Theme: Truth

SPEAKING TRUTHFULLY IN MORAL LANGUAGE?

(advanced topic) (from elsewhere)

Numbers (positional names) exist quite differently from hammers. While it certainly is possible that some higher mathematics exists than a simple truth table – it is hard to conceive of such a thing. We have no discretion over numbers, whereas we have a lot of discretion over hammers.

…sensation, synthesis, association, representation, description, hypotheses, theories, laws, logic, names, numbers, recipes, actions, constructions….

The beauty of numbers is that if we construct a series of axiomatic statements, then all numerical consequence lies deterministically in those statements – yet these consequences are beyond our perceptions.

The “calculator” (device), does in fact compute: perform a series of user-configurable operations according to fixed rules.

If we mean – via Searle – that the device lacks sentience (awareness), with which experience the meaning of the performance of the operations. We must then express meaning which requires perception, memory, association, evaluation, choice. :the mixing of perception with memory, intuition, and instinct.

But a human arranged information in the device, and the device does in fact perform operations that constitute the computation.

And the test of this argument is that man cannot perform these operations without the aid of the device. (See Mandelbrot).

…The information in the man’s mind.

The actions performed by man.

The information embodied in the construction of the device by man.

The information entered into the device for the purpose of computation.

The transformation of information by the device.

The perception of the output information by the man.

Association of the output information with the memory of man….

The man created the tool of transformation but he did not transform it. In fact, that is why we use most such tools: we are incapable of such transformations in real time without them.

Does an idiot savant know he is performing computations? Or is he merely reciting a series of steps that others have trained him to perform?

Most of us lear by repetition and gain undrestanding of what it is we do only after we have learned it through repetition.

Des that mean we do not calculate until we know the meaning of calculating?

I tend to see these statements as a language problem originating in the attempts to use common language to make scientific statements, and nothing more. Our language evolved for justification (permission) and anthropomorphization (basic association).

So we use analogies, nor names of analogies, or names of experiences, but not existential names: descriptions of a series of operations. This CONFLATION of common language terminology with which we convey meaning, with the attempt to produce trutfhu statemetns, results in failure. And most philosophical discourse is nothing more than the parlor game of trying to fit a term of common language into a technical one, like two puzzle pieces that clearly were not cut from the same board.

But if we follow the information just as in economics we follow the money, we can operationally (scientifically) describe any process that transforms information.

The colloquial tongue with which we discourse is no more suitable to speaking truthfully (operationally) than formal logic is for dinner chat.

Why? the economics of transfer is utilitarian, and we manage exceptions, not perfect at all times. That would be an unnecessary burden.

I remember ancient mechanical adding machines that my parents had in the shop in the 60’s and 70’s. The energy of my arm pulling the lever transformed some arrangement of numbers into other numbers – I knew not how. Today the energy stored in batteries, delivered by dc or ac current does the same.

To say the I performed a calculation and the machine assisted me by performing computations is about as accurate in our language as we can get. Why? because the purpose of the statement is to distinguish my efforts and responsibilities from those which were not my efforts and responsibilities. Since that is the content of moral (cooperative) language: cause and accountability.

We evolved speech to cooperate. We cooperate because it is more productive than any other individual action we can take by orders of magnitude. We evolved moral intuitions, moral language, and not unsurprisingly, justificationary argument because of the value of cooperation. And so our common language is framed for the purpose of conveying moral information. Why else would we even care about speaking the truth?

Man is a moral creature – he must be. So he gives precedent to moral framing. And truthfully, man is largely unsuitable for nearly any other form of discourse.

If you want to speak amorally it is possible, but one must merely describe the movement of information to do so – without conflating the language of morality with the language of truth (testimony).

I am not sure others have addressed this issue or not. I have not found it in the literature. Although I tend to read science…

Cheers.