Theme: Coercion

  • Propertarian Aggression versus Libertine (Rothbardian) Aggression

    (worth repeating)

    [I]n political philosophy we separate the use of proactive force (aggression) from reactive force (defense). So force can be put to positive (defensive) or negative (aggressive) uses. But then this approach requires that we define what we can aggress against, in order to know what we can defend against. In libertinism they refer to intersubjectively-verifiable property (physical things) whereas in propertarianism I refer to property-en-toto, meaning all things that humans seek to defend that they have obtained by voluntary exchange or homesteading (transforming). ergo: I cannot force your you to give me your attention – that is theft, which allows violence. Conversely I can use violence to defend against your attempt to get my attention. However, if I hear that you advocate theft, then I can defend against your advocacy of theft – and visa versa.

  • Propertarian Aggression versus Libertine (Rothbardian) Aggression

    (worth repeating)

    [I]n political philosophy we separate the use of proactive force (aggression) from reactive force (defense). So force can be put to positive (defensive) or negative (aggressive) uses. But then this approach requires that we define what we can aggress against, in order to know what we can defend against. In libertinism they refer to intersubjectively-verifiable property (physical things) whereas in propertarianism I refer to property-en-toto, meaning all things that humans seek to defend that they have obtained by voluntary exchange or homesteading (transforming). ergo: I cannot force your you to give me your attention – that is theft, which allows violence. Conversely I can use violence to defend against your attempt to get my attention. However, if I hear that you advocate theft, then I can defend against your advocacy of theft – and visa versa.

  • PROPERTARIAN AGGRESSION VERSUS LIBERTINE AGGRESSION (worth repeating) –“In poli

    PROPERTARIAN AGGRESSION VERSUS LIBERTINE AGGRESSION

    (worth repeating)

    –“In political philosophy we separate the use of proactive force (aggression) from reactive force (defense). So force can be put to positive (defensive) or negative (aggressive) uses. But then this approach requires that we define what we can aggress against, in order to know what we can defend against. In libertinism they refer to intersubjectively-verifiable property (physical things) whereas in propertarianism I refer to property-en-toto, meaning all things that humans seek to defend that they have obtained by voluntary exchange or homesteading (transforming). ergo: I cannot force your you to give me your attention – that is theft, which allows violence. Conversely I can use violence to defend against your attempt to get my attention. However, if I hear that you advocate theft, then I can defend against your advocacy of theft – and visa versa.”–


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-14 05:30:00 UTC

  • Libertine’s justify and complain. Libertarians understand and plan. Violence is

    Libertine’s justify and complain. Libertarians understand and plan. Violence is a virtue and its mastery an art.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-12 07:21:00 UTC

  • Why can’t we just say we’re anti-representational, anti-majoritarians? I’m pro a

    Why can’t we just say we’re anti-representational, anti-majoritarians? I’m pro anything that’s voluntary and moral. If it’s involuntary and immoral then I’m not.

    Majority rule is demonstrably immoral and involuntary.

    Contracts don’t require ‘rule’. They require incentives and exchanges.

    It’s not like we can’t produce commons contractually.

    In fact, I think the evidence supports the argument that we would create more commons contractually. It’s just that the Cathedral and the bureaucracy couldn’t parasite upon us. But that would be a good thing now wouldn’t it?

    What is the difference between unproductive priests and shamans, and unproductive overpaid bureaucrats, professors and academic administration workers?

    Nothing. Nothing whatsoever.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-11 12:16:00 UTC

  • The Law Must Address The Full Spectrum of Thefts

    [T]he manner of theft is immaterial. Either the court provides a means of remedy for a theft, or we are free to use violence to obtain remedy for the theft. The court does not grant what we may do. It holds provision only over those conflicts which it agrees to resolve via property rights. See Burke —-“In a state of nature, it is true, that a man of superior force may beat or rob me; but then it is true, that I am at full liberty to defend myself, or make reprisal by surprise or by cunning, or by any other way in which I may be superior to him. But in political society [, outside of the state of nature], a rich man may rob me in another way. [And] I cannot defend myself; for money is the only weapon with which we are allowed to fight [in political society]. If I attempt to avenge myself, the whole force of that society is ready to complete my ruin.” -– Edmund Burke Ergo, political society fails, and juridical society succeeds.

  • The Law Must Address The Full Spectrum of Thefts

    [T]he manner of theft is immaterial. Either the court provides a means of remedy for a theft, or we are free to use violence to obtain remedy for the theft. The court does not grant what we may do. It holds provision only over those conflicts which it agrees to resolve via property rights. See Burke —-“In a state of nature, it is true, that a man of superior force may beat or rob me; but then it is true, that I am at full liberty to defend myself, or make reprisal by surprise or by cunning, or by any other way in which I may be superior to him. But in political society [, outside of the state of nature], a rich man may rob me in another way. [And] I cannot defend myself; for money is the only weapon with which we are allowed to fight [in political society]. If I attempt to avenge myself, the whole force of that society is ready to complete my ruin.” -– Edmund Burke Ergo, political society fails, and juridical society succeeds.

  • Property Rights Are Cheaper Than Slavery Or Serfdom

    CHEAPER FOR THE STRONG TO GIVE PEOPLE PROPERTY RIGHTS

    [P]roperty exists prior to codification in a constitution. So does promise, prior to the institution of contract. A constitution is merely an agreement for reciprocal insurance of the terms of property and contract.

    It so happens that allocation of property rights determines the incentives possible, and the incentives determine the degree of market participation – how many hands make the work light – and therefore the cost of providing individuals with incentives.

    It’s just cheaper for the strong to give everyone property rights – so long as none of the weak band together to extract from the strong under platonic justification via those self-same rules.

    This is the same reason that Slavery is illogical as well as immoral: assuming the prior slaves respect property rights and do not form a government of extraction, then it is merely cheaper and easier to have one’s slaves as vendors and customers.

  • Property Rights Are Cheaper Than Slavery Or Serfdom

    CHEAPER FOR THE STRONG TO GIVE PEOPLE PROPERTY RIGHTS

    [P]roperty exists prior to codification in a constitution. So does promise, prior to the institution of contract. A constitution is merely an agreement for reciprocal insurance of the terms of property and contract.

    It so happens that allocation of property rights determines the incentives possible, and the incentives determine the degree of market participation – how many hands make the work light – and therefore the cost of providing individuals with incentives.

    It’s just cheaper for the strong to give everyone property rights – so long as none of the weak band together to extract from the strong under platonic justification via those self-same rules.

    This is the same reason that Slavery is illogical as well as immoral: assuming the prior slaves respect property rights and do not form a government of extraction, then it is merely cheaper and easier to have one’s slaves as vendors and customers.

  • The Transaction Cost Theory of Government

    PROPERTARIANISM: THE TRANSACTION COST THEORY OF GOVERNMENT
    (second draft) (closer)

    [H]istory says only that the development of a state – a monopoly bureaucracy – transfers high local transaction costs without central rents, to state rents and low transaction cost. Libertarians nearly universally ignore the evidence of universal transaction costs and free riding at the local level.

    And they further ignore the demonstrated necessity using organized violence by a monopoly organization to suppress those transaction costs and free ridings (“local rents”), and to convert them into central rents in order to pay for such suppression.

    The counter-argument is that states are in fact a neutral cost, and that we don’t spend enough on them in the suppression of transaction costs, because states provide multiples of return on that suppression. This is also demonstrable.

    The question isn’t how we can do without the state (a corporation articulated as a monopoly definition of property rights ), but now that we have suppressed local transaction costs, and replaced them with centralized rents in order to produce the commons we call property rights – how do we suppress centralized rents while maintaining the suppression of transaction costs, and the ability to construct commons that such suppression of transaction costs and rents allows us to construct?

    To argue that a monopoly definition of property rights is somehow “bad”, is irrational since property, obtained by homesteading and by voluntarily exchange, under the requirements for productivity, warranty and symmetry, is as far as I know, as logically consistent and exception-less as are mathematical operations on natural numbers. So the imposition of property rights cannot be illogical, immoral, unethical no matter how they are imposed since they define that which is logical, ethical and moral.

    There is nothing wrong whatsoever with violence – in fact, it is violence with which we pay for property rights and liberty – it is our first, most important resource in the construction of liberty. Instead, the question is purely institutional: having used violence to centralize transaction costs into rents, how do we now use violence to eliminate rents from the central organization?

    This is pretty easy: Universal standing, Universal Property rights, and Organically constructed, Common Law, predicated upon the one law of property rights as positive articulation of the prohibition on and the suppression of involuntary transfers: the demand for fully informed, productive, warrantied, voluntary exchanges free of externality. Because it is only under fully informed, productive, voluntary transfer, warrantied and free of externality that cooperation is rational, rather than parasitic. And only under rational cooperation is forgoing one’s opportunity to use violence equally rational.

    The question becomes then, who prohibits the formation of authority and this falls to the citizenry: the militia – those who possess violence.

    As far as I know this is the correct analysis of political evolution, and the correct theory for future political action.

    Curt Doolittle 
    The Propertarian Institute 
    Kiev, Ukraine.