Theme: Causality

  • NATURE, NURTURE AND CULTURE Three causal axis. Our genes and in-utero developmen

    NATURE, NURTURE AND CULTURE

    Three causal axis.

    Our genes and in-utero development. Our family structure, child rearing, and pedagogical methods. Our informal and formal institutions.

    One of the most problematic cognitive biases is the tendency to take a single axis of causality – a single explanation – and to apply anywhere and everywhere. It’s the ‘ideal type’ bias.

    But human beings are causally dense creatures. And behaviorally plastic creatures. Because the combination of memory and the ability to plan (reason) allows us to forecast the future, and adapt to it proactively. If we are successful, some of the biases in our memories and planning can become incorporated into our genetics. If our plans become successful, they are carried between overlapping generations by imitation and memory.

    Further, as creatures who find patterns between different stimuli, we are unable to separate ideas into neat drawers. They bleed into each other. As such we have explicit memories (knowledge) that we possess intentionally, we have habitual memories (knowledge) that we realize varies from group to group. We have unconscious associations and habits and value judgements that we take as physical properties of life, but can at some point become aware of and aware of their variation. We have metaphysical value judgements that CAUSE much of our unconscious biases. And we have genetic differences in our moral intuitions, and cognitive abilities that are the result of both genetic and in-utero experiences.

    Nearly all food habits are the result of regional necessity and economics. Almost all clothing habits are the same – the development of excellence in one minor technology or another as a demonstration of status. Almost all family habits are very similar at the same level of economic development. Childrearing seems to have as great an impact as does family structure.

    Rituals and religions are a complex topic but our knowledge of the social, political and economic reasons. We know why feasts, military tactics, the problem of uniting tribes, and the problem of constraining power, and in some places, the problem of resigning to difficult environments, found the idea of scriptural religion useful in a social context by transferring the family hierarchy to the ether.

    Our genetic makeup is different BECAUSE of these factors. Or rather, some minor biases in our genetic makeup interplayed with these cultural ‘genetics’ and the two together brought us to where we are today.

    When we argue that genetics is ‘all there is’ or culture is ‘all there is’ we are just confusing the Nature, Culture, Nurture argument further. we are making the same mistake that the ‘nurturists’ do but from the opposite end of the spectrum.

    Since we know that Nature, Culture and Nurture are three extant causal axis, then a simple application of Ockham’s razor for any demonstrated human behavior prevents us from being people wearing tin foil hats. All our behaviors are the product of these three axis.

    Cheers


    Source date (UTC): 2013-10-06 04:17:00 UTC

  • INDUCTION AND HUMAN SOCIETY The world is a lot easier to understand if you think

    INDUCTION AND HUMAN SOCIETY

    The world is a lot easier to understand if you think in terms of incentives that exist in the present, rather than ‘what has happened before’.

    Induction is a problem everywhere. The past repeats itself where the incentives are repeated. It’s not that we necessarily will do what we did before, if the incentives are different. Economic history helps us understand that beliefs justify incentives, but that history is a product of incentives. Beliefs and reasons are part of justification. And justification is misleading.

    We can’t learn from our justifications what we can learn from reconstructing our incentives.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-09-28 05:18:00 UTC

  • INTENTIONS ARE A CHEAT AND A FANTASY : ONLY CONSEQUENCES EXIST A psychological a

    INTENTIONS ARE A CHEAT AND A FANTASY : ONLY CONSEQUENCES EXIST

    A psychological and hormonal trick that lets you do nothing meaningful, and possibly plenty that’s harmful, in exchange for the cheap high of feeling that you made a difference in the world.

    Because if you tried to so something that people actually wanted, by producing something people actually wanted, you’d fail.

    The only altruism is teaching someone to fish. Because if you try and succeed it was your victory. And if you try and fail, it is your failure. Rather than risk failure people try to obtain good feelings about themselves by good intentions.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-09-05 05:04:00 UTC

  • THE POWER OF PARSIMONY If you learn enough about Physics, Math, Computer Science

    THE POWER OF PARSIMONY

    If you learn enough about Physics, Math, Computer Science, Economics and Philosophy (and hopefully in that order), it becomes readily apparent that all of these disciplines create all sorts of language for very, very simple principles that are constant across all of them.

    I don’t know what we need to call that basic set of ideas. In theory that’s part of the domain philosophy, because they are all tools for helping us think cogently, and act cogently, in a given discipline.

    But I can tell you one thing: there isn’t much difference between how science is practiced, than that set of basic principles. The only exception being that science discounts subjectivity and morality, economics includes subjectivity but not morality, and philosophy includes morality, subjectivity and objectivity.

    What I like most about computer programming is that it forces us to avoid the platonism in mathematics. And as such, avoids postmodernist influences on academia and the “res publica”.

    There are only a few dozen ideas for man to learn, but an infinite set of applications of them. Unfortunately, we ask our children, and each other, to memorize an infinite number of techniques, instead of a handful of necessary causal relations.

    This foundation, if it can be articulated as a finite set of principles with infinite application, is what we have been unable to define. That is because the political impact of those definitions would be problematic.

    If you don’t believe me. Then you might just have to take a look at the history of ideas. Because that history is little more than attempts to justify claims against the property of others in order to achieve alternate ends.

    Period.

    MANS WORLD IS QUITE SIMPLE. IT”S THE LIES THAT MAKE IT COMPLICATED.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-27 06:41:00 UTC

  • NOT THAT I REALLY LIKE METAPHYSICS But in my quest for demarcation between scien

    NOT THAT I REALLY LIKE METAPHYSICS

    But in my quest for demarcation between science and logic: is there any argument for existence independent of time, or is any representation of real world phenomenon time-dependent?

    I mean, logic is not time dependent, and by definition represents states to which we add time and measure change.

    We cannot perceive the long or short without altering time. THis is the value of high speed photography which reduces the unobservable to the observable, and measurement, which reduces the unobservable to analogy.

    Thanks


    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-21 08:00:00 UTC

  • On Realism

    [W]hat is the relationship between:

      and the combination of:

        when given

          In purest terms, of course, there are limits because of necessary information loss from the process of categorization. And it certainly appears that we can use science (categories and measurements and narratives that express causal relations that are allegories to experience) to understand almost everything we desire to = eventually. But despite apparent successes, the question is whether those limits are meaningful in the context of being a human: converting extra sensual perceptions to sense perceptions. Those limits can be meaningful in at least three dimensions: a) the scope of the patterns that we can identify (which I suspect we can use machines for), b) the period of those patterns, given that causality depends on arbitrary selection of periods of regularity, c) the number of axis of causal relations that we can understand. But since our problem is knowledge for the purpose of action in real time, not ‘knowledge’ as a static absolute, and it is our actions that are limited by our ignorance, and we would not be ‘human’ without those limits, the question always seems irrational. If we understand that all thought is time-contingent based upon the knowledge at our disposal, then it’s simply illogical to even try to represent knowledge as static ‘truths’. The question itself is irrational. If the standard is ‘enough perception that we can act to achieve our ends despite the limits of our minds’ that is very different from ‘we can understand the full set of causal relations by a process of representing measures of categories, and reducing them to expressions that are possible to articulate as a narrative.’ Since, we can test our theories, and science demands that we can both test (reproduce)( and determine the boundary conditions (falsify) our theories, using science and language to extend our sense perceptions, then we can test the correspondence of our understanding of the real world. It certainly appears that we can be successful in reducing the unobservable complexity of the real world into symbolic and linguistic representations that are sufficient allegories to experience, that we can understand and at at any scale in which we an define a scheme of measurement (sensing). And there is no reason at present to believe that there is some limit to this, other than our ability to marshall the physical resources to perform tests, or because performing those tests would violate the terms of cooperation with other humans (morality). And so, as Steven says above, theories are descriptive within the state of knowledge of the moment, if they correctly express the measurements and narratives of causal relations as we understand them at the moment, because they cannot exist without the context of the forms of measurement that we used to formulate them. Those statements in fact, correspond with reality at some level of precision. So the realist expectation is that we increasingly understand the complexity of reality, but may never fully achieve it. Although that imperfection may be meaningless for the purposes of action, as long as the allegory to experience is sufficient to produce the actions in question. The generational problem affecting the discipline of philosophy is that the metaphysical assumption that we can introspectively solve these problems without the help of science is as absurd as thinking that we can solve these problems without language. The discipline of Philosophy can help us construct analogies to experience so that we may consume those analogies and ‘understand’ them. But we cannot introspectively sense, perceive, and understand much outside of human scale, without the discipline of science. Hence not only is CR a form of Realism, but it is an improvement on Realism because it does not assume that representations are static.

        • The Causal Problem Of Government Is The Same Causal Problem Of Ethics: The Incorrect Assumption Of The Value Of Monopoly

          [W]hy on earth, would you assume, that ethical principles must assume we agree upon ends? Seriously? Why is it that the study of ethics assumes that there are optimum ends for all? That’s, really, ABSURD on it’s face, isn’t it? I mean. That’s ridiculous. Why not that ethics agree upon means, but not ends? Is ‘group think’ or ‘group-ness’ such an instinct? I think not. I think it is fear of making the wrong decision about which group to belong to. Or simply a cover for theft… We have spent millennia now trying to apply the rules of the family and extended family and tribe to the market, and to justify takings, and thefts and redistributions so that there can be a monopoly of ethical statements. But that’s not necessary. The market doesn’t require that at all. We cooperate on means, but not ends. We don’t even largely know wo we’re cooperating with. The same is true in banking. We don’t know what use our money is put to. We cooperate with people in exchange for interest. The market, and banking, are institutions that help us cooperate on means even if not on ends. [I]f we instead of monopolies imposing homogeneity via law (commands), our institutions relied upon the voluntary exchange of property (contracts) between GROUPS with different property rights internal to the groups, but consistent across the groups, then Law and monopoly are means of one class forcing another class. Democracy is an attempt to legitimize forcing transfers between classes. But why can’t our classes conduct exchanges? There isn’t any reason.

        • THE CAUSAL PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT IS THE SAME CAUSAL PROBLEM OF ETHICS: THE INCOR

          THE CAUSAL PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT IS THE SAME CAUSAL PROBLEM OF ETHICS: THE INCORRECTLY ASSUMPTION OF THE VALUE OF MONOPOLY 🙂

          Why on earth, would you assume, that ethical principles must assume we agree upon ends? Seriously? Why is it that the study of ethics assumes that there are optimum ends for all? That’s, really, ABSURD on it’s face, isn’t it? I mean. That’s ridiculous. Why not that ethics agree upon means, but not ends? Is ‘group think’ or ‘group-ness’ such an instinct? I think not. I think it is fear of making the wrong decision about which group to belong to. Or simply a cover for theft…

          WE have spent millennia now trying to apply the rules of the family and extended family and tribe to the market, and to justify takings, and thefts and redistributions so that there can be a monopoly of ethical statements. But that’s not necessary. The market doesn’t require that at all. We cooperate on means, but not ends. We don’t even largely know wo we’re cooperating with. The same is true in banking. We don’t know what use our money is put to. We cooperate with people in exchange for interest.

          The market, and banking, are institutions that help us cooperate on means even if not on ends.

          If we instead of monopolies imposing homogeneity via law (commands), our institutions relied upon the voluntary exchange of property (contracts) between GROUPS with different property rights internal to the groups, but consistent across the groups, then

          Law and monopoly are means of one class forcing another class. Democracy is an attempt to legitimize forcing transfers between classes. But why can’t our classes conduct exchanges?

          There isn’t any reason.


          Source date (UTC): 2013-07-08 10:17:00 UTC

        • PRAXEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION I don’t think philosophical pro

          PRAXEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION

          I don’t think philosophical problems are all that difficult. Any philosophical problem that is terribly difficult, is only difficult if you’re trying to justify a falsehood. 🙂 Praxeological analysis makes it VERY hard to justify a falsehood. As such, if you can’t describe something as human action, either you don’t understand it, or you’re trying to justify a falsehood. Most falsehoods are just attempts at theft by some sort of justification or deception. Otherwise we wouldn’t bother.

          Occam’s razor and all that… 🙂


          Source date (UTC): 2013-07-08 08:50:00 UTC

        • WORLD EVENTS ARE LUMPY. Planning is so much easier when we think the universe is

          WORLD EVENTS ARE LUMPY.

          Planning is so much easier when we think the universe is even and predictable. But we tend to confuse our desire for and search for regularity, with the fact that the universe, and the human actions within that universe, are unpredictable, lumpy and our lives fragile.


          Source date (UTC): 2013-07-07 11:04:00 UTC