Theme: Grammar

  • OUR METAPHYSICS by Bill Joslin Metaphysics and claims of metaphysical privilege

    OUR METAPHYSICS

    by Bill Joslin

    Metaphysics and claims of metaphysical privilege (like platonists) I find aggravating.

    Building from the simplistic trivium method – metaphysics distills down to grammar and dataset – the answer to what (object) when (what time), who (what person), where (what place)… The constellation of facts under-girding the claim.

    But but metaphysics is about HOW things (whats) exists.

    Now fast forward to Joel ‘s “operationalizing Kant”, where by observation cohere according to conceptual frames (Kant’s categories). Operationalism ensures existential coherence between the frame and observation – ensures the facts are reported accurately in relation to the frame. (Reporting corresponds to the coherence with observation).

    This solves, or rather closes the door, to one of the most sophisticated means of deception ever – fucking around with grammar to predetermine logical outputs and defining grammar by a presupposed logic. It bridges a little notice but crucial gap between metaphysics and epistemology… Gunna upset some thomistic Aristotelians cause they can’t lean on their metaphysical claims anymore… But I suspect they will shout ‘niave realist” (which they seem to not understand) or “reductionary materialism” from atop of their ivory ruins, Ignoring (or not comprehending) that the above does not presume or presuppose materialism, reduction or realism – only relational consistency to any type of metaphysical presumptions and claims. In doing so only some metaphysical presumptions and clams can survive (ones which retain coherence from observation through frame to claim) which theirs don’t.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-07-04 18:37:00 UTC

  • by Propertarian Frank (1) Language and human action are inseparable, i.e. one ca

    by Propertarian Frank

    (1) Language and human action are inseparable, i.e. one cannot understand language separately from action (this reveals most of philosophy to be contentless)

    (2) Names make sense exactly to the extent and via the structure they refer to actions (spectrum of measurements determine the scope and limits of names)

    (3) Commensurability is the best language can do, because:

    (i) To discern is an ACT of measurement

    (ii) Indiscernible things are informationally null

    (iii) Ergo one can only fully convey (without informational loss) names discernible to oneโ€™s interlocutor

    (iv) Ergo we can only talk in dimensions of commensurability (measurements both parties can enACT)

    Apply (i-iv) reflexively (talking to oneself): informational content in conceptualization is determined by the set of novel measurements (and ways thereof: meta-measurements or measurement-measurements, recursively) introduced.

    In other words, commensurability exhausts the reach of language.

    In other words, magic donโ€™t real.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-07-04 06:23:00 UTC

  • It is *soooo* much easier to discuss philosophical ideas using mathematics than

    It is *soooo* much easier to discuss philosophical ideas using mathematics than it is language. The problem is, ordinary folk don’t know enough of mathematics, so you can’t reach them.

    Thankfully Property is a good enough proxy. It’s the unit of commensurability in a division of perception, cognition, knowledge and labor.

    The problem with property is you can try to guild rally and shame using it. And that’s almost impossible with positional numbering. ๐Ÿ˜‰


    Source date (UTC): 2017-07-03 10:06:00 UTC

  • “HOLY SHIT. I just realized that the trivium was a method of teaching strict con

    —“HOLY SHIT. I just realized that the trivium was a method of teaching strict construction.”—Ryan Williams

    Yep. Now, please try to argue that the left removed it from the cirriculum for any reason other than to make their lies possible?

    You want to dumb down a population? remove it’s central method of truth telling. Grammar, logic, rhetoric.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-07-03 04:57:00 UTC

  • by Joel Davis I would add, that “defining the relative variance/convergence betw

    by Joel Davis

    I would add, that “defining the relative variance/convergence between concepts incommensurably” seems to “expand the definition of the experiential context beyond commensurable relativity between its components”.

    So, I guess I am rendering the whole correspondence vs. coherence epistemological dichotomy as mutual failure to establish commensurable context.

    All you need to do is operationalize their refutations of one another relative to the perciever, and then the conclusion that correspondence is merely coherence with experience becomes apparent. Which I guess leaves Hegelians with the dubious honour of discovering the most sophisticated articulation of coherence with non-experience ๐Ÿ˜‚

    Curt Doolittle I think I have figured out what you have achieved as a philosopher on an even more profound level..

    You operationalized Kant.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-07-03 04:03:00 UTC

  • “You’re saying all mathematical statements are true or false but the liar parado

    —“You’re saying all mathematical statements are true or false but the liar paradox is one example of an ordinary language sentence which hasn’t got a truth-value, right? Well, stated that way, I’d say you’re right about all of that, but are you also saying that the liar sentence expresses a proposition? That might be the part where it starts to get problematic.”—

    Good question.

    In short, we can ask a question, or we can assert an opinion, conflate the two, or we can speak nonsense. And only humans (so far) can ask, assert, conflate, and fail at all of them. But out of convenience, we subtract from the real to produce the ideal, and speak of the speech as if it can act on its own.

    Just to illustrate that the test we are performing (context) limits both what we are saying and what we can say. From the most decidable to the least:

    1 – The mathematical category of statements, (tautological) single category. (relative measure)

    2 – The ideal category of statements, (logical) multiple categories. (relative meaning)

    3 – The operational category of statements (existential possibility)

    (sequential possibility )

    4 – The correspondent (empirical) category of statements. all categories. ( full correspondence )

    5 – The rational category of statements ( an actor making rational choices) (‘praxeological’)

    6 – The ‘moral’ category of statements ( test of reciprocity)

    7 – The fully accounted category of statements (tests of scope)

    8 – The valued (loaded) category of statements. (full correspondence and loaded with subjective value)

    9 – The deceptive category of statements (suggestion, obscurantism, fictionalism, and outright lying.

    We can speak a statement in any one or more of these (cumulative) contexts.

    So for example, statements are not true or false or unknowable, but the people who speak them speak truthfully, falsely, or undecidedly. So performatively (as you have mentioned) only people can make statements.

    However, to make our lives easier, we eliminate unnecessary dimensions of existence unused in our scope of inquiry, and we conflate terms across those dimensions of existence, and we very often don’t even understand ourselves what we are saying. (ie; a number consists of a function for producing a positional name, from an ordered series of symbols in some set of dimensions. Or, only people can act and therefore only people can assert, and therefore no assertions are true or false, the person speaking speaks truth or falsehood. etc.)

    This matters primarily because no dimensional subset in logic closed without appeal to the consequence dimensional subset. In other words, only reality provides full means of decidability.

    Or translated differently, there just as there is little action value in game theory and little action value in more than single regression analysis, there is little value after first order logic, since decidability is provided by appeal to additional information in additional dimensions rather than its own. Which is, as far as I know, the principal lesson of analytic philosophy and the study of logic, of the 20th century.

    Or as I might restate it, we regress into deeper idealism through methodological specialization than is empirically demonstrable in value returned. Then we export these ‘ideals’ as pseudosciences to the rest of the population. This leading to wonderful consequences like the copenhagen consensus. Or the many worlds hypothesis, or String Theory. Or keynesian economics. Or the (exceedingly frustrating) nonsense the public seems to fascinate over as a substitute for numerology, astrology, magic, and the rigorous hard work required

    FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC

    The foundations of logic like those of mathematics are terribly simple as subsets of reality. But by doubling down in the 19th and 20th centuries all we have found is that we say rather nonsensical terms like ‘the axiom of choice’ or ‘limits’ rather than ‘undecidable without appeal to information provided by existential context’. After all, math is just the discipline of scale independent measurement, and the deduction that is possible given the precision of constant relations using identical unitary measures. Logic is nothing more than than set operations. Algorithms are nothing more than sequential operations restoring time. Operations are nothing more than algorithms restoring physical transformation, time and cost. etc.

    As a consequence, I find most of this kind of terminological discourse … silly hermeneutics. As Poincare stated ‘that isn’t math its philosophy’. Or as I would say, ‘with platonism we depart science and join theology. It may be secular theology in that it is ideal rather than supernatural, but it is theology none the less’.

    it is one thing to say ‘by convention in math (or logic or whatever dimension we speak of) we use this colloquialism (half truth) as a matter of convenience. It is not ‘true’ as in scientifically true. It is just the best approximation given the brevity we exercise in simplifying our work.

    There exists only one possible ‘True’: the most parsimonious and correspondent testimony one can speak in the available language in the given context. Everything else is a convention.

    Ergo, if you do not know the operational construction of the terms that you use, you do not know of what you speak. That does not mean you cannot speak truth any more than monkey cannot accidentally type one of the Sonnets.

    This is why the operationalist movement in math we call Intuitionism failed.

    Anyway. Well formed (grammatically correct) statements in math may or may not be decidable but our intention is to produce decidable statements. In symbolic logic, well formed (grammatically correct) statements may or may not be decidable. in logic (language), well formed (grammatically correct) statements are difficult to construct because of the categorical difference between constant relations (ideals in math), constant categories (ideals in formal logic), and inconstant categories (ordinary language). Furthermore the process of DEDUCTION using premises (or logical summation) limits us to utility of true statements. Ergo for that purpose statements can only evaluate to true or not-true (including false and undecidable). While for the purpose of INDUCTION (transfer of meaning by seeding free association, or the construction of possibility by the same means) seeks only possibility or impossibility not truth or falsehood.

    Now. I have written far too much already, so I won’t try to increase the precision of what I’ve written, but hopefully the answer is the same:

    How can you claim to make a truth proposition and demand precise language when your premises are mere demonstrably falsehoods used by convention?


    Source date (UTC): 2017-07-02 10:58:00 UTC

  • (the purpose of idealism in mathematics is to simplify discourse given the probl

    (the purpose of idealism in mathematics is to simplify discourse given the problem of scale independence. In other words, math has a ‘quaint’ vocabulary the purpose of which is to simplify the problem of prevarication when discussing subjects of scale independence. )


    Source date (UTC): 2017-06-30 10:43:00 UTC

  • ABSOLUTELY TRUE OR TRUE? —“Is the term ‘absolutely true’ necessary? Or, is the

    ABSOLUTELY TRUE OR TRUE?

    —“Is the term ‘absolutely true’ necessary? Or, is the use of ‘absolutely’ extraneous?”– A Friend

    Great Question.

    Well, it’s extraneous in fact among professionals. But the problem is we use ‘true’ in the vernacular as a general category conflating all sorts of claims (including ‘true for me’ – which is absurd).

    So when I hear it I understand that you mean “Truth Proper” as in “analytic truth” in logic and mathematics, “Ideal Truth” when in the context of rational statements, and “Truthful” when in the context of the physical sciences.

    And I suspect most people who have some skill in this field would do the same if you gave them a survey, and asked “if I say the words Absolutely True’ does that mean (a, b, c, d).” And if you asked that question in giving a statement that conveyed the context I’m pretty sure again that they would choose the right ‘true’ accordingly.

    I think this is the right answer. It is unnecessary (and possibly confusing) when talking both in context, and to professionals in each discipline.

    The problem is that we often speak in audiences that do not know the difference in parsimony between analytic, ideal, and scientific truth. And we have some in our audiences that live under the postmodern influence that ‘what works’ to achieve my ends is ‘true’.


    Source date (UTC): 2017-06-29 16:58:00 UTC

  • IT’s not the nouns that” fool you” it’s the grammar – or rather, the absence of

    IT’s not the nouns that” fool you” it’s the grammar – or rather, the absence of grammar.

    Primary culprit behind which all fictions hide is the verb to be. If you eliminate it, then it’s extremely hard to create false equivalencies (which is what you’re describing). If you add operational grammar Meaning complete sentences that name actors, objects, actions, transformations, and consequences, then it is almost impossible to state an undetectable false equivalency. If in addition you require any noun or verb be stated as a member of a series, then it will be all but impossible to employ the pretense of knowledge.

    English is a high precision, low context language. That means it is burdensome, can be wordy, but can be very precise – if you use the language. But we tend to use substitution for either brevity, or to obscure our ignorance – which is which is only decidable if the person can state that which he states in brevity, in full sentences of operational grammar. In other words, if we deflate our sentences from approximations to names of actors, actions, and objects, it becomes almost impossible to state a falsehood.

    (see E-Prime, which I’m sure you’re aware of. See Operationalism int he scientific method, operationism in psychology, proofs in mathematics and logic, and the failed program of praxeology – operationalism in economics and ethics.)

    The problem is the grammar: what surrounds the noun and provides context and limits. Not the noun. A noun is just a name. A category if broad, a type if narrow, and an entity if unique. But the limits of that noun, whether category, type, or entity are provided by context (limits) produced by the grammar.

    So, I might go back to casting but suspicion on the noun, then saving the noun and blaming the grammar, and because of that, the speaker – because it is the speaker who exercises the pretense of knowledge without testing whether he knows of what he speaks (or reads), whenever he does not speak it in burdensome grammar – and instead he avoids that burdensome grammar, for the purpose of either brevity, approximation, pretense of knowledge, or outright deception.

    (if you note that last sentence you’ll see what I mean by the use of series to deflate a category into a spectrum.)

    -Curt


    Source date (UTC): 2017-06-28 13:26:00 UTC

  • NON PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY #1: “WHY IS THERE SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING”. This

    NON PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY #1: “WHY IS THERE SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING”.

    This is an illogical question – another pseudo-rational word game. A conflation of the ideal and the real. In order to ask this question, something must exist – namely the person asking the question – and we must be able to identify some ‘nothing’ to refer to. The word nothing, as far as I know, can only mean ‘nothing exists of consequence’ not the absence of existence. So, as far as I know, ‘nothing’ is impossible. In other words, nothing still requires existence (persistence) of whatever you call ‘nothing’ in contrast to ‘something’. I can’t imagine any ‘nothing’ that isn’t ‘something’ or a category of something within something. I can imagine various combinations of ignorance, error and falsehood. But I can’t imagine something that both exists (a referent of nothing) and does not exist at the same time. In other words, this is another problem of nonsense language. If operationally stated we find: “If I can perceive persistence, then why does that which I perceive persist? And so far we are at least close enough to an answer that we can say something always persists, the question is reducible to (a) what is its lifecycle? And (b) is that lifecycle unique, iterative, or a subset of a larger lifecycle?

    I keep a catalog of the kinds of bias and error man man suffers from in each era of his evolution of his knowledge. And if we subtract the theories reliant upon the errors and biases man suffers from, and leave only those theories that reflect constant simple observable laws of the universe, then the universe is merely constructed from a portfolio of positive and negative forces that act upon one another, and is constructed of a regular geometry of those forces little different from the ordinary universe we perceive at human scale, with the remote possibility that some of those forces propagate at speeds different from (both faster and slower) than the electromagnetic spectrum that we are currently able to react to and act upon.

    The error (evil) of platonism (Idealism) exists everywhere, just like the other forms of fictionalism. But just as categories must be tested by logic, and logic tested by correspondence, and correspondence tested by operations, and operations tested by full accounting, fictionalism cannot survive tests of operational construction. Whether that fictionalism be the supernatural(pseudo mythical), the ideal (pseudo-real), the pseudo-rational, or the pseudo-scientific. The reason all those forms of fictionalism exist, is simply the failure to fully test the available dimensions against ignorance, error, bias and deceit.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2017-06-27 20:00:00 UTC