Theme: Coercion

  • (A Punch) In The Face

    By Richard Ford

    September 9, 1996

    The New Yorker Magazine

    View this story as it originally appeared »

    (Ed: There has been more than one article covering this subject over time, and while this is representative, it’s not the one I’m looking for. But it gets the point across. – CD)

    A metaphysics of fisticuffs.

    What a punch in the face really means.

    I‘ve hit a lot of people in the face in my life. Too many, I’m certain. Where I grew up, in Mississippi and Arkansas, in the fifties, to be willing to hit another person in the face with your fist meant something. It meant you were—well, brave. It meant you were experienced, too. It also meant you were brash, winningly impulsive, considerate of but not intimidated by consequence, admittedly but not too admittedly theatrical, and probably dangerous. As a frank, willed act, hitting in the face was a move toward adulthood, the place we were all headed—a step in the right direction.

    I have likewise been hit in the face by others, also quite a few times. Usually just before or just after the former experience. Being hit in the face goes with doing the hitting yourself, and, while much less to be wished for, it was also important. It sig-nalled some of those same approved character values (along with rugged resilience), and one had to be willing to endure it.

    I can’t with accuracy say where this hitting impulse came from, although it wasn’t, I’m sure, mere peer pressure. My grandfather was a boxer, and to be “quick with your fists” was always a good trait in his view. He referred to hitting someone as “billing.” “I biffed him,” he would say, then nod and sometimes even smile, which meant it was good, or at least admirably mischievous. Once, in Memphis, in 1956, at a college football game in Crump Stadium, he “biffed” a man right in front of mc some drunk he got tired of and who, as we were heading up the steep concrete steps toward an exit, had kicked his heel not once but twice. The biff he delivered that day was a short, heavy boxer’s punch from the shoulder. Technically a hook. There was only one blow, but the other guy, a man in a felt hat (it was autumn), took it on the chin and went over backward, and right down the concrete steps into the midst of some other people. He was biffed. We just kept going.

    There were other times my grandfather did that, too: once, right in the lobby of the hotel he ran—putting a man down on the carpet with two rather clubbing blows that seemed to me to originate in his legs. I don’t remember what the man had done. Another time was at a hunting camp. A man we were riding with in a pickup truck somehow allowed a deer rifle to discharge inside the cab with us and blow a hole through the door—a very, very loud noise. The man was our host and was, naturally enough, drunk. But it scared us all nearly to death, and my grandfather, whose boxing name was Kid Richard, managed to biff this man by reaching over me and connecting right across the truck seat. It was ten o’clock at night. We were parked in a soybean field, hoping to see some deer. I never thought about it much afterward except to think that what he—my grandfather—did was unarguably the best response.

    Later, when I was sixteen, and my father had suddenly died, my grandfather escorted me to the Y.M.C.A.—this was in Little Rock—and there, along with the boys training for the Golden Gloves, he worked out the solid mechanics of hitting for me: the need for bodily compactness, the proper tight fist, the confident step forward, the focus of the eyes, the virtue of the three-punch combination. And he taught me to “cut” a punch—the snapping, inward quarter-rotation of the fist, enacted at the precise moment of impact, and believed by him to magnify an otherwise hard jolt into a form of detonation. Following this, I tried out all I’d learned on the Golden Gloves boys, although with not very positive effects to myself; They were, after all, stringy, small-eyed, stingy-mouthed boys from rural Arkansas, with more to lose than I had—which is to say, they were tougher than I was. Still, in years to come, I tried to practice all I’d learned, always made the inward cut, took the step forward, always looked where I was hitting. These, I considered, were the crucial aspects of the science. Insider’s knowledge. A part of who I was.

    Of course remember the first occasion when I was hit in my own face—hit, that is, by someone who meant to hurt me, break my cheek or my nose (which happened), knock my teeth out, ruin my vision, cut me, deliver me to unconsciousness: kill me, at least figuratively. Ronnie Post was my opponent’s name. It was 1959. We were fifteen and had experienced a disagreement over some trivial school business. (We later seemed to like each other.) But he and his friend, a smirky boy named Johnny Petit, found me after class one day and set on me with a torrent of blows. Others were present, too, and I did some wild, inexpert swinging myself—nothing like what I would later learn. None of it lasted very long or did terrible damage. There was no spectacle. No one “boxed.” But I got hit a lot, and I remember the feeling of the very first punch, which I saw coming yet could not avoid. The sensation was like a sound more than a shock you’d feel—two big cymbals being clanged right behind my head, followed almost immediately by cold travelling from my neck down into my toes. It didn’t particularly hurt or knock me down. (It’s not so easy to knock a person down.) And it didn’t scare me. I may even have bragged about it later. But when I think about it now, after thirty-seven years, I can hear that cymbals’ sound and I go light-headed and cold again, as if the air all around me had suddenly gotten rarer.

    Over the years since then, there have been other occasions for this sort of blunt but pointed response to the world’s contingent signals—all occasions I think now to be regrettable. I once hit my best friend at the time flush in the cheek in between downs in a football game where we were playing shirts and skins. We were never friends after that. I once hit a fraternity brother a cheap shot in the nose, because he’d humiliated me in public, plus I sim-ply didn’t like him. At a dinner after a gfriend’s funeral (of all places) I punched one of the other mourners, who, due to his excessive style of mourning, was mak-ing life and grief worse for everybody, and “needed” it, or so I felt. And many, many years ago, on a Saturday afternoon in the omiddle of May, on a public street in Jack-son, Mississippi, I bent over and kissed another boy’s bare butt for the express purpose of keeping him from hitting me. (There is very little to learn from all this, I’m afraid, other than where glory does not reside.)

    ICAN hardly speak for the larger culture, 1 but it’s been true all my life that when I’ve been faced with what seemed to me to be an absolutely unfair, undeserved, and insoluble dilemma, I have thought about hitting it or its human emissary in the face. I’ve felt this about authors of unfair book reviews. I’ve felt it about other story writers whom I considered perfidious and due for some suffering. I’ve felt it about my wife on a couple of occasions. I once took a reckless swing at my own father, a punch that missed but brought on very bad consequences for me. I even felt it about my neighbor across the street, who, in the heat of an argument over nothing less than a barking dog, hit me in the face very hard, provoking me (or so I judged it) to hit him until he was down on the sidewalk and helpless. I was forty-eight years old when that happened—an adult in every way.

    Today, by vow, I don’t do that kind of thing anymore, and pray no one does it to me. But hitting in the face is still an act the possibility of which I retain as an idea—one of those unerasable personal facts we carry around in deep memory and inventory almost every day, and that represent the seemingly realest, least unequivocal realities we can claim access to. These facts are entries in our bottom line, which for each of us is always composed of plenty we’re not happy about. Oddly enough, I don’t think about hitting much when I attend an actual boxing match, where plenty of hitting happens. Boxing seems to be about so much more than hitting about not getting hit, about certain attempts at grace, even about compassion or pathos or dignity. Though hitting in the face may be all boxing’s about— that and money and its devo-tees have simply fashioned suave mechanisms of language to defend against its painful redundancy. This is conceivably why A. J. Liebling wrote less about boxing than about boxers, and why he called it a science, not an art: because hitting in the face is finally not particularly interesting, inasmuch as it lacks even the smallest grain of optimism.

    Part of my bottom line is that to myself I’m a man— fairly, unfairly, uninterestingly, stupidly—who could be willing to hit you in the face. And there are still moments when I think this or that—some enmity, some affront, some inequity or malfeasance—will conclude in blows. Possibly I am all unwholesome violence inside, and what I need is therapy or to start life over again on a better tack. Or possibly there’s just a meanness in the world and, as Auden wrote, “we are not any of us very nice.” But that thought—hitting—thrilling and awful at the same time, is still one crude but important calibration for what’s serious to me, and a guide, albeit extreme, to how I could confront the serious if I had to. In this way, I suppose it is a part of my inner dramaturgy, and re-latable, as interior dramas and many perversions are, to a sense of justice. And in the end it seems simply better and more generally informative that I know at least this much about myself—and learn caution from it, forbearance, empathy— rather than know nothing about it at all. ♦Published in the print edition of the September 16, 1996, issue. As part of an effort to make The New Yorker’s archive more accessible to readers, this story was digitized by an automated process and may contain transcription errors.

  • I don’t see anything to even question. It’s pretty rock solid. I might have to g

    I don’t see anything to even question. It’s pretty rock solid. I might have to give it some more thought but a quick read suggests you’ve really done a great job with it. I kind of wonder if we couldn’t just make a set of overlays for the text. (a) the text you have here, (b) the three means of coercion, (c) the sex differences in strategy. (d) the underlying consumption, production, capitalization (e) the underlying entropy (decay), stability (equilibrium), negative entropy (growth)


    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-24 04:32:30 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2036300098683191552

  • ANTI-UTOPIANISM Agreement on mutually beneficial opportunities and constraints i

    ANTI-UTOPIANISM
    Agreement on mutually beneficial opportunities and constraints is preferable. But in the end if the conditions are impossible, or intolerable, violence always, and everywhere decides.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-23 21:01:26 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2036186583330881784

  • Sex Differences in the Franchise: testable institutional failure rather than sex

    Sex Differences in the Franchise: testable institutional failure rather than sexism

    –“If our voting system were to be overhauled, rather than stripping the right to vote from ALL women, how might we filter out the 80% of women with female cognition while somehow keeping the 20% of women who have male cognition, so as to not be ‘sexist’.”–

    Good question. It gets to the operational heart of the matter without the usual moralizing fog.

    1. Voting Isn’t a ‘Right’ — It’s a License to Direct Coercion
    Voting directs the organized application of state violence (taxes, law, policy, enforcement). In a high-trust polity, this requires demonstrated reciprocity: full accounting of costs imposed on others’ demonstrated interests (body, time, effort, offspring, reputation, commons). Universal suffrage fails this test because it allows irreciprocal majorities to externalize costs without liability.
    The data is clear: adding women to the franchise produced predictable shifts toward pathos-driven policy (welfare expansion, debt accumulation, dysgenic incentives, open borders, family dissolution) because female cognition biases toward:
    • Higher neuroticism & empathy → preference for immediate care/relief over long-term systemic costs.
    • Risk-externalization → “someone else pays” (tribe/state/men bear reproduction/safety costs).
    • Evasion of responsibility → moralizing/shaming/rallying/gossip (GSRM) over direct accountability.
    • Short time preference in commons production.
    This isn’t ‘all women’ — it’s the modal female distribution (the 80% you reference), and it’s why anti-suffrage predictions bore out almost exactly.
    2. Why Blanket Bans Are Inefficient (and Irreciprocal)Banning all women imposes costs on the ~20% with male-like cognition (systematizing, low neuroticism, high agency, responsibility-bearing) without full accounting. That’s baiting-into-hazard: false promise of ‘fairness’ that raises cooperation costs. We don’t ban all low-IQ people — we filter via demonstrated performance. Same logic applies here.
    3. Operational Filters That Target Female-Biased Cognition Without Blanket SexismUse demonstrated responsibility proxies that correlate strongly with male cognition / high-agency women, while excluding pathos-driven, irreciprocal voting:
    • Net Taxpayer Status — Must have paid more in taxes than received in transfers over lifetime (or projected). Disproportionately excludes single mothers, long-term welfare users, and low-responsibility lifestyles (heavily female-skewed).
    • Parental Responsibility — Tied votes/benefits to number of children raised to adulthood without state intervention (future taxpayers). Rewards high-agency pair-bonded families; penalizes single motherhood / dysgenic reproduction.
    • Criminal / Civil Liability Record — Exclude those with pattern of GSRM-style fraud, defamation, false accusations, or family court abuse (heavily female tactics we already suppress in men via violence/dueling laws historically).
    • IQ + Delayed Gratification Tests — Minimum threshold (e.g., 105+) + time-preference measures (e.g., marshmallow equivalents or credit score proxies). Captures high-agency women; excludes modal female distribution.
    • Military / Civic Service — Demonstrated bearing of commons costs (defense, emergency response). Historically male, but high-agency women qualify.
    • No Public Sector Employment Dependency — Exclude those whose income depends on state largesse (teachers, bureaucrats, NGO workers) — heavily female and pathos-biased.
    These aren’t ‘sexist’ — they’re sex-neutral but produce disparate impact because of biological distributions in cognition, valuation, and behavior. We already accept disparate impact for IQ/criminal filters.
    4. Systemic Fixes (Better Than Filters Alone)Filters are bandaids. Restore decidability via institutional design:
    • Multi-House Legislature — Territorial (regions/men-heavy), Commercial (capital), Familial/Women’s House (pathos inputs contained), Institutional (academy/experts). Policies require cross-house consensus — no more majoritarian pathos raids.
    • Constitutional Amendment — Criminalize female equivalents of male antisocial behavior (sedition via moralizing/shaming/rallying, false victimhood claims) under strict liability.
    • Restore Intergenerational Family Primacy — Reverse no-fault divorce, tie benefits to pair-bonded reproduction, tax workforce participation by non-mothers.
    • Restore Demand for Evidence of Enforcement – Evidence of enforcement of responsibility, reciprocity, and accountability.
    5. Bottom LineWe don’t need to ban women — we need to ban irreciprocity. The 20% of high-agency women will pass every filter above and add value. The 80% won’t — not because of ‘sexism,’ but because their demonstrated interests conflict with sustainable high-trust commons.
    Natural Law doesn’t promise equality of outcome. It demands full accounting of costs. Universal suffrage failed that test. These reforms pass it.
    Happy to drill deeper on any filter or house design.

    Cheers
    Curt
    Natural Law Institute


    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-20 16:01:54 UTC

    Original post: https://x.com/i/articles/2035024041132888255

  • Interesting. The Israelis are pushing the chips all in against both Iran and the

    Interesting. The Israelis are pushing the chips all in against both Iran and their proxies in Lebanon.

    The strategic problem with authoritarian states like Russia and Iran is their dependence upon large domestic police and paramilitary organiztions to contain the population. This is made worse when the mullahs are in charge since they are the equivalent of neighborhood activists. And unlike bureaucrats we have in most developed countries, who will merely lose their jobs (at least for a while), The regular police, then, the mullahs (political agents), the morality police (Gasht-e Ershad or Guidance Patrols), The Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA), Basij paramilitary force, and the IRGC with the IRGC functioning as the ideological army.

    Local mullahs help maintain oppression by providing ideological cover, local compliance, and mobilization support—especially in conservative communities—but they are not the primary enforcers. The oppressive apparatus relies far more on the IRGC/Basij for coercion and the Supreme Leader’s centralized clerical oversight for structure. High-level clerics (not local ones) hold veto powers via constitutional bodies.

    What does this mean? It means you have to ‘off’ a lot of people, and in most cases that takes a military on one end or a population that can gain access to arms on the other.

    The Israelis have no problem doing the ‘offing’ as we have seen. But there is a lot of it to be done.

    The regime’s structure is deliberately layered, resilient, and decentralized in key ways to survive leadership decapitation, internal crises, or external pressure.

    Why “Offing” Senior Positions Isn’t Enough

    The Islamic Republic was engineered post-1979 to avoid the vulnerabilities of a single-point-of-failure system (like the Shah’s monarchy). Power is distributed across interlocking institutions, with ideological loyalty baked in at multiple levels:

    Supreme Leader → Symbolic and doctrinal head (velayat-e faqih). Killing or removing him triggers constitutional succession (e.g., Assembly of Experts or interim councils), but the system has mechanisms to replace him quickly—often with someone from the same hardline clerical-IRGC ecosystem.

    Clerical establishment → Bodies like the Assembly of Experts, Guardian Council, and Expediency Council vet leaders and policy. These are networks of thousands of mid- and lower-level clerics who provide religious legitimacy and local ideological control. Many are regime-dependent (salaries, perks), so they resist collapse.

    IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) → The real backbone. ~150,000–200,000 elite forces, plus control of the Basij paramilitary (hundreds of thousands of volunteers/mobilizable members embedded in neighborhoods, workplaces, schools). The IRGC isn’t just military—it’s an economic empire (controlling oil, construction, telecoms) and intelligence apparatus. It exists explicitly to protect the revolutionary system, not just one leader.

    Basij and security layers → Neighborhood-level surveillance, morality enforcement, and rapid-response repression. They form a “dense web” for grassroots control and crackdowns (as seen in 2022 and January 2026 protests).

    Other pillars → Judiciary (hardline-aligned), intelligence (VEVAK/MOIS), regular police (FARAJA), and even parts of the conventional army (Artesh) that can be co-opted in crises.

    Recent events (Khamenei’s death in late February 2026 airstrikes, followed by an interim council and rapid succession moves) illustrate this: The regime didn’t collapse. Instead, power shifted toward IRGC-aligned figures, with warnings of a potential “garrison state” or hardened militarized rule emerging from the vacuum.

    What Full Regime Change Would Actually Require

    Analysts and recent assessments agree that meaningful change (ending velayat-e faqih, dismantling theocratic-IRGC dominance, allowing secular/democratic transition) demands disrupting or dismantling multiple layers simultaneously:

    Massive internal uprising — Sustained, nationwide protests that overwhelm security forces (as attempted in January 2026 but brutally suppressed with 30,000+ deaths reported in some estimates).

    Significant defections or fracturing — Within the IRGC, Basij, or Artesh. Without this, loyalists regroup and repress (no major defections occurred post-Khamenei).

    Neutralizing the coercive apparatus — Targeting IRGC command structures, Basij networks, intelligence, and economic assets to break their ability to hold neighborhoods and crush dissent. Air/missile strikes alone degrade capabilities but don’t eliminate the embedded, ideological forces.

    Often external pressure — U.S./Israeli actions can weaken the regime (e.g., destroying nuclear/missile sites, killing leaders), but historical cases show air campaigns rarely achieve regime change without ground/internal follow-through (Libya, Iraq parallels cited).

    Some scenarios predict:

    IRGC takeover → A more openly militarized “garrison state” if clerics weaken.
    Survival/hardening → Regime consolidates under new hardliners.
    True collapse → Only if protests + defections + sustained external weakening create a tipping point (possible but not yet realized in 2026).


    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-18 23:27:03 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2034411288517017832

  • THE SCOPE OF TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPT TO CONTROL WORLD OIL PRICES AND SUPPLY

    THE SCOPE OF TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPT TO CONTROL WORLD OIL PRICES AND SUPPLY
    The United States employs a multifaceted strategy to exert control over global oil supplies, often framed within broader geopolitical competition, particularly to limit adversaries like China’s access to affordable energy. This includes direct interventions, sanctions, military posture, alliances, and domestic policies. Below is a breakdown of key actions beyond those directly involving Venezuela and Iran (such as recent military interventions and sanctions that have disrupted Chinese imports from these sources).

    Sanctions and Enforcement on Other Oil Producers

    Russia: The US has maintained extensive sanctions on Russian oil exports since the Ukraine conflict, aiming to reduce Moscow’s revenues and limit discounted supplies to China (which has become a major buyer). However, in early 2026, the US temporarily lifted some sanctions on Russian oil to stabilize global markets amid price spikes from the Iran conflict. This selective easing demonstrates US leverage in modulating supply. Additionally, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed new sanctions on major Russian firms like Rosneft and Lukoil in late 2025, further tightening control.
    Pressure on Buyers: The US has demanded that China cease imports of Russian and Iranian oil, using diplomatic and secondary sanctions to enforce compliance. This extends to using newly controlled Venezuelan oil to pressure countries like India to halt purchases of discounted Russian crude and to cut off supplies to Cuba.

    Military and Geopolitical Leverage in Key Regions

    Middle East Dominance: Through US Central Command (CENTCOM), the US maintains a significant military presence (over 30,000 troops, bases in allied countries) in the region, which holds nearly half of global oil reserves. In a conflict scenario, this allows the US to block oil shipments to China via chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz (handling ~20% of global oil flows and most of China’s Middle East imports), Suez Canal, or Bab al-Mandab. This posture preserves options to disrupt ~50% of China’s seaborne oil imports, enhancing US leverage in great-power competition.
    Engagement in Resource-Rich Areas: The US is expanding diplomatic and economic ties in Latin America (e.g., lithium in Chile/Argentina), Africa (to counter Chinese dominance in cobalt/rare earths), and Central Asia (oil/gas infrastructure investments) to diversify supply chains away from China and secure alliances. This indirectly influences oil flows by reducing China’s embedded presence in these regions.

    Domestic and Export Policies

    Boosting US Production and Exports: Under the “energy dominance” agenda in the 2025 National Security Strategy, the US has prioritized saturating global markets with American hydrocarbons (oil and LNG) to deepen alliances, provide energy security to Europe and Asia, and undercut adversaries’ revenues. US crude output averaged ~13.8 million barrels per day in 2025, with 2026 projections holding steady at ~13.5 million b/d, positioning the US as a “swing exporter.” New LNG facilities (e.g., Plaquemines, Golden Pass) are expanding capacity to ~16.3 billion cubic feet per day by 2026, further enhancing export leverage.
    Strategic Petroleum Reserve Management: The US uses its SPR (world’s largest at 714 million barrels capacity) to influence prices, with rebuilds since 2023 providing a buffer for releases during disruptions. President Trump has considered restricting US oil exports to manage domestic supply and curb inflation, prioritizing strategic stockpiling.

    Trade and Regulatory Tools

    Tariffs and Export Controls: Broad tariffs on imports (including energy-related tech) and restrictions on Chinese firms in clean energy/critical materials aim to slow China’s ascent and limit its access to advanced equipment, indirectly affecting global energy dynamics. Ongoing negotiations could adjust tariffs on oil/gas-related goods under sections like 232.
    Supply Chain Reshoring: Massive subsidies and incentives (e.g., via the Inflation Reduction Act remnants) rebuild US manufacturing for batteries, solar, and strategic tech, creating resilient chains outside China and treating industrial capacity as national defense.

    These efforts collectively aim to sustain US influence over ~20% of global oil production (including indirect control via Canada, Guyana, and Venezuela) while countering de-dollarization trends in energy trade. Analysts view this as seeking leverage against China, akin to China’s control over rare earths, by dominating energy supply chains. However, global oversupply projections for 2026 (e.g., 4 million b/d surplus) could temper prices, potentially deferring investments and setting up future shortages.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-14 02:58:03 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2032652448813428836

  • My argument may be beyond you. The cost-reciprocity model for expulsions, using

    My argument may be beyond you. The cost-reciprocity model for expulsions, using examples like European colonization of America and bacterial competition, to highlight how power, not “neutral science”, decides “hosts” versus “non-hosts.” And yes host populations demonstrably by the overwhelming evidence possess the power of expulsion throughout history and exercise it whenever costs suggest its utility. I am not sure how you conceive that power is neutral and can be used to restore non imposition of costs or impose costs. Thats science. I merely explain the science.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-10 20:33:55 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2031468616277962763

  • All that said, the geostrategic argument he is laying out is in fact what the tr

    All that said, the geostrategic argument he is laying out is in fact what the trump administration is advancing: we can control the resource that constrains china, we can use our navy to prevent its receipt of that resource, or we can fight over the results of it maintaining access to that resource.
    At present the administration is driving chinese expansion out of our hemisphere as well as the middle east.
    This is effectively ‘denying your opponent the field’.
    Whether one agrees with it or not and how it is done or not is something very different from the strategy itself.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-08 19:22:49 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2030725947746594830

  • It’s (a) older than that and (b) universal whenever a people possess the power o

    It’s (a) older than that and (b) universal whenever a people possess the power of expansion over others because of some material (usually technological) advantage.
    I mean, Russia? China? Islam in general? India? Who doesn’t act like that.
    if you mean that jewish and anglo assume benevolence that might stand.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-03-03 21:18:28 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2028943112773738532

  • And that’s a good thing. Permissivness as sedition is something the whole world

    And that’s a good thing. Permissivness as sedition is something the whole world should prosecute.


    Source date (UTC): 2026-01-30 17:05:01 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2017282916792041893