THOUGHTS ON OPERATIONALISM AND FALSIFICATIONISM
Still thinking because I can’t quite grasp ..hmm.. and I think it’s like falsification – that if an argument (a theory) isn’t falsifiable then it isn’t scientific. And that …. well, that something isn’t ‘scientific’ is a non-operational statement – its like saying it’s good or heavenly, but that doesn’t tell us anything. Internal consistency, external correspondence and existential possibility do tell us something.
—“operationalise a concept likes suppression”–
Damn…. finally… I know how to talk about it…. YAY!
Thank you Ayelam Valentine Agaliba. For some reason you always give me the most helpful breadcrumbs…. the only people in this world worth anything in epistemology are CR’s.
I am too under the weather this morning to write something meaningful. But I can now show that the way I am using operationalism is as a further extension of falsificationism for those cases where our sense and perceptions are sufficient for decidability (social sciences). Or I would invert it: that falsification is a lower standard of operationalism for those cases when our sense and perception are insufficient for decidability (the physical universe).
Well that is a good way to start off a day even if it’s a day with a headache…
Source date (UTC): 2014-12-15 02:54:00 UTC
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