Curt Doolittle

Theme: Causality

  • This argument does not apply as clearly as you suggest to social phenomenon, bec

    http://ex-army.blogspot.com/2013/06/three-ways-to-go-wrong.html?spref=fb1) This argument does not apply as clearly as you suggest to social phenomenon, because of causal density, and un-testability. That we can argue against induction is of course correct as an analytical statement. But that does not mean that we cannot argue in favor of general principles necessary for consensual action. This is the difference between abstract truth and knowledge necessary for action. The first is irrelevant. The second is how humans make collective decisions in commons.

    2) Data will, within the next twenty years or so, give us evidence that eliminates our need for philosophical argument, and instead, will allow us to make empirical arguments. RIght now, voting data, which is demonstrated preference, provides most of the data useful for our arguments.

    This is the underlying problem with current libertarian popular argument: fighting the last war. We fought the war on socialism on philosophical grounds because a) we lacked the data to do otherwise, and b) central planning results show up faster than self organizing results. So the other side had more better data than we did. That’s changed. The problem today is not central planning, or socialism, or social democracy. It’s Postmodernism, which has replaced ‘scientific socialism’ as the religion of choice of the state. So most libertarians fight the last war, using last war’s rhetoric, rather than data against postmodernism. (Which is what those few of us do on the edge of the ‘reformation’ in libertarianism.)

    3) Non aggression is an epistemological TEST to which we can subject statements. It is not a positive proscription for action. Rothbardian/Hoppiean Libertarianism is philosophically rigid, and an attempt at a complete theory, but that completeness is beyond the use of even the educated classes. As such that complexity has been reduced to the single test, which can be employed without such study and rigor.

    We DO have a necessary and sufficient theory of liberty. We just have an insufficient and necessary explanation of morality. Rothbard did a good job but he was wrong in relying upon the ethics of the ghetto instead of the ethics of the soldiery. Ghetto ethics are why libertarianism remains a minority movement. Mises did a good job, but in failing to incorporate opportunity costs he failed to formulate his Praxeology as a the closed science that he suggested it to be.

    Cheers.

    Curt Doolittle.

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev.

    Source date (UTC): 2013-06-24 13:15:00 UTC

  • ECONOMIC FALLACY #3 : CORRELATION VS CAUSATION Correlation does not mean causati

    ECONOMIC FALLACY #3 : CORRELATION VS CAUSATION

    Correlation does not mean causation.

    I hesitate to include this one on the list because the phrase has become overused in some circles. It can be very easy to accuse someone of this and then not have to deal with their argument, even though there is good reason to believe causation exists. Inappropriately accusing people of this fallacy is especially easy when discussing economics. Economics is like a science in which you can’t account for all of the variables. Politicians can take credit, or blame others, for things without knowing the real cause.

    One example of this fallacy is David Johnston’s assessment of the Bush tax cuts. I have no problem when he says the Bush tax cuts didn’t lead to the prosperity Bush promised, although I don’t blame Bush for that, and nearly every politician exaggerates when they are trying to sell something. The main problem I have is when he says “the data show overwhelmingly that the Republican-sponsored tax cuts damaged our nation.” This is a case of the fallacy because most of his evidence that the nation has been damaged is a decrease in average income (his case that less revenue was collected is legitimate). It very well could be the case that the tax cuts made the average income higher than what it would have been.

    The average income could have decreased for reasons other than the Bush’s tax cuts. I lean toward that conclusion because there is no conceivable way that tax cuts can cause a decrease in average income. I would be more than happy to retract my statement if someone could please tell me how this happens.

    I first became aware of this fallacy while I was in college. I was discussing minimum wage with a sociology professor. There are better arguments for raising the minimum wage, but the one she was giving me was that raising it often decreased the unemployment rate. I was baffled that someone could say this because, again, there is no conceivable way that increasing minimum wage could cause a decrease in unemployment. She pointed to certain years when minimum wage increased, and unemployment decreased. It escaped her that minimum wage could have destroyed jobs in one place while a new business may have started up in another, showing a net increase in employment.

    With both the professor and Johnston, they claim that they are just looking at the facts, and those of us with even a little understanding of what causes what in economics are blindly following an ideology with no connection to reality. All this tells me is that they have no interest in how economics actually works. They have a political position they want to advance and they hope they can find “facts” to support it, even if it doesn’t make any sense.

    Source date (UTC): 2013-04-11 03:16:00 UTC

  • Kinsella’s Criticism of Locke, and My Explanation of Locke’s Reasonable Mistake, and What To Do About It.

    [T]hanks to Stephan Kinsella for giving me the opportunity to explain why Locke accidentally created the Labor theory of value. (From a FB post)

    I’m starting to think one of the costliest intellectual mistakes of all human history was Locke’s ridiculous idea that we own the fruits of our labor (or that we own our labor). This labor theory of property has led to all kinds of mischief, not to mention the labor theory of value and communism and hundreds of millions of deaths, plus the horrible IP system which also literally kills people and retards progress and imposes relative impoverishment. PLus, Locke anchored his theory in God-owns-us stuff, instead of rational argument, and he was a racist and pro-slaver. Meh. Lockean homesteading is correct, but not for Locke’s reasons. I’m going to do a long blog post about this.

    He needed to justify the middle class takeover of property from the aristocracy. To put a fork in feudalism. In the church. In the feudal commons. And to do that he had to justify ACTION as the source of property ownership. And he made the obvious logical leap that confused ownership with (a) subjective value, (b) exchange value and (c) market value. Which to us, is absurd, because we work to expose properties of the market in order to illustrate the evils of the middle class and proletarian states. Each of which attempts to reconstruct that aristocratic commons under different administrative ownership – full of sound and fury but changing nothing. But he wasn’t trying to do [what we are – expose the problem of the middle class and proletarian states]. So he didn’t have the need to disentangle the spectrum that we call ‘value’. (a,b and c above.) You’re right that he was imperfect and that there have been consequences to that imperfection. [B]ut to some degree, our emphasis on subjective value alone creates a similar problem. 1) Subjective value is immeasureable. (psychological) 2) Exchange value is incomensurable (barter: visible but incommensurable )) 3) Market value is calculable. (prices: visible, commensurable) I think, that when we libertarians use imprecise language that we make Hume’s mistake. We dont go deep enough and create confusion: political externalities. Just like he did. Because we do not illustrate the problems that the market solves by commensurability. Instead we think subjective value is self evident. And it may be. But it is incomplete. And therefore insufficient to support our claims. This is the same problem we have with Rothbardian ethics and Misesian Praxeology. Theyre incomplete as stated. And if incomplete they cannot be apodeictically certain as we claim. Too deep perhaps. More simply: There is more to value than subjectivity. [Subjectivity is but one point on a spectrum.]

  • METAPHYSICS I am pretty convinced that all the evidence available to us today co

    METAPHYSICS

    I am pretty convinced that all the evidence available to us today confirms that we experience the material universe correspondingly.

    That our perception can be extended to both micro and macro scales through devices.

    That our perception of causal relations can be extended through recording information at micro, normal, and macro scales and then replaying these recordings at higher speed so that patterns emerge within our visible perceptions.

    That our perception of such causal relations is limited by the very small number of axis of causality we can cognitively identify.

    That our ability to improve this process of causal analysis is limited by our current concept of mathematics.

    That our deductive capabilities are jaundiced by our various cognitive biases.

    That our particular human preferences limit our ability to reason clearly.

    That the variation in human ability and rationality limit our collective accomplishment.

    And that superior intelligence, memory, and perception would only increase the rate at which we comprehend these relations

    That superior distributions of knowledge and intelligence would further improve that rate.

    And that different biases and preferences would do little more than impede that understanding in different ways.

    But there is little if any evidence that the vast metaphysical and epistemological distraction enthralling the philosophical profession has produced insight or value.

    Humans must act. All else is entertainment.

    Source date (UTC): 2013-02-26 05:58:00 UTC

  • TWO: STEVEN PINKER NEEDS PRAXEOLOGICAL CORRECTION. Better angels of our nature i

    TWO: STEVEN PINKER NEEDS PRAXEOLOGICAL CORRECTION.

    Better angels of our nature is one of the most important books of this century. Along with Acemoglu, Haidt, Fukuyama and a handful of others.

    And since hes one of those whose works we use to correct progressive thinking, I don’t like to criticize him.

    But better angels fails to accurately judge incentives.

    And as such he uses his errors to come to a fanciful conclusion in chapter 10. He nods to the problem of males. But he does not even mention the problems with females.

    I need a few months to write this spring. :/

    Source date (UTC): 2012-12-28 13:45:00 UTC

  • TO EVOLUTIONARY CERTAINTY: We killed Off Our Competition?

    http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/science/cousins-of-neanderthals-left-dna-in-africa-scientists-report.htmlCLOSER TO EVOLUTIONARY CERTAINTY: We killed Off Our Competition?

    Source date (UTC): 2012-07-27 20:50:00 UTC

  • READ” SCIENCE ON THE IMPACT OF SUPERNOVAE ON CLIMATE AND RATES OF EVOLUTION (som

    http://judithcurry.com/2012/04/24/evidence-of-nearby-supernovae-affecting-life-on-earth/”MUST READ” SCIENCE ON THE IMPACT OF SUPERNOVAE ON CLIMATE AND RATES OF EVOLUTION

    (some fun links today)

    Source date (UTC): 2012-04-24 21:42:00 UTC

  • Mises On Determinism: An Agnostic.

    His argument is that the human mind must determine action or the human creature cannot survive as an acting animal, And the human mind therefore is incapable of seeing the universe as anything other than a sequence of causes. It is a criticism of the tendency of the human mind to err.

    Quote: “It is impossible, … for the human mind to think of any event as uncaused. The concepts of chance and contingency, if properly analyzed, do not refer ultimately to the course of events in the universe. They refer to human knowledge, prevision, and action. They have a praxeological, not an ontological connotation.”

    [callout]The universe cannot observe itself, predict it’s own movements, and construct a plan by which it may alter events. It consists of constant categories. The categories used by human beings are limited only by their desired actions, and their desired actions, in collective permutation, are less limited than those of the physical universe.[/callout]

    In other words, any notion of determinism is an artifact of the human mind. He goes on to give examples of how different fields err. He summarizes by saying we just don’t know whether it is or not, and that we may be prevented from understanding whether it is or not, simply because we cannot conceive of it otherwise. He’s agnostic. He’s not a determinist. He says we just don’t know, and in all the examples that we have tried so far, none of them survive critical analysis. He argues that the use of numerical aggregates and statistics only reinforce that issue. I can see how someone would not understand his argument if they didn’t read it carefully. But his first paragraph makes the entire argument:

    Quote “Whatever the true nature of the universe and of reality may be, man can learn about it only what the logical structure of his mind makes comprehensible to him. Reason, the sole instrument of human science and philosophy, does not convey absolute knowledge and final wisdom. It is vain to speculate about ultimate things. What appears to man’s inquiry as an ultimate given, defying further analysis and reduction to something more fundamental, may or may not appear such to a more perfect intellect. We do not know.”

    He’s an agnostic, not a determinist: “WE DO NOT KNOW.” And any illusion that we can know is a byproduct of the structure of the human mind. Therefore by occam’s razor, it’s more likely that we’re simply WRONG whenever we have deterministic ideas. So Mises was not a determinist. Since his time, we have learned enough, that it is possible to defeat the argument to physical determinism in human action, if not the physical world. What arguments to Determinism that remain, are artifacts of religious mysticism and the structure of our minds. 1) Causality Exists 2) Determinism doesn’t. (Unless there is a god who determines everything.)

    “RE: “Like “Existence”, “Causation” is, as Gian-Carlo Rota might have said, a folie. There is only direction of entropy as measured by gradients of correlation. It is one of those dirty secrets of philosophy of science.” – A Critic

    This view of causality is only true in the abstract, special case of relations in the physical universe which exist independently of human action. When instead, we consider that category of relations which are the result of human action, and where such action requires information necessary to plan, and where such information is of necessity a generalization of the complexity of the physical universe, and as such where a loss of information is necessitated by such acts of generalization, and where such a loss of information is necessary in order to compose an action which will alter the existing course of events using a process of heuristic calculation, where that calculation is made with fragmentary information, and where actions are limited to the possible scope of human actions. Then by necessity causation consists of a set of actions that are observable, and categorically definable both individually, and in the aggregate, by observation of those actions. Actions which produce patterns of outcome which are distinguishable from the entropic limitations of the physical universe. A physical universe to which calculation and aggregation are impossible concepts. The universe cannot observe itself, predict it’s own movements, and construct a plan by which it may alter events. It consists of constant categories. The categories used by human beings are limited only by their desired actions, and their desired actions, in collective permutation, are less limited than those of the physical universe. Anyway, I think I might understand the suggestion that mises was a causal determinist at this point as saying: a) State t1 is the product of prior states tn{..}. b) each state in tn{} is the product of human naming and identity. BUT c) this is not to say that tn{} is complete. d) this is not to say that tn+1 must occur, only that tn+1 can be described by tn+1{…} In this sense, human action is not deterministic, it is however causally determinable. If the question of determinism is metaphysical, then: a) Mises has made no statements to metaphysical determinism, only that humans think in deterministic terms and are incapable of doing otherwise. This is a statement about human beings, not the physical universe. b) If instead of a metaphysical question, it is a question of praxeological action, then all human actions have causes, moreover, all actions are rational (in the broader sense of the term). c) causality is separate from determinacy. That all events have enumerable causes is separate and distinct from the assertion that all causes produce fixed ends. In this sense, the term causal (praxeological) determinism can have meaning separate from Fatalism, Predeterminism, or Predictability, as well as causal (metaphysical) determinism. Mises may have ben a praxeological determinist but not a metaphysical determinist. Clear as mud I’m sure. 🙂

  • HUMAN ACTION AS A SOLUTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF CAUSATION (Had To Captur

    HUMAN ACTION AS A SOLUTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF CAUSATION

    (Had To Capture This one – although I belabored the middle part a bit)

    RE: “Like “Existence”, “Causation” is, as Gian-Carlo Rota might have said, a folie. There is only direction of entropy as measured by gradients of correlation. It is one of those dirty secrets of philosophy of science.” – A Critic

    This is only true in the abstract, special case of relations in the physical universe which exist independently of human action. When instead, we consider that category of relations which are the result of human action, and where such action requires information necessary to plan, and where such information is of necessity a generalization of the complexity of the physical universe, and as such where a loss of information is necessitated by such acts of generalization, and where such a loss of information is necessary in order to compose an action which will alter the course of events through a process of heuristic calculation, and where actions are limited to the possible scope of human actions, then by necessity causation consists of a set of actions that are observable, and categorically definable both individually, and in the aggregate, by observation of those actions, which because of the information loss aforementioned, produce patterns of outcome which are distinguishable from the entropic limitations of the physical universe to which calculation and aggregation are impossible concepts. The universe cannot observe itself, predict it’s own movements, and construct a plan by which it may alter events. It consists of constant categories. The categories used by human beings are limited only by their desired actions, and their desired actions, in collective permutation, are less limited than those of the physical universe.

    This paragraph, should you care to wade through it, answers the question of causation, and most likely imposes sufficient constraints upon the metaphysical nature of existence, and limits the problem of determinism and free will enough to reduce all problems to solvable problems. Humans must act.

    Science is more simplistic than human cooperation. That is why we solved it first.

    🙂

    Source date (UTC): 2012-04-06 16:24:00 UTC

  • Karl Smith Watch: Learning From Fables

    Crises, however, are not fables. They do not exist to teach us lessons or help us learn to mend our ways. The forces at work are utterly indifferent to the narratives we attach to them. Like everything else, they are simply a chain of events. One damned thing after another. Our task is to understand how this chain is likely to unfold and uncover what, if anything, we can do to mitigate the damage.

    via On Europe: Tyler and I « Modeled Behavior.

    To which I replied: Again, love you and your work. But you are artificially narrowing the scope of inquiry to suit your biases and calling it truth rather than preference. A longer time preference would argue for different policies, lower fragility, and better individual planning. You have a shorter time preference which suits your bias toward redistribution and allowing increasing birth rates among the lower classes. The average European as a lower IQ than in 1850 for a reason. You are the reason. Actually women are — but you’re a product of that thinking. (Ashkenazim have remained constant from the medieval average, while Europeans have declined.) There are hard conceptual barriers at 105, 122 and 140. And the composition of a population determines its possible norms. Ideas have consequences. In particular, your ideas have consequences.