Theme: Institution

  • We have series 7 for investment. We have the md for medicine. We have the rn for

    We have series 7 for investment.

    We have the md for medicine.

    We have the rn for medicine

    We have the bar for law.

    We have the cpa for accounting

    Why not an equivalent for lending?

    Why not an equivalent for handling money in any capacity (all employees)?

    Why not the same for speech-for-fee? (journalism)

    The academy makes no warranty.

    The Libertarian solution is private insurance.

    But losing your ticket is insurance enough. Insurance creates perverse incentives also.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-07 10:57:00 UTC

  • Current Western Institutional Trends explained

    [P]rivatization of commons in Western Europe and North America since the 1980s is but a reaction to a rapidly growing heterogeneous society; and a move by those who have*, to prohibit those who can’t**, from fraudulently obtaining rents.

    Similarly, creating compliance processes is making what used to be unnecessary to formulate and to structure, and implicit – knowledge of, and compliance with, core business-affecting legal procedures – explicit, so that the workforce created by heterogenification can either understand it, or be deprived of excuses in case they don’t.

    <div class=”_5wd4 _1nc6 direction_ltr _5yt9″ title=”13:20″ data-reactid=”.3d.$“>

    <div class=” _5wd9″=”” _5wde”=”” _5w1r=”” _5wdf=”” _3okg”=”” _d97″=”” _5yl5″=”” .3d.$Creation of regulation as a means to mitigate lost norms.

    * property, status, class
    ** obtain property, status, class

  • Current Western Institutional Trends explained

    [P]rivatization of commons in Western Europe and North America since the 1980s is but a reaction to a rapidly growing heterogeneous society; and a move by those who have*, to prohibit those who can’t**, from fraudulently obtaining rents.

    Similarly, creating compliance processes is making what used to be unnecessary to formulate and to structure, and implicit – knowledge of, and compliance with, core business-affecting legal procedures – explicit, so that the workforce created by heterogenification can either understand it, or be deprived of excuses in case they don’t.

    <div class=”_5wd4 _1nc6 direction_ltr _5yt9″ title=”13:20″ data-reactid=”.3d.$“>

    <div class=” _5wd9″=”” _5wde”=”” _5w1r=”” _5wdf=”” _3okg”=”” _d97″=”” _5yl5″=”” .3d.$Creation of regulation as a means to mitigate lost norms.

    * property, status, class
    ** obtain property, status, class

  • Murray, like most conservatives, is studying, and conveying observations about o

    http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2015/06/charles_murray_5.htmlScott,

    Murray, like most conservatives, is studying, and conveying observations about our change in NORMATIVE capital, not income or consumption.

    Deviation from northern european traditional norms is a luxury good ( the absolute nuclear family, delayed marriage, delayed reproduction, high investment parenting, the manorial/protestant work ethic, hight trust from homogeneity, truth-telling/testimony ).

    RELATING YOUR POST TO ROMER’S ‘MATHINESS’

    (a)While you haven’t read the book, the fact that you, who are one of our very best (IMHO), immediately assume the mainstream bias that income (an easily visible measure) is somehow meaningful rather than merely a justification of priors – and it provides a more valuable insight into the ‘mathiness’ of mainstream economics, than murray’s book does about the destruction of the family as the central unit of inter-temporal reproduction and temporal production that was in no small part, caused by that mainstream bias and ‘mathiness’.

    (b) No economic hypothesis can be ‘true’ in the sense that it is descriptively complete, and therefore free of error, bias, and deception, if we fail to account for the full spectrum of costs in the full spectrum of time frames. That is after all, the only measure of costs: opportunity costs. So solving for income or consumption demonstrates a selection bias, under the assumption that all negative externalities are less ‘bad’ than the ‘good’ produced by observable increases in income and consumption.

    In other words, if we stack all possible forms of capital by the length of the production cycle and it’s corresponding consumption or decay, then what is the net change?

    The conservative mind is biased to the long term, to saving, to risk, and to disgust. It is a reproductive strategy – a very masculine one perhaps – and the absolute nuclear family is central to it. And it was a very expensive reproductive strategy to develop – which is why was unique.

    He does not make the leap (not being an economist) to the extremely damaging suggestion that we move people to capital (a heavy industrial era bias) and it’s destruction of the family and its impact upon norms, instead of moving capital to people (a post-heaving-industrial economy) in order to preserve and expand normative capital.

    America’s dirty secret is that pervasive consumption is an insufficient reward for loneliness and isolation. Americans are heavily drug dependent for the sole reason that they are the most lonely and isolated peoples on earth, for whom the media is a poor substitute for friends and family. The absolute nuclear family is necessary, perhaps, but it can only persist within a civic society. The civic society is a product of the absolute nuclear family. It cannot exist otherwise.

    So what is the cost of the destruction of the family in pursuit of income and consumption?

    What will be the cost of 40% of american women on anti-depressants?

    Mathiness is most visible in the selection bias demonstrated by measuring temporally differential income rather than inter-temporarily differential consumption. But that is not the most important effect of quantitative pseudoscience: it is the destruction of long term capital in favor of short term consumption and the placement of faith in technology to rescue us from the consequences of it.

    So, it is not so trivial a question as you suppose.

    It’s an illustration of everything that is wrong with modern macro’s mathniess.

    It’s not the use of math. It’s measuring in favor of bias.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-07 04:50:00 UTC

  • NOMOCRATIC INSTUTUTIONS The People : A partnership of reciprocal insurance inclu

    NOMOCRATIC INSTUTUTIONS

    The People : A partnership of reciprocal insurance including every living soul in the polity.

    The Militia : Defense and Emergency Services

    The Military : Defense, Strategy, Offense.

    The Judiciary : The Common Organic Law

    The Houses of the Commons : Production of Commons

    The Treasury (The corporation that manages shares of stock as money)

    The Academy : Education

    The Monarchy : A family whose head has veto over the houses of the Commons.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-07 04:41:00 UTC

  • UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA It is hard for westerners subject to multiple competing ide

    UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA

    It is hard for westerners subject to multiple competing ideological frameworks while at the same time, protected by rule of law, in a high trust culture, where people largely tell the truth, to imagine how primitive, superstitious, pseudoscientific, paranoid, conspiratorial, the Russian mind is.

    They live in a world of lies. In their world of lies they are rational actors.

    They exist without the cultural luxuries we take for granted as human nature. They are anything but natural.

    But it should be a lesson to us that the media frames opinion. It does not measure it.

    ——


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-05 10:47:00 UTC

  • on Livy: III.16-18 by Coyle Neal III.16–18 In a sentiment that would later be ec

    http://wordpress.com/Discourses on Livy: III.16-18

    by Coyle Neal

    III.16–18

    In a sentiment that would later be echoed by Viscount James Bryce, the great observer of American politics, Machiavelli notes that

    It has always been, and will always be, that great and rare men are neglected in a republic in peaceful times. (III.16.1)

    Why is it, Viscount Bryce would ask four centuries later, that great men are not elected president? One reason Bryce gives is that they are simply not needed when things are going well. Machiavelli puts a darker spin on it: it’s not just that great men are neglected in times of peace and prosperity, they are actively disdained:

    For through the envy that the reputation their virtue has given them has brought with it, one finds very many citizens in such times who wish to be not their equals but their superiors. (III.16.1)

    It would be one thing if we merely ignored the virtuous when things were going well, but in a republic we actively do our best to tear them down to our level and even raise ourselves above them. (Here, Tocqueville rather than Bryce becomes Machiavelli’s echo.)

    Such is doubly damaging to a republic, first because of the injustice itself of ignoring great men’s advice—Machiavelli barely mentions this in passing, pointing to Thucydides and the famous debates between Nicias and Alcibiades over the Sicilian expedition as evidence. Greater damage, however, is done through the twofold effect this injustice has on those virtuous men:

    …in republics there is the disorder of giving little esteem to worthy men in quiet times. That thing makes them indignant in two modes: one, to see themselves lacking their rank; the other, to see unworthy men of less substance than they made partners and superiors to themselves. (III.16.2)

    At best this is, as already said, unjust; at worst it leads to conspiracy and revolution as the disgruntled great men become increasingly unhappy with their lot in life. And if at this point Machiavelli is beginning to sound a bit like Ayn Rand, his solution is certainly not for the capable to petulantly withdraw from society into self-indulgent isolation. Instead, Machiavelli says there are two options:

    Thinking over what could be the remedies, I find two of them: one, to maintain the citizens poor so that they cannot corrupt either themselves or others with riches and without virtue; the other, to be ordered for war so that one can always make war and always has need of reputed citizens. (III.16.2)

    In the first “remedy” to the problem facing republics, Machiavelli is simply arguing that an impoverished citizen body has bigger worries than fretting over its social standing relative to the virtuous and capable in society. A point with which few could reasonably disagree.

    I think the second remedy is much more interesting, as it draws on a longstanding interpretation of Roman history applied by the Romans themselves. Both the pagan historian Sallust and the Christian theologian Augustine argued that Rome began its slide away from whatever original virtue it had into decadence and, eventually, tyranny only when it defeated its last military enemy and had nothing left forcing it to be good. It seems to be generally agreed that hard times build national character, however little we actually want to face those hard times if given the choice. Machiavelli’s suggestion that a state ought to intentionally cultivate virtue by being perpetually at war strikes us as abhorrent, of course, even as we can recognize the reasoning behind it.

    (As a side note: this very problem becomes a theme in mid-twentieth century science fiction. How can we have a generation that matches the virtue of the World War II generation without replicating the Great Depression and World War II itself? How can such character be built without throwing the whole nation back into such desperate circumstances? Various answers are given in the works of Frank Herbert, Robert Heinlein, Orson Scott Card, and Cordwainer Smith, among others.)

    If a state decides to reconsider its capital punishment laws, the recently released prisoner who had wrongly been sitting on death row for the last two decades should probably not be put in charge of the reforms. At least, that’s Machiavelli’s advice:

    A republic ought to consider very much not putting someone over any important administration to whom any notable injury has been done by another. (III.17.1)

    While Machiavelli’s example of a general who decides he will either win glory or see himself revenged in the defeat of the state is probably a more extreme condition than most republics will regularly find themselves in, he still makes a good point. Before giving someone authority or high office, we should be sure that they have no secret agendas that involve revenge on their enemies and that they are not driven by bitterness against a system that has failed them. Machiavelli notes that this is a serious danger even in a strong and virtuous state, to say nothing of republics in decline. This leads him to the somewhat tangential conclusion (which is still clearly an important point, even if oddly placed in the discourse) that

    Because one cannot give a certain remedy for such disorders that arise in republics, it follows that it is impossible to order a perpetual republic, because its ruin is caused through a thousand unexpected ways. (III.17.1)

    Why it is that this particular unfixable danger leads to the conclusion that there can never be an eternal republic isn’t clear. Machiavelli has commented on many such dangers up until now, and he does not especially distinguish this one beyond saying it is a danger to strong and weak republics alike. In any case, it is worth noting that for Machiavelli there should be no hope of establishing a Hobbsean “mortal god” (more on that in a few months) which will survive whatever contingencies the world may throw at it. Our expectations for our republic should be kept reasonable, historical, and limited.

    The very greatest leaders are those who can correctly predict and interpret the actions and motives of the enemy. Machiavelli’s examples all involve the battlefield, but clearly there is application to every aspect of political life.

    Because such knowledge is difficult, he who employs himself so as to make conjectures about them deserves so much the more praise. (III.18.1)

    Careful consideration of the enemy and a correct understanding of his actions can mean the difference between victory and defeat. This is the beginning of a discussion on leadership that we will take up in the next post.

    Coyle Neal is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Southwest Baptist University in Bolivar, Missouri.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-02 05:08:00 UTC

  • IBM AND APPLE ARE GOING TO HAVE THE LAST LAUGH And if they don’t, it’s Apple’s m

    IBM AND APPLE ARE GOING TO HAVE THE LAST LAUGH

    And if they don’t, it’s Apple’s management team’s problem.

    Because it’s so damned obvious.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-01 02:11:00 UTC

  • Companies Train Real Employees

    http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/business/international/in-europe-fake-jobs-can-have-real-benefits.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&bicmp=AD&bicmlukp=WT.mc_id&bicmst=1409232722000&bicmet=1419773522000&_r=0Fake Companies Train Real Employees


    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-30 23:46:00 UTC

  • Why not a war on corporations: The corporate state vs the nation state The redis

    Why not a war on corporations:

    The corporate state vs the nation state

    The redistributive state vs the family

    The corporate commercial entity vs partnerships

    Why isn’t progressivism just a war on good families by bad families?

    Isn’t progressivism just a war on aristocracy?


    Source date (UTC): 2015-05-24 03:59:00 UTC