—“Have you written about the Coase theorem in respect to the propertarian theory of property? I searched your site & didn’t find anything related. Most discussions of externalities are at least tangentially prefaced with a description of the Coase theorem & its limitations. I’m interested in how you (or another propertarian) would approach the problem.”— 1) Hmmm… I think I see polity formation as the process of suppressing local rents, centralizing them to pay for local suppression of rents, and trading a small number of low cost rents that are predictable (taxation) for many high transaction cost rents that are not …. 2) …and the individuals in the polity capturing the differences as profits on decreased transaction costs, increased risk tolerance, and higher economic (monetary) velocity. (This follows my general method of analysis by via-negativa: we are always saving time via cooperation). 3) Coase’s theorem can be stated the same way: the differential rents (different allocations of property rights) are suppressed by competition across variable property allocations (normative property, and formal property rights) by international trade. … 4) So Coase expresses at the inter-polity scale, what I express at the intra-polity scale. But the phenomenon is the same: increasing the radius of cooperation will suppress rents(assymetries) through competition, whether internal or external. …. 5) … and we eventually converge on individual property rights with gains captured and redistributed as commons, just as we see by comparison the convergence on mathematics, and the convergence on scientific ‘grammar’ as a universal language. 6) Competition at ever increasing scales causes convergence on indifference in all ‘grammars’ (Methods) of cooperation from the conceptual to the verbal, to the material. (offset by war, group strategy etc.) 7) So in this sense my approach is broader than Coase, and where Coase incorrectly suggests cooperation reinforces seeking equilibrium, instead cooperation seeks convergence, competition seeks efficiency, and opportunity seeks disequilibrium, with shocks as discovery of limits. 8) That’s pretty heavy but I think it’s in your intellectual wheelhouse. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
Theme: Externalities
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7) So in this sense my approach is broader than Coase, and where Coase incorrect
7) So in this sense my approach is broader than Coase, and where Coase incorrectly suggests cooperation reinforces seeking equilibrium, instead cooperation seeks convergence, competition seeks efficiency, and opportunity seeks disequilibrium, with shocks as discovery of limits.
Source date (UTC): 2018-06-01 16:17:58 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1002585052159627264
Reply addressees: @MartialSociety
Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1002367912512970752
IN REPLY TO:
@MartialSociety
@curtdoolittle I searched your site & didn’t find anything related. Most discussions of externalities are at least tangentially prefaced with a description of the Coase theorem & its limitations. I’m interested in how you (or another propertarian) would approach the problem.
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1002367912512970752
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“Have you written about the Coase theorem in respect to the propertarian theory
—“Have you written about the Coase theorem in respect to the propertarian theory of property? I searched your site & didn’t find anything related. Most discussions of externalities are at least tangentially prefaced with a description of the Coase theorem & its limitations. I’m interested in how you (or another propertarian) would approach the problem.”—
1) Hmmm… I think I see polity formation as the process of suppressing local rents, centralizing them to pay for local suppression of rents, and trading a small number of low cost rents that are predictable (taxation) for many high transaction cost rents that are not ….
2) …and the individuals in the polity capturing the differences as profits on decreased transaction costs, increased risk tolerance, and higher economic (monetary) velocity. (This follows my general method of analysis by via-negativa: we are always saving time via cooperation).
3) Coase’s theorem can be stated the same way: the differential rents (different allocations of property rights) are suppressed by competition across variable property allocations (normative property, and formal property rights) by international trade. …
4) So Coase expresses at the inter-polity scale, what I express at the intra-polity scale. But the phenomenon is the same: increasing the radius of cooperation will suppress rents(assymetries) through competition, whether internal or external. ….
5) … and we eventually converge on individual property rights with gains captured and redistributed as commons, just as we see by comparison the convergence on mathematics, and the convergence on scientific ‘grammar’ as a universal language.
6) Competition at ever increasing scales causes convergence on indifference in all ‘grammars’ (Methods) of cooperation from the conceptual to the verbal, to the material. (offset by war, group strategy etc.)
7) So in this sense my approach is broader than Coase, and where Coase incorrectly suggests cooperation reinforces seeking equilibrium, instead cooperation seeks convergence, competition seeks efficiency, and opportunity seeks disequilibrium, with shocks as discovery of limits.
8) That’s pretty heavy but I think it’s in your intellectual wheelhouse.
Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev, Ukraine
Source date (UTC): 2018-06-01 12:21:00 UTC
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The work’s been done. Trying to remember…. Um…. intergeneration cost of a si
The work’s been done. Trying to remember…. Um…. intergeneration cost of a single criminal reproducing. If I remember the most cited case is a woman whose offspring over three or four generations cause an unbelievable amount of damage.
Source date (UTC): 2018-05-24 01:17:35 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/999459361805266945
Reply addressees: @TheBurkeanOak
Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/999442054760480770
IN REPLY TO:
Original post on X
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Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/999442054760480770
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THE PROBLEM ISN”T TECH IT’S GOVERNMENT USURPATION OF JUDGEMENT OVER THE COMMONS
THE PROBLEM ISN”T TECH IT’S GOVERNMENT USURPATION OF JUDGEMENT OVER THE COMMONS
—“Technology explodes the prevalence of externalities–not just the frequency, but also the variety. The faster the pace of technological evolution, the more urgent the need to develop better and better systems of accounting for externalities, and mechanisms for adequately imposing costs on those who generate them.”— Skinner Layne
I would state it as wealth from technology makes it cheap to explore our differences and export externalities, for the simple reason that there is a delay between our development of any technology, the discovery of externalities, and the production of prohibitions on the actions that produce those (negative) externalities. And that the reason is government usurpation of our rights to use the courts to defend the commons as well as private and semi-private property. The wealthier we get the easier it is to use the courts and private interests to police innovations and externalities produced by them. The problem isn’t tech, or fear of tech, but that we have no systematic means of acting to constrain externalities in the commons because government has taken from us that role.
Source date (UTC): 2018-05-19 11:27:00 UTC
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The Problem Isn”t Tech It’s Government Usurpation of Judgement Over the Commons
—“Technology explodes the prevalence of externalities–not just the frequency, but also the variety. The faster the pace of technological evolution, the more urgent the need to develop better and better systems of accounting for externalities, and mechanisms for adequately imposing costs on those who generate them.”— Skinner Layne I would state it as wealth from technology makes it cheap to explore our differences and export externalities, for the simple reason that there is a delay between our development of any technology, the discovery of externalities, and the production of prohibitions on the actions that produce those (negative) externalities. And that the reason is government usurpation of our rights to use the courts to defend the commons as well as private and semi-private property. The wealthier we get the easier it is to use the courts and private interests to police innovations and externalities produced by them. The problem isn’t tech, or fear of tech, but that we have no systematic means of acting to constrain externalities in the commons because government has taken from us that role.
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The Problem Isn”t Tech It’s Government Usurpation of Judgement Over the Commons
—“Technology explodes the prevalence of externalities–not just the frequency, but also the variety. The faster the pace of technological evolution, the more urgent the need to develop better and better systems of accounting for externalities, and mechanisms for adequately imposing costs on those who generate them.”— Skinner Layne I would state it as wealth from technology makes it cheap to explore our differences and export externalities, for the simple reason that there is a delay between our development of any technology, the discovery of externalities, and the production of prohibitions on the actions that produce those (negative) externalities. And that the reason is government usurpation of our rights to use the courts to defend the commons as well as private and semi-private property. The wealthier we get the easier it is to use the courts and private interests to police innovations and externalities produced by them. The problem isn’t tech, or fear of tech, but that we have no systematic means of acting to constrain externalities in the commons because government has taken from us that role.
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Um, just tax people by population density. It’s not complicated. It’s progressiv
Um, just tax people by population density. It’s not complicated. It’s progressive as hell. Higher density means lower cost of commons maintenance and lower opportunity cost, and higher income. Now we progressively tax income but we don’t progressively tax benefits from the commons, and give credit for maintenance of the commons.
Source date (UTC): 2018-05-18 11:21:00 UTC
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The NYT article conveys is that it is that virtue signaling is a form of conspic
The NYT article conveys is that it is that virtue signaling is a form of conspicuous consumption that one forces others to pay the indirect cost of.
Or stated directly: we are burning the most valuable form of capital in the world (homogeneity and high trust) for virtue signals.
Source date (UTC): 2018-05-10 14:32:02 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/994585863207182336
Reply addressees: @KennethBuff @sapinker
Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/994585245491040257
IN REPLY TO:
Unknown author
@KennethBuff @sapinker Any time we state an incomplete premise we feed discord by supplying bias confirmation by doing the cherry picking for them. He stated an incomplete premise in order to feed the confirmation bias of a majority faction – not the Truth. (“The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth”)
Original post: https://x.com/i/web/status/994585245491040257
IN REPLY TO:
@curtdoolittle
@KennethBuff @sapinker Any time we state an incomplete premise we feed discord by supplying bias confirmation by doing the cherry picking for them. He stated an incomplete premise in order to feed the confirmation bias of a majority faction – not the Truth. (“The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth”)
Original post: https://x.com/i/web/status/994585245491040257
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De gustibus non est disputandum by Steve Pender Not quite. If you don’t pay for
De gustibus non est disputandum
by Steve Pender
Not quite. If you don’t pay for the costs (packaging, moving, defense) of your aesthetic, we gonna dispute. This is why there’s conflict sometimes between male aesthetic (direct, utilitarian, minimalist) and female (representational, extravagant, status-seeking). Aerospace/industrial/military vs shabby chic/victorian (at the extreme of female taste). It almost seems that some women have to be figuratively dragged kicking and screaming into the future.
Source date (UTC): 2018-05-01 20:20:00 UTC