Theme: Institution

  • The Institutions of Nomocracy (Rule of Law)

    [I]nstitutions:
    The People : A partnership of reciprocal insurance including every living soul in the polity.
    The Militia : Defense and Emergency Services
    The Military : Defense, Strategy, Offense.
    The Judiciary : The Common Organic Law
    The Houses of the Commons : Production of Commons
    The Treasury (The corporation that manages shares of stock as money)
    The Academy : Education
    The Monarchy : A family whose head has veto over the houses of the Commons.

    Source: Curt Doolittle

  • The Institutions of Nomocracy (Rule of Law)

    [I]nstitutions:
    The People : A partnership of reciprocal insurance including every living soul in the polity.
    The Militia : Defense and Emergency Services
    The Military : Defense, Strategy, Offense.
    The Judiciary : The Common Organic Law
    The Houses of the Commons : Production of Commons
    The Treasury (The corporation that manages shares of stock as money)
    The Academy : Education
    The Monarchy : A family whose head has veto over the houses of the Commons.

    Source: Curt Doolittle

  • “A Month Of Quotes on Corporatism By Tom Reeves”

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2015/06/13/corporations-were-like-limited-monopolies-ip-and-like-letters-of-marque-limited-duration-contracts-in-the-public-interest/FYI: “A Month Of Quotes on Corporatism By Tom Reeves”


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-13 04:24:00 UTC

  • EVERY WORD : Tom Reeves on the origins of corporations and the malincentives tha

    http://tomwoods.com/podcast/ep-325-are-corporations-un-libertarian/READ EVERY WORD : Tom Reeves on the origins of corporations and the malincentives that led to crony capitalism.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-12 07:52:00 UTC

  • “…how corporations came about — they were all one-off, special purpose and lim

    —“…how corporations came about — they were all one-off, special purpose and limited-duration monopolies created in the public interest, not charters that the government let you file that were just like limited partnership agreements.”— Tom Reeves

    The same is true for ip.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-12 07:46:00 UTC

  • QUESTION CONCERNING ABUSES BY REPRESENTATIVES —Question for Curt, would be phi

    http://romaninukraine.com/curt-understanding-russia/A QUESTION CONCERNING ABUSES BY REPRESENTATIVES

    —Question for Curt, would be philosopher:

    How does property rights fit into mixed economies, corporatism and cronyism?

    If a corporation has property rights is that for eternity?

    Who decides?— Beauregard.

    Beauregard,

    I’m going to try to guess at what “fit in” means. I think you mean, “How do we reconcile the apparent conflicts between the logical ideal of property rights theory, and the existential reality of mixed economies, pervasive corporatism, and cronyism?”

    The problem I’m having is that I”m not really sure what you’re asking. So I’ll stab in the dark trying to reconcile as best I can.

    Mixed economies are as simple as corporations with shareholders who receive dividends on their investments – whether those investments are in sweat equity (observing norms), acting in an employee capacity(participating in the market of production distribution and trade), or whether one is an investor (taxpayer). There is no difference between a mixed economy and a corporation. It’s an organization where different interests combine different resources, to produce, distribute, and trade.

    Corporatism exists because the state wanted to give capital a free ride, and took upon policing corporations in the legislature by removing universal standing under the common law. This is a problem of representative democracy. The answer is to revoke the corporate privilege, restore universal standing, and eliminate shareholder voting which is meaningless. (This takes a lot of explanation but I know how to address it.)

    Cronyism exists because of the combination of representative government policing corporations by rather than citizen policing under universal standing. And because funding choices (monetary, fiscal trade, and industrial policy) are made by representatives rather than held at auction, using modern technology.

    As for corporate rights, I don’t know what you’re referring to. But if the current shareholders of a corporation purchased rights to their shares, and therefore to a share of some property or other, or that organization persists as a functional organizational entity then it is hard to see how those rights should terminate. But you could be referring to some strange exception like intellectual property rights or something, and I might not really be able to guess your question.

    All of these problems arise because of three simple problems.

    First, a technological problem of the pre-industrial era where time and the speed of communications were problematic. We are not challenged by these problems any longer.

    Second, by the conflation of law-making (the judiciary) with commons-creation (the government), into a law-making-body called the legislature. Instead, if the government could not make law, only contract enforcible under law, and so the legislature can only produce contracts and not laws, and contracts all expire with the people who wrote them, then there is a time limit on all relations between the public (commons) and the private sector, and laws cannot be constructed to favor corporations for the benefit of politicians.

    Third, there is no reason whatsoever for majority rule. Monopoly government is pointless. Law must be decidable, so the law must exist as a monopoly definition of property and rights. However, the construction of contracts under that law, for the production of commons, do not need universal approval. They need only prevent imposition of costs on non-participants under the rule of law which protects non-participants property rights from exactly those kinds of attacks.

    So as far as I know, all of the questions you’re asking are entirely compatible with property rights theory (or at least by Propertarianism), and in fact, they are only confusing in the absence of property rights theory.

    There are some interesting human cognitive biases in play in the populace but that’s another story for another time..

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-10 09:05:00 UTC

  • PROPERTY PROVISIONS Bruce, Another great piece for nomocracyinpolitics. Excuse m

    http://nomocracyinpolitics.com/2015/06/10/when-does-copyright-become-wrong-by-bruce-frohnen/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS

    Bruce,

    Another great piece for nomocracyinpolitics.

    Excuse me in advance for the language of my analytic philosophy. That said, I tend to describe the grant of limited monopoly license under similar criteria to which we grant the license to property: “Transitus(transit), Usus(use), Fructus (fruits of), Mancipio(transfer), and Abusus(consumption)”.

    We can grant different rights to property. We can grant different rights to the market as well.

    In intellectual property I use: Innovatio(invention), Investimus(investment), Moralis(morality- necessary for preservation of cooperation and prevention of retaliation for free riding) . We can grant these three rights as long as we maintain the corresponding requirements – of which time is actually a poor measure.

    1) ‘INNOVATIO’ : The practical utility of creating a lottery effect as a means of encouraging innovation.

    – In which case, one must maintain a product in production in order to maintain the original intent. In other words, there can be no patent protection per se, merely a patent serves as prohibition on competition for the resulting products and services.

    2) ‘INVESTIGATIO’ : The practical utility of creating a limited monopoly as a means of funding off-book research and development for goods not possible for the market to produce otherwise at current incentives. This is probably a much better solution to basic research than is the grant system.

    – In which case it is possible to set a limited return on the limited monopoly – not just in time but also in income.

    3) ‘MORALIS’ : The moral prohibition on free riding*, and a requirement for production in order to participate in the commons (market).

    – In which case the prohibition must be limited to profiting in the broadest sense, not to personal copying, for personal use. (Creative Commons for example).

    *The prohibition on free riding (imposition of costs) that we evolved to prevent ‘cheating’ in parallel to our evolution of cooperation might require some explaining. We retaliate, at cost, against the imposition cost, whether it be obvious violence theft and fraud, less obvious free riding, or imperceptible violation of moral norms.

    REPAIRING EXTERNALITIES

    Now, some side effects are perverse and obvious:

    (a) patent trolls (our friends in Seattle for example)

    (b) patents as total market prohibitions. (the rubber tires example)

    (c) lawsuits the content of which we cannot construct juries capable of adjudicating. (Samsung and Apple for example).

    (d) the need to defend patents even if you don’t want to in order to prevent reverse-prohibitions.

    (e) The absurd costs of researching and filing and defending them.

    (f) The result that it’s not the patent that secures your invention, but the financial ability to wage a lawsuit at high risk.

    But some externalities are less obvious:

    (a) How would plot lines, and movie portfolios, and bookstore catalogs differ, without copyrights? How would the high arts be affected? At present, we produce almost none, and we produce almost entirely what can be considered folk arts and vaudeville at best. Wouldn’t the elimination of copyrights change arts back to a form of conspicuous elite consumption, and the product of the aristocracy rather than the proletariat? (I am more concerned about this then the other factors combined.)

    Hope that gave you a few ideas.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-10 06:45:00 UTC

  • I WANT THE CHURCHES. ALL OF THEM. EVERY SINGLE ONE. Churches are our monuments.

    I WANT THE CHURCHES. ALL OF THEM. EVERY SINGLE ONE.

    Churches are our monuments. Monuments claim territory.

    I want the churches: Arsenal. Banking and Credit. Education. Training.

    It sounds nuts. But it’s brilliant really.

    (h/t: Aaron Kahland )


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-09 02:45:00 UTC

  • FUKUYAMA DID NOT UNDERSTAND The Chinese developed their bureaucracy precisely be

    FUKUYAMA DID NOT UNDERSTAND

    The Chinese developed their bureaucracy precisely because they FAILED to solve the problem of politics.

    The west solved it. We just didn’t know it.

    CENTRALIZED———-WEAK————NOMOCRATIC

    LIARS——————————————-TRUTH TELLERS

    DIVERSE—————————————HOMOGENOUS


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-09 02:41:00 UTC

  • attack on doctors

    http://www.aei.org/publication/malaise-among-medics-doctors-desire-vocational-purpose/Obamas attack on doctors


    Source date (UTC): 2015-06-08 07:30:00 UTC