (dividends to the political class and their enablers).
-
The False Dichotomy of Socialism vs Capitalism
What kind of government? Rule of Law, or Rule by Discretion? It’s an easy question. Natural Law Capitalism (markets in everything, limited by externality) must emerge under rule of law since no other option is available. The only externality is black markets (crime) to profit by imposition of costs by externalities. All other forms of circumventing rule of law by rule of discretion will simply breed special interests, monopolies, rents, and corruption – as well as black markets One of the great intellectual scams of the 19th and 20th centuries is to sell the replacement of rule of law, with arbitrary rule – by selling capitalism (unlimited free trade capitalism that tolerates externalities), versus socialism (discretionary rule socialism that manufactures externalities in volume). There is no alternative to a mixed economy. The alternative is between rule of law mixed economy (dividends to shareholder-citizens), and arbitrary rule mixed economy (dividends to the political class and their enablers).
-
Not to disagree, but it’s not clear borrowing for consumption is imposing harm o
Not to disagree, but it’s not clear borrowing for consumption is imposing harm or risk as long as one is not creating either intergenerational transfer or economic, monetary, and institutional fragility as a consequence. The problem? Without a measure (limit), we always do so.
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-20 14:35:00 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1020316145910517765
Reply addressees: @Race_Skin @DA_Stockman @SenMikeLee @TrueDilTom @realDonaldTrump @zerohedge @Styx666Official @JohnStossel @TruthGundlach @RubinReport @reason @mises
Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1020307379680940032
IN REPLY TO:
@Race_Skin
@DA_Stockman @SenMikeLee @TrueDilTom @realDonaldTrump @zerohedge @Styx666Official @JohnStossel @curtdoolittle @TruthGundlach @RubinReport @reason @mises https://t.co/SI9vMiMraG
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1020307379680940032
-
Ah… Yes. I see. Well, we use the terms (a) unintended consequences, (b) extern
Ah… Yes. I see. Well, we use the terms (a) unintended consequences, (b) externalities or accumulated externalities, or (c) self organizing (“Catallaxy” or “Catallatic”) or (d) market consequences or (e) evolutionary consequences.
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-04 14:51:25 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1014522071018344449
Reply addressees: @WytWlkrBronn
Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1014520241139961856
IN REPLY TO:
Original post on X
Original tweet unavailable — we could not load the text of the post this reply is addressing on X. That usually means the tweet was deleted, the account is protected, or X does not expose it to the account used for archiving. The Original post link below may still open if you view it in X while signed in.
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1014520241139961856
-
DIMENSIONS OF JURIDICAL DECISION 1 – Reciprocity (relatively easy) 2 – Incentive
DIMENSIONS OF JURIDICAL DECISION
1 – Reciprocity (relatively easy)
2 – Incentive -means, motive, opportunity (relatively easy)
3 – Competency (this is the problem)
4 – Externality (relatively easy)
The problem with competency is that the superior is liable for the ignorance of the inferior, while the superior has every incentives to profit from the ignorance and incompetence of the inferior. Hence the question of ghetto vs aristocratic ethics: whether you do not (ghetto) or do (aristocratic) demand paternal due diligence. And the western answer is “yes”.
(draft)
Source date (UTC): 2018-06-16 15:15:00 UTC
-
Q:Have you written about the Coase theorem?
—“Have you written about the Coase theorem in respect to the propertarian theory of property? I searched your site & didn’t find anything related. Most discussions of externalities are at least tangentially prefaced with a description of the Coase theorem & its limitations. I’m interested in how you (or another propertarian) would approach the problem.”— 1) Hmmm… I think I see polity formation as the process of suppressing local rents, centralizing them to pay for local suppression of rents, and trading a small number of low cost rents that are predictable (taxation) for many high transaction cost rents that are not …. 2) …and the individuals in the polity capturing the differences as profits on decreased transaction costs, increased risk tolerance, and higher economic (monetary) velocity. (This follows my general method of analysis by via-negativa: we are always saving time via cooperation). 3) Coase’s theorem can be stated the same way: the differential rents (different allocations of property rights) are suppressed by competition across variable property allocations (normative property, and formal property rights) by international trade. … 4) So Coase expresses at the inter-polity scale, what I express at the intra-polity scale. But the phenomenon is the same: increasing the radius of cooperation will suppress rents(assymetries) through competition, whether internal or external. …. 5) … and we eventually converge on individual property rights with gains captured and redistributed as commons, just as we see by comparison the convergence on mathematics, and the convergence on scientific ‘grammar’ as a universal language. 6) Competition at ever increasing scales causes convergence on indifference in all ‘grammars’ (Methods) of cooperation from the conceptual to the verbal, to the material. (offset by war, group strategy etc.) 7) So in this sense my approach is broader than Coase, and where Coase incorrectly suggests cooperation reinforces seeking equilibrium, instead cooperation seeks convergence, competition seeks efficiency, and opportunity seeks disequilibrium, with shocks as discovery of limits. 8) That’s pretty heavy but I think it’s in your intellectual wheelhouse. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine