Category: Epistemology and Method

  • Speaking Honestly vs Truthfully (vs Dishonestly)

    [I]’m really happy with having captured the difference between speaking honestly, speaking truthfully, and the mere concept of .

    • Platonic (Analytic) Truth: the most parsimonious description that is not a tautology.
    • Speaking Truthfully: promising an epistemic warranty, that you possess the knowledge of construction(causation) and of use(correlation), necessary to make a truth claim, consisting of the minimum error, bias, imaginary content, deception that is possible for you to render with current technology.
    • Speaking Honestly: that you testify only to experiential knowledge (correlation) but not to causation, and that your testimony is free of deception, because you cannot have warrantied that your testimony is free of error, bias, and imaginary content.

    This is relatively important because, as I said yesterday, apriorism cannot be true, unless all all properties and contexts under such a general rule remain constant. This is very, very close to being limited to a tautologies – something I will have to work on further.

  • WHERE HOPPE MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO ABANDON APRIORISM I just figured out where

    WHERE HOPPE MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO ABANDON APRIORISM

    I just figured out where Hans missed the irrefutable argument against apriorism, and the necessity of operationalism. He looked it in the face so to speak, and didn’t understand it.

    He must not have understood why Bridgman was demanding Operationalism, or why Brouwer was demanding Intuitionism. (same thing – different names).

    I could make a career out of this single issue…. fascinating.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-25 03:55:00 UTC

  • (Really happy with having captured the difference between speaking honestly, spe

    (Really happy with having captured the difference between speaking honestly, speaking truthfully, and the mere concept of platonic truth. Platonic truth: the most parsimonious description that is not a tautology. Speaking truthfully: promising an epistemic warranty, that you possess the knowledge of construction(causation) and of use(correlation), necessary to make a truth claim, consisting of the minimum error, bias, imaginary content, deception that is possible for you to render with current technology. Speaking honestly: that you testify only to experiential knowledge (correlation) but not to causation, and that your testimony is free of deception, because you cannot have warrantied that your testimony is free of error, bias, and imaginary content. This is relatively important because, as I said yesterday, apriorism cannot be true, unless all all properties and contexts under such a general rule remain constant. This is very, very close to being limited to a tautologies – something I will have to work on further.)


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-24 15:04:00 UTC

  • AGAIN – IT”S NOT THAT I DON’T UNDERSTAND… ABANDON RATIONALISM AND LEAVE CHILDH

    AGAIN – IT”S NOT THAT I DON’T UNDERSTAND… ABANDON RATIONALISM AND LEAVE CHILDHOOD BEHIND.

    —“If I understand Curt’s argument orrectly, operationalism has a long history in Austrian economics. Hayek called it scientism, Mises called it panphysicalism and posivism, and Menger called a version of it “The Historical Point of View in Economic Research.”—

    Not quite. if mises had correctly understood the difference between logic and science, he would have understood that he was attempting in economics what had been done in physics and mathematics, and that his praxeology was a failed attempt to state operationalism in the context of economics. Instead he mistakenly denied that economics must be practiced empirically and tested operationally to know if in fact, economic theories were internally consistent, because they consisted entirely of rational actions. However instead he misunderstood the properties of axiomatic systems, and declared economics axiomatic, rather than theoretic. He probably made this mistake because he failed to grasp the problem of arbitrary precision in the construction of general rules. I know his work very well, and Mises was not sophisticated in these matters.

    If you want to read, you can, in the SEP, on Operationalism, Operationism, Intuitionism, Reverse Russian Mathematics, and the problems of decidability as well as that of the debate between the various factions that resulted in the current state of theory in mathematics.

    —“No Austrian to my knowledge has argued that operationalism and economic reasoning are equivalent or that one is superior to the other. Instead, the argument made by the Austrians is Methodological Dualism.”—

    Well I know that, but it just means that they’re wrong, and have been proven wrong by subsequent events. The difference between the social sciences and the physical sciences is only in that the decidability of all social (economic) propositions is ascertainable by subjective experience. In other words, given proximately equal knowledge, we can empathize with any economic statement, and determine whether what a rational actor would do. This is required for humans to understand intent, and understanding intent is required for cooperation. Lastly human incentives except at the margins are marginally indifferent. So for these reasons all propositions are decidable by man. Tn other words, we know the first cause, at some level of precision, of all human action. Whereas in the physical science we are unable to rely on mere sense perception or sympathy for the purpose of decidability. All human knowledge regardless of context is theoretical, because all human knowledge is that is non-tautological must be hypothetical. Since all axiomatic statements are by and of necessity tautological, then they are useful for the purpose of modeling within some specified precision, where such precision is determined by the utility of the action (context.)

    —“It seems to me that he is confused about Austrian economics.”—

    As you can see, quite not. There are a few men living that can debate me on this subject and I know them, and they know me. ( And they aren’t fans. )

    —“Curt seems to rely totally on the post-Misesian ethics of Murray Rothbard and other anarcho-capitalist as a source for his understanding of Austrian economics.”—

    Not sure where you are getting that idea from. If you were to restate that as that I am trying to expose and refute the rothbardians, and that mises’ errors were compounded by Rothbard for his ideological purposes, and that if we were to restate mises as I have as merely a visionary but failed operationalist, then I would agree with all that.

    —“He neglects the tension between the anarcho-capitalists and other writers who label themselves Austrian economists. He particularly neglects the pre-Rothbardians, Hayek and Mises.”—

    I actually state (as does even wikipedia) that the Misesian program is not ‘austrian’, but cosmopolitan, and it is the cosmopolitan program that has been discredited, and that the original Austrian program has been fully incorporated into current economics, save for the still open dispute over the business cycle; and that just as rothbard (somewhat dishonestly) appropriated the term libertarian, the rothbardians have appropriated the term “Austrian” through successful propagandizing. So successfully that the classical liberals (namely the team at GMU), as well as the the think tanks other than the rothbardian advertising machine (mises.or) have had to distance themselves from the term. (A fact which the GMU crowd laments now and then.)

    —“I deny that the rationalist program demonstrated success in philosophy,” I don’t think that anyone ever claimed that Austrian critiques had much success in philosophy. On the contrary, in his introduction the Human Action, Mises denies that the new economics, [which, in my opinion had, up that time, been best expressed by the Austrian economist], had influenced philosophers.”—

    Probably my fault but I cannot see the the connection between my statement and your response. Sorry. I didn’t claim that Austrian critiques had success in philosophy, I claimed that rationalism (in Kantian, broader german, and cosmopolitan, and therefore Misesian form) has proven to be a vehicle for dishonesty, and error. I don’t argue that Mises was dishonest, I argue he was wrong, because the problem was a very hard one. It’s rothbard I’m not sure about.

    —“the capacity of humans to perceive, remember, compare, and judge is extremely limited”— >”This general statement does not apply to the geniuses. “—

    You are kidding right? Up here in the rarified air we all rely on numbers, the narrative, pencil and paper, the need for cartesian representation…. I really don’t know where you’re getting that from… Furthermore it’s disprovable by Mises rather absurd errors alone, or by Poincare’s failure to eliminate the frame of reference, even though he had correctly understood the consequence of the Lorenz transformations. I mean… where do I start? We can measure it. It’s simple. …

    —“But that is not the important point. I wrote “You deny that distinctly human minds have a logical structure. The logical structure is simple and universal.”—

    You would need to (a) define ‘minds have’ in some existential terminology. (b) define ‘logical structure’ in some form other than metaphorical, ‘logical structure’ is an existential statement (c) that if the structure is simple and universal why haven’t stated what it is, in simple universal terms. I am fairly current cognitive sciences and experimental and evolutionary psychology. So I will understand it if you state it.

    —“We define a human mind as distinct from that of its nearest non-human mind in terms of means and ends.”—

    I think you mean that we observe that humans plan, and that, humans are capable of planning, and that planning requires we are capable of means (inputs and operations) and ends (outputs). (The statement ‘we define…’ is an axiomatic one, but the statement that follows is empirical.)

    —“The human mind, we reason aprioristically, has ends,”—

    I think you mean that given our observations, we deduce, induce or guess, that human beings demonstrate that the act to pursue ends, and therefore the human brain is capable of conceiving of ends.

    —“it perceives what it regards as realistic means of attaining them, and it expects that if it applies those means, its utility will be greater than if it does not. “—

    Yes, I think that is correct.

    —“This mental operation is carried out by the natural scientist and by ordinary people in their everyday lives.”—

    “—

    The act of planning is demonstrated by all people we know of, and we cannot observe individuals who we consider to demonstrate expected human behavior who cannot.

    Yes, but this tells us nothing about the limits to that process, nor the numerable cognitive biases that we have documented, nor the reasons that we require recorded observations, instrumentation and operational language in order to ensure that what we imagine is that which others can replicate.

    —“To deny the logical structure is tantamount to denying that human beings are distinct in that it can reason about how to achieve what they regard as their ends.”—

    But then I never did deny this straw man, right? I denied that rationalism dependent upon reason independent of the scientific method constituted in empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism and testimonial truth, have been demonstrated to provide greater success in all walks of life and in all fields, than rationalism, and that rationalism had been used moreover to conduct the vast majority of ethical, moral, pseudoscientific, political, economic, platonic and mystical deceptions.

    —“Curt may reject this argument,”—-

    You haven’t made an argument. You’ve merely stated the straw many that people are capable of SOME reason, but not impugned the argument that people are ONLY capable of SOME reason and measurably, very little of it, and that we can measure it consistently. And that the vast majority of errors, and lies have been conducted using the rationalist method.

    —” but you should not advance the hypothesis that it is dishonest or that one who makes it is a liar. “—

    But you have just done an elaborate job of demonstrating that I am correct, by misrepresenting my position, arguing against a straw man, pretending that you are reliant upon axiomatic (closed) argument. And you have avoided the central argument that I have put forward by doing it.

    SO HOW DO I KNOW? How am I to assume that you can conduct this elaborate a set of mistakes, without attributing mistakes of this number and severity to lying? WHereas, if you stated the same argument as a sequece of human actions, or even vaguely analytically so that each staetment was testable, then I could at least know you were TRYING to speak truthfulfly.

    Now, because I can deduce that you’ve been fooled by the use of overloading by the advocates of the rationalist fallacy, and I can tell that you are not fully cognizant of what you’re saying, I know that just as a child has been taught that which he believes to be right, but lacks the ability to refute, that you’re just propagating someone else’s lie, rather than lying yourself. (I knew that all along really, because you can only be fooled by the rothbardian misesian fallacies if you morally intuit that they are correct even if you cannot criticize them sufficiently to falsify them.) In other words, you have learned an elaborate means of justifying your cognitive biases.

    SO IF YOU TALK LIKE A LIAR, AND YOU”RE TELLING A LIE, HOW DO I KNOW YOUR INTENTIONS? Whereas if you talk as an honest man in the language of science, which is mischaracterized as ‘the scientific method’ since that method has nothing necessarily to do with the practice of physical science, and everything to do with ensuring that one is making honest testimony regardless of subject matter.

    So yes I was taunting you so that you would create an emotional association with this argument and ponder it.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-23 11:06:00 UTC

  • RATIONALISM PROVIDES A VECTOR FOR THE LIES OF LIARS —“The most troubling thing

    RATIONALISM PROVIDES A VECTOR FOR THE LIES OF LIARS

    —“The most troubling thing about rationalism, is that it does not help correct those people who are telling lies, but who are not desirous of lying. As such rationalism, like religious mythos, functions as a vector for lying. One can perpetuate a lie through argument without understanding that he is lying – lying on behalf of others, but lying none the less. And entirely unaware of it.”–


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-23 10:57:00 UTC

  • RATIONALISM: THE LANGUAGE OF LIARS? (from elsewhere) —“The data suggests that

    RATIONALISM: THE LANGUAGE OF LIARS?

    (from elsewhere)

    —“The data suggests that the only reason to rely upon rationalism is to lie. That is because most liars rely upon rationalism. The reason scientists rely upon the truth telling method (more accurately as empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism, and testimonial truth), is because it is harder to err, bias and lie. So if any given argument can be conducted both in the language of liars, and in in the language of truth tellers, then why would one defend use of the language of liars? Why would anyone rely upon rationalism except to lie?”—


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-23 10:54:00 UTC

  • “Hayek did not disagree with Mises because he used words to express his ideas. “

    —“Hayek did not disagree with Mises because he used words to express his ideas. “—

    Words consist of names (extant observable), experiences (unobservable, extant), allegories(unobservable in-extant). Words can be used to convey truth, or meaning, or truth and meaning, or falsehood and meaning. If I speak in names, (operational descriptions are unique just as positional numbers are unique) then I can speak in names of extant entities. Otherwise nothing else is observable. It is very hard to err, lie, or add imaginary content.

    Conversely if I speak in analogies and allegories, I can convey meaning to those with asymmetric information (less), but I can also load and frame that meaning, and with effort, overload our reason (via suggestion). And if I speak in analogies I cannot make a truth claim. What I **CAN** do is first convey meaning by analogy, then restate the idea operationally, and convey truth. And this is, it turns out, the only honest way of conveying understanding truthfully.

    So, as an example of deception and error, your statement that I relied upon the category ‘words’ was dishonest, when my argument relied upon the category ‘analogies’.

    –“You deny that distinctly human minds have a logical structure.”–

    Well aside from the fact that ‘mind’ is the name of an experience that requires time to produce changes in state, and brain is the name of the extant organ, this is a very poor sentence, but I will try to repair it by restating it as: the acts of daydreaming, thinking, reasoning, calculating and computing demonstrate that humans are capable of the practice of logical argument. Therefore humans are capable of logical thought.

    Now, again, you have used fuzzy language to make a dishonest statement. Instead, what I have said is that the capacity of humans to perceive, remember, compare, and judge is extremely limited, and that we must rely upon instrumentation both logical and physical to assist us in all but the most trivial of comparisons. (I don’t know how it is possible to refute this.) I have furthermore stated that language, unless operationally articulated, is so imprecise that error, bias, loading, framing, overloading, wishful thinking and the addition of imaginary content, that reason independent of empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism and testimonial truth (stated in e-prime for that matter) is not only insufficient a technology for the prevention of error, bias, loading, framing, overloading, wishful thinking, and the addition of imaginary content, but that if we look at the evidence throughout history, the primary function of rationalism is to justify, deceive, frame, and overload, and that humans do not seem to be easily able to detect errors when communication takes place in this method.

    So your entire paragraph on rationalism is an example of how one can attempt to use reason to justify the black or white fallacy: that you levy an accusation of denying that the capacity to reason logically, exists, when I merely state that the capacity to reason independent of empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism, and testimonial truth is extremely limited, (as evidenced by the failure of your own argument), and that is after accusing me of saying that reason cannot be used for honest discourse, rather than the fact that the vast majority of lies, deceptions and fallacies have been created using rationalism.

    —“But a method of doing the natural sciences is not the only logic that, in a pragmatic sense, has succeeded in helping humankind achieve progress. The logic of the classical economists has also succeeded. “—

    I stated that it is extremely hard to lie, cheat, steal, add imaginary content, frame, load, overload, and err, using the scientific method as constituted in empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism and testimonial truth. But it is very easy to conduct a dishonest argument that postulates straw men, and black or white fallacies using rationalism.

    The data suggests that the only reason to rely upon rationalism is to lie. That is because most liars rely upon rationalism. The reason scientists rely upon the method (more accurately as empiricism, instrumentalism, operationalism, and testimonial truth), is because it is harder to err, bias and lie. So if any given argument can be conducted both in the language of liars, and in in the language of truth tellers, then why would one defend use of the language of liars?

    The most troubling thing about rationalism, is that it does not help correct those people who are telling lies, but who are not desirous of lying.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-23 08:42:00 UTC

  • GETTING CLOSER TO CORRECTING THE CRITICAL RATIONALISTS —“We can only know when

    GETTING CLOSER TO CORRECTING THE CRITICAL RATIONALISTS

    —“We can only know when we speak falsehoods. We cannot know when we speak the truth. Therefore all we can ever do is testify truthfully. And we can only testify truthfully, even if we desire to, by operational description, because we ourselves are the victims of error, bias, wishful thinking, habit, and deception. So to speak truthfully is only possible if we limit ourselves to operational actions and measures. This does not convey ‘meaning’ which is what others often desire. We can either leave the derivation of meaning to others, or we can construct the meaning by way of analogy. The problem is, that when we construct an analogy, we must add information external to the facts. To convey meaning is not to convey the truth. One can convey meaning by analogy, but then one must provide operational descriptions in order to prove that one has not erred, biased, imagined, or lied. This argument, is the simplest reduction that I know of for the arguments of the intuitionists(mathematics), Operationists (psychology), and Operationalists (physics), and Praxeologists (economics). It is a moral restatement of the mathematical argument for the requirement of Reverse Russian Mathematics in order to make a truth claim. Speaking truthfully is merely a matter of whether we can testify to their existential possibility of their construction as well as the theory’s existential correspondence with demonstrable reality .”—

    I think that when I was arguing with critical rationalists earlier in the year, I could not distill this argument down this far. Neither Poppers ‘meaning’ nor David’s formal logic solve this problem. As such I stipulate that this is the correct solution to the critical rationalist problem, and that as Alex has argued, popper was a cosmopolitan, and he was a victim of the vast legacy of cosmopolitan errors. He was half right but he was not right enough.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-22 11:23:00 UTC

  • If we cannot agree with that which we cannot sense (reduce to an analogy to expe

    If we cannot agree with that which we cannot sense (reduce to an analogy to experience), then how can we convince people that something that they cannot intuit is in fact moral…… How the hell do we solve this problem…

    If one is intuitively immoral (as it appears the majority are) then, then how is any argument able to persuade?


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-22 09:59:00 UTC

  • I just realized, that Oversing is an enormous elaborate lie detector….. wow. W

    I just realized, that Oversing is an enormous elaborate lie detector….. wow. What does that mean?

    (I mean… is that what I was doing all along… for years, and never knew it? Just by following my intuitions?)

    fuk… I’m going to add a specific gossip metric…. or maybe we’ll add heavy weight to gossip in the Soft Skills, by creating a negative weight? Yes. Negatives…. Yep.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-10-21 20:40:00 UTC