Theme: Truth

  • ONE MORE PASS AT MISES I have to re-read mises again. It’s very dense work. But

    ONE MORE PASS AT MISES

    I have to re-read mises again. It’s very dense work. But on one topic in particular: his emphasis on apriorism.

    Because, for some reason I didn’t really understand (habit? Immaturity of scientific Philosophy?) Mises attempted to use logic to defend praxeology.

    But he was wrong. Praxeology is a scientific not logical question. You cannot deduce much from human action. However, you can TEST any statement of incentives a priori. Because we are marginally indifferent from one another.

    Took me a long time to get my arms around all of this.

    And Hans Hoppe’s (brief) advice to me had a dramatic influence on how I argued these positions. But it was the advice I needed.

    I learned pretty much everything from Hoppe worth learning. In the sense, that the few insights that I have had are purely dependent upon the insights he gave us.

    I just am very lucky that we’ve got a generation between us, so that I can draw on science, and the demonstrated failure of socialism, rather than draw on philosophy and logic and the as-yet-undemonstrated failure of socialism, and the as-yet-scientific validation of the classical liberal, aristocratic, vision of man.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-09-06 06:55:00 UTC

  • PUZZLES vs PROBLEMS : PLATONISM vs NATURALISM What is the difference between a p

    PUZZLES vs PROBLEMS : PLATONISM vs NATURALISM

    What is the difference between a puzzle and a problem?

    What is the difference between tautology and correspondence?

    What is the difference between utility and necessity?

    What is the difference between equivalence and truth?

    What is the difference between platonism and realism?

    What is the difference between mathematics and science?

    From Books To Problems or from Problems To Books?

    Cheers.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-09-05 11:36:00 UTC

  • THE IMMORALITY AND UN-NECESSITY OF MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM (I’m getting closer. F

    THE IMMORALITY AND UN-NECESSITY OF MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM

    (I’m getting closer. From a post elsewhere. And, yes. ‘unnecessity’ is a word. Really. I checked.) 🙂

    My argument, is that of mathematics can be stated operationally, and non-platonically, without negative externality, and that mathematicians have tragically produced the new mysticism in postmodernism for purely utilitarian and self interested reasons.

    Can we create a “standard of truth”? In other words, can two or more of the theories of truth be organized such that one is more narrowly constrained and more parsimonious than the other? I think that correspondence theory of truth is pretty much the accepted practice, while deflationary and formal theories are adaptations to the needs of particular problems. That And that pluralistic theory attempts to compensate for these differences.

    We can measure truth on two axis. The first is completeness of correspondence: it’s parsimony and explanatory power. And the second is the presence and severity of negative externalities. That means that a utilitarian standard of truth is a convenience and a necessary standard of truth is not. And it means that a necessary standard of truth that produces negative externalities is unavoidable and moral and a pragmatic standard of truth is both avoidable and immoral. Morality being a higher standard than disciplinary utility.

    If you read the background on intuitionist mathematics, then that’s enough. And I don’t have to repeat it here. I think that ‘defining truth’ independent of correspondence is a non sequitur, and is conveniently circular use of the term ‘truth’. Internal consistency is not equal to external correspondence. Nor is it immune from criticism. I think if you read, even just the wiki article on the different forms of truth, including the difference between Formal (linguistic) and Substantive (correspondence) theories of truth, then that’s enough, and I don’t need to repeat it here. I think it’s not difficult to grasp that the different theories of truth have different standards – certainly intuitionist has a higher standard than classical. I think it’s not difficult to grasp that math has a lower standard than science. I think that it’s not difficult to grasp that the standards in classical mathematics are utilitarian. And I think it’s not difficult to grasp that utilitarian actions, if they produce externalities, allow us to criticize that utility. And to demand change if necessary. For example: free speech is one thing, but shouting fire in a theater is another. And while justifying and spreading postmodernism, is less immediate, it is more consequential.

    I have not taken it on myself to play Wittgenstein’s game. I am not sure I am up to it. But I believe I can attack the mathematician’s justification of the logic of sets well enough to put the blame for postmodernism on the people within the discipline. And I can denounce their motives. I may be wrong. But I think I can do it. At least. I can do it well enough.

    MARGINAL INDIFFERENCE is the only criteria for performative truth that I know of that is universally applicable in all circumstances.

    This set of criteria satisfies the requirements of even the PLURALIST theory of truth. It allows us to use correspondence, marginal indifference, and externalities as the criteria of truth, without the need to resort to the ‘religion’ and ‘theology’ of platonism, and the external consequences of teaching generations of students a new theology that is dependent upon magic.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-29 15:14:00 UTC

  • VERY CLOSE TO PUTTING ANOTHER STAKE IN POSTMODERNISM: MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM AS

    VERY CLOSE TO PUTTING ANOTHER STAKE IN POSTMODERNISM: MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM AS ‘FRAUD’.

    (Excerpt From A Very Very Very long thread)

    Hopefully some people will begin to gasp the difference between morality and property in Propertarianism as I’ve defined them, versus the way Rothbard defined morality and property in libertarianism.

    I think that I should probably write 2500 words on how Rothbard’s argument was sufficient for socialism, but insufficient for Postmodernism. That way I don’t have to attack rothbard as hard as I do now.

    The necessity of operational language is something that I understood was necessary in politics and law. But it was only over the past year or two that I understood that it is necessary for avoiding fraud.

    I still cannot solve the point of demarcation between literature and it’s appeals for empathy, or Heidegger’s confusing mixture of literature and reason, at the expense of causality. I think I know where it is. But I’ll have to work on it.

    -Curt

    ——–

    From: William

    @Curt Doolittle says: “So I would argue, why not just admit that these are utilities and contrivances, not operational truths, and just go on your merry way?”

    I don’t have the vocabulary to express what I think in response to the above. But, I will try to give a stab to convey my thoughts.

    First, it appears to me that you are using “utilities”, ” contrivances”, etc in a derogatory meaning, but “operational” in a favorable meaning. This is similar to attaching a derogatory meaning to “liberal”. I will leave it at this without going into it any further.

    Second, I have a book “A Course In Constructive Algebra” by Ray Mines, Fred Richman and Wim Ruitenburg. The authors don’t accept the principle of excluded middle and they require elements of sets to be constructable. I have no problem reading it and following the proofs. I realize that I am working in a different context. It is just as good as if I worked in the context of ZFC with allowing excluded middle. In other words, I am not converted over to their method and give up standard ZFC. I do both.

    Third, I have no qualms about working out a problem in Newtonian physics (like calculating the moment of inertia of a spinning top). I don’t know if you would say I am doing “operational truths” because the operations are constructive, or if you would say I an not doing “operational truths” because the result is not true because Newtonian physics is not true.

    Fourth, I suspect that in the 21th century there are still philosophers who support the framework of mathematicians who do standard ZFC theorem proving. That is, those mathematicians have not been abandoned by philosophers who try to justify, explain, etc what the mathematicians are doing. And there are other philosophers who support other different views, who have mathematicians following them to provide their ground to stand on. If these philosophers can’t agree among themselves, why do you want the mathematicians to choose just one of them. Are mathematicians a better judge of the various philosophical views than the philosophers themselves?

    Fifth, I believe mathematicians would not have any qualms switching among the various mathematical foundations. Would a “utilitarian” philosopher be ok with writing a paper in the “platonic” viewpoint, and vice versa?

    ————–

    From: Curt Doolittle

    @William Hale

    RE “Second”, “Fourth”, “Fifth”

    I think we are still talking past each other. I’m fully appreciative of using multiple methodologies to solve problems. I’m fully appreciative of the fact that mathematicians, like a general staff, run theories – and that surprisingly often, some particular formula describes a useful natural process. The question is, do you understand that point of demarcation, or not. And do you claim that the standard of truth in deduction is equal to the standard of truth in construction. That the two standards are marginally indifferent is different from the two standards being identical. They aren’t. So then, there are statements that are necessarily true. And statements that are deductively true. IF we can claim there are many types of infinities but some are larger or smaller. Then perhaps we can claim their are many truths, but that some are more authoritative than others. if you claim that .999… is operationally equal to one, that is different from whether .999.. is deductively equal to one, or equal by fiat. But in a conflict over which statement is a more authoritative truth, the operational must be. Because it can be nothing else. And even this is not important to me. What is important is that the Russell/Cantor debate led to platonism. And platonism was adopted by postmodernists. Yet the more parsimonious answer was readily available.

    RE: “Third”

    I would say that newtonian physics is sufficiently precise for the calculations where it is sufficiently precise. This is all that needs to be said. Just like all scientific theories are open to revision, so are all formulae. Why mathematicians feel that they need to create Platonistic standards of truth when the matter is one of precision is … as far as I can tell… an artifact of the language of the Greeks, Bacon and Newton – religious language. Appeals to divine authority.

    RE: “First”

    I am raising a moral objection. Correct? Is then moral context not relevant? 🙂 But that said, I think that when one makes a truth claim about something that is in fact, utilitarian, it is… either immoral, ignorant, or dishonest.

    In other words, do we get to act selfishly when it suits us?

    WHY

    What if all political language (law, regulation) was stated operationally, so that it was not open to interpretation? How would that change civic discourse?

    Utterances are actions and all actions have consequences. Or, are we not responsible for our actions?

    The basic argument is that, when making truth claims, scientific statements, stated operationally, are moral, and non scientific statements are immoral. It is very hard to commit fraud by operational argument. It is very easy to commit fraud by platonic argument. In fact – that is the entire purpose of it.

    For example, money laundering. Money laundering is the process of removing causation. If mathematicians remove causality from their language, it is laundering as well (information loss). If I cannot launder money because it causes externalities, why can I launder causality in mathematics if it causes externalities?

    Everything isn’t relative. 🙂 Truth is accurate description of causal relations. Everything else is ‘contrivance’. And the only reason for developing alternative forms is to say ‘we can get away with it’ and to raise it to the same level of legitimacy as truth. The same way that politicians use the word ‘law’ to give legitimacy to ‘command’. There is but one LAW of human cooperation. The rest is commands and punishments. And non-operational language, platonic language, meant to provide legitimacy, is in fact, a violation of that single law: theft. It is fraud by omission. Obtaining convenience and legitimacy by use of language that avoids causal relations. Mathematical platonism if argued as a truth claim, where that truth claim is also stated as equivalent to operational truth, is in fact, fraud.

    This is, in fact, the source of the argument for postmodern thought: mathematics.

    We may not HOLD each other accountable for our actions. But our actions have consequences that we are RESPONSIBLE for, whether we hold our selves accountable, or others hold us accountable for them. I am holding (or anticipating holding) mathematicians responsible for the consequences of their actions. (this is the theory I am testing via argument to make sure that I understand it.)

    And operational language is the only truth. Everything else is an allegory to it. We can speak truthfully to the best of our knowledge. We can write theories that are testable. But we can make no truth claim that is not operationally stated. Because platonism is the laundry of causal relations.

    Mathematics has reinvented mysticism – appeals to platonism to justify arguments. I don’t care about math as a discipline. It’s not terribly important. I care about society. i care about the fact that in democracy, debates have consequences. And the moral commons is an asset we must protect like any other asset from the privatization of wins and the socialization of losses.

    So when I say, operationally .999… cannot exist, and even if it could could not equal 1, because it never CAN equal one. That is a true statement. Or, given that the the correct term is ‘substitution’, that .999.. in any context we can imagine, can be substituted for 1. Or if you were to say that … is a a notation for that which we cannot operationally state because of the limits of our number system. Or if you were to say that because in all real world applications, precision is contextually dependent, and infinity allows us to represent contextual precision. Or if you say you say deductively, they are equivalent, if not equal. Or if you say that in practice, the fields of irrational numbers tell us what geometric calculations will be problematic or easy. Or if you say that in practice, fields of (rings of) complex numbers, actually do represent combinations of charges we observe at the subatomic level. (there are still more I can think of). Then all of those are valid statements. They are true statements. But under no conditions are platonic arguments ‘true’. That is a terribly deceptive game that is the source of moral ‘relevance’ in our society.

    Mathematical ‘truth’, not stated operationally, is a contrivance, which we use to give status and legitimacy to pragmatic utilitarian actions just as governments give legitimacy to commands by calling them laws. In practice this does not affect our calculations due to the marginal indifference of contextual precision. Symbolic substitution, at marginally indifferent precision does not affect our calculations as well.

    There is absolutely no reason that mathematical language must be stated platonically other than status seeking, and legitimacy seeking.

    If questioned, it is quite alright to say, ‘we do these things because, in our craft it is easier’ that is different from saying, ‘we do these things because they are true’. The first is a pleading for understanding given the high cost of operational language. The second is an act of fraud.

    – cheers. 🙂

    (PS: I suspect that I may have given you the vocabulary to express your thoughts.) 🙂


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-29 02:14:00 UTC

  • THE POWER OF PARSIMONY If you learn enough about Physics, Math, Computer Science

    THE POWER OF PARSIMONY

    If you learn enough about Physics, Math, Computer Science, Economics and Philosophy (and hopefully in that order), it becomes readily apparent that all of these disciplines create all sorts of language for very, very simple principles that are constant across all of them.

    I don’t know what we need to call that basic set of ideas. In theory that’s part of the domain philosophy, because they are all tools for helping us think cogently, and act cogently, in a given discipline.

    But I can tell you one thing: there isn’t much difference between how science is practiced, than that set of basic principles. The only exception being that science discounts subjectivity and morality, economics includes subjectivity but not morality, and philosophy includes morality, subjectivity and objectivity.

    What I like most about computer programming is that it forces us to avoid the platonism in mathematics. And as such, avoids postmodernist influences on academia and the “res publica”.

    There are only a few dozen ideas for man to learn, but an infinite set of applications of them. Unfortunately, we ask our children, and each other, to memorize an infinite number of techniques, instead of a handful of necessary causal relations.

    This foundation, if it can be articulated as a finite set of principles with infinite application, is what we have been unable to define. That is because the political impact of those definitions would be problematic.

    If you don’t believe me. Then you might just have to take a look at the history of ideas. Because that history is little more than attempts to justify claims against the property of others in order to achieve alternate ends.

    Period.

    MANS WORLD IS QUITE SIMPLE. IT”S THE LIES THAT MAKE IT COMPLICATED.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-27 06:41:00 UTC

  • WHY NATURALISM? (GEM) The reason I advocate epistemic naturalism in all fields o

    WHY NATURALISM?

    (GEM)

    The reason I advocate epistemic naturalism in all fields over platonism in all fields, is not ideological or preferential or even metaphysical. It’s because I think that epistemic naturalism is as important as are objective truth, contract, the rule of law, the balance of powers, accounting, money and prices, for the survival and prosperity of man. Truth is truth. Expediency is expediency. Causality is different from consequence. And if people do not know that, they believe in magic.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-22 03:28:00 UTC

  • IN JOURNALISM; A PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION (The Common Law) Craig WIlly, a blogger

    http://www.craigwilly.info/2013/08/14/can-media-tell-the-truth-on-new-vs-traditional-journalism/TRUTH IN JOURNALISM; A PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION

    (The Common Law)

    Craig WIlly, a blogger who I follow who writes honestly about EU affairs, will leave blogging for a position as a reporter with a financial new service in Germany.

    In his column he states the obvious: that there is no such thing as journalism, only opinion writing. “Opinion Journalism”. He uses a quote from Julian Assange to justify the journalistic economy: It is the clashing of these voices together that reveals the truth about the world as a whole”. Just like any other form of capitalism.

    But I would argue, given the statements below, that if you don’t get paid for it, it’s an opinion. But if you sell it, it’s a product. And if you sell a product, you must warrantee it. And journalists, or at least media providers, should be held accountable for the quality of their products.

    Our courts made a vast mistake undermining traditional common law on libel and slander. And we worsen that mistake with not requiring warrantee on the products of reporters. If products must come to market with warrantee, then fewer of them will come, but they will be of much higher quality.

    It should be noted that the government gives corporations the permission to pollute, and journalists the permission to lie, slander and commit fraud, by revoking your right of standing in the court of law, as a consumer of a good that was purchased on the market.

    So while I agree with Craig’s argument, I do not agree that the market without the courts, is a sufficient guarantee of public good. Not even market anarchists make this argument. Nor do I agree that the market for information is a sufficient guarantee of public good without the protection of the courts in enforcing warrantee on the quality of the product that we consume. Nor do I agree that the market for academic knowledge without the courts is a sufficient guarantee of public good.

    Personally, I’d like to take Dan Rather to court for all the damage he did to America.

    QUOTE:

    “Today, years later, I’ve come to be more aware than ever that media are generally not in a particularly good position to tell the truth. There are too many structural problems:

    The journalist (or media) is often an amateur-generalist who writes about subjects about which he has no expertise. (How many Yugoslavia-experts were there in Western media in the 1990s? How many Islam experts after 9/11? How many Germany experts since the euro crisis?)

    1) The journalist has to write to very short time constraints, before the “fog of war” clears.

    2) The traditional (print or TV) journalist has to simplify according to the constraints of column size and screen time (“concision”).

    3) The journalist panders to the powerful in order to preserve “access.”

    4) The journalist panders to his audience’s prejudices in order to acquire and keep readers.

    5) The journalist engages in sensationalism to get “hits.”

    6) The journalist must respect the interests of his paymasters (corporate or government owners, subsidizers, advertisers, subscribers…).

    7) “The journalist” is defined here as he who lives by his writing, each of these points could be extended to media in general.

    The point here is all media, all journalists, have necessary and structural conflicts of interest that potentially compromise and bias the truthfulness of their writing.”


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-15 13:18:00 UTC

  • THREAD ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC ADVOCACY I follow this blog fairly closely ex

    http://judithcurry.com/2013/08/06/irresponsible-advocacy-by-scientists/GREAT THREAD ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC ADVOCACY

    I follow this blog fairly closely exactly for this reason: they cover the debate over scientific ethics fairly honestly.

    My position is pretty clear: advocacy is the responsibility of journalists. And neutral research is the responsibility of scientists.

    If you can’t trust politicians why should you trust scientists that are acting like politicians?

    This division of labor is the only way to ensure that advocacy is responsible.

    I’ve even advocated in the past, that we should hold scientists and journalists accountable for the equivalent of pollution if it turns out that they were wrong. People who are not accountable are not responsible. You are not responsible for discovering the atomic bomb. You are responsible for advocating the construction and use of it.

    (I know. Sounds nuts. But that’s what propertarian logic would suggest that we do.)


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-13 05:43:00 UTC

  • “DOCUMENTARY = PROPAGANDA” PROBLEM I was crushingly depressed when I learned tha

    http://www.cracked.com/article_20585_6-famous-documentaries-that-were-shockingly-full-crap_p2.htmlTHE “DOCUMENTARY = PROPAGANDA” PROBLEM

    I was crushingly depressed when I learned that “Nanook of the North” was utter nonsense. I felt lied to. (I had been lied to.) The noble savage myth is a myth. Living primitive life is hard. And when indigenous people discover their own poverty, large numbers of them commit suicide many others seek any exit possible.

    McDonalds is possibly one of the best food products ever produced. (Corn syrup probably one of the worst.) When I was 16, before work, would eat two big mac’s and a large order of fries, and I had a washboard stomach. We ought to treat McDonalds as one of the worlds best charity organizations for the poor. Because that’s how much they’ve done to feed the poor. (Compared to the nonsense the government does.)


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-13 01:38:00 UTC

  • No. I don’t know anything. I just make arguments. Like any other intellectual ma

    No. I don’t know anything. I just make arguments. Like any other intellectual makes arguments. We don’t choose whether our arguments are true or not. We try to construct them as honestly as possible, if we are honest with ourselves, and then see wether, like so many experimental products, they survive in the market for criticism. I get a little frustrated with people who assume one moral bias or strategy is preferential to all. I ‘think’ I’m right. But I don’t know. I can just follow the only strategy that seems to work: prosecute a set of ideas until they succeed or fail. The minute you try to persuade an audience rather than test your ideas to see if they fail, you’ve stopped acting as a scientist and started acting as an advocate. It is probably possible to advocate what you think may be true. But the minute you claim you’re right, then, well, that’s not advocacy that’s politics.


    Source date (UTC): 2013-08-11 16:38:00 UTC