Theme: Truth

  • The Problem Of Competence – The Value Of Critical Rationalism : Skeptical Empiricism, Or What We Call ‘Science’.

    [T]hose who try to master fields usually end up with the Socratic opinion that ‘I don’t know anything (for certain)’. We have simply collected large sets of examples that we know do not work. But this knowledge informs us. If we cannot know much of anything, then why would we create a political system that depends upon our presumption of knowledge? I’m trying to create a political model that facilitates the presumption that we know nothing, and that people will remain desperately imperfect with fragile virtues, rather than assumes that we know anything at all, and can create a system, or people who are indeed virtuous. The scientific method, under critical rationalism bothers me a bit, and I’d like to be sure that Skeptical Empiricism isn’t an improvement on it. But in the balance between science and reason, science appears to win hands down. In the battle between critical rationalism and positivism, critical rationalism wins hands down. Despite the Krugman-DeLong Liberal fantasy that the quantitative measures are in deed measures of what they assume, rather than the noise created as England and America have violently imposed anglo universalism under ‘free trade’ around the world. This is particularly troubling because free trade benefits the most advanced technologist. It is not ‘fair’, it simply produces a virtuous cycle. But it is not a natural cycle, and it’s only possible to enforce as long as anglo culture and institutions are supported by anglo-american (cum Roman) military power. This cannot be sustainable – on purely demographic grounds. [S]o Keynesian noise is not signal. It is just a selection bias that favors Leftist Dunning Kruegerists like Krugman, DeLong, Stiglitz and Thoma. At least, that’s my working hypothesis.

  • RT @FriedrichHayek: In many discussions one person is deliberatively careful, kn

    RT @FriedrichHayek: In many discussions one person is deliberatively careful, knowledgeable & possesses sound background judgment – & the o…


    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-21 05:30:32 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/358821270483243008

  • Logic, Praxeology And Science: Dependency And Demarcation. Reforming Libertarianism By Incorporating Scientific Argument Rather Than Relying On The Purely Rational

    LOGIC, PRAXEOLOGY AND SCIENCE: DEPENDENCY AND DEMARCATION. REFORMING LIBERTARIANISM BY INCORPORATING SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT RATHER THAN RELYING ON THE PURELY RATIONAL [T]hose three terms, Logic, Praxeology, and Science describe a spectrum. But what is the point of demarcation between each? Which of these domains is capable of testing which category of problems, and what constraints does any domain place upon the others, given that each is open to error, and requires the other to test its hypotheses. I’ve been working on this problem now for quite some time, and have almost got my arms around how to talk about it praxeologically: as observable human action: and therefore a test of possibility, rational choice and incentives. WHY DOES THIS MATTER I have, I think, reformed the concepts of property and morality, but I can’t reform the system of thought that we call libertarian political theory without reforming the distinction between logic (unobservable, internally testable), praxeology (observable and subjectively testable), and science (unobservable, and objectively & externally testable.) That work may have been done somewhere but I haven’t found it yet. And I have a very hard time slogging my way through metaphysical assumptions and highly loaded vocabulary of both logicians on one end and rationalists on the other. Current libertarian (Rothbardian) ethics rely upon very weak rational arguments. I’ve tried to systematically falsify each of them – there are only a handful really. And I think I have been successful. Current progressive (Rawlsian) ethics rely upon very weak rational arguments. I think that I can falsify that argument without much difficulty. Veil of ignorance being a logical fallacy so to speak. Conservatives don’t have an argument, so I have to explain their implied argument in libertarian terminology. [W]hat I find most interesting, from our perspective, as libertarians, is that we acknowledge that the common law is an organic process, and it functions because it must be digestible and applicable by ordinary people in juries. We understand that the english built an empirical society, not a rational one. And that the French took the british concept of liberty and made it into a rational one. Then the germans have tried, and continue to, make it a spiritual one. In other words, Rothbard’s arguments, and one of hoppe’s (his only weak one) rely on rationalism rather than empiricism. And while praxeology may be a test, and while reason may be a test, the purpose of empirical analysis is to extend our senses, and reduce what we cannot sense to analogies that we can perceive by proxy. Now, prior generations had to suffer with the limited tool of Rational argument, because they didn’t have data, and the socialistic system of central control produces data on short periodicity, and can justify itself with that data. While the libertarian and conservative argument is that the externalities produced outweigh the short term benefits. But we have to WAIT for our data, and therefore socialistic arguments gather momentum in and civic behavior alters while we wait. Thankfully we have data now. Our rational arguments were correct. The conservative arguments look like they are correct too. The only progressive argument we are unsure about at present is whether or not fiat money itself can function in a positive fashion, under some as yet undefined circumstance. (We argue that it can’t, out of hand, on rational grounds, but I’m not sure we can prove that there aren’t holes in our reason sufficient to undermine our position.) We are lucky. Time has passed. We’ve learned more than our preceding generations had available to learn. And as such we can debate and restate libertarian theory using scientific rather than rational arguments. And that is what I’m trying to do.

  • Logic, Praxeology And Science: Dependency And Demarcation. Reforming Libertarianism By Incorporating Scientific Argument Rather Than Relying On The Purely Rational

    LOGIC, PRAXEOLOGY AND SCIENCE: DEPENDENCY AND DEMARCATION. REFORMING LIBERTARIANISM BY INCORPORATING SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT RATHER THAN RELYING ON THE PURELY RATIONAL [T]hose three terms, Logic, Praxeology, and Science describe a spectrum. But what is the point of demarcation between each? Which of these domains is capable of testing which category of problems, and what constraints does any domain place upon the others, given that each is open to error, and requires the other to test its hypotheses. I’ve been working on this problem now for quite some time, and have almost got my arms around how to talk about it praxeologically: as observable human action: and therefore a test of possibility, rational choice and incentives. WHY DOES THIS MATTER I have, I think, reformed the concepts of property and morality, but I can’t reform the system of thought that we call libertarian political theory without reforming the distinction between logic (unobservable, internally testable), praxeology (observable and subjectively testable), and science (unobservable, and objectively & externally testable.) That work may have been done somewhere but I haven’t found it yet. And I have a very hard time slogging my way through metaphysical assumptions and highly loaded vocabulary of both logicians on one end and rationalists on the other. Current libertarian (Rothbardian) ethics rely upon very weak rational arguments. I’ve tried to systematically falsify each of them – there are only a handful really. And I think I have been successful. Current progressive (Rawlsian) ethics rely upon very weak rational arguments. I think that I can falsify that argument without much difficulty. Veil of ignorance being a logical fallacy so to speak. Conservatives don’t have an argument, so I have to explain their implied argument in libertarian terminology. [W]hat I find most interesting, from our perspective, as libertarians, is that we acknowledge that the common law is an organic process, and it functions because it must be digestible and applicable by ordinary people in juries. We understand that the english built an empirical society, not a rational one. And that the French took the british concept of liberty and made it into a rational one. Then the germans have tried, and continue to, make it a spiritual one. In other words, Rothbard’s arguments, and one of hoppe’s (his only weak one) rely on rationalism rather than empiricism. And while praxeology may be a test, and while reason may be a test, the purpose of empirical analysis is to extend our senses, and reduce what we cannot sense to analogies that we can perceive by proxy. Now, prior generations had to suffer with the limited tool of Rational argument, because they didn’t have data, and the socialistic system of central control produces data on short periodicity, and can justify itself with that data. While the libertarian and conservative argument is that the externalities produced outweigh the short term benefits. But we have to WAIT for our data, and therefore socialistic arguments gather momentum in and civic behavior alters while we wait. Thankfully we have data now. Our rational arguments were correct. The conservative arguments look like they are correct too. The only progressive argument we are unsure about at present is whether or not fiat money itself can function in a positive fashion, under some as yet undefined circumstance. (We argue that it can’t, out of hand, on rational grounds, but I’m not sure we can prove that there aren’t holes in our reason sufficient to undermine our position.) We are lucky. Time has passed. We’ve learned more than our preceding generations had available to learn. And as such we can debate and restate libertarian theory using scientific rather than rational arguments. And that is what I’m trying to do.

  • LOGIC, PRAXEOLOGY AND SCIENCE: DEPENDENCY AND DEMARCATION. REFORMING LIBERTARIAN

    LOGIC, PRAXEOLOGY AND SCIENCE: DEPENDENCY AND DEMARCATION. REFORMING LIBERTARIANISM BY INCORPORATING SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT RATHER THAN RELYING ON THE PURELY RATIONAL

    Those three terms, Logic, Praxeology, and Science describe a spectrum. But what is the point of demarcation between each?

    Which of these domains is capable of testing which category of problems, and what constraints does any domain place upon the others, given that each is open to error, and requires the other to test its hypotheses.

    I’ve been working on this problem now for quite some time, and have almost got my arms around how to talk about it praxeologically: as observable human action: and therefore a test of possibility, rational choice and incentives.

    WHY DOES THIS MATTER

    I have, I think, reformed the concepts of property and morality, but I can’t reform the system of thought that we call libertarian political theory without reforming the distinction between logic (unobservable, internally testable), praxeology (observable and subjectively testable), and science (unobservable, and objectively & externally testable.) That work may have been done somewhere but I haven’t found it yet. And I have a very hard time slogging my way through metaphysical assumptions and highly loaded vocabulary of both logicians on one end and rationalists on the other.

    Current libertarian (Rothbardian) ethics rely upon very weak rational arguments. I’ve tried to systematically falsify each of them – there are only a handful really. And I think I have been successful.

    Current progressive (Rawlsian) ethics rely upon very weak rational arguments. I think that I can falsify that argument without much difficulty. Veil of ignorance being a logical fallacy so to speak.

    Conservatives don’t have an argument, so I have to explain their implied argument in libertarian terminology.

    What I find most interesting, from our perspective, as libertarians, is that we acknowledge that the common law is an organic process, and it functions because it must be digestible and applicable by ordinary people in juries. We understand that the english built an empirical society, not a rational one. And that the French took the british concept of liberty and made it into a rational one. Then the germans have tried, and continue to, make it a spiritual one.

    In other words, Rothbard’s arguments, and one of hoppe’s (his only weak one) rely on rationalism rather than empiricism. And while praxeology may be a test, and while reason may be a test, the purpose of empirical analysis is to extend our senses, and reduce what we cannot sense to analogies that we can perceive by proxy.

    Now, prior generations had to suffer with the limited tool of Rational argument, because they didn’t have data, and the socialistic system of central control produces data on short periodicity, and can justify itself with that data. While the libertarian and conservative argument is that the externalities produced outweigh the short term benefits. But we have to WAIT for our data, and therefore socialistic arguments gather momentum in and civic behavior alters while we wait.

    Thankfully we have data now. Our rational arguments were correct. The conservative arguments look like they are correct too. The only progressive argument we are unsure about at present is whether or not fiat money itself can function in a positive fashion, under some as yet undefined circumstance. (We argue that it can’t, out of hand, on rational grounds, but I’m not sure we can prove that there aren’t holes in our reason sufficient to undermine our position.)

    We are lucky. Time has passed. We’ve learned more than our preceding generations had available to learn. And as such we can debate and restate libertarian theory using scientific rather than rational arguments.

    And that is what I’m trying to do.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-16 05:23:00 UTC

  • (NOTES TO SELF) RELEVANT DEFINITIONS (I don’t want to really work in this part o

    (NOTES TO SELF) RELEVANT DEFINITIONS

    (I don’t want to really work in this part of philosophy because it brushes up with metaphysics, and I stick to ethics and institutions. But since our movement’s fearless leader has advised me to try to use existing language more often, I’m collecting some common language definitions that constrain to the propertarian methodology.)

    1: PHILOSOPHY

    PHILOSOPHICAL REALISM is the view that our reality, or some aspect of it, is ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc., such that truth consists in the mind’s correspondence to reality; and whatever we believe at any moment is only an approximation of reality and that every new observation brings us closer to understanding reality.

    SCIENTIFIC REALISM is the view that the world described by science and the scientific method is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be, and that we can make valid claims about unobservables, and those claims have the same ontological status as observables.

    INSTRUMENTALISM is the view that a scientific theory is a useful instrument in understanding the world. A concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality, but that some experience, understanding, or knowledge cannot fully be captured by science.

    ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY: A philosophical methodology that attempts to adopt the methods and findings of the physical sciences, and as such is characterized by an emphasis on:

    a) CLARITY: constructing clear arguments, objectively stated, often with the help of formal logic and analysis of language, expressed if possible in ordinary language ;

    b) SCIENCE: a respect for the superiority of the methods and findings of natural sciences over that of the senses (See Scientific Realism);

    c) TRUTH: the principle that there are not any specifically philosophical truths;

    d) THOUGHT: and that the object of philosophy is the logical clarification, and reduction of error, in thought.

    and

    e) ACTIONS: Tangentially, that all arguments (a) are constructed as human actions in Operational Language (See Operational Language).

    In practice, Analytical Philosophy is a rejection of broad philosophical systems in favor of attention to detail, precise, testable statements, expressed in ordinary language. This atomic approach allows analytical philosophers to bring the discipline of philosophy closer to the discipline of the physical sciences because it has the advantage of being able to solve problems incrementally by the same evolutionary process as does science using the scientific method – rather than requiring that all statements fit within a predefined system of thought.

    OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS: (Operationalism) Operational definitions are definitions of theoretical constructs that are stated in terms of concrete, observable procedures (Actions). Operational definitions solve the problem of what is not directly observable by connecting unobservable traits or experiences to things that can be observed. Operational definitions make the unobservable observable. ( the concepts or terms used in nonanalytic scientific statements must be definable in terms of identifiable and repeatable operations.)

    PRAXEOLOGY: is the application of Operationalism to human behavior: it suggests that all statements must be expressed as human actions, just as all scientific actions must use observable procedures, all scientific statements about man must expressed as individual human actions. Praxeology therefore, is a methodology for testing incentives by analyzing every action in a chain of actions to see if each is a rational action for the actor. In theory praxeolgical reasoning is a rational, non empirical test of any statement about human activity. But given the similarity of human beings, it can be used by human beings to test statements about other human beings, assuming one possesses enough information about the individual’s circumstance to sympathize with it. (I don’t argue that it’s a science. I argue that it is a logical test, and a valid logical test, because humans are more capable of empathic considerations of observables, than they are any other system of measurement.) This definition of praxeology contrasts with it’s authors as a science that purports to permit us to deduce human actions, rather than a method of testing a set of human actions as believable sequences of rational incentives. Praxeology has largely be subsumed by Incentives Theory. But Incentives theory as currently structured seems to rely on positivism rather than testing. And incentives theory seems to have largely been subsumed by Experimental Psychology, which has produced most of the valuable information about human cognitive biases and limits.

    2: SCIENCE

    SCIENTIFIC METHOD is a body of procedures for investigating phenomena, acquiring new knowledge, and correcting or integrating previous knowledge, consisting of:

    a) the identification of question or problem,

    b) systematic observation, measurement, and experiment,

    c) the formulation, testing, falsification, and modification of hypotheses.

    (There are multiple ways of expressing this.)

    THE FIVE COMPENSATIONS of Science: The scientific method can help us compensate for:

    i) Biological Limits to Observation: sense, perception, relation, and calculation.

    ii) Cognitive Biases which distort our senses, perceptions, relations, valuations and calculations: the operative consideration bing ‘valuation’ or ‘weights’.

    iii) Experiential Biases which distort the same, such as emotional loading, mysticism, traditions, myths, norms and assumptions.

    iv) Performative Errors which are due to the imperfection of our actions in any endeavor.

    v) Deceptive Loadings such as lies, propaganda, deceptions or manipulations.

    (The compensations are the part I care about.)

    THE FOUR CANONS OF SCIENCE In order to understand the scientific approach to experimental psychology as well as other areas of scientific research, it is useful to know the four fundamental principles that appear to be accepted by almost all scientists.

    i) DETERMINISM : One of the first canons of science is the assumption of determinism. This canon assumes that all events have meaningful, systematic causes. The principle of determinism has a close corollary, that is, that the idea that science is about theories. Scientists accept this canon largely on faith and also to the fact that theories wouldn’t be very useful in the absence of determinism, because in the absence of determinism, orderly, systematic causes wouldn’t exist.

    ii) EMPIRICISM: The canon of empiricism simply means to make observations. This is the best method of figuring out orderly principles. This is a favorite tool among scientist and psychologists because they assume that the best way to find out about the world is to make observations.

    iii) PARSIMONY: The third basic assumption of most scientific schools of thought is parsimony. The canon of parsimony says that we should be extremely frugal in developing or choosing between theories by steering away from unnecessary concepts. Almost all scientist agree that if we are faced with two competing theories, that both do a great job at handling a set of empirical observations, we should prefer the simpler, or more parsimonious of the two. The central idea behind parsimony is that as long as we intend to keep simplifying and organizing, we should continue until we have made things as simple as possible. One of the strongest arguments made for parsimony was by the medieval English philosopher William of Occam. For this reason, the principle of parsimony is often referred to as Occam’s razor.

    iv)TESTABILITY: The final and most important canon of science is the assumption that scientific theories should be testable using currently available research techniques. This canon is closely related to empiricism because the techniques that scientists typically use to test their theories are empirical techniques. In addition to being closely related to empiricism, the concept of testability is even more closely associated falsifiability. The idea of falsifiability is that scientists go an extra step by actively seeking out tests that could prove their theory wrong.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-15 11:57:00 UTC

  • (A collection of thoughts about this problem, not an argument.) 1) SYMBOLS ARE A

    (A collection of thoughts about this problem, not an argument.)

    1) SYMBOLS ARE ANALOGIES

    It is possible to speak universal statements.

    It is possible to record universal statements as symbols.

    It is possible to manipulate relations between symbols while retaining ratios.

    We can use numbers to represent quantities, but numbers are not limited in use to quantities, just as sets of objects are not limited to the property of their count alone.

    We can use symbols to describe categories arbitrarily and at whim – they are categories: analogies.

    We can describe possibilities in time and therefore constrain those analogies by temporal dimension.

    We can count things that exist in reality and are constrained by measurement, and we can perform actions in reality constrained by practical effort. But actions exist, and symbols are just imprecise analogies to existence.

    It is not possible to perform universal actions.

    When we use the terms ‘universal’ and ‘infinite’ we refer to two possible meanings: a) the set of all X, the quantity of which we do not know, and b) an infinite quantity of X’s, the quantity of which we cannot know and cannot count.

    ‘Universal’ can refer to an unknown quantity. But it cannot refer to an infinite quantity. Because infinite quantities cannot exist in reality, only symbolically. We can error in our definition and create the error of infinite objects, but that is all.

    “Infinite anything” is an error. It is the quantitative opposite of ‘division by zero’. We can write division by zero. We can write infinite quantities, but we cannot perform division by zero and infinite quantities cannot either exist or be made to exist in reality despite that we can express them symbolically. We can’t even ‘have’ zero anything except by analogy, because to ‘have’ something means having at least ‘one’.

    We use infinite sets in mathematics as a shortcut for our ignorance – because they can exist symbolically even if they cannot exist quantitatively.

    Making universal statements and using universal symbols is an acknowledgement of our performative ignorance.

    It is a logical error to confuse performative ignorance with possibility. To confuse logical, symbolic allegorical possibility with quantitative or performative possibility.

    Universal and infinite statements are analogies, not facts.

    2) PERFORMATIVE TRUTH

    If we agree on the definition of the room, people, and brown hair, it is possible to know both how many people ARE in the room, and how many people CAN be in the room. Any possibility of error is either an error in the definition of the room, or an error in the definition of ‘people’, or an error in our measurements. This is not a question of externalities for the purpose of action. And the problem with scientific theories is the problem of externalities (what we dont know), what we have selected, and omitted from selection, and our performative errors.

    Information loss exists only because we articulate a theory. Not because the performative actions in the real world would lose such information. OUr actions in reality retain the relations to all other physical properties and entities in the universe. Our ‘rules’ or statements do not.

    Ludic fallacies for example, argue that probabilities we can measure can produce risks measurements, but very few real world phenomenon are sufficiently closed domains.

    3) RECIPES VS THEORIES

    There is a very great difference between the errors that it is possible to create with symbols because they are ANALOGIES, and the performance of actions themselves. The question comes down to whether, when we say we have a theory, we are describing actions (a recipe) which produce specifically desired ends, or general statements (descriptive rules) that purport to describe as yet unknown circumstances.

    Science progresses by producing recipes, and people improve those recipes. Theories are inductive tests that produce new recipes. But theories are just analogies, and recipes are prescriptions for performative action. I think it is a mistake to confuse the difference between symbols which are analogies, and actions which are recipes.

    Rules are general and open to symbolic error. Recipes are functional and open to perforative error. But recipes make no broader claim than that they should produce desired ends if you make no performative error.

    When we talk about the physical sciences we are discussing a vastly unknown territory where we do not understand the basic mechanics well enough to relate our different sets of symbolic tools and rules to each other. But at some point it is both possible and likely we will discover how to do this – because the universe does it so to speak. We simply lack the tools to observe it.

    The failure to demarcate between actions, recipes, rules and symbols is just another kind of platonism in the benign sense, or mysticism in dangerous sense.

    4) WORLDS AND THEORIES AS PLATONIC OR MAGIC

    “We can never know. We can just keep trying.” We must keep pace with the Red Queen. But it turns out that trying produces recipes that work, and that we can indeed make general statements about recipes in order to help us understand how to make new and improved recipes.

    The discussion of theories is a little too close to platonic or magian error, for adult conversation.

    The practical difference is that if we must err on one side or the other: between closed mind and open mind, that the theoretical approach functions as a positive bias in favor of experimentation in the human mind, and the skeptical approach functions as a negative bias in favor of conservation.

    And I am not sure that, like many things we create elaborate artifices to justify, much of symbolic reasoning is anything other than an attempt to alter our innate cognitive bias.

    That’s a laudable objective, but not if we create a new form of mysticism while we’re at it. 🙂


    Source date (UTC): 2013-07-15 03:49:00 UTC

  • On Realism

    [W]hat is the relationship between:

      and the combination of:

        when given

          In purest terms, of course, there are limits because of necessary information loss from the process of categorization. And it certainly appears that we can use science (categories and measurements and narratives that express causal relations that are allegories to experience) to understand almost everything we desire to = eventually. But despite apparent successes, the question is whether those limits are meaningful in the context of being a human: converting extra sensual perceptions to sense perceptions. Those limits can be meaningful in at least three dimensions: a) the scope of the patterns that we can identify (which I suspect we can use machines for), b) the period of those patterns, given that causality depends on arbitrary selection of periods of regularity, c) the number of axis of causal relations that we can understand. But since our problem is knowledge for the purpose of action in real time, not ‘knowledge’ as a static absolute, and it is our actions that are limited by our ignorance, and we would not be ‘human’ without those limits, the question always seems irrational. If we understand that all thought is time-contingent based upon the knowledge at our disposal, then it’s simply illogical to even try to represent knowledge as static ‘truths’. The question itself is irrational. If the standard is ‘enough perception that we can act to achieve our ends despite the limits of our minds’ that is very different from ‘we can understand the full set of causal relations by a process of representing measures of categories, and reducing them to expressions that are possible to articulate as a narrative.’ Since, we can test our theories, and science demands that we can both test (reproduce)( and determine the boundary conditions (falsify) our theories, using science and language to extend our sense perceptions, then we can test the correspondence of our understanding of the real world. It certainly appears that we can be successful in reducing the unobservable complexity of the real world into symbolic and linguistic representations that are sufficient allegories to experience, that we can understand and at at any scale in which we an define a scheme of measurement (sensing). And there is no reason at present to believe that there is some limit to this, other than our ability to marshall the physical resources to perform tests, or because performing those tests would violate the terms of cooperation with other humans (morality). And so, as Steven says above, theories are descriptive within the state of knowledge of the moment, if they correctly express the measurements and narratives of causal relations as we understand them at the moment, because they cannot exist without the context of the forms of measurement that we used to formulate them. Those statements in fact, correspond with reality at some level of precision. So the realist expectation is that we increasingly understand the complexity of reality, but may never fully achieve it. Although that imperfection may be meaningless for the purposes of action, as long as the allegory to experience is sufficient to produce the actions in question. The generational problem affecting the discipline of philosophy is that the metaphysical assumption that we can introspectively solve these problems without the help of science is as absurd as thinking that we can solve these problems without language. The discipline of Philosophy can help us construct analogies to experience so that we may consume those analogies and ‘understand’ them. But we cannot introspectively sense, perceive, and understand much outside of human scale, without the discipline of science. Hence not only is CR a form of Realism, but it is an improvement on Realism because it does not assume that representations are static.

        • On Realism

          [W]hat is the relationship between:

            and the combination of:

              when given

                In purest terms, of course, there are limits because of necessary information loss from the process of categorization. And it certainly appears that we can use science (categories and measurements and narratives that express causal relations that are allegories to experience) to understand almost everything we desire to = eventually. But despite apparent successes, the question is whether those limits are meaningful in the context of being a human: converting extra sensual perceptions to sense perceptions. Those limits can be meaningful in at least three dimensions: a) the scope of the patterns that we can identify (which I suspect we can use machines for), b) the period of those patterns, given that causality depends on arbitrary selection of periods of regularity, c) the number of axis of causal relations that we can understand. But since our problem is knowledge for the purpose of action in real time, not ‘knowledge’ as a static absolute, and it is our actions that are limited by our ignorance, and we would not be ‘human’ without those limits, the question always seems irrational. If we understand that all thought is time-contingent based upon the knowledge at our disposal, then it’s simply illogical to even try to represent knowledge as static ‘truths’. The question itself is irrational. If the standard is ‘enough perception that we can act to achieve our ends despite the limits of our minds’ that is very different from ‘we can understand the full set of causal relations by a process of representing measures of categories, and reducing them to expressions that are possible to articulate as a narrative.’ Since, we can test our theories, and science demands that we can both test (reproduce)( and determine the boundary conditions (falsify) our theories, using science and language to extend our sense perceptions, then we can test the correspondence of our understanding of the real world. It certainly appears that we can be successful in reducing the unobservable complexity of the real world into symbolic and linguistic representations that are sufficient allegories to experience, that we can understand and at at any scale in which we an define a scheme of measurement (sensing). And there is no reason at present to believe that there is some limit to this, other than our ability to marshall the physical resources to perform tests, or because performing those tests would violate the terms of cooperation with other humans (morality). And so, as Steven says above, theories are descriptive within the state of knowledge of the moment, if they correctly express the measurements and narratives of causal relations as we understand them at the moment, because they cannot exist without the context of the forms of measurement that we used to formulate them. Those statements in fact, correspond with reality at some level of precision. So the realist expectation is that we increasingly understand the complexity of reality, but may never fully achieve it. Although that imperfection may be meaningless for the purposes of action, as long as the allegory to experience is sufficient to produce the actions in question. The generational problem affecting the discipline of philosophy is that the metaphysical assumption that we can introspectively solve these problems without the help of science is as absurd as thinking that we can solve these problems without language. The discipline of Philosophy can help us construct analogies to experience so that we may consume those analogies and ‘understand’ them. But we cannot introspectively sense, perceive, and understand much outside of human scale, without the discipline of science. Hence not only is CR a form of Realism, but it is an improvement on Realism because it does not assume that representations are static.

              • THE HOLES IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT WILL KILL OFF POSTMODERNISM? (Quote:) “Showing th

                http://www.amazon.com/dp/0983258406/ref=tsm_1_fb_lkFILLING THE HOLES IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT WILL KILL OFF POSTMODERNISM?

                (Quote:)

                “Showing that a [Postmodernism] leads to nihilism is an important part of understanding it, as is showing how a failing and nihilistic movement can still be dangerous.

                “Tracing postmodernism’s roots back to Rousseau, Kant, and Marx explains how all of its elements came to be woven together. Yet identifying postmodernism’s roots and connecting them to contemporary bad consequences does not refute postmodernism. What is still needed is a refutation of those historical premises, and an identification and defense of the alternatives to them.

                “The Enlightenment was based on premises opposite to those of postmodernism, but while the Enlightenment was able to create a magnificent world on the basis of those premises, it articulated and defended them only incompletely. That weakness is the sole source of postmodernism’s power against it.

                “Completing the articulation and defense of those premises is therefore essential to maintaining the forward progress of the Enlightenment vision and shielding it against postmodern strategies.”

                (FROM: Hicks, Stephen R. C. – Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault)

                COMMENT

                This is the last page of Stephen Hicks’ exceptionally accessible work on Postmodernism.

                But for those in the Dark Enlightenment, and for those of us trying to articulate why the western social model produced the high trust society, and how we can preserve that high trust society against both the state and the errors of the enlightenment vision, that task is much harder than it sounds.

                The reason being that we are not as marginally indifferent as the enlightenment philosophers argued. We are not separated by will and resource, but we are separated by ability, necessity, and preference, and that separation is irreconciliable with the institutions that the classical liberals gave us as an inheritance. We are saddled with multiple conflicts, and a rapidly diverging set of cultures, under an imperial bureaucracy, that is so well funded it is impossible to break, but equally impossible to use to cooperate.

                Some of us are trying to develop institutions that will allow heterogeneous peoples with conflicting moral codes to cooperate as peacefully in the production of commons as they do in the market.

                But the Postmodern vision is to empower tyranny in pursuit of a homogenous equalitarian utopia. which for the top and bottom may be attractive. But for the rest it is a net loss in all that we can desire, hope for and imagine.

                SKEPTICISM

                I am skeptical that it is at all possible to repair classical liberal institutions under representative majority rule. That system was invented to secure and hold power. But the question is, who will hold that power, and what will they do with it.

                That is even more frightening than another dark age created by yet another version of an irrational religion.


                Source date (UTC): 2013-07-13 06:50:00 UTC