Dec 25, 2019, 7:37 PM Panic of 1901, a U.S. economic recession that started a fight for financial control of the Northern Pacific Railway Panic of 1907, a U.S. economic recession with bank failures In 1913 we formed the federal reserve. The 19-teens. Visions of Big government danced in their heads. Fiat currency catastrophe begins. The USA becomes a world creditor because of the wars. Depression of 1920-21, a U.S. economic recession following the end of WW1 Roaring 20’s give us Electrification and the Automobile which are the primary drivers of the 20th century. Wall Street Crash of 1929 and Great Depression (1929–1939) the worst depression of modern history 1930’s the Lost Decade of the Great Depression. FDR’s failures at socialism, that end up without result. WW1 and WW2 were financed by high taxation. Restores the economy. Big government at home, becomes big government worldwide as the USA tries to ‘teach the world a lesson’. See the pattern yet? We survived WW2 but the industrialized world was trashed, and the developing world was taking on communism (effectively slave labor). 1950’s were a quiet boom, the height of fashion, family, masculinity and mass migration into home ownership and the middle class. By 1960 it was clear communism couldn’t function. This led to intellectual postmodernism (what we call political correctness – pseudoscience, pseudomathematics, sophistry and denialism) By the mid 1960’s the world had recovered. In 1964 we implement the immigration act designed to flood the country with underclass labor that would drive down the price of labor, and destroy the american experiment of a nation ‘of people of character’ (meaning a middle class nation state). The 1960’s ended the feeling of certainty. Why? The counter culture and media, and the assault on our civilization. Everything goes wrong here. Everything. By 1970 it was clear that unions had run up costs during a period of recovery that could not be paid. Nixon’s was in the right doing it wrong. He’s gone. Vietnam ends. Cold war is at its height. In 1973 we had the oil crisis that crashed our economy. By the mid 70’s only a minority of college educated graduates would find jobs. Gasoline went from .25 a gallon to over $1.00 Secondary banking crisis of 1973–1975 in the UK Latin American debt crisis (late 1970s, early 1980s) known as “lost decade” The automotive industry collapsed, as it tried to convert from making poor quality, heavy cars, to those that could operate By 1976 we understood that Johnson’s Great society project to imitate the soviets had failed and all we had done was destroy black families, the black middle class, and great vast ghettos in urban areas that would bankrupt our cities. In 77 we had star wars and” something changed” – the tech revolution was starting. (I built my first computer). In 1979 we had the second oil crisis. We were tired of ‘losing’ more and more year after year. The seventies ended the postwar economy and with it the socialists and communists’ dreams. In 1980 we elected reagan. He and thatcher ended the postwar social fantasy that soviet or social democratic economics were possible. in 1980 and 1982 we had two recessions. In the 1980s we had the savings and loan crisis. Reagan’s strategy was to bankrupt the soviets and the chinese. It worked. It worked at the cost of debt. Black Monday in 1987 1992 Soviet Collapse results in 1990’s peace dividend, and the roaring 90’s. client server peaks. Internet era starts, cell phone era starts. Dot-com bubble (2000-2002) (US) and… wow. Uncertainty returns. The 1980-2000 period like the teens and twenties, and like the 50’s is a high period for america. 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 2010’s the Lost Decade of World Financial Exhaustion. Late 20-teens america begins ending the postwar order and returning to the world balance of powers, now that technology and power have been equilibrated by the rest of the world ‘catching up’ and americans ‘falling behind’. Do I need to give a lesson to you on the economics of of the late 19th – early 21st century? America was artificially wealthy for (a) conquering a continent, (b) buying the rest from napoleon for cheap, (c) selling it off to ethnic europeans (largely germans) who were genetically middle class and land- constrained (c) using fiat currency to finance the immigration of through the 20’s, (d) inheriting the british empire and replacing london as the world currency, (e) using our resources to fund the world’s recovery (f) and the war against world communism (g) and the war against world islamism that has replaced it. But the world has caught up and we have immigrated the underclasses our ancestors sought to avoid -because they create demand for parasitic redistribution, and authoritarian government, because they are not genetically middle class. We no longer have 400 years of northern european institutional, technological, knowledge, cultural and genetic advantage. Meanwhile the destruction of the family, the substitution of INTEREST for TAXATION, and the decline in reproduction has pushed US IQ levels from 115 victorian era to 97 and soon we will fall off the cliff to third world IQ levels. We are entering a century where the american standard of living will decline in parallel with the US Military and the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. The world is going to equilibrate but that means we will be relatively poorer. Just as the vast underclass population we allowed into the country becomes a majority, generates demand for a centrally planned state, and we follow south america into collapse. And that’s before I get started on automation, changes to the labor force, and the problem of organizing people if the voluntary organization of production (markets, money, productivity, incentives) So when you look at that chart outlined in red, you don’t knw what the fk you’re talking about. Drop a few tech companies out of the economy – heck, just apple – and look for productivity gains. They aren’t there.
Category: Civilization, History, and Anthropology
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Prewar We Had Done to Europe What China Has Recently Done to Us.
Dec 25, 2019, 7:37 PM Panic of 1901, a U.S. economic recession that started a fight for financial control of the Northern Pacific Railway Panic of 1907, a U.S. economic recession with bank failures In 1913 we formed the federal reserve. The 19-teens. Visions of Big government danced in their heads. Fiat currency catastrophe begins. The USA becomes a world creditor because of the wars. Depression of 1920-21, a U.S. economic recession following the end of WW1 Roaring 20’s give us Electrification and the Automobile which are the primary drivers of the 20th century. Wall Street Crash of 1929 and Great Depression (1929–1939) the worst depression of modern history 1930’s the Lost Decade of the Great Depression. FDR’s failures at socialism, that end up without result. WW1 and WW2 were financed by high taxation. Restores the economy. Big government at home, becomes big government worldwide as the USA tries to ‘teach the world a lesson’. See the pattern yet? We survived WW2 but the industrialized world was trashed, and the developing world was taking on communism (effectively slave labor). 1950’s were a quiet boom, the height of fashion, family, masculinity and mass migration into home ownership and the middle class. By 1960 it was clear communism couldn’t function. This led to intellectual postmodernism (what we call political correctness – pseudoscience, pseudomathematics, sophistry and denialism) By the mid 1960’s the world had recovered. In 1964 we implement the immigration act designed to flood the country with underclass labor that would drive down the price of labor, and destroy the american experiment of a nation ‘of people of character’ (meaning a middle class nation state). The 1960’s ended the feeling of certainty. Why? The counter culture and media, and the assault on our civilization. Everything goes wrong here. Everything. By 1970 it was clear that unions had run up costs during a period of recovery that could not be paid. Nixon’s was in the right doing it wrong. He’s gone. Vietnam ends. Cold war is at its height. In 1973 we had the oil crisis that crashed our economy. By the mid 70’s only a minority of college educated graduates would find jobs. Gasoline went from .25 a gallon to over $1.00 Secondary banking crisis of 1973–1975 in the UK Latin American debt crisis (late 1970s, early 1980s) known as “lost decade” The automotive industry collapsed, as it tried to convert from making poor quality, heavy cars, to those that could operate By 1976 we understood that Johnson’s Great society project to imitate the soviets had failed and all we had done was destroy black families, the black middle class, and great vast ghettos in urban areas that would bankrupt our cities. In 77 we had star wars and” something changed” – the tech revolution was starting. (I built my first computer). In 1979 we had the second oil crisis. We were tired of ‘losing’ more and more year after year. The seventies ended the postwar economy and with it the socialists and communists’ dreams. In 1980 we elected reagan. He and thatcher ended the postwar social fantasy that soviet or social democratic economics were possible. in 1980 and 1982 we had two recessions. In the 1980s we had the savings and loan crisis. Reagan’s strategy was to bankrupt the soviets and the chinese. It worked. It worked at the cost of debt. Black Monday in 1987 1992 Soviet Collapse results in 1990’s peace dividend, and the roaring 90’s. client server peaks. Internet era starts, cell phone era starts. Dot-com bubble (2000-2002) (US) and… wow. Uncertainty returns. The 1980-2000 period like the teens and twenties, and like the 50’s is a high period for america. 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 2010’s the Lost Decade of World Financial Exhaustion. Late 20-teens america begins ending the postwar order and returning to the world balance of powers, now that technology and power have been equilibrated by the rest of the world ‘catching up’ and americans ‘falling behind’. Do I need to give a lesson to you on the economics of of the late 19th – early 21st century? America was artificially wealthy for (a) conquering a continent, (b) buying the rest from napoleon for cheap, (c) selling it off to ethnic europeans (largely germans) who were genetically middle class and land- constrained (c) using fiat currency to finance the immigration of through the 20’s, (d) inheriting the british empire and replacing london as the world currency, (e) using our resources to fund the world’s recovery (f) and the war against world communism (g) and the war against world islamism that has replaced it. But the world has caught up and we have immigrated the underclasses our ancestors sought to avoid -because they create demand for parasitic redistribution, and authoritarian government, because they are not genetically middle class. We no longer have 400 years of northern european institutional, technological, knowledge, cultural and genetic advantage. Meanwhile the destruction of the family, the substitution of INTEREST for TAXATION, and the decline in reproduction has pushed US IQ levels from 115 victorian era to 97 and soon we will fall off the cliff to third world IQ levels. We are entering a century where the american standard of living will decline in parallel with the US Military and the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. The world is going to equilibrate but that means we will be relatively poorer. Just as the vast underclass population we allowed into the country becomes a majority, generates demand for a centrally planned state, and we follow south america into collapse. And that’s before I get started on automation, changes to the labor force, and the problem of organizing people if the voluntary organization of production (markets, money, productivity, incentives) So when you look at that chart outlined in red, you don’t knw what the fk you’re talking about. Drop a few tech companies out of the economy – heck, just apple – and look for productivity gains. They aren’t there.
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Fable 112 – The Chariot of Hermes and the Arabs
Fable 112 – The Chariot of Hermes and the Arabs https://propertarianism.com/2020/05/30/fable-112-the-chariot-of-hermes-and-the-arabs/
Source date (UTC): 2020-05-30 17:17:07 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1266780691171180544
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Fable 112 – The Chariot of Hermes and the Arabs
Fable 112 – The Chariot of Hermes and the Arabs
“One day, Hermes drove across the entire Earth a chariot filled with lies, villainy and fraud. And he distributed a small portion of his cargo in each country he visited. But when he arrived in the country of the Arabs, the chariot suddenly broke down. The Arabs believed he was carrying a precious cargo and so they stole the contents of his chariot. Hermes was then unable to carry on into the countries of other peoples. More than all other people the Arabs are liars and cheats. Indeed, there is not even a word for ‘truth’ in their language.”
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Fable 112 – The Chariot of Hermes and the Arabs
Fable 112 – The Chariot of Hermes and the Arabs
“One day, Hermes drove across the entire Earth a chariot filled with lies, villainy and fraud. And he distributed a small portion of his cargo in each country he visited. But when he arrived in the country of the Arabs, the chariot suddenly broke down. The Arabs believed he was carrying a precious cargo and so they stole the contents of his chariot. Hermes was then unable to carry on into the countries of other peoples. More than all other people the Arabs are liars and cheats. Indeed, there is not even a word for ‘truth’ in their language.”
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Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception)
Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception) https://propertarianism.com/2020/05/30/why-arabs-fail-trust-familism-honor-in-deception-2/
Source date (UTC): 2020-05-30 16:31:01 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1266769091567792128
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Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception)
Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception) https://propertarianism.com/2020/05/30/why-arabs-fail-trust-familism-honor-in-deception/
Source date (UTC): 2020-05-30 16:30:56 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1266769071388758017
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Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception)
Jan 9, 2020, 5:45 PM Why Arabs Lose Wars meforum.org Source: Excerpt from meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars (Conversely: Staying on message: Islamism like Judaism (or christianity) is exceptional at undermining.)
- First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations.26 Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units (which throughout the Arab world have the same duty—to protect the regime, rather than the country). In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.
- Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The ‘Alawi minority controls Syria, East Bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi’a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit.
The same lack of trust operates at the interstate level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel—that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when most of its planes had been destroyed)—was a classic example of deceit.27 Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception which included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes).28 With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.29
- Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority.30 They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler’s whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable.
Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are a double-edged sword. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. The land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat at the same time. No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine; the usual excuse is financial expense, but that is unconvincing given their frequent purchase of hardware whose maintenance costs they cannot afford. In fact, combined arms exercises and joint staffs create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing. Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation. For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defense; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may be out of style, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work, it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. Arab regimes have learned how to be coup-proof.
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Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception)
Jan 9, 2020, 5:45 PM Why Arabs Lose Wars meforum.org Source: Excerpt from meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars (Conversely: Staying on message: Islamism like Judaism (or christianity) is exceptional at undermining.)
- First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations.26 Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units (which throughout the Arab world have the same duty—to protect the regime, rather than the country). In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.
- Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The ‘Alawi minority controls Syria, East Bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi’a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit.
The same lack of trust operates at the interstate level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel—that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when most of its planes had been destroyed)—was a classic example of deceit.27 Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception which included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes).28 With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.29
- Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority.30 They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler’s whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable.
Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are a double-edged sword. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. The land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat at the same time. No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine; the usual excuse is financial expense, but that is unconvincing given their frequent purchase of hardware whose maintenance costs they cannot afford. In fact, combined arms exercises and joint staffs create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing. Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation. For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defense; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may be out of style, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work, it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. Arab regimes have learned how to be coup-proof.
-
Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception)
Jan 9, 2020, 5:45 PM Why Arabs Lose Wars meforum.org Source: Excerpt from meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars (Conversely: Staying on message: Islamism like Judaism (or christianity) is exceptional at undermining.)
- First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations.26 Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units (which throughout the Arab world have the same duty—to protect the regime, rather than the country). In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.
Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The ‘Alawi minority controls Syria, East Bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi’a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit.
The same lack of trust operates at the interstate level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel—that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when most of its planes had been destroyed)—was a classic example of deceit.27 Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception which included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes).28 With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.29
- Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority.30 They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler’s whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable.
Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are a double-edged sword. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. The land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat at the same time. No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine; the usual excuse is financial expense, but that is unconvincing given their frequent purchase of hardware whose maintenance costs they cannot afford. In fact, combined arms exercises and joint staffs create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing. Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation. For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defense; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may be out of style, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work, it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. Arab regimes have learned how to be coup-proof.