Category: Epistemology and Method

  • REFORMING PHILOSOPHY: ITS ALL CALCULATION NOW. ALGORITHMS WIN OVER SET OPERATION

    REFORMING PHILOSOPHY: ITS ALL CALCULATION NOW. ALGORITHMS WIN OVER SET OPERATIONS.

    That any general rule,

    Requires a utilitarian context (a ‘question’)

    AND

    That answering that question,

    Requires an hypothesis{intuition,->hypothesis, ->theory, ->law}

    AND

    Any hypothesis,

    Requires a test of verbal construction,

    Requires tests of internal consistency,

    Using the instruments of logical operations{identity, ->category(logic proper), ->scale, ->relation, ->time, ->cause, ->cooperation}

    AND

    Requires tests of external correspondence,

    Using the instruments of physical operations {a sequence of actions},

    Recorded as a sequence of actions and measurements(observations)

    That can be followed and reproduced by others,

    AND

    Requires Warranty,

    Provided to the self, or to others, consisting of:

    Tests of falsification recorded

    Using instruments of physical and logical operations.

    Recorded as a sequence of actions and measurements(observations),

    That can be reproduced by others.

    AND

    Requires Warranty,

    Provided to the self and others, consisting of:

    Testimony to the truthful witness of all the above.

    This algorithm applies in all cases of human construction of general rules. There is no need for any other model except to lower the standard, and to obviate the individual from warranty.

    Philosophy suffers, possibly catastrophically, from verbalism: syllogism and set operation, rather than algorithmic operations. These verbalisms rely on extant meaning of words, themselves general rules. These words carry properties and relations whenever used. We use only some subset of those properties and relations in any context.This means that the use of words can add informational content to any statement that would not be extant if expressed as an operation.

    As such philosophy as a discipline tolerates polluted (extra information) that obscures, incorrectly weights, confuses and conflates theories. The majority of errors come not from comparisons (calculations) but from information external to the operation included in the language. This is why defining terms is so important. It is equivalent to using pure ingredients in chemistry.

    As far as I know, once we have solved the problem of ethics, morality, and politics, we possess all necessary logical instrumentation, and philosophy is a closed domain in which all statements can be represented logically through operations.

    As far as I know, if we follow what originated as the scientific method, but is simply the algorithmic application of instruments both mental and physical: “THE method”, no other method is needed.

    Worse philosophy, outside of science, appears to be extremely useful for the purpose of conducting interpersonal, social, political, and economic, fraud. In fact, the singular purpose of the vast majority of philosophy, has been used for the purpose of justifying these categories of fraud: justifying takings.

    Apriorism, as we have seen in Mises and Rothbard, can be abused, can be used to state pseudoscience (misesian praxeology), and to state immorality as moral (Rothbard), and requires no warranty. And all products in the market, whether physical operations (goods and services) or mental operations (hypothesis) can cause negative externalities that impose costs upon others.

    When our theories were confined to human action at human scale, mythology was adequate, and even when our investigation of the physical world was limited to human scale, our reason was largely adequate. Because humans can test arguments at human scale. But all theories exceeding human scale (human perception) require instrumentation. And instrumentation is required for any operation that is not possible to conduct with human sense perception alone.

    So, while it may be true that relying upon apriorism is useful. It is also true that constructing and publishing a theory in that manner is an avoidance of providing warranty to your ideas. And labeling your ideas as a black-market product that may have dangerous, keynesian levels, freudian levels, cantorian levels, rothbardian levels, of side effects.

    And any moral man should seek to prosecute you in every possible venue for the pollution of the commons.

    (I think I can wrap it all together even better, but I’m getting there.)


    Source date (UTC): 2014-09-29 04:52:00 UTC

  • WHAT IS THE NEXT ITERATION AFTER CRITICAL RATIONALISM? (worth repeating) I consi

    WHAT IS THE NEXT ITERATION AFTER CRITICAL RATIONALISM?

    (worth repeating)

    I consider myself a critical rationalist as far as it goes. But:

    1) I practice the art with much higher technical standards necessary to reduce or eliminate error and deception. In my view I practice philosophy as science not rationalism. It is possible that I have come to see all rationalism as justification. I am not yet certain. I do however understand the very great difference between daydreaming, thinking, reasoning, calculating and computing. And that reason is vastly inferior to calculation. And that if I am correct, and property provides us with commensurability then moral and political conflicts are marginally calculable.

    2) I do not believe that CP is empirically true although it is logically true. Only formal study will answer this question but at present the evidence certainly appears to bear out my bias.

    3) I do not believe criticism is as productive a means of innovation as exhausting theories and reforming them – which is why scientists practice exhaustion not criticism. The reason is scientists pursue goals (problems), not knowledge for its own sake (puzzles).

    4) There is no difference between any method of investigation or production other than the value attributed to different outputs of the method we call the scientific method.

    5) Although I believe Miller’s loosely correct, I also believe his emphasis on formal logic (sets) is not equal in value to operational articulation, and is likewise subject to verbalism. In fact, in large part I see the era of set operations involving language as passé, and that like law, functions and operations defeat sets and set membership. In fact, I see Cantorian sets as one of the great disasters of intellectual history.

    (Not that anyone here is going to follow what the hell I’m talking about…)


    Source date (UTC): 2014-09-26 08:47:00 UTC

  • CRITICAL RATIONALISM AS CRITIQUE The purpose of critique is deception and contro

    CRITICAL RATIONALISM AS CRITIQUE

    The purpose of critique is deception and control. Now that I understand that fact, and that Critical Rationalism can easily be used as an instance of Critique, I understand why it is so frequently misused, and why scientists don’t practice CR. They use falsification, sure, and they are forever skeptical, but they do not practice criticism as critique. In fact, they ignore the philosophical community altogether.

    Worse, CRITICAL RATIONALISM without Operationalism is not compatible with truth tellilng. Construction is not justification it is a test of observation vs imagination.

    As a general rule, misuse of CR places emphasis on meaning as a means of control, while the craft of science produces recipes in the universal language of action without control. Science is compatible with operational language and testimonial truth, and CR, as stated and practiced is not.

    Under CR one has no skin in the game. Under science and testimonial truth, one has skin in the game. Thus we get Rothbards, Lesters and Blocks, not science.

    Our western science evolved not to justify but to emphasize truth telling. Hermeneutic scriptural interpretation and the same under jewish law evolved to justify interpretation, not truthful description of extant events.

    Indo European Aristocratic Egalitarian = warrior testimony.

    Anglo Empirical Testimonial truth = Same

    German Duty Testimonial Truth = Same

    Cosmopolitan Justifiactionary = Not at all the same.

    Yep.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-09-26 04:54:00 UTC

  • (PROFOUND) Sitting here thinking: you know Lester doesn’t know what he’s doing a

    (PROFOUND)

    Sitting here thinking: you know Lester doesn’t know what he’s doing any more than the socialists did, or Hoppe does, or Popper did – or anyone for that matter who relies upon reason instead of science.

    Lester doesn’t understand the difference between an argument reliant upon, and producing, meaning (knowledge of use – correlation), vs one reliant upon and producing truth one can testify to the construction of (knowledge of construction – causality).

    Kinsella doesn’t understand (and maybe Hoppe doesn’t) that a performative contradiction is a verbalism only relevant in law, versus the possibility of demonstrated actions in negotiation regardless of words used (what I call ternary logic). It may be true that libertarianism must always consist in a legal philosophy, but that human NEGOTIATION is not constrained to the limits of legal ARGUMENT. (this is profound for those of you who still put faith in argumentation: argument is not equal to negotiation, and humans negotiate prior to agreement and retain the option to use violence, while after agreement not to use violence we agree to debate.)

    I am unsure about whether Walter Block knows he’s promoting immorality and therefore violating the contract for non-violence with people of western ethics. He’s just a Jewish guy raised with those levantine low trust instincts and trained in justifying them as moral.

    Mises didn’t understand that the reason he failed to develop operationalism that would have fulfilled the promise of his praxeology was his ignorance of other fields, and his fairly weak understanding of the philosophical movements of his era. Nor did he understand that the commons was the western competitive advantage and he was arguing to destroy it.

    Hoppe doesn’t, from what he states in his book, understand the intuitionistic and operationalist arguments, and how they undermine his a-priorism permanently and irrefutably. Nor does he understand that the reason for the failure of intuitionistic arguments in math were due to constancies in math (relations) that are impossible in other fields (causality, information, decidability).

    Rothbard I assume, knew he was just a second-hander appropriating every justification he could find – from Hospers and others like a collector of bottlecaps constructing a mosaic – and using his ability to use half true, untestable, obscurant moralism to justify cosmopolitan low trust ethics in an effort to make his own ethics applicable in the high trust society – also destroying the commons – the western aristocratic competitive strategy.

    Hell, I didn’t know what I was doing either. I just knew there was a problem and I tried to solve it. I was trying to make it impossible for the postmodernists to lie, while helping the conservatives to articulate their ideas. I didn’t know that I was actually accomplishing was to remove the distinction between philosophy and science by stating all philosophy outside of Propertarian constraints to be indistinguishable from mysticism at best, but lying in universal practice. Philosophy as it was constructed, was an exceptional means of lying, and justifying lying, by loading framing and overloading.

    Someone after me will probably finish that work, but the net result is that within two generations we can destroy philosophy and replace it with calculation. That is a profound prediction but I see it already. Philosophy was invented to persuade (lie) with, and calculation is invented to prevent loading, framing and overloading (lying).

    If you stew on this post a bit your world will melt.

    Cheers


    Source date (UTC): 2014-09-23 08:21:00 UTC

  • ANY POLITICAL STATEMENT USING THE WORD “FAIR” AS A INSTRUMENTAL MEASURE IS A LIE

    ANY POLITICAL STATEMENT USING THE WORD “FAIR” AS A INSTRUMENTAL MEASURE IS A LIE.

    (worth repeating)

    –“Fairness may be perceptible but it is not instrumentally calculable, and as such the scope of fairness is limited to members of the small, local group; and any use of the word ‘fair’ beyond the immediately perceptible is not only an error it is a deception if not an outright lie.”–

    –“We have a sense of fairness – the correct term is ‘Proportionality’, and left and right value proportionality differently (equality vs meritocracy), however it is true that all people sense violations of proportionality. However, the fact remains that this is the projection of a sense-perception onto a scale requiring instrumentalism. As such, any statement of proportionality is a fallacy since such a thing is incalculable. Instead, we respond to people who are in need, but we do not SUPPORT people who are in need as a matter of course, because it is UNFAIR (disproportionate) to support people who systemically seek rents at the expense of others. We DO seek to insure each other against the vicissitudes of life, but we also seek to insure each other against free riding. One cannot make one statement without making the other without engaging in verbal deception.”—

    Curt Doolittle


    Source date (UTC): 2014-09-21 11:09:00 UTC

  • MORE ON HUMAN SCALE You know, empiricism (observation) and instrumentalism (inst

    MORE ON HUMAN SCALE

    You know, empiricism (observation) and instrumentalism (instrumental observation) are demarcated by the limits of our sense perception. But the process is essentially the same.

    I would prefer to get the point across that the reason we require instrumentalism is that once we pass beyond our sense perception, we also pass beyond human scale.

    I consider economics to be instrumental : a discipline for measuring that which is directly unobservable, and therefore only indirectly observable.

    Just as I consider all logics to be instruments, and any human action that does not require such instruments within human scale.

    This distinction turns out to be terribly important once we realize just WHY Bridgman was so concerned about operationalism, why Poincare so concerned about mathematical platonism, why Brouwer was so concerned about mathematical operationalism and intuitionism, and why **I** am so concerned about both verbal operationalism and testimonial truth, and it’s opposite: the use of verbalisms (obscurant analogies), loading and framing.

    Because we have been systematically applying the methods, including mathematical methods, but more importantly, the philosophical methods, that we developed during the era of human scale where we could reason without instruments, to the era of post-human scale where we cannot sense perceive without instruments. And there is a vast difference in the properties of human scale and post-human scale measurements.

    Most important of these, at least in economics, is morality. Morality is a local phenomenon and macro economics is NOT. Just as we cannot apply the morals of the famly to the extended order, we cannot likewise apply the rules of the extended order to the family.

    Now, if we apply the rules of the family to the extended order our efforts will be non-predictive. That is merely an empirical or perhaps epistemological criticism. But when we apply the rules of the extended order (non-moral) to the rules of the family and tribal (moral) then we commit suicide.

    Macroeconomics as I understand it is merely a secular christian crusade against aristocracy by the Cathedral. It is not we who are conquering the cathedral. But the out-group nations who understand that the cathedral’s immorality is socially destructive religion, both for it’s hosts (us) and everyone touched by it.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-09-16 13:04:00 UTC

  • THE CONSEQUENCE OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM IS PERFORMATIVE TRUTH. What is the diffe

    THE CONSEQUENCE OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM IS PERFORMATIVE TRUTH.

    What is the difference then, between the critical rationalist position that we cannot know the truth of a theory, only eliminate error; and the consequential argument that I cannot know that you speak the truth, and therefore must be sure that you speak honestly and without error?

    You know; the blade cuts both ways. Just as in science we are constrained to constructing recipes and eliminating error, in all our arguments we are constrained to operational descriptions, and defending against deception.

    Not sure how critical rationalists who buy into Popperian platonism feel about that – but I think it is an inescapable consequence of the critical rationalist assertion.

    We can construct recipes. We can testify to operations. That’s all we can do. Any narrative we construct is a memory device and nothing more.

    Why do we need theories anyway? Justification? If I construct by verbal means, a general rule, that describes common properties of many recipes, then have I really done anything at all other than create a loose description of similar recipes? That description places no constraints on future recipes. Isnt’ this just an artifact of speech? Of verbalism? Isn’t speech a symbolic generalization of many memories? So why should we give such weight to what amounts to a verbal protocol for the purpose of simplifying communication. i mean, wouldn’t it be easier to just transfer memories of related instances? We can’t do that but that’s what our words attempt to do.

    Actions not words.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-09-12 14:20:00 UTC

  • IS PHILOSOPHY A PROTOCOL FOR JUSTIFICATION? AND IS PHILOSOPHY A FORM OF CALCULAT

    IS PHILOSOPHY A PROTOCOL FOR JUSTIFICATION? AND IS PHILOSOPHY A FORM OF CALCULATION?

    I am fairly certain that calculation in the wider sense – that which is necessary for action – precedes verbalism necessary for philosophy, and I am unsure that philosophy as currently stated is calculative and necessary, or whether it is merely justificationary.

    In other words, is philosophy a form of calculating, or is calculating a form of philosophy? And I am increasingly convinced the former.

    We may require philosophy to categorize and describe such things but we do not require philosophy to act, nor to act morally, where morally is defined as prohibiting free riding in-group and prohibiting imposed costs in and out-group. We did these things prior to philosophy, and they exist independent of philosophy.

    Furthermore, how do we account for the use of philosophy for the purpose of deception and obscurantism in the french, german and jewish schools, the use of mysticism in most other cultures, or the past (Kant) and current (progressives,postmoderns, libertarians) use of moral philosophy to restate christianity in non mystical terms. In other words, calculation (demonstrated action as well) does not allow us to make such framing and loading, while language does, and it is quite possible to use language to err, lie, obscure, frame, load and overload.

    This gets quite deep in distinguishing between demonstrable actions stated as operations and analogies as used in philosophy and reason. And I want to stay on track. But it is useful to at least point out that I am approaching problems descriptively via action, and treating language as largely justificationary. That shouldn’t be a big leap really.

    Philosophy is necessary to justify to the self or others, but it is not necessary for action. Hopefully that makes sense. I may be engaging in philosophical discourse but that is very different from planning and acting.) I work with operationalism precisely because it is insulated from the various sins of rationalism. That is why science and even psychology have adopted Operationalism.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-09-12 08:33:00 UTC

  • MORE PROFOUND THAN IS OBVIOUS… Now, what is the difference between trying to i

    MORE PROFOUND THAN IS OBVIOUS…

    Now, what is the difference between trying to ideologically persuade someone of your preferences, and picking a fight over whether arguments are true or not?

    Put truth back into discourse.

    Pick a fight.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-09-05 14:39:00 UTC

  • Existential, Experiential, and Objective

    ON THE EXISTENTIAL, EXPERIENTIAL, AND OBJECTIVE (OBSERVABLE)
    (worth repeating)

    [H]umans are usually, when not defective, capable of reasoning – meaning comparing and contrasting properties, methods and relations, then forecasting, then ranking and choosing – usually without much introspective requirement – although our abilities to do so differ vastly. Very often we use language to organize these thoughts, which then frames the thoughts themselves by the language available to the speaker.

    One can be sentient (aware of changes in state of memory) and willing, but not able to make rational judgements. (see Sacks). One’s rational judgements can be internally consistent, and therefore self-justifiable as rational, but externally non-correspondent (false) and therefore objectively non-rational. (or more easily stated, an individual may be too incompetent or ignorant to make an objectively rational assessment.)

    So while we use the term ‘rational’ categorically, we cannot ‘cheat’ and because of that verbalism, conflate the existence, the experience, and the measure. This is also the technique used by the postmoderns, of whom Heidegger is the most advanced, in their attempt to restate truth as experiential rather than objective. For him, Being is experiencing, not acting. This is an elaborate defense of hedonic ignorance. The most anti-rational set of ideas yet made.

    It is possibly not obvious that advocating both Popper’s Platonic Truth, and your above statement that we “ARE” rational (which is also an obscurant use of the verb to-be) with as Experiential Truth, is itself a contradictory definition of Truth. We may use language to mask the point of view, but points of view are different: existential, experiential, and objective are three different points of view.

    (I suspect this might be brain-frying, because I have to actually pay attention when I’m writing it myself this morning) lol Operational language, constant awareness of the ‘fungibility’ of empty verbalisms, has helped me avoid these mistakes.