Source: Facebook

  • (dear dimwit of the moment) (from elsewhere) But (a) I didn’t justify monarchy,

    (dear dimwit of the moment) (from elsewhere)

    But (a) I didn’t justify monarchy, i justified Christian Monarchy under Natural Law. (b) I didn’t justify feudalism. (c) I have no idea what you mean by royalism but it’s extremely unlikely I justified it. (ergo, straw men, not arguments)

    And (d) Natural Law as I use the term is not an abstraction but a rigorous definition: the limit of our actions to productive, fully in formed, warrantied, voluntary exchange of property-in-toto, limited to productive externalities. Or conversely, the prohibition of the imposition of costs upon property-in-toto. Where property in toto refers to demonstrated property not authoritarian declaration, or rational justification definitions of property. Or what you might call the initiation of ‘aggression’ against property-in-toto; whereby we preserve and expand the incentive to cooperate, and refrain from initiating the incentive to retaliate. (An adult version of the half truth we call the non aggression principle) (Ergo, straw man, not argument)

    From what I see in just a few of your comments, and which is obvious from the chain of reasoning that you depend upon, you rely on sentimental rather than operational definitions of terms. This is a form of pseudoscientific argument applied to economic, political, and legal sciences.

    If you define your terms precisely you will be unable to make the arguments you think you do.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-23 10:18:00 UTC

  • (dear dimwit) (from elsewhere) Please don’t friend me so that you can waste my t

    (dear dimwit) (from elsewhere)

    Please don’t friend me so that you can waste my time with non-arguments. My time is valuable. Furthermore, If you can only produce the rational equivalent of green frog memes then you lack rationality, and lacking rationality you lack agency, and lacking agency you can never possess sovereignty, and as such can never possess a condition of liberty.

    Curt


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-23 10:05:00 UTC

  • FASCISM, COMMUNISM, MONARCHY – ONLY ONE OF THEM IS ‘BAD’. to: Robby Daniel Dyer

    FASCISM, COMMUNISM, MONARCHY – ONLY ONE OF THEM IS ‘BAD’.

    to: Robby Daniel Dyer

    I don’t have the time this morning to correct you in detail,

    BUT since you’re a smart enough fellow I’ll give you these points to ponder:

    An unlimited market system allows endemic parasitism others and the commons by externality and this is why it never has or will exist – people won’t tolerate it.

    When you say ‘authoritarian’ rule you mean DISCRETIONARY rule. However, rule of law removes discretion by empirical evolution.

    Under rule of law, under natural law, (non-discretionary rule) a monarch merely functions as a judge of last resort, when the subject under consideration is not one of law but long term consequence.

    A monarchy that collects administrative fees (sales taxes or land rent taxes) on the market it administers (polity), may spend that income however it prefers, and in history, it has been small, and they tend to spend it reasonably well. Because otherwise, as individuals, they are open to assassination – usually by their own family members for threatening their social status.

    So while fascism requires discretionary rule, it remains a viable strategy for the conduct of Total War – which was the reason it was invented: to preserve napoleon’s invention of total war, and apply it to the industrial era.

    While communism requires discretionary rule, it also lacks an incentive structure necessary for a voluntary organization of production, so it requires a vast directorial class.

    So when you include monarchy in that list I am not sure what you are talking about. Because christian monarchy dependend eitehr on the common traditional law, or later natural law, or something in between – the restored roman law. No monarch had full license, and the church mandated that fact – and if one’s rule was ‘uninsured’ by the church it meant it was ‘for sale to all commers’ with license.

    As far as I know ‘perfect government’ consists of natural law, independent judiciary (the west’s original priesthood), a military militia, a hereditary monarchy, a market for commons consisting of multiple houses, a market for the production of goods, services, and information, a market for reproduction (marriage), a market for association.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-23 08:50:00 UTC

  • Curt Doolittle shared a post

    Curt Doolittle shared a post.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-23 02:23:00 UTC

  • UM, please separate peter’s commentary – which i wanted to preserve but question

    UM, please separate peter’s commentary – which i wanted to preserve but question – from the map. Peter’s comments are his own and I wanted to see what thoughts others would have.

    The map only makes a comparison of terms, not grammar.

    The map shows terminological borrowing not language structure.

    what this map Should show is influence across languages primarily through proximity and trade.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-23 02:02:00 UTC

  • “My contribution: If you translate information theory and evolutionary theory in

    —“My contribution: If you translate information theory and evolutionary theory into Aristotelean language, you get a ready-made bridge across the fact/value divide”—Adam Voight


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-22 14:54:00 UTC

  • “Donald Trump’s new national security advisor, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, has inher

    —“Donald Trump’s new national security advisor, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, has inherited a world in which the tectonic plates are perceptibly shifting. Power, long centered in Washington, is radiating eastward toward Moscow, Tehran, New Delhi, and Beijing. Meanwhile, the rules and institutions of the international system that have for 70 years maintained some modicum of order are visibly under stress, as are the states that make up that system. Whether it recognizes it yet or not, the Trump administration will likely be forced to confront the ongoing challenge of how to restore stability.

    The unraveling is most apparent in the Middle East. Four states have failed and collapsed into civil war (Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen); others are at peril of the same. In Syria, it is now Russia, not the United States, that is calling the shots, having brazenly inserted its military — together with Iran and its proxies — into the conflict in 2015 to save Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad from defeat. As in the region’s other civil conflicts, the breakdown of order has led to unmitigated chaos: up to a half-million Syrians killed and more than 11 million displaced. The Islamic State and al Qaeda have profited from the mayhem to secure territory and recruits while committing unspeakable atrocities of their own.

    But the unraveling is evident in Europe as well. Europe is dealing with a not dissimilar crisis of political legitimacy, most noticeably on its periphery, as weak states such as Greece and Bulgaria struggle to provide their citizens with jobs and services in the face of severe fiscal constraints. Europe also is coping with the consequences of the Middle East’s civil wars in the form of massive refugee flows and terrorist attacks. The fear these consequences have generated has strengthened far-right political parties with anti-immigrant, law-and-order messages, contributing to the Brexit victory in Britain and threatening ultimately to undermine the European Union as a whole.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed his preference for the more multipolar world that is starting to emerge from these dark centripetal forces of disorder. He appears to want to revert to 19th-century balance-of-power politics, wherein a few large states broker among themselves issues of war and peace and maintain order within their respective spheres of influence, often by aligning with local strongmen.

    Some people in the new administration have suggested they would not be interested in arresting the unraveling of global politics in this direction. But they will ultimately find themselves compelled, for the sake of American power and prosperity, to try revitalizing for a new era the rules-based international order constructed following World War II. At that time, the United States, eager to prevent Europe’s bloody wars from ever recurring and the scourge of communism from spreading, helped design a web of international and regional institutions to shore up its European allies and encouraged cooperation rather than armed conflict among states.

    A somewhat analogous challenge faces the United States today in the Middle East. <blockquote class=”pullquote-left”>The region is likely to be the fiery cauldron in which the global order either gets reforged for a new era or melts down entirely.</blockquote>The region is likely to be the fiery cauldron in which the global order either gets reforged for a new era or melts down entirely.</span> Syria may provide the first test. The Russians would like the United States to accept Assad’s continued rule of that shattered country, in return for a partnership to fight the Islamic State and al Qaeda together. But that is not how stability will be achieved in the Middle East. Assad has alienated too many Syrians through his misrule and brutalities to be able to put his country back together. In the absence of a viable and vibrant Syria that offers its citizens some hope for the future, any battlefield gains against the Islamic State and al Qaeda are likely to be ephemeral.

    Instead, the United States should seek to negotiate a resolution to the Syrian conflict that safeguards the interests of all parties and provides broad latitude for local and provincial self-government. The Russians need to be persuaded that the war is unwinnable and that Assad is not capable of stabilizing the country. If words alone fail to sway them, then a policy of greater humanitarian protection for civilians trapped in the conflict — combined with a stepped-up U.S. effort against the Islamic State in tandem with regional partners — should provide greater leverage to nudge them toward a negotiated settlement.

    For the region more broadly, the agenda needs to be no less ambitious. The measures required to put the Middle East on a more positive trajectory resemble those undertaken in Europe 70 years ago: stop the fighting, negotiate equitable and inclusive political settlements (in this case to the region’s other civil wars), shore up weak states to make them resistant to subversion, encourage political leaders to govern in ways that strengthen their legitimacy and unleash the talents of their people, and develop regional institutions that help mitigate conflict and enhance the prospects for cooperation. To achieve this, the United States should partner with states in and outside the region that share its interest in a more stable Middle East. It is high time that those in the region took the lead, providing the vision and doing the lion’s share of the work, but the United States, Europe, and potentially Russia and China should help, as a matter of self-interest.

    This may seem a tall order, but the benefits could be substantial. A more secure and prosperous Middle East would undercut radical Islam’s ideological appeal, stabilize Europe’s southern border, and open up a market of more than 300 million consumers. Such a project could give new purpose to the transatlantic relationship while reinvigorating and expanding the existing international order for a new era.

    As it contemplates how to deal with an increasingly chaotic world, the new administration will ultimately face a choice: Do you throw your lot in with strongmen who offer the semblance of order but cannot provide lasting stability, or do you double down on a rules-based international system that has been far from perfect but delivered 70 years of peace and prosperity in an otherwise anarchical world? No other choice could be more consequential.”—F.P.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-22 14:48:00 UTC

  • You don’t have to trust people so much as (a) know their incentives, (b) know th

    You don’t have to trust people so much as (a) know their incentives, (b) know their capabilities, (c) know your recourse. We have to know quite a bit in order to know their incentives and know their capabilities. But we don’t need to know much to know our recourse. Ergo, institutions of recourse (insurance), meaning the judiciary, provide extraordinary discounts on all transactions great and small.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-22 14:23:00 UTC

  • Erik Weinstein, Theil Capital (From Elsewhere) A, fan. But a few comments 1) Eri

    Erik Weinstein, Theil Capital

    (From Elsewhere)

    A, fan. But a few comments

    1) Eric ends up describing the elusive goal of reducing discretionary economic *policy* to non-discretionary *rule of law*. The way he expresses it is just unclear. This is the holy grail of political, and legal as well as economic and social science.

    2) Regarding the ‘new economy’. Perhaps, it’s rather better to state that the production of commons in the market for commons (politics) by the demonstration of behavior in the commons, is of greater value in producing goods for consumption, than the production of goods, services, and information in the market for consumption (private goods), when the ability to organize people by voluntary incentives (capitalism and markets) is no longer possible because of the excess of labor, and limited contribution of labor to that process.

    3) Unstated in Eric’s assumptions is a concept of ‘We’ evolved under the enlightenment seizure of the organs of the state from the aristocracy, and its universalism under the subsequent influence of Cosmopolitanism and the Industrial Revolution, and my understanding is that this concept of ‘we’ is disintegrating along with the ‘luxury’ of the cosmopolitan presumption.

    4) Because of the ‘we’ question (the value of nation states, because of the dead weight of the underclasses under Cosmopolitanism), as far as I can tell, the most successful group evolutionary strategy is to force new-normative behavior into nations with large underclasses. And I am all but certain that it is this return-to-normal that will play out.

    5) What Eric does not mention is the similarity between silicon valley and the german princedoms wherein monarchies fought for status and wealth by sponsoring talents across the spectrum. Rather than cosmopolitan solutions I suggest that this is the reason that the germans nearly brought about the second scientific revolution and it’s consequential second enlightenment pre-war. And that this is the model we should take from Silicon Valley, not the fact that Silicon valley is

    In other words, Eric is making the progressive error, common in the Cosmopolitans and Postmoderns that the assumption of growth that the Capitalist state relies upon, is not the assumption he himself relies upon. Bigger is only better if capital is brought to people rather than people to capital.

    As far as I an tell there is no means of constructing a higher incentive than kin, when macro incentives fail, and the choice is between absorbing far more risk and change and increased competition, or creating scarcity and benefitting from it.

    This is how I position the worldwide shift at present. My understanding of the 20th century ‘overstatement’ of economics and mathematics is marginally indifferent from Eric’s. But my understanding of human history is that there is absolutely nothing unique about our present condition other than scale. And one can ‘hope’ and ‘pray’ and ‘aspire’ and ‘labor’ to bring about a solution that continues evolving the world to what amounts to a universal caste system, but the mathematics of the formation of voluntary organizations of production in all the markets: association, reproduction, production, production of commons, production of polities, and group evolutionary strategies, suggests that it’s not possible. But that a larger number of smaller polities can achieve those ends without expanding the underclasses and causing the ‘problem’ that Eric is leaving unstated: the market for human beings will not bear goods for that which has no demand – other than kinship.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute.

    Kiev, Ukraine.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-22 13:35:00 UTC

  • INTRO TO PROPERTARIANISM Depends on what you want out of it. Do you want to unde

    https://propertarianism.com/basic-concepts/NEWBIES: INTRO TO PROPERTARIANISM

    Depends on what you want out of it.

    Do you want to understand what propertarianism is sort of ‘about’?

    Do you want to understand why the west evolved faster than the rest?

    Do you want to now how we can save western civilization – easily?

    Do you want to win arguments against the “bad” people?

    Do you want to construct ‘proofs’ of natural law?

    Do you want to contribute to this natural law?


    Source date (UTC): 2017-02-22 12:23:00 UTC