Theme: Decidability

  • (NLI) Filled the hole in the prompt. I hope the team can find others. Curt Said:

    (NLI)
    Filled the hole in the prompt. I hope the team can find others.

    Curt Said:
    In the work we (doolittle) reduces this question to that of “The provision of decidability sufficient for the satisfaction of demand for infallibility in the context in question.”

    Geminii Said:
    Analysis complete
    That’s correct. In Doolittle’s work, the question of abortion is reduced to the question of “the provision of decidability sufficient for the satisfaction of demand for infallibility in the context in question.” This means that the question of whether abortion is permissible can be decided if there is enough information to determine whether it violates natural law.  

    In the case of abortion, the relevant natural law is the law of sovereignty. This law states that individuals have the right to self-determination and bodily autonomy. Doolittle argues that a woman’s sovereignty over her own body is absolute, and that a fetus does not have a competing claim to sovereignty until it is viable (able to survive independently outside the womb).  

    Therefore, Doolittle concludes that abortion is permissible. when the fetus is not yet viable because it does not violate natural law.


    Source date (UTC): 2024-11-18 20:50:12 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1858613699944259584

  • (NLI) Prompt update: Plugging the hole. Curt Said: ok. you have exposed a hole i

    (NLI)
    Prompt update: Plugging the hole.

    Curt Said:
    ok. you have exposed a hole in the prompt. Just as we want to explain causal chains, we want to explain epistemology, responsibility, warrantability, and liability chains, and to include externalities in our assessments. Ergo in the case of say, assisted suicide, or abortion, or gender modification, the extant arguments do not address the introduction of another party to the decision, and the capacity to know the future, take responsibility and liability for it, and whether it is possible to warrant one’s choices. This is the foundational problem with these irreversible decisions.

    I might need some assistance adding another line to the prompt to cause ai’s to consider this issue.

    Google Geminii Said:
    You’re absolutely right. The prompt, as it stands, misses a crucial element of Doolittle’s thought, particularly when applied to irreversible decisions like assisted suicide, abortion, or gender modification.

    The missing piece is the long-term consequences and the difficulty of predicting them, along with the assignment of responsibility and liability for those consequences. Doolittle places a high value on limiting harm and emphasizes personal responsibility. Any action with potentially irreversible and far-reaching consequences needs to be analyzed through this lens.

    Here’s a possible addition to the prompt to address this:

    “Analyze the issue of [moral/legal question] considering the full causal chain of consequences, including potential externalities and long-term effects. Address the epistemic limits of predicting future outcomes and how this uncertainty affects the assignment of responsibility and liability for the consequences of the decision.”

    This addition prompts the AI to consider:

    Epistemology: Can we know with sufficient certainty the full consequences of these decisions, especially the long-term ones?
    Responsibility: Who bears responsibility for the potential unforeseen consequences, both for the individual and for others affected?
    Warrantability: Given the uncertainty, can such a decision be truly warranted? What level of confidence is required to justify irreversible actions?
    Liability: What are the legal and moral implications of potential harm, and how should liability be assigned?

    By incorporating this element, you ensure the AI grapples with the full complexity of these issues in a way that’s more aligned with Doolittle’s emphasis on minimizing harm and taking responsibility for one’s actions.

    Here’s how this might look in the context of the examples you provided:

    Assisted Suicide: Does assisting someone in ending their life absolve them of responsibility for that act? What are the potential long-term consequences for society if assisted suicide becomes widely accepted?
    Abortion: Who bears responsibility for the potential long-term consequences (psychological, social, etc.) of an abortion, both for the woman and for any potential future children she might have?
    Gender Modification: Given the relative novelty of these procedures, can we fully know the long-term physical and psychological consequences? How should responsibility and liability be handled in cases of regret or unforeseen complications?
    By adding this dimension to the prompt, you push the AI to engage in a deeper and more nuanced analysis that better reflects Doolittle’s comprehensive approach to natural law.


    Source date (UTC): 2024-11-18 20:40:18 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1858611208385163265

  • Universal commensurability does not mean uniformity. I think the one bit I would

    Universal commensurability does not mean uniformity.

    I think the one bit I would counsel you with, is that while natural law provides decidability, it is a measure that we can test the deviation from while making trade-offs.

    But that it will prevent people (politicians, academics, public intellectuals, pseudoscientists, frauds, and ideologues) from claiming such trade offs (costs) are not extant and inescapable.

    Secondly demonstrated interests do vary between cultures for a variety of reasons precisely because of the history of their trade offs.

    As such I see my work on decidability (the method through natural law) as the provisioning of truth and transparency in the defense against abuses regardless of context.

    In other words, humanity has been taught justificationism, then falsification, then in my work adversarial competition and constructive logic, and finally with a system of measurement, we can not only explain group differences, class differences, sex differences, but also explain the trade offs while preventing deception to common in human history and the false promises and resulting conflict that emerge from the vulnerability of humans who lack such a system of measurement.

    I have no idea if you can comprehend this argument in it’s depth but I assume you may gather some understanding from it.


    Source date (UTC): 2024-11-18 08:00:05 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1858419896872493056

  • WORKING WITH THE AI ON MORAL QUESTIONS (these are just early tests without havin

    WORKING WITH THE AI ON MORAL QUESTIONS
    (these are just early tests without having trained it on the thirty or so foundational questions of moral disputes common in law. I’m setting a baseline so I know what it needs to learn. Basically I have to teach it to take the epistemic and liability route.)

    Prompt:
    OK, let’s revisit killing in war. Given morality (reciprocity) is only dependent upon the preference for producing cooperation and it’s discounts on persistence, when it is always of use in the ingroup, but then what if the criteria for the warfare is irreconcilable, and therefore cooperation is either predicted to be impossible, or undesirable? What then does ‘moral’ mean versus an outgroup where morality (reciprocity) is either undesirable or impossible. And how does that refine our understanding of the question of killing in war?

    ChatGPT said:
    This question delves into the limits of reciprocity and the contextual nature of morality when applied to ingroups versus outgroups. Let’s refine the framework to account for scenarios where cooperation is impossible or undesirable.

    Revisiting Killing in War: Reciprocity and Cooperation Limits

    1. Reciprocity as a Function of Group Dynamics

    Ingroup Reciprocity:
    Reciprocity is universally desirable within the ingroup to maintain cooperation and reduce the costs of conflict. Violations undermine group cohesion, threatening long-term stability and survival.
    Killing in war is justified against an outgroup aggressor to preserve ingroup sovereignty and reciprocity.

    Outgroup Reciprocity:
    Reciprocity depends on the potential for mutual benefit (cooperation).
    When no such potential exists—due to irreconcilable values, resource competition, or existential threat—reciprocity between groups is impossible or undesirable.
    In this case, the moral obligation to reciprocity is confined to the ingroup, and actions against the outgroup are judged by necessity, proportionality, and the ingroup’s survival interests.

    2. Defining Morality in War Against Non-Cooperative Outgroups

    Moral Action = Utility for Ingroup Persistence:
    Morality becomes operationally defined as maximizing ingroup persistence, sovereignty, and autonomy in a competitive or hostile environment.
    Killing in war against an irreconcilable outgroup is “moral” if it secures these objectives, even in the absence of reciprocity with the outgroup.

    Limits of Justification:
    Actions taken must still satisfy internal epistemological rigor—testifiability, accountability, and the minimization of unnecessary harm.
    Even if reciprocity with the outgroup is irrelevant, testimonial truth ensures that war is not waged unnecessarily or recklessly, thus maintaining internal legitimacy.

    3. Refinement of the Question of Killing in War

    Primary Justification:
    Killing in war is justified within the framework of Natural Law if it defends the sovereignty of the ingroup and preserves reciprocity within that group.

    Secondary Consideration (Outgroup):
    When cooperation with the outgroup is impossible, morality shifts from reciprocity to strategic necessity.
    The principle of reciprocity applies internally, ensuring accountability for the decision to go to war and the conduct of war.

    Operational Definition of Morality in War:
    Ingroup morality ensures proportionality, necessity, and responsibility.
    Outgroup morality, when reciprocity is impossible, reduces to operational necessity: What actions secure ingroup persistence at the least cost?

    Decidability in Such Conflicts
    Does the conflict preserve ingroup sovereignty and reciprocity?
    Is the lack of cooperation with the outgroup a function of irreconcilable demonstrated interests?
    Are the actions necessary and proportional to the threat posed by the outgroup?
    Does the ingroup maintain accountability for decisions and conduct during the war?

    Conclusion
    Killing in war is moral under Natural Law when it defends ingroup reciprocity and sovereignty, even when reciprocity with the outgroup is impossible. Morality shifts from external reciprocity to internal accountability, ensuring that actions are testifiable and necessary to secure ingroup persistence.

    This refined framework clarifies how morality operates contextually, with reciprocity and cooperation serving as contingent strategies rather than universal absolutes.


    Source date (UTC): 2024-11-18 05:14:59 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1858378346578800640

  • WORKING WITH THE AI ON MORAL QUESTIONS (these are just early tests without havin

    WORKING WITH THE AI ON MORAL QUESTIONS
    (these are just early tests without having trained it on the thirty or so foundational questions of moral questions common in law. I’m setting a baseline so I know what it needs to learn. Basically I have to teach it to take the epistemic and liability route.)

    Prompt:
    OK, let’s revisit killing in war. Given morality (reciprocity) is only dependent upon the preference for producing cooperation and it’s discounts on persistence, when it is always of use in the ingroup, but then what if the criteria for the warfare is irreconcilable, and therefore cooperation is either predicted to be impossible, or undesirable? What then does ‘moral’ mean versus an outgroup where morality (reciprocity) is either undesirable or impossible. And how does that refine our understanding of the question of killing in war?

    ChatGPT said:
    This question delves into the limits of reciprocity and the contextual nature of morality when applied to ingroups versus outgroups. Let’s refine the framework to account for scenarios where cooperation is impossible or undesirable.

    Revisiting Killing in War: Reciprocity and Cooperation Limits

    1. Reciprocity as a Function of Group Dynamics

    Ingroup Reciprocity:
    Reciprocity is universally desirable within the ingroup to maintain cooperation and reduce the costs of conflict. Violations undermine group cohesion, threatening long-term stability and survival.
    Killing in war is justified against an outgroup aggressor to preserve ingroup sovereignty and reciprocity.

    Outgroup Reciprocity:
    Reciprocity depends on the potential for mutual benefit (cooperation).
    When no such potential exists—due to irreconcilable values, resource competition, or existential threat—reciprocity between groups is impossible or undesirable.
    In this case, the moral obligation to reciprocity is confined to the ingroup, and actions against the outgroup are judged by necessity, proportionality, and the ingroup’s survival interests.

    2. Defining Morality in War Against Non-Cooperative Outgroups

    Moral Action = Utility for Ingroup Persistence:
    Morality becomes operationally defined as maximizing ingroup persistence, sovereignty, and autonomy in a competitive or hostile environment.
    Killing in war against an irreconcilable outgroup is “moral” if it secures these objectives, even in the absence of reciprocity with the outgroup.

    Limits of Justification:
    Actions taken must still satisfy internal epistemological rigor—testifiability, accountability, and the minimization of unnecessary harm.
    Even if reciprocity with the outgroup is irrelevant, testimonial truth ensures that war is not waged unnecessarily or recklessly, thus maintaining internal legitimacy.

    3. Refinement of the Question of Killing in War

    Primary Justification:
    Killing in war is justified within the framework of Natural Law if it defends the sovereignty of the ingroup and preserves reciprocity within that group.

    Secondary Consideration (Outgroup):
    When cooperation with the outgroup is impossible, morality shifts from reciprocity to strategic necessity.
    The principle of reciprocity applies internally, ensuring accountability for the decision to go to war and the conduct of war.

    Operational Definition of Morality in War:
    Ingroup morality ensures proportionality, necessity, and responsibility.
    Outgroup morality, when reciprocity is impossible, reduces to operational necessity: What actions secure ingroup persistence at the least cost?

    Decidability in Such Conflicts
    Does the conflict preserve ingroup sovereignty and reciprocity?
    Is the lack of cooperation with the outgroup a function of irreconcilable demonstrated interests?
    Are the actions necessary and proportional to the threat posed by the outgroup?
    Does the ingroup maintain accountability for decisions and conduct during the war?

    Conclusion
    Killing in war is moral under Natural Law when it defends ingroup reciprocity and sovereignty, even when reciprocity with the outgroup is impossible. Morality shifts from external reciprocity to internal accountability, ensuring that actions are testifiable and necessary to secure ingroup persistence.

    This refined framework clarifies how morality operates contextually, with reciprocity and cooperation serving as contingent strategies rather than universal absolutes.


    Source date (UTC): 2024-11-18 05:14:59 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1858378036867203072

  • “We are facing the epistemic failure of the moment leading to the failure of dec

    –“We are facing the epistemic failure of the moment leading to the failure of decidability at the scale of human cooperation presently being attempted by man. Overcoming this failure is the Problem of the Ages. We are providing the solution to the Problem of the Ages.”–…


    Source date (UTC): 2024-11-17 16:53:20 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1858191705239064786

  • DEFINITION: A GRAMMAR –“A Grammar consists of the rules of continuous recursive

    DEFINITION: A GRAMMAR
    –“A Grammar consists of the rules of continuous recursive disambiguation sufficient for reasoning by operation, deduction, induction, or even abduction within a domain, where a domain consists of a paradigm of first principles, and first principles consist of the dimensions of causality and their limits within that paradigm (causes), domain (application), and grammar (rules).”– Chapter 10, Part 3, How to apply the method to the grammars.


    Source date (UTC): 2024-11-17 16:06:30 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1858179918322126848

  • Q: –“Do you value truth or utility more? Is it even possible for humans to know

    Q: –“Do you value truth or utility more? Is it even possible for humans to know truth?”–

    1. Yes we can know whether or not testimony (truth) is testifable (possible to testify to), and if so, whether it provides decidability sufficient for satisfaction of demand for infallibility in the context in question.

    2. The spectrum of demand (preference, utility, truth) refers to the scope of consequences and externalities that are produced by the satisfaction of demand for infallibility. That’s what that spectrum refers to.

    Reply addressees: @UntiedWolfdog


    Source date (UTC): 2024-11-16 19:05:55 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1857862683758039040

    Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1857853297832366476

  • We’re Creating A Science of Decidability and Applying it to Law, Government, Eco

    We’re Creating A Science of Decidability and Applying it to Law, Government, Economy, Society, and Family.
    But we’re working in the USA that has the most sophisticated system of rule of law in the world by far (despite the left’s attempts to undermine it for more than a century).

    Let’s discuss: (Excerpt from a conversation with @NoahRevoy on Tuesday.)

    I assume that, well, we’re just trying to make a science of decidability. One that results in a science of cooperation at scale. Meaning law, government, economy, society, family. The U.S. Is the furthest along in the decidability curve because our constitution is just a system of empirically deriving the will of the states – it requires concurrency of the people upward, not one of governing downward. And so the U.S. is the place where we can probably make the biggest change fastest and then spread it outwards.

    But that’s not what everyone hears. I completely get it. They can’t tell the difference between a science and a good. So they think we’re recommending what to do rather than a system of understanding the optimum and the trade offs that come from variation from that optimum – variations that suit the needs of the individual polity. We have different demographics, strategies, traditions, norms, values, institutions, degrees of technological, informal, and formal development.

    The USA, the Five Eyes (Anglosphere plus Japan), are islands, not continentals – part of the world island of eurasia. The USA is Strategically, Militarily, Economically autarkic (independent). So the USA has more choice in its self determination as well as a more sophisticated system of government (for a federation) to do it with.

    But that doesn’t apply to everyone. European countries are all relatively weak. They focused on an economic union first instead of a military and strategic. (french manipulation is as deep as russian). Aside from france who wisely choose nuclear power, to maintain her african empire (despite tolerating muslim immigration), and to maintain at least some ability to project power, every other country is effectively militarily incompetent (germany, eastern europe) or militarily exceptional but small in population (Sweden, Finland).

    So, what is a small central european country’s application of our theory? How are they going to apply it themselves? Or how could they? Or better, rather than prescribing is to Tell people, if we do this, we’ll get this. If we do that, we’ll get that. Not to lie about it or ignore the externalities, or pretend that sovereignty exists by other than the barrel of a gun, and interdependence of trade.

    I would advise suggesting models for France and Germany as well, even though they’re larger and have a lot more power. What does it mean and what’s the best way to use that for your own country’s benefit?

    Because I always thought we were trying to make this as value neutral as possible, but obviously being made in the U.S. as its focus because the US is the most advanced rule of law polity (Federation). We can move the needle the most easily. And spread out from there.


    Source date (UTC): 2024-11-15 00:49:18 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1857224322366291968

  • For Those Who Object to My Work on The Natural Law of Decidability (NLI: Save Fo

    For Those Who Object to My Work on The Natural Law of Decidability
    (NLI: Save For Regular Use)

    Any framework as ambitious as one seeking universal commensurability across disciplines naturally encounters skepticism, even resistance. This resistance often manifests as claims of complexity, impracticality, or distrust. Here, I will address these anticipated objections, revealing not only their predictable nature but also how they ultimately reinforce the utility and necessity of an operational, testifiable system of knowledge.

    1. “It’s Word Salad.”
    Objections labeling the framework as “word salad” reflect a common resistance to structured, precise language in exploring complex ideas. The terminology used here is not arbitrary; it’s crafted to meet the standards of operational clarity required for testifiability. Rather than obscuring, the language is an essential tool that demands specificity and rigor. Understanding this framework demands a level of engagement equal to the precision we seek in scientific or legal discourse, not less.

    2. “If It’s Difficult, It Can’t Be True.”
    There is a tendency to equate difficulty with error, as if truth should be inherently accessible. However, the rigor of disciplines such as mathematics and physics shows that some truths require extensive abstraction and labor to uncover. Just as these fields depend on rigorous systems for understanding phenomena beyond superficial observation, so does the system of operational and testifiable knowledge in the social and behavioral sciences. Simplicity is an ideal, but it must serve—not undermine—the integrity of truth.

    3. “If You Can’t Explain It Simply, It Can’t Be True.”
    The desire for simplification is understandable, but certain concepts resist reduction without distortion. This framework aims to simplify only to the point that preserves accuracy, testifiability, and utility. Explaining the mechanics of decidability across disciplines requires foundational concepts that may appear complex at first, but they are as streamlined as the demands of fidelity allow. In fields where implications reach across scientific, ethical, and legal domains, a reductionist approach risks undermining the very truth it aims to clarify.

    4. “It’s Too Much Work to Learn.”
    The framework presented here does require investment, as all specialized knowledge systems do. But this is not gratuitous complexity; it is commensurate with the promise of universal applicability. The rigor of operational truth and the value of testifiability justify the effort required to engage fully. For those willing to confront the complexity, the returns are substantial: a cohesive, disciplined means of understanding and navigating reality.

    5. “I’m Too Entrenched in My Frame.”
    Embedded frameworks offer familiar comforts, but they often lack the rigor of testifiability and operational clarity. The universal applicability of this framework does not require displacing other paradigms entirely but rather asks for alignment with principles that ensure claims are accessible, testable, and applicable beyond ideological silos. Entrenched paradigms are welcome but must subject themselves to the same standards of truthfulness that this framework imposes.

    6. “Universal Commensurability Isn’t Possible.”
    Critics often regard universal commensurability as an unattainable ideal. But just as mathematical axioms provide a common basis across mathematical applications, operational principles enable commensurability without requiring uniformity in all interpretations. While certain aspects of human experience, such as qualia, retain layers of subjective richness, this framework does not diminish their significance; rather, it allows us to assess their truth value in a shared empirical context. Thus, universal commensurability remains both feasible and desirable within practical limits.

    7. “I Don’t Trust Your Motives.”
    The transparency of motives often challenges those who favor ideological relativism. This framework’s reliance on operational testifiability exists precisely to minimize bias and maximize accountability. By setting objective standards for truth claims, we constrain personal motives to the bounds of demonstrable accuracy, allowing knowledge to stand or fall on its own empirical and logical merits. Distrust here stems less from any inherent flaw and more from the discomfort that such transparency imposes on relativistic or ideological perspectives.
    Beyond Objections: A Call to Engagement
    While objections may arise from a place of defensiveness, discomfort, or the instinctive desire to protect familiar paradigms, they inadvertently underscore the need for a universal framework. Operationalism and testifiability invite each claim, objection, and counterpoint to prove its merit through demonstrable evidence and rational coherence. To those willing to engage rigorously, this framework offers not only clarity but the potential to unify our understanding across disciplines in a way that is accessible, actionable, and resilient.

    In the end, objections become opportunities—not to defend the framework but to show its ability to withstand scrutiny, adapt through rational critique, and deliver on the promise of universal commensurability.


    Source date (UTC): 2024-10-27 16:19:08 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1850572953924280320