Theme: Property

  • The Court Is Required To Address All Thefts

    [T]he manner of theft is immaterial. Either the court provides a means of remedy for a theft, or we are free to use violence to obtain remedy for the theft. The court does not grant what we may do. It holds provision only over those conflicts which it agrees to resolve via property rights.

    See Burke
    —-“In a state of nature, it is true, that a man of superior force may beat or rob me; but then it is true, that I am at full liberty to defend myself, or make reprisal by surprise or by cunning, or by any other way in which I may be superior to him.

    But in political society [, outside of the state of nature], a rich man may rob me in another way. [And] I cannot defend myself; for money is the only weapon with which we are allowed to fight [in political society]. If I attempt to avenge myself, the whole force of that society is ready to complete my ruin.” -– Edmund Burke

    Ergo, political society fails, and juridical society succeeds.

  • The Court Is Required To Address All Thefts

    [T]he manner of theft is immaterial. Either the court provides a means of remedy for a theft, or we are free to use violence to obtain remedy for the theft. The court does not grant what we may do. It holds provision only over those conflicts which it agrees to resolve via property rights.

    See Burke
    —-“In a state of nature, it is true, that a man of superior force may beat or rob me; but then it is true, that I am at full liberty to defend myself, or make reprisal by surprise or by cunning, or by any other way in which I may be superior to him.

    But in political society [, outside of the state of nature], a rich man may rob me in another way. [And] I cannot defend myself; for money is the only weapon with which we are allowed to fight [in political society]. If I attempt to avenge myself, the whole force of that society is ready to complete my ruin.” -– Edmund Burke

    Ergo, political society fails, and juridical society succeeds.

  • Contra Locke on Self-Ownership

    Guest Post by Michael Phillip

    [L]ocke’s argument starts with the notion that we own ourselves. It does not rest on us being the creation of our own labour, but a notion of self-ownership. By “mixing our labour” with things acquired from nature we “create” property by a process of extension of our self-ownership.

    There are a series of problems with this argument. First, if we own ourselves, do we really think that we can therefore sell ourselves, either entire or by amputation and alienation of bits? And, if not, in what sense is this ownership? Is there not something perverse about a concept which implies an acceptable separation of our physical self (in whole or in part) from ourself.

    To be property is to be owned by something that is not itself and which can be passed on to others. So, to be property, even of ourself, is to be lessened from what we feel is the proper status of being a moral agent.

    A notion of self-dominion makes more sense; we control ourselves and property extends from that control. By taking some unowned thing from nature, we assert control over it; it is the assertion and acceptance of control which creates property.

    As ever, slavery provides a limiting case. The institution of slavery contradicts Locke’s notion that we own ourselves. Slavery is morally obnoxious (a violation of self-dominion, and so human autonomy, in the most profound sense) but it does not make slaves any less property. It is the acknowledged assertion of control over the slave that creates slavery, not the labour of the slaveowner (even if it is directed to that end) extending the slaver’s self-ownership to cover the slave.

    Do we really think that the process of enslaving is a process of the slaver “mixing their labour” with the slave? Surely not; neither as a description nor as some act of legitimation. No amount of applied labour by the slaver makes slavery legitimate nor is it what makes slaves property.

    The process of enslaving is a process of getting acknowledged control over the slave. The more difficulty involved, the more the slaver has to act to do so, but the effort required does not affect any “level” of being property, merely whether it is worth the bother.

    Locke’s use of the term ‘labour’ directs attention to the effort and not to what is being effected. (Hence the connection to the labour theory of value, which makes the same error.)



    Note: My position is that the necessity of cooperation determines property, not self owenrship. Michael (as usual) is correct. – Curt

  • Contra Locke on Self-Ownership

    Guest Post by Michael Phillip

    [L]ocke’s argument starts with the notion that we own ourselves. It does not rest on us being the creation of our own labour, but a notion of self-ownership. By “mixing our labour” with things acquired from nature we “create” property by a process of extension of our self-ownership.

    There are a series of problems with this argument. First, if we own ourselves, do we really think that we can therefore sell ourselves, either entire or by amputation and alienation of bits? And, if not, in what sense is this ownership? Is there not something perverse about a concept which implies an acceptable separation of our physical self (in whole or in part) from ourself.

    To be property is to be owned by something that is not itself and which can be passed on to others. So, to be property, even of ourself, is to be lessened from what we feel is the proper status of being a moral agent.

    A notion of self-dominion makes more sense; we control ourselves and property extends from that control. By taking some unowned thing from nature, we assert control over it; it is the assertion and acceptance of control which creates property.

    As ever, slavery provides a limiting case. The institution of slavery contradicts Locke’s notion that we own ourselves. Slavery is morally obnoxious (a violation of self-dominion, and so human autonomy, in the most profound sense) but it does not make slaves any less property. It is the acknowledged assertion of control over the slave that creates slavery, not the labour of the slaveowner (even if it is directed to that end) extending the slaver’s self-ownership to cover the slave.

    Do we really think that the process of enslaving is a process of the slaver “mixing their labour” with the slave? Surely not; neither as a description nor as some act of legitimation. No amount of applied labour by the slaver makes slavery legitimate nor is it what makes slaves property.

    The process of enslaving is a process of getting acknowledged control over the slave. The more difficulty involved, the more the slaver has to act to do so, but the effort required does not affect any “level” of being property, merely whether it is worth the bother.

    Locke’s use of the term ‘labour’ directs attention to the effort and not to what is being effected. (Hence the connection to the labour theory of value, which makes the same error.)



    Note: My position is that the necessity of cooperation determines property, not self owenrship. Michael (as usual) is correct. – Curt

  • Synonyms

    [T]he only moral society is one in which property, morality and law are synonyms.

    (i) PROPERTY : that which we demonstrate. 
    (ii) MORALITY: that which we require. 
    (iii) LAW: that which we promise.

  • Synonyms

    [T]he only moral society is one in which property, morality and law are synonyms.

    (i) PROPERTY : that which we demonstrate. 
    (ii) MORALITY: that which we require. 
    (iii) LAW: that which we promise.

  • Property is Settled Science

    [W]e Don’t Need To Further Research Property – it’s Settled Science.

    1) Property that we consider ours, is that which we bear costs to obtain or bear costs if we lose.

    2) Property that is necessary within a cooperative kinship group is determined by that which is necessary to prevent free-riding.

    3) Property that we demonstrate to others that we consider ours, is determined by what one is willing to defend.

    4) Property rights demonstrated by others are limited to the property that others are willing to defend on our behalf.

    The question then, is not what is property, but how willing are we to defend the property that we demonstrate.

    We don’t need to invent property – or a limit to it.

    We need to adjudicate disputes over what we demonstrate to be property ourselves, among our cooperatives and kin, from those who we must defend it from, and those who we ask to help us in that defense.

    Every other argument is merely an attempt to gain a discount through verbal deception.

    (Punish The Wicked)

  • Property is Settled Science

    [W]e Don’t Need To Further Research Property – it’s Settled Science.

    1) Property that we consider ours, is that which we bear costs to obtain or bear costs if we lose.

    2) Property that is necessary within a cooperative kinship group is determined by that which is necessary to prevent free-riding.

    3) Property that we demonstrate to others that we consider ours, is determined by what one is willing to defend.

    4) Property rights demonstrated by others are limited to the property that others are willing to defend on our behalf.

    The question then, is not what is property, but how willing are we to defend the property that we demonstrate.

    We don’t need to invent property – or a limit to it.

    We need to adjudicate disputes over what we demonstrate to be property ourselves, among our cooperatives and kin, from those who we must defend it from, and those who we ask to help us in that defense.

    Every other argument is merely an attempt to gain a discount through verbal deception.

    (Punish The Wicked)

  • Property Rights are Cheaper than Slavery

    CHEAPER FOR THE STRONG TO GIVE PEOPLE PROPERTY RIGHTS

    [P]roperty exists prior to codification in a constitution. So does promise, prior to the institution of contract. A constitution is merely an agreement for reciprocal insurance of the terms of property and contract.

    It so happens that allocation of property rights determines the incentives possible, and the incentives determine the degree of market participation – how many hands make the work light – and therefore the cost of providing individuals with incentives.

    It’s just cheaper for the strong to give everyone property rights – so long as none of the weak band together to extract from the strong under platonic justification via those self-same rules.

    This is the same reason that Slavery is illogical as well as immoral: assuming the prior slaves respect property rights and do not form a government of extraction, then it is merely cheaper and easier to have one’s slaves as vendors and customers.

  • Property Rights are Cheaper than Slavery

    CHEAPER FOR THE STRONG TO GIVE PEOPLE PROPERTY RIGHTS

    [P]roperty exists prior to codification in a constitution. So does promise, prior to the institution of contract. A constitution is merely an agreement for reciprocal insurance of the terms of property and contract.

    It so happens that allocation of property rights determines the incentives possible, and the incentives determine the degree of market participation – how many hands make the work light – and therefore the cost of providing individuals with incentives.

    It’s just cheaper for the strong to give everyone property rights – so long as none of the weak band together to extract from the strong under platonic justification via those self-same rules.

    This is the same reason that Slavery is illogical as well as immoral: assuming the prior slaves respect property rights and do not form a government of extraction, then it is merely cheaper and easier to have one’s slaves as vendors and customers.