The truth is that fiat currency is such an advantage that a people cannot compete without it. Competing currencies and commodities exist but they are not anywhere near as price stabilized as fiat money CAN be. So we are always going to have it. Probably digital will replace it and it will have to because the abuse of it has gotten out of hand. What real purpose does government debt serve over simply printing money and paying with it? You pay the price of interest in order to delay the equlibrial neutrality of money working through the economy. In other words, the faster new money moves the faster prices in the existing cycle of production adjust. Fast adjustment is bad if it interferes with production ( planning ) cycles. So instead we pay interest and sell government debt so that we inflate away the interest at about the same rate that prices adjust in the economy.
Form: Mini Essay
-
Infinity, And The Fictional Justificationary Narratives Used In Mathematics
infinite = **’unknown, because without context of correspondence we cannot determine limits’**, that’s all it means. Because that’s all it *can* mean and not argumentatively convert from mathematics to theology or fictional justification is perhaps a better term. The irony is that mathematicians seek precision in their statements and take pride in the precision of their language, but on this subject they do the opposite: obscure. There is no difference at all between making theological justificationary narratives, and making mathematically platonic justificationary narratives other than in theology and mathematics, theologians and mathematicians both seek to enforce existing dogma, while at the same time obscuring the fact that they have no idea what they’re talking about, and therefore resort to fictional narrative justification. “God gave us the ten commandments” is a fictional justificationary narrative obscuring the lack of causal understanding, and “evolutionary constraints produced natural laws of cooperation at scale” articulates the causal understanding. I can obey those ten commandments and cooperate at scale whether I use the fictional justificationary narrative, or the causal scientific narrative. So the operations I take are identical. What differs is the consequences of using a fictional justificationary narrative and a causally parsimonious narrative – just as what differs in our ability to make consequential deductions from allegorical justificationary narratives, and axiomatic causal properties differs. Mathematics is literally full of holdovers from the greek and Christian eras of mysticism as well as the modern era’s rationalism – and mathematicians have not reformed mathematics as science has been reformed. And so mathematics still contain’s is fictional justificationary narratives. This retention of fictional justificationary narratives (the theology of mathematical platonism), does not necessarily inhibit the practice of mathematics any more than obeying the ten commandments inhibits the art of cooperating at scale. What matters is the consequence of teaching mathematics platonically (theologically) and teaching it scientifically (existentially). Now, in testimonialism we account for the ethics of externality and we require warranty of truthfulness in public speech. Therefore it would be unethical and immoral (and possibly criminal or at least negligent) for mathematicians to continue to teach or publish or speak in public using theological language while at the same time making proof or truth claims – because one cannot warranty due diligence against externality caused by the false statements. So someday we hope we can reform mathematics so that it is taught scientifically not theologically, and as such by superior methods of teaching, we expand the use of mathematics to increasing numbers of people, and export less theology via fictional justificationary narrative into the public domain.
-
Infinity, And The Fictional Justificationary Narratives Used In Mathematics
infinite = **’unknown, because without context of correspondence we cannot determine limits’**, that’s all it means. Because that’s all it *can* mean and not argumentatively convert from mathematics to theology or fictional justification is perhaps a better term. The irony is that mathematicians seek precision in their statements and take pride in the precision of their language, but on this subject they do the opposite: obscure. There is no difference at all between making theological justificationary narratives, and making mathematically platonic justificationary narratives other than in theology and mathematics, theologians and mathematicians both seek to enforce existing dogma, while at the same time obscuring the fact that they have no idea what they’re talking about, and therefore resort to fictional narrative justification. “God gave us the ten commandments” is a fictional justificationary narrative obscuring the lack of causal understanding, and “evolutionary constraints produced natural laws of cooperation at scale” articulates the causal understanding. I can obey those ten commandments and cooperate at scale whether I use the fictional justificationary narrative, or the causal scientific narrative. So the operations I take are identical. What differs is the consequences of using a fictional justificationary narrative and a causally parsimonious narrative – just as what differs in our ability to make consequential deductions from allegorical justificationary narratives, and axiomatic causal properties differs. Mathematics is literally full of holdovers from the greek and Christian eras of mysticism as well as the modern era’s rationalism – and mathematicians have not reformed mathematics as science has been reformed. And so mathematics still contain’s is fictional justificationary narratives. This retention of fictional justificationary narratives (the theology of mathematical platonism), does not necessarily inhibit the practice of mathematics any more than obeying the ten commandments inhibits the art of cooperating at scale. What matters is the consequence of teaching mathematics platonically (theologically) and teaching it scientifically (existentially). Now, in testimonialism we account for the ethics of externality and we require warranty of truthfulness in public speech. Therefore it would be unethical and immoral (and possibly criminal or at least negligent) for mathematicians to continue to teach or publish or speak in public using theological language while at the same time making proof or truth claims – because one cannot warranty due diligence against externality caused by the false statements. So someday we hope we can reform mathematics so that it is taught scientifically not theologically, and as such by superior methods of teaching, we expand the use of mathematics to increasing numbers of people, and export less theology via fictional justificationary narrative into the public domain.
-
Restoring Truth: It”s Not Easy Trying To Reground Man In Reality And Forcing Him To Speak Truthfully: Because It’s Hard And Costly
The attraction of the theological, platonic, ideal, fictional is so great if for no other reason that the mind naturally categorizes unnecessary operationally deterministic detail into names of consequences of those operations. In fact, this is what the mind does: generalize. Because our computational bandwidth is limited, and our ability to work with a concept in short term memory is very limited, so we are always struggling to compare the most complex RESULTS using the most simplistic INPUTS. In other words, we generalize so that we can make consequent imaginary associations of different degrees of precision. The problem is that each time we generalize we lose information. That’s what generalizing means. We give up detail to create increasingly explanatory categories. And each deduction we make from less precise generalizations includes greater potential for association, but also greater potential for error. So then, once we have found an answer we then re-evaluate whether that answer is possible by working backward through the detail of each generalization to test it. Given that mathematics consists entirely of testable operations this generally isn’t necessary, although that was the purpose of the intuitionistic movement in mathematics. But as we move away from mathematics, or as we move to richer and denser ideas in mathematics, we leave behind operational certainty and begin to encounter deductive uncertainty – searching for limits within which an answer might (or must) be found. And as we move farther away we rely upon only non-contradiction, and at last vague associative relation. The reason being that we move from reproducible and necessary operations to mere deductions, to mere non-contradiction, to mere possible association. So we fight two battles that are only solvable by reverse-construction: operational definitions from first causes. ONE In the first we have the mind’s need to generalize as we work with ever more complex topics, TWO In the second we may teach people operations with generalities rather than the construction of those generalities from first principles – so that they can later test consequent deductions, calculations, rationalizations, imaginary relations. THREE In the third, we see people that have been taught generalities instead of causalities then create theological, platonic, and other fictional narratives to simplify this causal density and to keep the entire model (system) within their grasp. FOUR In the fourth, we produce externalities by the use of the language generalizations, by applying the fictional narratives as if they constitute existential or possible operations, by mere verbal association to problems and categories that have no underlying association in causality, only narrative fictional association. FIVE This process is how the public becomes confused with math, science, biology, economics – and how these confusions end up as policy. Sometimes by the equal ignorance and stupidity of policy makers. And sometimes (as we have seen with the pseudoscientific social sciences) by intent to abuse the people’s openness to such narratives and the possibility of deceiving them by suggestion using those narratives. THEREFORE So if it is my purpose to eliminate the possibility of public error and deception from the commons, such that the people do not pursue fallacies, and cannot be led by fallacies, then we must hold accountable those people who manufacture manufacture research, teaching, manufacture publications, and manufacture ideas, and manufacture policy, by the same standards we hold people accountable in the production of resources, materials, goods, medicines, and services. KEEPING OUR DISCOUNTS AND IRRESPONSIBILITY Now you will hear from every discipline that they claim that they cannot be held accountable for the use of their products – they refuse to warranty verbal and literary products for the same reason ladder manufacturers, tool manufacturers, toy manufacturers, drug manufacturers, carpet installers, home builders, psychologists, and tax accountants desire not to warranty their services. And they will refuse this reformation the same way that every other externality-causing industry has attempted to refuse warranty of due diligence in informing the customer of the dangers of incorrect use of the product, and themselves of the clarity of articulation and description of the product or service. People want to preserve discounts and export costs onto others. Intellectuals are no more immune to parasitic existence than other disciplines. And outside of the financial and political sector producers of ideas are probably the GREATEST exporters of damage onto others because of their lack of warranty of due diligence. But that hasn’t and won’t and shouldn’t ask us to force the reformation of every discipline (math and economics and social science, and law in particular) so that the those who profit from the education and distribution of knowledge are held as accountable for it as are the producers and distributors of all other products. The informational commons has become as important as any other commons, and the market for information has become more important precisely because it is cheaper and easier to distribute products that harm individuals, groups, societies, and entire civilizations, if not mankind. I am convinced that the operational revolution that failed in the last century, and the one that we can yet bring about today, will produce as great an improvement in human thought and society as the scientific revolution has in contrast to the rational, and the rational in contrast to the mystical. We are not yet at the end of history. But if we defend the informational marketplace and the informational commons from pollution by error-bias, wishful thinking, suggestion, pseudoscience and deceit, we can bring the end of history one step closer to fruition. Truth is enough. But telling the truth is increasingly expensive. It is the highest tax that we pay. And it produces the greatest returns of any other tax – even more so than the tremendously costly, but beneficial tax, of paying for the institution of private property, and its consequences. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
-
Restoring Truth: It”s Not Easy Trying To Reground Man In Reality And Forcing Him To Speak Truthfully: Because It’s Hard And Costly
The attraction of the theological, platonic, ideal, fictional is so great if for no other reason that the mind naturally categorizes unnecessary operationally deterministic detail into names of consequences of those operations. In fact, this is what the mind does: generalize. Because our computational bandwidth is limited, and our ability to work with a concept in short term memory is very limited, so we are always struggling to compare the most complex RESULTS using the most simplistic INPUTS. In other words, we generalize so that we can make consequent imaginary associations of different degrees of precision. The problem is that each time we generalize we lose information. That’s what generalizing means. We give up detail to create increasingly explanatory categories. And each deduction we make from less precise generalizations includes greater potential for association, but also greater potential for error. So then, once we have found an answer we then re-evaluate whether that answer is possible by working backward through the detail of each generalization to test it. Given that mathematics consists entirely of testable operations this generally isn’t necessary, although that was the purpose of the intuitionistic movement in mathematics. But as we move away from mathematics, or as we move to richer and denser ideas in mathematics, we leave behind operational certainty and begin to encounter deductive uncertainty – searching for limits within which an answer might (or must) be found. And as we move farther away we rely upon only non-contradiction, and at last vague associative relation. The reason being that we move from reproducible and necessary operations to mere deductions, to mere non-contradiction, to mere possible association. So we fight two battles that are only solvable by reverse-construction: operational definitions from first causes. ONE In the first we have the mind’s need to generalize as we work with ever more complex topics, TWO In the second we may teach people operations with generalities rather than the construction of those generalities from first principles – so that they can later test consequent deductions, calculations, rationalizations, imaginary relations. THREE In the third, we see people that have been taught generalities instead of causalities then create theological, platonic, and other fictional narratives to simplify this causal density and to keep the entire model (system) within their grasp. FOUR In the fourth, we produce externalities by the use of the language generalizations, by applying the fictional narratives as if they constitute existential or possible operations, by mere verbal association to problems and categories that have no underlying association in causality, only narrative fictional association. FIVE This process is how the public becomes confused with math, science, biology, economics – and how these confusions end up as policy. Sometimes by the equal ignorance and stupidity of policy makers. And sometimes (as we have seen with the pseudoscientific social sciences) by intent to abuse the people’s openness to such narratives and the possibility of deceiving them by suggestion using those narratives. THEREFORE So if it is my purpose to eliminate the possibility of public error and deception from the commons, such that the people do not pursue fallacies, and cannot be led by fallacies, then we must hold accountable those people who manufacture manufacture research, teaching, manufacture publications, and manufacture ideas, and manufacture policy, by the same standards we hold people accountable in the production of resources, materials, goods, medicines, and services. KEEPING OUR DISCOUNTS AND IRRESPONSIBILITY Now you will hear from every discipline that they claim that they cannot be held accountable for the use of their products – they refuse to warranty verbal and literary products for the same reason ladder manufacturers, tool manufacturers, toy manufacturers, drug manufacturers, carpet installers, home builders, psychologists, and tax accountants desire not to warranty their services. And they will refuse this reformation the same way that every other externality-causing industry has attempted to refuse warranty of due diligence in informing the customer of the dangers of incorrect use of the product, and themselves of the clarity of articulation and description of the product or service. People want to preserve discounts and export costs onto others. Intellectuals are no more immune to parasitic existence than other disciplines. And outside of the financial and political sector producers of ideas are probably the GREATEST exporters of damage onto others because of their lack of warranty of due diligence. But that hasn’t and won’t and shouldn’t ask us to force the reformation of every discipline (math and economics and social science, and law in particular) so that the those who profit from the education and distribution of knowledge are held as accountable for it as are the producers and distributors of all other products. The informational commons has become as important as any other commons, and the market for information has become more important precisely because it is cheaper and easier to distribute products that harm individuals, groups, societies, and entire civilizations, if not mankind. I am convinced that the operational revolution that failed in the last century, and the one that we can yet bring about today, will produce as great an improvement in human thought and society as the scientific revolution has in contrast to the rational, and the rational in contrast to the mystical. We are not yet at the end of history. But if we defend the informational marketplace and the informational commons from pollution by error-bias, wishful thinking, suggestion, pseudoscience and deceit, we can bring the end of history one step closer to fruition. Truth is enough. But telling the truth is increasingly expensive. It is the highest tax that we pay. And it produces the greatest returns of any other tax – even more so than the tremendously costly, but beneficial tax, of paying for the institution of private property, and its consequences. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
-
Taleb vs Doolittle: Demanding Skin-in-the-Game vs Involuntary Warranty
Nassim Taleb and I are working on the same problem, which we identified by similar means: designing models. He was inspired when he designed financial risk models, and I was inspired when I designed artificial intelligences for games in anticipation of the kind of warfare we are seeing emerge today. I work bottom up (operationally), and Taleb works top-down (statistically). But this is the same problem from two ends of the spectrum. (He publishes books on the mass market to make money, I build software and companies for a limited number of partners and customers.) I want to find the mechanism and he wants to quantify the effect. But we are looking for the same thing. What is it? Computers are useful in increasing our perceptions. The game of Life is an interesting software experiment in that if you vary the rate (time) you see different patterns emerge. If you vary the scale you see different patterns emerge. But in the end, these patterns, while they appear relatively random at slow (operationally observable) rates, turn out to be highly deterministic at faster ( consequentially observable) rates. And this single experimental game tells us a lot about the human mind’s limits of perception. We see what we can, and the longer we observe the more consequential the patterns are that emerge, and the more deterministic is any system we observe. We have all heard how few behaviors ants have but what kind of complexity emerges from it. During a vacation in southern Oregon one year I observed ducks for a few days as a way of distracting myself from business stress. Ducks are not smart like crows. They have just a few behaviors (intuitions is perhaps a better word). And their apparent complexities emerge from just those few behaviors. But if you watch them long enough you see machines that do about four or five things. And that’s all. So, there is some limit to our perception underneath man’s behavior that is ascertainable: the metrics of human thought. And I would suggestion without reservation that this research program is at least – if more – profoundly important than the research program into the physical structure of the universe. This mathematics is achievable, but we don’t yet know how to go about it. And I am pretty certain that it’s a data collection problem: until we have vastly more data about our selves we probably cannot determine it. (emphasis on probably). We may solve it by analogy with artificial intelligence. Or we may not. I suspect that we will. We will develop a unit of cognition wherein x information is required for every IQ point in order to create a bridge between one substantive network of relations and another. But Taleb and I issue the same warning – although I think I have an institutional solution that can be implemented as formal policy and he has an informative narrative but no solution – as yet. Although his paper last year that shows just how extraordinarily large our information must be once we start getting into outliers. We both use some version of ‘skin in the game’ as a guardianship against wishful thinking and cognitive bias. I use the legal term warranty and he uses the financial street name ‘skin in the game’ But the idea is the same. In Taleb’s case, I think he is more concerned with stupidity and hubris as we have seen in the statistical (non-operational) financialization of our economy. Whereas I am more concerned with deception, as we have seen in the conversion of the social sciences to statistical pseudosciences in every field: psychology, sociology, economics, politics, and (as I have extended the scope of political theory) to group evolutionary strategy. But whether top down or bottom up, statistical or pseudoscientific, skin in the game or warranty, hubris or deceit, the problem remains the same: It is too easy for people in modernity to rely on pseudoscience in order to execute deceptions that cause us to consume every form of capital, from the genetic, to the normative, to the ethical and moral, to the informational (knowledge itself), to the institutional, to built capital, to portable capital, to money, to accounts, to the territorial, and destroying civilization, and in particular the uniqueness of western civilization in the process. So to assert our ( Taleb and I) argument more directly: given that these people have put no skin in the game, and provided no warranty, but that we can impose upon them the warranty against their will for their malfeasance, what form of restitution shall we extract from them? Territorial, physical, institutional, traditional, informational, normative, and genetic? How do we demand restitution for what they have done? How would you balance the accounts plus provide such incentive under rule of law that this would never happen again? As for the Great Wars – all debts are paid. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
-
Taleb vs Doolittle: Demanding Skin-in-the-Game vs Involuntary Warranty
Nassim Taleb and I are working on the same problem, which we identified by similar means: designing models. He was inspired when he designed financial risk models, and I was inspired when I designed artificial intelligences for games in anticipation of the kind of warfare we are seeing emerge today. I work bottom up (operationally), and Taleb works top-down (statistically). But this is the same problem from two ends of the spectrum. (He publishes books on the mass market to make money, I build software and companies for a limited number of partners and customers.) I want to find the mechanism and he wants to quantify the effect. But we are looking for the same thing. What is it? Computers are useful in increasing our perceptions. The game of Life is an interesting software experiment in that if you vary the rate (time) you see different patterns emerge. If you vary the scale you see different patterns emerge. But in the end, these patterns, while they appear relatively random at slow (operationally observable) rates, turn out to be highly deterministic at faster ( consequentially observable) rates. And this single experimental game tells us a lot about the human mind’s limits of perception. We see what we can, and the longer we observe the more consequential the patterns are that emerge, and the more deterministic is any system we observe. We have all heard how few behaviors ants have but what kind of complexity emerges from it. During a vacation in southern Oregon one year I observed ducks for a few days as a way of distracting myself from business stress. Ducks are not smart like crows. They have just a few behaviors (intuitions is perhaps a better word). And their apparent complexities emerge from just those few behaviors. But if you watch them long enough you see machines that do about four or five things. And that’s all. So, there is some limit to our perception underneath man’s behavior that is ascertainable: the metrics of human thought. And I would suggestion without reservation that this research program is at least – if more – profoundly important than the research program into the physical structure of the universe. This mathematics is achievable, but we don’t yet know how to go about it. And I am pretty certain that it’s a data collection problem: until we have vastly more data about our selves we probably cannot determine it. (emphasis on probably). We may solve it by analogy with artificial intelligence. Or we may not. I suspect that we will. We will develop a unit of cognition wherein x information is required for every IQ point in order to create a bridge between one substantive network of relations and another. But Taleb and I issue the same warning – although I think I have an institutional solution that can be implemented as formal policy and he has an informative narrative but no solution – as yet. Although his paper last year that shows just how extraordinarily large our information must be once we start getting into outliers. We both use some version of ‘skin in the game’ as a guardianship against wishful thinking and cognitive bias. I use the legal term warranty and he uses the financial street name ‘skin in the game’ But the idea is the same. In Taleb’s case, I think he is more concerned with stupidity and hubris as we have seen in the statistical (non-operational) financialization of our economy. Whereas I am more concerned with deception, as we have seen in the conversion of the social sciences to statistical pseudosciences in every field: psychology, sociology, economics, politics, and (as I have extended the scope of political theory) to group evolutionary strategy. But whether top down or bottom up, statistical or pseudoscientific, skin in the game or warranty, hubris or deceit, the problem remains the same: It is too easy for people in modernity to rely on pseudoscience in order to execute deceptions that cause us to consume every form of capital, from the genetic, to the normative, to the ethical and moral, to the informational (knowledge itself), to the institutional, to built capital, to portable capital, to money, to accounts, to the territorial, and destroying civilization, and in particular the uniqueness of western civilization in the process. So to assert our ( Taleb and I) argument more directly: given that these people have put no skin in the game, and provided no warranty, but that we can impose upon them the warranty against their will for their malfeasance, what form of restitution shall we extract from them? Territorial, physical, institutional, traditional, informational, normative, and genetic? How do we demand restitution for what they have done? How would you balance the accounts plus provide such incentive under rule of law that this would never happen again? As for the Great Wars – all debts are paid. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
-
Conservatism And The Central Objects Of Law, Policy, And Commons.
Conservatism is not an individualist but a Familial strategy. In other words, the strategy is building good, self-insuring families. So conservatism eugenically suppresses weak and bad family members from the gene pool, allowing those who demonstrate a willingness to transcend their familial (genetic) weaknesses through demonstrations of heroism. So if your family is too weak you provide you with wealth it’s a measure of your genes. And you are a representative of those genes. Through actions and choices, you may transcend your family limits. Through actions and choices one can descend from a family’s achievements. There are four functions that play for and against your statement. First, the lottery effect is real and necessary (you can’t win if you don’t play) but not all people can win the lottery. This creates incentives for many at very low cost. Second capitalism pays us for the number of people who are willing to contribute to the production of goods and services. It’s purely a numbers game. Making cooking-matches and making symphonies is inversely rewarding; lots of people use cooking-matches. Third – it is extremely difficult to hold wealth over more than three generations unless you are in fact genetically superior. And that is what we see. Fourth – those families that demonstrate superiority over many generations are in fact demonstrating that they are a natural aristocracy – by any measure: and there are very few of them. THEREFORE The central object of law is the individual, since the individual acts. The central object of policy is the family. The central object of commons is the competitiveness of the polity. Insurance of various forms is a luxury we can afford or not depending on the success of the central objects of law, policy, and polity. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine, (And my spiritual homes: London UK, Boston, and Seattle USA) 🙂
-
Conservatism And The Central Objects Of Law, Policy, And Commons.
Conservatism is not an individualist but a Familial strategy. In other words, the strategy is building good, self-insuring families. So conservatism eugenically suppresses weak and bad family members from the gene pool, allowing those who demonstrate a willingness to transcend their familial (genetic) weaknesses through demonstrations of heroism. So if your family is too weak you provide you with wealth it’s a measure of your genes. And you are a representative of those genes. Through actions and choices, you may transcend your family limits. Through actions and choices one can descend from a family’s achievements. There are four functions that play for and against your statement. First, the lottery effect is real and necessary (you can’t win if you don’t play) but not all people can win the lottery. This creates incentives for many at very low cost. Second capitalism pays us for the number of people who are willing to contribute to the production of goods and services. It’s purely a numbers game. Making cooking-matches and making symphonies is inversely rewarding; lots of people use cooking-matches. Third – it is extremely difficult to hold wealth over more than three generations unless you are in fact genetically superior. And that is what we see. Fourth – those families that demonstrate superiority over many generations are in fact demonstrating that they are a natural aristocracy – by any measure: and there are very few of them. THEREFORE The central object of law is the individual, since the individual acts. The central object of policy is the family. The central object of commons is the competitiveness of the polity. Insurance of various forms is a luxury we can afford or not depending on the success of the central objects of law, policy, and polity. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine, (And my spiritual homes: London UK, Boston, and Seattle USA) 🙂
-
The Uncomfortable Political Truth We Must Adapt To In This Century
Nationalism, Tribalism, Familialism are all the best POLITICAL criteria for decidability in matters of commons, just as individualism is the best criteria for decidability in matters of the individual. I don’t like “anti-anyone” other than perhaps I am pretty much against religions that are incompatible with natural law, and are justified by means incompatible with physical law. I prefer limiting immigration to the ‘highly’ skilled (I don’t include IT in that category – IT will be analogous to any other trade soon enough). And I am against the importation of calculators, managers, laborers, and underclasses, in all cases. Precisely because they may increase short-term profits at the expense of long-term genetic, institutional, and normative costs. But if we retain Nationalism, Tribalism, and Familialism in Political policy (positive production of commons) and Individualism in Legal policy (negative resolution of differences), then this forces groups to pay their own way genetically, institutionally, and normatively. And by doing so raise their family, tribe, and nation to transcendence. We do not make better people so much as we eliminate those people who are a detriment to the better people. And it is this reality that we must come to terms with in this century. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine</div>