Theme: Operationalism

  • Propertarianism’s Testimonial Truth

    [T]he Question:
    How do we warranty that we speak the truth, given any subset of properties of reality? Testimonial truth is a promise, a warranty.  But a warranty of what?  All knowledge is theoretical; and all non-tautological, non-trivial premises and propositions are theoretical.  Therefore how to we know our theories can be warrantied?

    We can warranty that our statement somewhere in this spectrum:

    And we can state what criteria any proposition tested on this spectrum satisfied. And we can conversely state whether a proposition is required to satisfy each criteria. 

    All disciplines are subject to this list, and to testimony.  All that differs is whether the properties are necessary for application of the theory to the context (scale) at hand.

    Only such statements made under this warranty, are classifiable as moral: consisting of Truthful, fully informed, productive, voluntary exchange free of negative externality.

    The Warranty that we give is that:

    • I. A statement is stated *TRUTHFULLY*: satisfying the criteria for such a warranty to be made.
    • II. A statement is *TRUE*: Assuming that we eliminated the barriers of time, space, scale, and observability, we warranty that one would come to the same conclusion if equally truthful in his actions.

    We can never state whether a statement is “Absolutely True”, as in satisfying Platonic truth. And rarely can we state that we have satisfied analytic truth, and only at human scale can we testify that we have satisfied Perceivable Truth – original experience.  But we can always state whether we have stated something truthfully.

    The question is only *whether we truly desire to*.

    Criticism of Intellectual History:
    We have been obsessed with science and math rather than seeing them as simple subsets of the more complex problem. And in the west, we took truth telling for granted, when it is the first principle upon which all other western advances were made.

    (Next. Information Differences Necessary in Verbal Expression)

    Curt Doolittle
    The Propertarian Institute
    Kiev, Ukraine.

  • THOUGHTS ON OPERATIONALISM AND FALSIFICATIONISM Still thinking because I can’t q

    THOUGHTS ON OPERATIONALISM AND FALSIFICATIONISM

    Still thinking because I can’t quite grasp ..hmm.. and I think it’s like falsification – that if an argument (a theory) isn’t falsifiable then it isn’t scientific. And that …. well, that something isn’t ‘scientific’ is a non-operational statement – its like saying it’s good or heavenly, but that doesn’t tell us anything. Internal consistency, external correspondence and existential possibility do tell us something.

    —“operationalise a concept likes suppression”–

    Damn…. finally… I know how to talk about it…. YAY!

    Thank you Ayelam Valentine Agaliba. For some reason you always give me the most helpful breadcrumbs…. the only people in this world worth anything in epistemology are CR’s.

    I am too under the weather this morning to write something meaningful. But I can now show that the way I am using operationalism is as a further extension of falsificationism for those cases where our sense and perceptions are sufficient for decidability (social sciences). Or I would invert it: that falsification is a lower standard of operationalism for those cases when our sense and perception are insufficient for decidability (the physical universe).

    Well that is a good way to start off a day even if it’s a day with a headache…


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-15 02:54:00 UTC

  • you need operational language in politics law and economics

    http://takimag.com/article/jonathan_gruber_honest_liberal_patrick_buchanan#axzz3Li934qk7Why you need operational language in politics law and economics


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-12 13:51:00 UTC

  • THE TRANSFORMATION OF AUTISTIC INTUITION TO OPERATIONAL EXPOSITION. Yes, my work

    THE TRANSFORMATION OF AUTISTIC INTUITION TO OPERATIONAL EXPOSITION.

    Yes, my work is getting clearer. Yes it is getting easier for BOTH you and I to understand. Well, but what’s the reason why I had a lot of trouble articulating my ideas in the past? I could sense the pattern and talk about it with autistic forms of symbolic analogy, but I could not convert it into more accessible language because I hadn’t yet been able to identify and model all the axis I was working from. Today I can. And pretty soon I’ll be able to reduce it to a few simple rules. But going from autistic speech (pattern intuition without rational comprehension of those patterns) is just not a very suitable means of argument. And the art is in patiently and deliberately attempting to state the arguments operationally (using new existentially possible frameworks to build upon) rather than meaningfully (using extant imaginary frameworks to build upon).

    I don’t really ‘think’ of things in any material sense as much as gather information and ‘catch’ intuitions that are usually too subtle and complex to ignore . The difference which has caused me some difficulty in life is that I intuit operationally correspondent (operational) patterns, but I have no intuition for experiential (meaningful) patterns what soever. My brain does not allow me to use empathy as a shortcut. This particular blindness means that I am somewhat limited to ascertainable facts instead of experiences – I just don’t HAVE those experiences to work from. Whereas ordinary people have a problem seeing beyond experiences because they’re so clear, influential and meaningful.

    Autistic worlds are very different. There is a lot LESS in them. So we have less to calculate with. If you look at it that way it’s not so much that people like me are massively smarter than people with similar IQ’s. But it’s that we only see non-experiential signals, and as such are sort of specialized tools – conceptual warrior ants in the human tribal hive.

    I think it’s wrong to express this as a disease or illness rather than a specialization. And I think it’s also wrong to to say autistic thought is ‘more internal’, rather than we are just working with the data we have to work with. In my case it has been emotionally painful but personally fruitful.

    The whole anglo philosophical and political fantasy of equality has been a disaster for mankind. We must be equal in property rights and equal under the law, but that’s so that we may coordinate our actions as specialists, and succeed as specialists – not so that we can act as equals.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-12 04:10:00 UTC

  • (choice words) –“As far as I know, in my work, I have … restated the Austrian

    (choice words)

    –“As far as I know, in my work, I have … restated the Austrian position in ratio scientific terms as a economic operationalism: the extension of analysis beyond human scales of perception and as such the need to add the requirement for operational tests of existential possibility to ensure that verbal expressions reflect existentially possible phenomenon, and not imaginary content or assumptions.”–


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-06 06:38:00 UTC

  • POSITIONING AUSTRIAN ECON IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (posted in new school of austr

    POSITIONING AUSTRIAN ECON IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

    (posted in new school of austrian economics)



    (Note: This is a draft that I am working on. And even for people who follow me, and who have philosophical training in the sciences, this may still be a challenge to digest. For those who do not follow me it may be difficult going but you will find some very useful ideas inside the cracker jack box.)



    Lets start off with a deceptively simple, common question, that leads us to a very complex journey:

    QUESTION: –“Is it a contradiction to accept Austrian theories (ie. business cycle theory) but to also accept empirical methodology?”– Robert Beattie

    ANSWER: No.

    THE TALE OF THREE CITIES: THE ISLAND, THE FOREST AND THE GHETTO

    You will find largely vapid arguments in the Austrian community that state that in practice, Austrian economists do this or that by empirical means. Which is a meaningless argument of course. It says nothing about what is different in their discipline – they might also ride unicycles. You will find arguments that the primary difference between mainstream and Austrian Economics is the business cycle. This is also partly correct. But also that business cycles are not predictable – even though this is actually probably not true. Instead, it’s that it’s, socially and legally disruptive, and expensive to collect the data and even if we did it would influence the outcome. You will find that in some quarters Austrian economics is cast as the study of information – which is fairly accurate, since that is how Physics has also evolved as a discipline. You will find some groups saying that it is the study of human action – which again is a meaningless verbalism, as if all other fields were not also studies of man’s actions (and far better at producing results). You will find that Austrian economics is often discussed in Misesian terms. But this is nonsense as well. Mises split off from Menger’s german rationalist school and created a Jewish cosmopolitan school more reflective of Cosmopolitan political interests and as such, was more political than scientific. The propaganda campaign conducted by the Mises institute – the Middle class cosmopolitan version of the lower class Cosmopolitan Frankfurt School – by the use of the technique of Marxist Critique of heaping undue praise, and appropriating the terms “Libertarian” and “Austrian” has been marginally successful in framing the vernacular. But the fact remains that whether German rationalist or Jewish Cosmopolitan, both branches of Austrian economics attempt to study human cooperation, and reflect particularist, nationalist, if not tribal, political oppositions to anglo universalist empiricism framed in scientific language. It is this framing that separates anglo-islander, german-flatlander and Jewish-disaporic thought. Kantian rationalism is an attempt to conflate truth and duty. Jewish disasporic thought is an attempt to preserve authority and separatism. Anglo thought is best seen as an emanating from the safety of an ivory tower defended by the seas, and ignoring or at least discounting nearly infinitely the need for our political thought to assist us in group cohesion. And the German and Jewish Schools intent on preserving their group cohesion in the face of anglo universal empiricism.

    But underneath those political aspirations – anglo island dweller and navy, german land holder and army, or jewish migrant ghetto dweller and trader – the scientific proposition they each intuit, and seek to use to their group’s political advantage in the enlightenment, can be found.

    But we must go looking for it carefully:

    POSITIONING AUSTRIANISM IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT

    Austrian Economics is best understood as a higher scientific standard, wherein any instrumental observation (regular correlation), must also be operationally constructed (existentially possible) in order to be testified to as truthful. (In common vernacular:true).

    A sequence of sympathetically testable human operations in economics are identical in class to a sequence of possible mathematical operations in mathematics: they determine existential possibility.

    In mathematics we explore using the same operations as instruments as we do to construct our proofs: the analogy to truth in math. We use the same descriptions to explore with and demonstrate with. But that coincidence is unique to mathematics.

    In the study of human cooperation that we call economics we hypothesize using many different instruments to arrive at a theory – most of which depend upon the evidence of demonstrated preference recorded as monetary transactions – but unless we can explain a theory as the RESULT of a sequence of sympathetically testable human operations, then it is not existentially possible, and as such the theory cannot be truthfully testified to be ‘true’. The impossible cannot be true.

    But unlike mathematical operations in the construction of proofs, or physical transformations and measurements in physical science – a violation of which are merely an error in understanding, recording, measuring, testing, which may cause others to bear costs in order to refute – when we make untrue statements in economic policy, WE CAUSE THEFTS.

    Unfortunately Mises intuits this approximate way to articulate the difference in disciplines, but as a German rationalist and Jewish hermeneuticist, rather than anglo analytic empiricist, he made a pseudoscientific proposal instead: praxeology. (Note: to qualify as pseudoscientific one must claim a discipline is a science or scientific but at the same time not follow the scientific method.)

    As far as I know, in my work I have corrected this error and restated the Austrian position in ratio scientific terms as a economic operationalism: the extension of analysis beyond human scales of perception and as such the need to add the requirement for operational tests of existential possibility to ensure that verbal expressions reflect existentially possible phenomenon, and not imaginary content or assumptions.

    EINSTEIN, BRIDGMAN, BROUWER, HOPPE,

    Hoppe came very close to figuring it out but was too committed to imprecision of aprioism and rationalism – both of which are of limited use and only of use at human scale of perception (in reductio argument), just as Newtonian physics is limited to use at near-human scales of perception. However, when we speak of economics, we almost immediately exceed the limits of human scales of perception – which is precisely why we require the money and prices

    Poincare was the most vocal critic of analogistic pseudosciences (correlation is just a form of empirical analogy not an operational description). It was Einstein who demonstrated that apriorism was dead by showing that if we cannot depend upon such basic premises as time and length, then we can depend upon no premises for the purpose of deducing apriori statements whatsoever. And next, Bridgman, Brouwer, and Bishop then explained why we cannot depend upon premises: because only a sequence of operations (and measures) expose changes in the properties of premises that analogies (words) obscure and imply are constant. In other words, terms refer to meaning (analogy) and operations refer to reality (truth). However, the human mind, which evolved reason and language together, cannot remember or manipulate long strings of operations, so we must reduce long strings of operations to analogies (words) which we remember by virtue of association(meaning), and verify those reductions of operations(and measurements) to words, whenever the scale (context) of the general rule (statement in words) changes.

    So for those of us that correctly intuit that something is immoral and wrong with Keyesian and New-Keynesian macro, we are partly right: correlative economics was expressly invented to obscure the systems of redistribution and theft that such policies institute and perpetuate. Analogies, even if they are empirically statistical or rational and therefore verbal analogies, are still merely analogies, and only operations can be demonstrated to be true for more than trivial theories within the very limited human scales of perception.

    Analogies are good for the transfer of meaning – and to some degree they are necessary for the purpose of condensing into the verbal and mental equivalent of functions that which is too complex to understand as a series of operations (counting numbers and the square root of two are the most obvious examples). But analogies are not the same as truths, any more than poetry is the same as scientific recipe, or the same as adding colorful and illustrious details for the purpose of entertainment on a witness stand is telling the truth.

    The only possible means of knowing whether our analogous words, have exceeded the bounds of their construction, is by testing their construction by operationalist means – operations and measures.

    Austrian economics then asks us, as does intuitionism and construction in mathematics, and operationalism in science, and operationism in psychology, to test whether a economic propositions are open to operational construction: whether they are decidable propositions by an actor given the information he is exposed to in real time.

    We do not require external instrumentation to test whether propositions are rational for an actor to decide, because humans are marginally indifferent in our sympathetic capacity: in other words, we are similar enough to cooperate and therefore similar enough to empathize (sympathize) with one another’s incentives. If not (as our ape relatives often demonstrate they cannot, and our dog friends demonstrate they can) we could not cooperate. We can cooperate because we can sympathetically determine intent. As such in matters of cooperation we can sympathize with one another sufficiently to decide preferential propositions marginally indifferently. As such we are, ourselves intrinsically able to perform sympathetic tests, as well as judge an equal’s sign in mathematics, and as well as a scale in physical matters, or as well as any other instrumental measurement that we can construct.

    The practitioners of science took under consideration those topics that were beyond human scale. **Science is best understood as discipline of truth telling – not a means of investigating the world. The fact that scientists had to find ways of truth telling at scale helped them develop their moral principles of truth telling that we call the scientific method. However, there is nothing particular to the study of physical phenomenon in that moral method.

    The revolution in thinking that we learned from science after the various revolutions in scale that occurred in the 1800’s, was that we must place a higher constraint upon truth telling in social matters for large populations outside of the family and tribe, just as we had placed a higher standard upon truth telling in the physical sciences when the scale also exceeded our human perceptions.

    MORALS RULES AS AVAILABLE AS OPERATIONS

    Why? Because the operations (moral rules) in each population differ according to necessity, accident and intent. But most importantly, the moral rules in each population reflect their group’s competitive strategies.

    Loosely this means that macro economic policy can be practiced at most across a heterogeneous people, otherwise, it is a surreptitious invisible means of conducting genetic warfare by redistributing wealth between competing families and tribes.) Only operational analysis of MORALS will make this evident. And this insight is why I have argued for the past decade that economics as practiced is an immoral discipline.

    There are limits to all general rules when scale is exceeded. In the case of economics, the use of policy beyond the nation-state is immoral-in-fact because consequences of conquest via consumption credit and interest; but it is also immoral in the sense that we do not analyze the operations that are changed by its implementation – the extant moral codes and their consequences. Nor do we analyze the normative or human capital changes that occur as a result of our actions. In the case of the west we have undermined our ancient moral codes as well as our demographics – Keynesian induced consumption is suicidal. We enjoy consumption, but we enjoy narcotics drugs and alchohol. Whether we enjoy something is not a measure in and of itself. It means only that we have found a means of producing a chemical reaction in our bodies.

    THE IMPOSITION OF RULE

    The counter proposition is that we evolved and imposed laws and religions to unite peoples, and are now evolving economics (rule by consumption, credit and interest) to unite peoples. But the uniting of peoples is only beneficial for the conduct of warfare – and it is demonstrably dysgenic, since only separatist peoples appear to evolve above the median. Fiat money, the nation state, the empire, evolved for the purpose of war making:conquest.

    When you are trying to institute property rights so that people can cooperate, then that is beneficial for those with potential, and only in marginal cases does it deny peoples from participation in the market and harm their competitive abilities. In other words,imposition of property rights facilitates cooperation and may be eugenic to some degree – which we have seen.

    But when you try to institute economic redistribution the opposite occurs: evolutionarily advantageous separatist populations have the choice only of adopting the Jewish and Chinese diasporic strategies, and abandoning traditional land-holder morality, or of being the subjects of conquest by rates of dysgenic competitors now funded by that redistribution. (Which we see now worldwide.) So while law makes cooperation possible as we increasingly impose a uniform standard, and while religion makes war at scale possible, macro economics across heterogeneous groups makes dysgenia possible, and nothing else.

    AUSTRIAN ECON: MORAL ECONOMICS AT MAXIMUM SCALE

    Austrian economics then, is the study of moral economics at maximum scales before the return on economic policy is negative: nation states. And Keynesian macro is the justification for immoral economics (the imposition of rule by consumption, credit and interest) for the purpose of conquest, just as monotheistic religion was developed for the purpose of rule, conquest, and the making of war. This is a simple unavoidably proposition without possibility of refutation.

    The question of economics is instead- how can we increase the volume of economic activity without committing immoral acts? This is what separates moral Austrian Economics from immoral correlative economics. And we must see Keynesian macro economics for what it is: a statistical religion of conquest for the purpose of increasing uniform rule by means of consumption, credit and interest, at the expense of formerly separatist gene pools.

    And here is the problem; it is only in separatist gene pools that high trust society has developed – extending kinship trust to near kin who demonstrate identical morphology and norms. And economic velocity sufficient to conduct redistribution is dependent upon levels of trust that is only possible in homogenous societies. As such the Keynesian model across nation-state boundaries is destructive (as we have seen in all of world history) because it destroys the trust that make redistribution possible at homogenous-polity levels.

    Truth and volition are central to western civilization and unique to western political systems. Marxist, Keynesian, Freudian, Cantorian, Misesian pseudosciences are violations of the central competitive strategy of western civilization: truth before the jury of ones peers, the hight trust that evolves from pervasive truth telling, and the velocity of economy that develops from trust.

    Cheers.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute,

    Kiev

    See Horowitz for the best example of more colloquial language

    http://www.cato-unbound.org/…/empirics-austrian-economics


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-06 05:26:00 UTC

  • POSITIONING AUSTRIAN ECON IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY — (Note: This is a draft tha

    POSITIONING AUSTRIAN ECON IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY



    (Note: This is a draft that I am working on. And even for people who follow me, and who have philosophical training in the sciences, this may still be a challenge to digest. For those who do not follow me it may be difficult going but you will find some very useful ideas inside the cracker jack box.)



    Lets start off with a deceptively simple, common question, that leads us to a very complex journey:

    QUESTION: –“Is it a contradiction to accept Austrian theories (ie. business cycle theory) but to also accept empirical methodology?”– Robert Beattie

    ANSWER: No.

    THE TALE OF THREE CITIES: THE ISLAND, THE FOREST AND THE GHETTO

    You will find largely vapid arguments in the Austrian community that state that in practice, Austrian economists do this or that by empirical means. Which is a meaningless argument of course. It says nothing about what is different in their discipline – they might also ride unicycles. You will find arguments that the primary difference between mainstream and Austrian Economics is the business cycle. This is also partly correct. But also that business cycles are not predictable – even though this is actually probably not true. Instead, it’s that it’s, socially and legally disruptive, and expensive to collect the data and even if we did it would influence the outcome. You will find that in some quarters Austrian economics is cast as the study of information – which is fairly accurate, since that is how Physics has also evolved as a discipline. You will find some groups saying that it is the study of human action – which again is a meaningless verbalism, as if all other fields were not also studies of man’s actions (and far better at producing results). You will find that Austrian economics is often discussed in Misesian terms. But this is nonsense as well. Mises split off from Menger’s german rationalist school and created a Jewish cosmopolitan school more reflective of Cosmopolitan political interests and as such, was more political than scientific. The propaganda campaign conducted by the Mises institute – the Middle class cosmopolitan version of the lower class Cosmopolitan Frankfurt School – by the use of the technique of Marxist Critique of heaping undue praise, and appropriating the terms “Libertarian” and “Austrian” has been marginally successful in framing the vernacular. But the fact remains that whether German rationalist or Jewish Cosmopolitan, both branches of Austrian economics attempt to study human cooperation, and reflect particularist, nationalist, if not tribal, political oppositions to anglo universalist empiricism framed in scientific language. It is this framing that separates anglo-islander, german-flatlander and Jewish-disaporic thought. Kantian rationalism is an attempt to conflate truth and duty. Jewish disasporic thought is an attempt to preserve authority and separatism. Anglo thought is best seen as an emanating from the safety of an ivory tower defended by the seas, and ignoring or at least discounting nearly infinitely the need for our political thought to assist us in group cohesion. And the German and Jewish Schools intent on preserving their group cohesion in the face of anglo universal empiricism.

    But underneath those political aspirations – anglo island dweller and navy, german land holder and army, or jewish migrant ghetto dweller and trader – the scientific proposition they each intuit, and seek to use to their group’s political advantage in the enlightenment, can be found.

    But we must go looking for it carefully:

    POSITIONING AUSTRIANISM IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT

    Austrian Economics is best understood as a higher scientific standard, wherein any instrumental observation (regular correlation), must also be operationally constructed (existentially possible) in order to be testified to as truthful. (In common vernacular:true).

    A sequence of sympathetically testable human operations in economics are identical in class to a sequence of possible mathematical operations in mathematics: they determine existential possibility.

    In mathematics we explore using the same operations as instruments as we do to construct our proofs: the analogy to truth in math. We use the same descriptions to explore with and demonstrate with. But that coincidence is unique to mathematics.

    In the study of human cooperation that we call economics we hypothesize using many different instruments to arrive at a theory – most of which depend upon the evidence of demonstrated preference recorded as monetary transactions – but unless we can explain a theory as the RESULT of a sequence of sympathetically testable human operations, then it is not existentially possible, and as such the theory cannot be truthfully testified to be ‘true’. The impossible cannot be true.

    But unlike mathematical operations in the construction of proofs, or physical transformations and measurements in physical science – a violation of which are merely an error in understanding, recording, measuring, testing, which may cause others to bear costs in order to refute – when we make untrue statements in economic policy, WE CAUSE THEFTS.

    Unfortunately Mises intuits this approximate way to articulate the difference in disciplines, but as a German rationalist and Jewish hermeneuticist, rather than anglo analytic empiricist, he made a pseudoscientific proposal instead: praxeology. (Note: to qualify as pseudoscientific one must claim a discipline is a science or scientific but at the same time not follow the scientific method.)

    As far as I know, in my work I have corrected this error and restated the Austrian position in ratio scientific terms as a economic operationalism: the extension of analysis beyond human scales of perception and as such the need to add the requirement for operational tests of existential possibility to ensure that verbal expressions reflect existentially possible phenomenon, and not imaginary content or assumptions.

    EINSTEIN, BRIDGMAN, BROUWER, HOPPE,

    Hoppe came very close to figuring it out but was too committed to imprecision of aprioism and rationalism – both of which are of limited use and only of use at human scale of perception (in reductio argument), just as Newtonian physics is limited to use at near-human scales of perception. However, when we speak of economics, we almost immediately exceed the limits of human scales of perception – which is precisely why we require the money and prices

    Poincare was the most vocal critic of analogistic pseudosciences (correlation is just a form of empirical analogy not an operational description). It was Einstein who demonstrated that apriorism was dead by showing that if we cannot depend upon such basic premises as time and length, then we can depend upon no premises for the purpose of deducing apriori statements whatsoever. And next, Bridgman, Brouwer, and Bishop then explained why we cannot depend upon premises: because only a sequence of operations (and measures) expose changes in the properties of premises that analogies (words) obscure and imply are constant. In other words, terms refer to meaning (analogy) and operations refer to reality (truth). However, the human mind, which evolved reason and language together, cannot remember or manipulate long strings of operations, so we must reduce long strings of operations to analogies (words) which we remember by virtue of association(meaning), and verify those reductions of operations(and measurements) to words, whenever the scale (context) of the general rule (statement in words) changes.

    So for those of us that correctly intuit that something is immoral and wrong with Keyesian and New-Keynesian macro, we are partly right: correlative economics was expressly invented to obscure the systems of redistribution and theft that such policies institute and perpetuate. Analogies, even if they are empirically statistical or rational and therefore verbal analogies, are still merely analogies, and only operations can be demonstrated to be true for more than trivial theories within the very limited human scales of perception.

    Analogies are good for the transfer of meaning – and to some degree they are necessary for the purpose of condensing into the verbal and mental equivalent of functions that which is too complex to understand as a series of operations (counting numbers and the square root of two are the most obvious examples). But analogies are not the same as truths, any more than poetry is the same as scientific recipe, or the same as adding colorful and illustrious details for the purpose of entertainment on a witness stand is telling the truth.

    The only possible means of knowing whether our analogous words, have exceeded the bounds of their construction, is by testing their construction by operationalist means – operations and measures.

    Austrian economics then asks us, as does intuitionism and construction in mathematics, and operationalism in science, and operationism in psychology, to test whether a economic propositions are open to operational construction: whether they are decidable propositions by an actor given the information he is exposed to in real time.

    We do not require external instrumentation to test whether propositions are rational for an actor to decide, because humans are marginally indifferent in our sympathetic capacity: in other words, we are similar enough to cooperate and therefore similar enough to empathize (sympathize) with one another’s incentives. If not (as our ape relatives often demonstrate they cannot, and our dog friends demonstrate they can) we could not cooperate. We can cooperate because we can sympathetically determine intent. As such in matters of cooperation we can sympathize with one another sufficiently to decide preferential propositions marginally indifferently. As such we are, ourselves intrinsically able to perform sympathetic tests, as well as judge an equal’s sign in mathematics, and as well as a scale in physical matters, or as well as any other instrumental measurement that we can construct.

    The practitioners of science took under consideration those topics that were beyond human scale. **Science is best understood as discipline of truth telling – not a means of investigating the world. The fact that scientists had to find ways of truth telling at scale helped them develop their moral principles of truth telling that we call the scientific method. However, there is nothing particular to the study of physical phenomenon in that moral method.

    The revolution in thinking that we learned from science after the various revolutions in scale that occurred in the 1800’s, was that we must place a higher constraint upon truth telling in social matters for large populations outside of the family and tribe, just as we had placed a higher standard upon truth telling in the physical sciences when the scale also exceeded our human perceptions.

    MORALS RULES AS AVAILABLE AS OPERATIONS

    Why? Because the operations (moral rules) in each population differ according to necessity, accident and intent. But most importantly, the moral rules in each population reflect their group’s competitive strategies.

    Loosely this means that macro economic policy can be practiced at most across a heterogeneous people, otherwise, it is a surreptitious invisible means of conducting genetic warfare by redistributing wealth between competing families and tribes.) Only operational analysis of MORALS will make this evident. And this insight is why I have argued for the past decade that economics as practiced is an immoral discipline.

    There are limits to all general rules when scale is exceeded. In the case of economics, the use of policy beyond the nation-state is immoral-in-fact because consequences of conquest via consumption credit and interest; but it is also immoral in the sense that we do not analyze the operations that are changed by its implementation – the extant moral codes and their consequences. Nor do we analyze the normative or human capital changes that occur as a result of our actions. In the case of the west we have undermined our ancient moral codes as well as our demographics – Keynesian induced consumption is suicidal. We enjoy consumption, but we enjoy narcotics drugs and alchohol. Whether we enjoy something is not a measure in and of itself. It means only that we have found a means of producing a chemical reaction in our bodies.

    THE IMPOSITION OF RULE

    The counter proposition is that we evolved and imposed laws and religions to unite peoples, and are now evolving economics (rule by consumption, credit and interest) to unite peoples. But the uniting of peoples is only beneficial for the conduct of warfare – and it is demonstrably dysgenic, since only separatist peoples appear to evolve above the median. Fiat money, the nation state, the empire, evolved for the purpose of war making:conquest.

    When you are trying to institute property rights so that people can cooperate, then that is beneficial for those with potential, and only in marginal cases does it deny peoples from participation in the market and harm their competitive abilities. In other words,imposition of property rights facilitates cooperation and may be eugenic to some degree – which we have seen.

    But when you try to institute economic redistribution the opposite occurs: evolutionarily advantageous separatist populations have the choice only of adopting the Jewish and Chinese diasporic strategies, and abandoning traditional land-holder morality, or of being the subjects of conquest by rates of dysgenic competitors now funded by that redistribution. (Which we see now worldwide.) So while law makes cooperation possible as we increasingly impose a uniform standard, and while religion makes war at scale possible, macro economics across heterogeneous groups makes dysgenia possible, and nothing else.

    AUSTRIAN ECON: MORAL ECONOMICS AT MAXIMUM SCALE

    Austrian economics then, is the study of moral economics at maximum scales before the return on economic policy is negative: nation states. And Keynesian macro is the justification for immoral economics (the imposition of rule by consumption, credit and interest) for the purpose of conquest, just as monotheistic religion was developed for the purpose of rule, conquest, and the making of war. This is a simple unavoidably proposition without possibility of refutation.

    The question of economics is instead- how can we increase the volume of economic activity without committing immoral acts? This is what separates moral Austrian Economics from immoral correlative economics. And we must see Keynesian macro economics for what it is: a statistical religion of conquest for the purpose of increasing uniform rule by means of consumption, credit and interest, at the expense of formerly separatist gene pools.

    And here is the problem; it is only in separatist gene pools that high trust society has developed – extending kinship trust to near kin who demonstrate identical morphology and norms. And economic velocity sufficient to conduct redistribution is dependent upon levels of trust that is only possible in homogenous societies. As such the Keynesian model across nation-state boundaries is destructive (as we have seen in all of world history) because it destroys the trust that make redistribution possible at homogenous-polity levels.

    Truth and volition are central to western civilization and unique to western political systems. Marxist, Keynesian, Freudian, Cantorian, Misesian pseudosciences are violations of the central competitive strategy of western civilization: truth before the jury of ones peers, the hight trust that evolves from pervasive truth telling, and the velocity of economy that develops from trust.

    Cheers.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute,

    Kiev

    Note: (The net is that we would all be better off if we just honestly pursued the scientific truth rather than invented universalism(error), rationalism (justification), and cosmopolitanism (pseudoscience), as pretenses in vain attempts to suggest that our means of group competition should be adopted as the universal standard, rater than that the universal standard is voluntary exchange, and that we remain, as always, competitors in commerce rather than competitors in religion and war.)

    See Horowitz for the best example of more colloquial language

    http://www.cato-unbound.org/…/empirics-austrian-economics


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-06 05:24:00 UTC

  • IS IT A CONTRADICTION TO ACCEPT BOTH AUSTRIAN OPERATIONAL, AND EMPIRICAL CORRELA

    IS IT A CONTRADICTION TO ACCEPT BOTH AUSTRIAN OPERATIONAL, AND EMPIRICAL CORRELATIONAL METHODOLOGIES?

    QUESTION: –“Is it a contradiction to accept Austrian theories (ie. business cycle theory) but to also accept empirical methodology?”– Robert Beattie

    ANSWER:

    Argh. No!

    Austrian Economics is best understood as a higher scientific standard, wherein any instrumental observation (regular correlation), must also be operationally constructed (existentially possible) in order to be testified as truthful. (In common vernacular:true).

    A sequence of sympathetically testable human operations in economics are identical in class to a sequence of possible mathematical operations in mathematics: they determine existential possibility.

    In mathematics we explore using the same operations as instruments as we do to construct our proofs: the analogy to truth in math. We use the same descriptions to explore with and demonstrate with. But that coincidence is unique to mathematics.

    In the study of human activity that we call economics we explore using many different instruments to arrive at a theory – most of which are the evidence of demonstrated preference recored as monetary transactions – but unless we can explain that theory as the RESULT of a sequence of sympathetically testable human operations, then it is not existentially possible, and as such the theory cannot be truthfully testified to be ‘true’. The impossible cannot be true.

    But unlike mathematical operations in the construction of proofs, or physical transformations in physical science – a violation of which are merely an error in understanding, recording, measuring, testing, which may cause others to bear costs in order to refute – when we make untrue statements in economic policy, WE CAUSE THEFTS.

    Unfortunately Mises intuits this approximate way to articulate the difference in disciplines, but as a German rationalist and Jewish hermeneuticist, rather than anglo analytic and empiricist, he made a pseudoscientific proposal instead: praxeology.

    As far as I know, in my work I have corrected this error and restated the Austrian position in ratio scientific terms.

    EINSTEIN, BRIDGMAN, BROUWER, HOPPE,

    Hoppe came very close to figuring it out but was too committed to imprecision of aprioism and rationalism – both of which are of limited use and only of use at human scale, just as Newtonian physics is limited in scale.

    Poincare was the most vocal critic of analogistic pseudosciences (correlation is just a form of empirical analogy not an operational description). It was Einstein who demonstrated that apriorism was dead by showing that if we cannot depend upon such basic premises as time and length then we can depend upon no premises, and Bridgman, Brouwer, and Bishop that explained why we cannot depend upon premises: because only operations expose changes in the properties of premises that analogies (words) obscure and imply are constant.

    So for those of us that correctly intuit that something is immoral and wrong with Keyesian and New-Keynesian macro, we are partly right: correlative economics was expressly invented to obscure the systems of redistribution and theft that such policies perpetuate. Analogies, even if they are empirical or rational, are still merely analogies, and only operations can be demonstrated to be true. Analogies are good for the transfer of meaning – and to some degree they are necessary for the purpose of condensing into the verbal and mental equivalent of functions that which is too complex to understand as a series of operations (counting numbers and the square root of two are the most obvious examples). But analogies are not the same as truths, any more than adding colorful and illustrious details to on a witness stand is telling the truth.

    CLOSING

    Austrian economics then is a higher constraint upon truth telling: it is the study of moral economics and Keynesian macro is the study of immoral economics. This is a simple unavoidably proposition without possibility of refutation. The question of economic science is instead- how can w increase the volume of economic activity without committing immoral acts? This is what separates moral Austrian Economics from immoral correlative economics.

    Truth and volition are central to western civilization and unique to western political systems. Marxist, Keynesian, Freudian, Cantorian, Misesian pseudosciences are violations of the central competitive strategy of western civilization: truth before the jury of ones peers, the hight trust that evolves from pervasive truth telling, and the velocity of economy that develops from trust.

    Cheers.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute,

    Kiev

    See Horowitz for more colloquial language

    http://www.cato-unbound.org/…/empirics-austrian-economics


    Source date (UTC): 2014-12-05 03:46:00 UTC

  • Sketch on Obverse/Inverse and Positive/Negative as Context/Rule

    (sketch)
    [I] have been working on this idea, and I finally gotten close to expressing it tangibly as measurement.  The examples I give are the golden(positive) vs the silver rule(negative),  property(positive) vs property rights(negative).  And I want to construct a general rule for requiring both positive(contextual precision) and negative(general rule).  Because I feel its necessary to unify the sciences, philosophy morality and law in order to eliminate ‘escape routes’ by various forms of verbalism, that man will try to employ as a means of circumventing the moral constraint of truth-speaking.

    Differences 
    ———-
    IDENTICAL: indistinguishable from one another.
    FUNGIBLE: each unit of a commodity is replaceable other units of the same commodity.
    SUBSTITUTABLE: performs the same utility in the context of a given purpose.

    MARGINALLY INDIFFERENT: insufficiently different to cause a change in state.
    MARGINALLY DIFFERENT: sufficiently different to cause a change in state.
    COMMENSURABLE: measurable by the same standard.
    INCOMMENSURABLE: having no common standard of measurement.

    Propositions
    —————–
    DECIDABLE: A decision can be made without the addition of external information.
    CALCULABLE: An operation can be performed without the addition of external information.
    DEDUCIBLE: A prediction can be made without the need for external information.
    OPERATIONAL: a conclusion can be reached by a series of existentially possible operations.
    STRICTLY OPERATIONAL : the theory is constructible (i)using existentially possible operations, (ii)does not include use of analogy, (iii)does not require inference (deduction), and (iv) survives all argumentative falsification. 
    ORIGINAL INTENTION (CONTEXT / ARBITRARY PRECISION) : in interpreting a text, a court should determine what the authors of the text were trying to achieve, and to give effect to what they intended the statute to accomplish, the actual text of the legislation notwithstanding.

    TEXTUAL / NARROW/ TRUE (Conservative – normative and legislative) vs ALLEGORICAL / WIDE / MEANING(judicial) interpretation.
    In textual/Narrow/True (conservative) legal interpretation, a law is analogous to an operational recipe and changes to the recipe must be enacted by the legislature. In Allegorical / Wide / Meaning (Progressive) interpretation, the judges can invent law if they can justify the extension of the principle of the law into new areas of application not considered by it’s authors. In practice conservative TRUTH and progressive MEANING place the construction of law into the hands of the judiciary rather than the hands of the legislature and people.

    HOLMES’ LIE
    ——————
    The life of the law may have been experience but that is not license for judges to write law at will – it is an admission of the failure of legal theorists to develop propertarianism, and to separate the resolution of disputes according to the law, from the development of contracts (legislative law) on behalf of the citizenry. The separation of functions of government is necessary for the defense of the people against tyranny. Holmes justified tyranny with his deceptive use of rationalism.

    Propertarianism
    ———————
    See Wiki (or legal dictionary) Textualism (the law is only what is written in the text), Originalism(the text must be interpreted as the authors intended it) and Strict Constructionism ( which is weak textualism and is not practiced ).

    In Propertarianism, have attempted to prevent deceptions by requiring law be written to include its precision – original intention – as a preamble for any prohibition, thus requiring both the obverse and inverse propositions, such that when conditions fail (precision is exceeded) then we must revert to strict operationalism to construct new law.

    In history, judges ‘discovered’ law, and asked the people (the legislature) to approve it. This constraint – the request for legislative approval – extends the period of resolution of disputes. (Which I address elsewhere.) But under Propertarian Property rights, it should be possible to construct new precision from first principles – or not. If not, then it is not a matter of law, but a matter of contract. If it is a matter of contractual exchange, then it is a legislative matter, not one for the courts to decide.

    Purpose 
    ———–
    The American constitution was an innovative experiment that nearly achieved law in logical form. However, the problem of contextual precision that we came to understand in the twentieth century was not known at the time.

    The purpose of the law is to (negative or inverse) identify and prohibit involuntary operations, and to (positive or obverse) identify and codify voluntary operations.

    Obverse statements determine precision (conditions), that operational analysis can later demonstrate conditions to have exceeded. Such extensions then require new law (new conditions) constructed as Obverse (positive) statements.

    (Much more … but too much of a headache)

  • Sketch on Obverse/Inverse and Positive/Negative as Context/Rule

    (sketch)
    [I] have been working on this idea, and I finally gotten close to expressing it tangibly as measurement.  The examples I give are the golden(positive) vs the silver rule(negative),  property(positive) vs property rights(negative).  And I want to construct a general rule for requiring both positive(contextual precision) and negative(general rule).  Because I feel its necessary to unify the sciences, philosophy morality and law in order to eliminate ‘escape routes’ by various forms of verbalism, that man will try to employ as a means of circumventing the moral constraint of truth-speaking.

    Differences 
    ———-
    IDENTICAL: indistinguishable from one another.
    FUNGIBLE: each unit of a commodity is replaceable other units of the same commodity.
    SUBSTITUTABLE: performs the same utility in the context of a given purpose.

    MARGINALLY INDIFFERENT: insufficiently different to cause a change in state.
    MARGINALLY DIFFERENT: sufficiently different to cause a change in state.
    COMMENSURABLE: measurable by the same standard.
    INCOMMENSURABLE: having no common standard of measurement.

    Propositions
    —————–
    DECIDABLE: A decision can be made without the addition of external information.
    CALCULABLE: An operation can be performed without the addition of external information.
    DEDUCIBLE: A prediction can be made without the need for external information.
    OPERATIONAL: a conclusion can be reached by a series of existentially possible operations.
    STRICTLY OPERATIONAL : the theory is constructible (i)using existentially possible operations, (ii)does not include use of analogy, (iii)does not require inference (deduction), and (iv) survives all argumentative falsification. 
    ORIGINAL INTENTION (CONTEXT / ARBITRARY PRECISION) : in interpreting a text, a court should determine what the authors of the text were trying to achieve, and to give effect to what they intended the statute to accomplish, the actual text of the legislation notwithstanding.

    TEXTUAL / NARROW/ TRUE (Conservative – normative and legislative) vs ALLEGORICAL / WIDE / MEANING(judicial) interpretation.
    In textual/Narrow/True (conservative) legal interpretation, a law is analogous to an operational recipe and changes to the recipe must be enacted by the legislature. In Allegorical / Wide / Meaning (Progressive) interpretation, the judges can invent law if they can justify the extension of the principle of the law into new areas of application not considered by it’s authors. In practice conservative TRUTH and progressive MEANING place the construction of law into the hands of the judiciary rather than the hands of the legislature and people.

    HOLMES’ LIE
    ——————
    The life of the law may have been experience but that is not license for judges to write law at will – it is an admission of the failure of legal theorists to develop propertarianism, and to separate the resolution of disputes according to the law, from the development of contracts (legislative law) on behalf of the citizenry. The separation of functions of government is necessary for the defense of the people against tyranny. Holmes justified tyranny with his deceptive use of rationalism.

    Propertarianism
    ———————
    See Wiki (or legal dictionary) Textualism (the law is only what is written in the text), Originalism(the text must be interpreted as the authors intended it) and Strict Constructionism ( which is weak textualism and is not practiced ).

    In Propertarianism, have attempted to prevent deceptions by requiring law be written to include its precision – original intention – as a preamble for any prohibition, thus requiring both the obverse and inverse propositions, such that when conditions fail (precision is exceeded) then we must revert to strict operationalism to construct new law.

    In history, judges ‘discovered’ law, and asked the people (the legislature) to approve it. This constraint – the request for legislative approval – extends the period of resolution of disputes. (Which I address elsewhere.) But under Propertarian Property rights, it should be possible to construct new precision from first principles – or not. If not, then it is not a matter of law, but a matter of contract. If it is a matter of contractual exchange, then it is a legislative matter, not one for the courts to decide.

    Purpose 
    ———–
    The American constitution was an innovative experiment that nearly achieved law in logical form. However, the problem of contextual precision that we came to understand in the twentieth century was not known at the time.

    The purpose of the law is to (negative or inverse) identify and prohibit involuntary operations, and to (positive or obverse) identify and codify voluntary operations.

    Obverse statements determine precision (conditions), that operational analysis can later demonstrate conditions to have exceeded. Such extensions then require new law (new conditions) constructed as Obverse (positive) statements.

    (Much more … but too much of a headache)