Curt Doolittle

Theme: Measurement

  • ***”Internal consistency is insufficient for truth propositions in non axiomatic

    ***”Internal consistency is insufficient for truth propositions in non axiomatic systems without external correspondence to replace those axioms with limits.”***

    That sentence is extremely powerful.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-01-15 03:50:00 UTC

  • Continental -> Postmodern Philosophy -vs- Analytic -> Testimonial Philosophy

    ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY -> POSTMODERN -> TESTIMONIAL PHILOSOPHY [Y]ou see all these damned lists I make? All these definitions I write? How I walk through long sequences of reasoning? How I’m pedantic about what information is present, and what operation alters what information? How I place great burden on your ability to maintain a chain of reasoning, instead of giving you shortcuts that rely upon what we call ‘meaning’ – existing analogies in your memory? This category of philosophy is called ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. Now technically analytic philosophy only requires set comparisons so that statements are internally testable, and non-contradictory. In other words “Does this appear to be true, and from the information stated in the words, can I say this is false?” Analytic philosophy attempts to incorporate scientific knowledge and their goal was to raise philosophy to a science – they failed. But analytic philosophy does not attempt to require basic research into creating sets of data. So analytic philosophy is extremely useful in the analysis and criticism of probabilistic data created in the age of probability and statistics. But it is not in and of itself useful for the solution of problems. There is nothing new therein. But TESTIMONIAL PHILOSOPHY (what I write) additionally more burdensome because it requires I make sequences of testable statements constructed out of operations, taking as few liberties as possible, so that we do not get to ‘fudge’ using ‘fluffy’ or ‘obscurantist’ language. I have categorized myself as an analytic philosopher, since the term post-analytic philosophy refers to postmodern philosophy – lying. But I am settling on Testimonial Philosophy as term that separates Modern Philosophy (‘meaningful’ post-mysticism), continental (rationalisms), analytic (testable statements), postmodern (‘deception’), and Testimonial (scientifically complete using all dimensions of criticism.) Religious philosophy takes very little scientific knowledge – if any. we can say it might even be a detriment. Continental philosophy requires only that we do not rely upon mysticism or the supernatural, only that what we say is meaningful, and possibly useful. It’s a philosophy of analogy and meaning. Post analytic philosophy takes this idea further by replacing the supernatural that was created by the divine, and saying we can create the supernatural by choice and repetition: the social construction of truth. Analytic philosophy attempts to convert philosophy into a science in the hope that we can something about the world from our statements and words. But while we can test for falsehood with analytic language, we cannot divine from our words what we do not already know when we make use of them. Testimonial philosophy attempts to unite all disciplines into a single language constructed only out of truthful statements that have survived criticism by all dimensions. Truth is what survives total criticism whether we desire it or not. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Continental -> Postmodern Philosophy -vs- Analytic -> Testimonial Philosophy

    ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY -> POSTMODERN -> TESTIMONIAL PHILOSOPHY [Y]ou see all these damned lists I make? All these definitions I write? How I walk through long sequences of reasoning? How I’m pedantic about what information is present, and what operation alters what information? How I place great burden on your ability to maintain a chain of reasoning, instead of giving you shortcuts that rely upon what we call ‘meaning’ – existing analogies in your memory? This category of philosophy is called ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. Now technically analytic philosophy only requires set comparisons so that statements are internally testable, and non-contradictory. In other words “Does this appear to be true, and from the information stated in the words, can I say this is false?” Analytic philosophy attempts to incorporate scientific knowledge and their goal was to raise philosophy to a science – they failed. But analytic philosophy does not attempt to require basic research into creating sets of data. So analytic philosophy is extremely useful in the analysis and criticism of probabilistic data created in the age of probability and statistics. But it is not in and of itself useful for the solution of problems. There is nothing new therein. But TESTIMONIAL PHILOSOPHY (what I write) additionally more burdensome because it requires I make sequences of testable statements constructed out of operations, taking as few liberties as possible, so that we do not get to ‘fudge’ using ‘fluffy’ or ‘obscurantist’ language. I have categorized myself as an analytic philosopher, since the term post-analytic philosophy refers to postmodern philosophy – lying. But I am settling on Testimonial Philosophy as term that separates Modern Philosophy (‘meaningful’ post-mysticism), continental (rationalisms), analytic (testable statements), postmodern (‘deception’), and Testimonial (scientifically complete using all dimensions of criticism.) Religious philosophy takes very little scientific knowledge – if any. we can say it might even be a detriment. Continental philosophy requires only that we do not rely upon mysticism or the supernatural, only that what we say is meaningful, and possibly useful. It’s a philosophy of analogy and meaning. Post analytic philosophy takes this idea further by replacing the supernatural that was created by the divine, and saying we can create the supernatural by choice and repetition: the social construction of truth. Analytic philosophy attempts to convert philosophy into a science in the hope that we can something about the world from our statements and words. But while we can test for falsehood with analytic language, we cannot divine from our words what we do not already know when we make use of them. Testimonial philosophy attempts to unite all disciplines into a single language constructed only out of truthful statements that have survived criticism by all dimensions. Truth is what survives total criticism whether we desire it or not. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY -> POSTMODERN -> TESTIMONIAL PHILOSOPHY You see all these da

    ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY -> POSTMODERN -> TESTIMONIAL PHILOSOPHY

    You see all these damned lists I make? All these definitions I write? How I walk through long sequences of reasoning? How I’m pedantic about what information is present, and what operation alters what information? How I place great burden on your ability to maintain a chain of reasoning, instead of giving you shortcuts that rely upon what we call ‘meaning’ – existing analogies in your memory?

    This category of philosophy is called ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. Now technically analytic philosophy only requires set comparisons so that statements are internally testable, and non-contradictory. In other words “Does this appear to be true, and from the information stated in the words, can I say this is false?” Analytic philosophy attempts to incorporate scientific knowledge and their goal was to raise philosophy to a science – they failed. But analytic philosophy does not attempt to require basic research into creating sets of data.

    So analytic philosophy is extremely useful in the analysis and criticism of probabilistic data created in the age of probability and statistics. But it is not in and of itself useful for the solution of problems. There is nothing new therein.

    But TESTIMONIAL PHILOSOPHY (what I write) additionally more burdensome because it requires I make sequences of testable statements constructed out of operations, taking as few liberties as possible, so that we do not get to ‘fudge’ using ‘fluffy’ or ‘obscurantist’ language.

    I have categorized myself as an analytic philosopher, since the term post-analytic philosophy refers to postmodern philosophy – lying.

    But I am settling on Testimonial Philosophy as term that separates Modern Philosophy (‘meaningful’ post-mysticism), continental (rationalisms), analytic (testable statements), postmodern (‘deception’), and Testimonial (scientifically complete using all dimensions of criticism.)

    Religious philosophy takes very little scientific knowledge – if any. we can say it might even be a detriment.

    Continental philosophy requires only that we do not rely upon mysticism or the supernatural, only that what we say is meaningful, and possibly useful. It’s a philosophy of analogy and meaning.

    Post analytic philosophy takes this idea further by replacing the supernatural that was created by the divine, and saying we can create the supernatural by choice and repetition: the social construction of truth.

    Analytic philosophy attempts to convert philosophy into a science in the hope that we can something about the world from our statements and words. But while we can test for falsehood with analytic language, we cannot divine from our words what we do not already know when we make use of them.

    Testimonial philosophy attempts to unite all disciplines into a single language constructed only out of truthful statements that have survived criticism by all dimensions.

    Truth is what survives total criticism whether we desire it or not.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2016-01-14 06:45:00 UTC

  • WHAT CONSTITUTES A FACT? OUTING AMATEURS AS FREE RIDERS

    —-“As if Jim could answer that without first RECOGNIZING the FACT of your question.”—-

    [T]his is an interesting example, so lets use it. You observe the text, determine the question, can make sense of it, and therefore determine it exists. This is a very simple statement. But the reason it is a fact is that you cannot find evidence that it does not exist, or is not comprehensible as a question. Observation -> “recognition” -> free association -> hypothesis -> test -> theory -> test -> Law This sequence (popper’s problem->theory->test cycle) is what our brains do. It’s inescapable. So you can indeed recognize what you believe is a fact. Yes. We construct facts by testing the results of our observations against the possibility of falsehood. You use the term ‘recognizing’ which means ‘correspondence’. But correspondence must survive criticism. Ergo a fact is the result of survival from criticism. Now, this is what scientists do, and this is the meaning of fact in philosophy and science. If you want to use analogies and non operational arguments to justify your usage, then as long as I an translate your colloquialism into truthful statements I can attest that you MEAN the truth mean and intend to convey the truth even if you lack the ability (skill) to speak truthfully (scientifically). Now if you move from reductio examples to the court of disputes how often are people’s observations and subsequent testimony true? Well, we know from both a vast body of experiments, and the change in testimony after the invention of photography, and then video, that our ‘recognition’ is plagued with falsehood. So there is a big difference between recognition (an hypothesis), and a fact (a theory) because that difference There is a minor difference between a fact (theory of a description of an observation) and a theory (a description of a general rule that explains many observations). But the epistemological process is identical. We observe, identify (recognize and therefore hypothesize), test (criticize and produce theory), and repeat this process over and over again. (See “On Intelligence” by Jeff Hawkins for accessible research, and explanatory model of synthesis in layers of the cortex). This distinction is important because it is not the identity(recognition) that converts an observation to a fact, but the criticism (survival) of the observation that converts it to a fact. This is why we engage in a distribution of labor in research because we are so bad at testing observations and constructing theories that we need our own judgements tested – IF WE SEEK TRUTH. Now, the crux of YOUR argument is that one only needs sufficient confidence in correspondence with reality in order to act, and that is because one (often) bears the cost of one’s (frequent) error. It is when our actions affect any polity or group that the externalities of our errors ask us to judge not our own confidence in our observations and testing, but wether others will retaliate (at worst), ignore (as usual), or reward with opportunities of cooperation (at best) the externalities caused by our actions. So the sufficiency of our judgements in what we determine action is dependent upon the externalities produced by those judgements. What most libertines attempt to do is tell others that they do not wish to account for externalities produced by our actions, and that others ‘should tolerate’ the externalities produced by our actions. When people demonstrably do not do that. They retaliate against any and all imposition of costs on their potentials (inventory of property en toto), and if one is not contributing to them by compensatory means they will not tolerate it. So this is why the NAP/IVP is insufficient for rational action. It is insufficient for the prevention of retaliation, and the boycott of opportunity from others. And in fact it is not only insufficient but it is an attempt to justify parasitic actions caused by the externalization of costs, and justify the non contribution to the commons despite the fact that any general rule of behavior must be adopted as a common contract by consent and therefore exists as a commons. One does not choose the incentives of others. They merely exist as surely as the earth itself. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine.

  • WHAT CONSTITUTES A FACT? OUTING AMATEURS AS FREE RIDERS

    —-“As if Jim could answer that without first RECOGNIZING the FACT of your question.”—-

    [T]his is an interesting example, so lets use it. You observe the text, determine the question, can make sense of it, and therefore determine it exists. This is a very simple statement. But the reason it is a fact is that you cannot find evidence that it does not exist, or is not comprehensible as a question. Observation -> “recognition” -> free association -> hypothesis -> test -> theory -> test -> Law This sequence (popper’s problem->theory->test cycle) is what our brains do. It’s inescapable. So you can indeed recognize what you believe is a fact. Yes. We construct facts by testing the results of our observations against the possibility of falsehood. You use the term ‘recognizing’ which means ‘correspondence’. But correspondence must survive criticism. Ergo a fact is the result of survival from criticism. Now, this is what scientists do, and this is the meaning of fact in philosophy and science. If you want to use analogies and non operational arguments to justify your usage, then as long as I an translate your colloquialism into truthful statements I can attest that you MEAN the truth mean and intend to convey the truth even if you lack the ability (skill) to speak truthfully (scientifically). Now if you move from reductio examples to the court of disputes how often are people’s observations and subsequent testimony true? Well, we know from both a vast body of experiments, and the change in testimony after the invention of photography, and then video, that our ‘recognition’ is plagued with falsehood. So there is a big difference between recognition (an hypothesis), and a fact (a theory) because that difference There is a minor difference between a fact (theory of a description of an observation) and a theory (a description of a general rule that explains many observations). But the epistemological process is identical. We observe, identify (recognize and therefore hypothesize), test (criticize and produce theory), and repeat this process over and over again. (See “On Intelligence” by Jeff Hawkins for accessible research, and explanatory model of synthesis in layers of the cortex). This distinction is important because it is not the identity(recognition) that converts an observation to a fact, but the criticism (survival) of the observation that converts it to a fact. This is why we engage in a distribution of labor in research because we are so bad at testing observations and constructing theories that we need our own judgements tested – IF WE SEEK TRUTH. Now, the crux of YOUR argument is that one only needs sufficient confidence in correspondence with reality in order to act, and that is because one (often) bears the cost of one’s (frequent) error. It is when our actions affect any polity or group that the externalities of our errors ask us to judge not our own confidence in our observations and testing, but wether others will retaliate (at worst), ignore (as usual), or reward with opportunities of cooperation (at best) the externalities caused by our actions. So the sufficiency of our judgements in what we determine action is dependent upon the externalities produced by those judgements. What most libertines attempt to do is tell others that they do not wish to account for externalities produced by our actions, and that others ‘should tolerate’ the externalities produced by our actions. When people demonstrably do not do that. They retaliate against any and all imposition of costs on their potentials (inventory of property en toto), and if one is not contributing to them by compensatory means they will not tolerate it. So this is why the NAP/IVP is insufficient for rational action. It is insufficient for the prevention of retaliation, and the boycott of opportunity from others. And in fact it is not only insufficient but it is an attempt to justify parasitic actions caused by the externalization of costs, and justify the non contribution to the commons despite the fact that any general rule of behavior must be adopted as a common contract by consent and therefore exists as a commons. One does not choose the incentives of others. They merely exist as surely as the earth itself. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine.

  • Very Short Introduction to the Epistemology of Testimonialism

    [B]RIEF DISCUSSION OF THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONIALISM 1) All non-tautological statements are incomplete, and as such no non-trivial premises are complete. Therefore all statements consist of nothing more than theoretical promises contingent upon their survival of criticism. 2) We can systematically criticize each dimension of every statement for identity, internal consistency, existential possibility, external correspondence, morality, full accounting, limits and parsimony. 3) If the statement survives this (admittedly expensive) criticism, then it remains a truth candidate that we can take risks with or not as our judgement sees fit. 4) Instead of justification providing legitimacy or support, provides a discount on later warranties, not an increase in truth content. Note: This last statement kind of threw me because I wasn’t expecting to come to that kind of conclusion. So while I wish I was done with this topic, it still behooves me to work on this problem. I still move it forward a bit at a time. The further I move it the less questions are left open and the more survivable the theory is from refutation. The hardest problem of all is parsimony, and as far as I know the only way to achieve this is through publication and social criticism. Thanks for following me on the journey.

  • FAITH IN PRIORS IS NOT RATIONAL ITS INSTINCTUAL —“The problem with this moral

    FAITH IN PRIORS IS NOT RATIONAL ITS INSTINCTUAL

    —“The problem with this moral and immoral discourse is the following: I act merely as someone defending the non-aggression principle which I, to use a colloquialism, regard as sacrosanct.”—

    So you mean then that you are arguing from faith? Is that what you’re basing your definition of morality upon?

    Well the problem with the half-truth of non aggression, is that one must aggress against something.

    By referring to the NonAggression Principle RATHER than stating a complete sentence, “I will define the category ‘moral’ as those actions in which one does not aggress against …[something or other]…” since the verb (aggress) lacks a noun (subject) and is therefore dependent upon substitution (suggestion) and therefore an appeal to introspection (deception).

    So you argue from this position that you have faith in an incomplete sentence that is structured precisely to avoid the necessity of defining the subject. In other words like ‘god is great’, NAP is a self referencing fallacy.

    Perhaps it does not occur to you that all debate in the different wings of libertinism are reducible to the same problem: the scope of that which we aggress against (initiate imposition of costs upon). Without this definition what libertinism’s NAP must and can only refer to, is that which is suppled by introspection by the listener and speaker.

    And while you can cast at me the accusation of sophism, it is somewhat ironic that one would fail to grasp that his entire moral basis is predicated upon a rather simplistic verbal sophism: a half truth that relies upon subjective substitution for agreement. But when articulated as it is by the various wings of libertinism, is no longer decidable.

    If you can grasp this – that you have been duped, and a useful idiot – then you will be on the journey OUT OF SOPHISM into truthfulness.

    You may not understand it right away but this argument ends rothbardian ethics and the NAP forever.

    Hoppe tries to rescue it with NAP IVP: Intersubjectively Verifiable Property. Meaning physical property. Yet IVP is insufficient to suppress retaliation, reduce transaction costs, and eliminate demand for authoritarian intervention on the basis of decidability.

    (That is the beauty of the lie of NAP: it leaves individual decidability but not intersubjective decidability, meaning that it is not logically possible to resolve disputes logically. It requires discretion (arbitrariness) and therefore authority not rule of law. )

    I repair this problem of undecidability by using property en toto, or demonstrated property: that which people retaliate against the imposition of costs upon, and therefore that which is sufficient for the elimination of discretion, and therefore elimination of authority and demand for the state.

    By consequence this definition of Non aggression against Property-en-toto defines the scope of that which we must reciprocally insure one another such that there is no demand for authority and such that we can rely entirely upon rule of law.

    I know it is hard for you to give up on a bad investment, but you’ve made a bad investment. You were played – just like Socialists and NeoCons.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-01-08 10:57:00 UTC

  • ***Why would you think you can rely on the objective morality of an action using

    ***Why would you think you can rely on the objective morality of an action using introspection rather than empirical measurement, any more than you can rely on the objective measurement of anything else by introspection rather than empirical measurement?***

    Seriously. In the future people won’t.

    Propertarianism and Testimonialism = “Radical Empiricism” in some people’s terms, but as far as I know it consists of ‘complete empiricism’ and every discipline that we call science before now consists of ‘incomplete empiricism’.

    There are only so many existentially possible dimensions to test.

    If we test them all then we have created complete empiricism.

    We stopped people from many forms of introspective reliance.

    The next step in our conceptual evolution is stopping people from introspective reliance on moral questions.

    Which is pretty cool really. Humbling. Terribly humbling. But cool.

    Source date (UTC): 2016-01-08 07:53:00 UTC

  • What is the Difference Between Information and Statement

    [I]’m working through Kripke again because I know it’s a half truth and I can’t quite put my finger on what’s missing. I know what is wrong with analytic philosophy (sets): their construction destroys information, causation, and operational construction, and therefore existential possibility. I know what’s right with information analysis: marginal difference (cause of change in state). So analytic philosophy is a sort of dead end in the sense that language is always informationally incomplete. But his understanding of names is correct. Even if his examples are not (the referent Aristotle isn’t identical to the referent Aristotle if he dies at age two and never creates the set of properties Aristotle). We cannot construct the references to the two year old without the reference to the man Aristotle. Therefore operationally, the example cannot exist. I can refer to Aristotle at the age of two, but I cannot refer to a greek two year old with the name of Aristotle. and convey any meaning without the existence of the aforementioned Aristotle as an accomplished adult. Meaning does not tell us much about truth – if anything. And the verbalists (analyticals and rationalists) are working with too little information to achieve much. Existence tells us a great deal about truth. Even if other methods tell us a lot about meaning. But even where they tell us about meaning, they tell us nothing about truth. And I think this is the area of confusion, because of hermeneutic conflation. We see this coming out of judaism and christianity and into law, where it did not previously exist. But this conflation of truth and meaning has imposed a catastrophically damaging influence on western thought. And in both the ancient(agrarian), modern(industrial), and current (information) eras, it has constituted a revolt against truth and the undesirability of truth for the parasitic and unproductive classes, peoples, and cultures. Meaning is dependent upon the content of one’s mind, and analogy to experience, but has little to no dependence upon truth content. Truth is dependent upon reality that is independent of the content and mechanism of of one’s mind – even if it is dependent upon the reduction to analogy to experience so that the mind can grasp it. But meaning is required as part of the process of free association. It is useful in obtaining information (hypotheses) that we may pursue and turn into truth candidates. It is useful in the transfer of experiences whether or not those experiences contain truth content. We must construct hypotheses out of concepts we can grasp, and we can only grasp concepts reducible to analogies to experience. So we must accumulate analogies to experience in sufficient number that we are able to run tests for possibility. This is one of the reasons for the value of scientific thinking (theories of general rules) since they reduce the informational content we must process in order to identify patterns and test perceptions and information against them. My hope (my suspicion) is that truthfulness once practiced like any other set of general rules will have an equally influential impact on human demonstrated intelligence and cooperation as has science. My concern is that we have passed peak human and are damaging our gene pool, and that we must reverse our century and a half of dysgenia before the accumulated damage is not correctable through assortative mating. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Lviv Ukraine