Curt Doolittle

Theme: Grammar

  • Yes, We Need To Define ‘Structural’

    One growing point of tension that I that has both semantic and substantive difficulties is whether or not we regard the situation in the mortgage markets as “structural.”

    via Two-Track Intermediation « Modeled Behavior.

    Karl, I would love it if you would solve this semantic problem. Because it’s material to the public debate. The technical definition is artificially narrow and as such leads to either dishonest (Krugmanian) or semantic rather than material debate. To Austrians, “Structural” means that we have misallocated financial capital and thereby caused a misallocation of human and fixed capital such that the cost of reallocating that capital is so high that the fixed capital may be ‘wasted’ and the human capital (human beings) cannot be put to productive ends because the learning curve and lifetime commitments of individuals cannot be altered by the market at ANY possible cost. This circumstance results in a permanent loss of competitiveness in relation to other societies what can allocate capital against the remaining productive workers. We see this as a permanent loss with human consequences. For example, the misallocation of human capital during both the tech boom and the housing boom mean that certain people obtained higher incomes in a short period of time but by doing so lost the opportunity to gain competitive skills (in relation to their ages) that had ongoing value to them. Furthermore, by implication, it means that those prior skills were of lower marketability than the skills that they might have possessed. The counter-arguments are that a) people are infinitely fungible (that’s not supportable) or b) we can keep misallocating capital from boom to boom as a means of redistribution, or c) this process is cumulative and causes permanent shifts toward financialization at the top and unproductive labor at the bottom, and production of inferior goods in the middle. I think you err on the side of (b). I think Austrians err on the side of (c). In more abstract terms I think this is a debate over the welfare of the bottom of society or the middle, with your side favoring the former and the austrians the latter. I also think your side considers this problem immaterial and Austrians (and conservatives) consider it cumulatively destructive. And of course, I disagree with your ‘belief’ that we can fix problems in the future. If that were true we would not have the polarization we do today – a polarization which is being solved, not by reason or argument but by differences in breeding rates and immigration.

  • Yes, We Need To Define ‘Structural’

    One growing point of tension that I that has both semantic and substantive difficulties is whether or not we regard the situation in the mortgage markets as “structural.”

    via Two-Track Intermediation « Modeled Behavior.

    Karl, I would love it if you would solve this semantic problem. Because it’s material to the public debate. The technical definition is artificially narrow and as such leads to either dishonest (Krugmanian) or semantic rather than material debate. To Austrians, “Structural” means that we have misallocated financial capital and thereby caused a misallocation of human and fixed capital such that the cost of reallocating that capital is so high that the fixed capital may be ‘wasted’ and the human capital (human beings) cannot be put to productive ends because the learning curve and lifetime commitments of individuals cannot be altered by the market at ANY possible cost. This circumstance results in a permanent loss of competitiveness in relation to other societies what can allocate capital against the remaining productive workers. We see this as a permanent loss with human consequences. For example, the misallocation of human capital during both the tech boom and the housing boom mean that certain people obtained higher incomes in a short period of time but by doing so lost the opportunity to gain competitive skills (in relation to their ages) that had ongoing value to them. Furthermore, by implication, it means that those prior skills were of lower marketability than the skills that they might have possessed. The counter-arguments are that a) people are infinitely fungible (that’s not supportable) or b) we can keep misallocating capital from boom to boom as a means of redistribution, or c) this process is cumulative and causes permanent shifts toward financialization at the top and unproductive labor at the bottom, and production of inferior goods in the middle. I think you err on the side of (b). I think Austrians err on the side of (c). In more abstract terms I think this is a debate over the welfare of the bottom of society or the middle, with your side favoring the former and the austrians the latter. I also think your side considers this problem immaterial and Austrians (and conservatives) consider it cumulatively destructive. And of course, I disagree with your ‘belief’ that we can fix problems in the future. If that were true we would not have the polarization we do today – a polarization which is being solved, not by reason or argument but by differences in breeding rates and immigration.

  • Republicans attack ObamaContent as “socialized meaning” « fauxphilnews

    In a rare break from party infighting, Monday’s Republican primary debate saw the candidates unite in their derision of “ObamaContent,” the president’s newly unveiled theory of linguistic meaning.  The theory, which relies upon the practice of a speaker’s linguistic community to fix the semantic content of many words, was attacked as “socialized meaning” by the debate participants.

    via Republicans attack ObamaContent as “socialized meaning” « fauxphilnews.

    This is just the right making use of the left’s strategy (from Chomsky etc.). Just as they have adopted every other strategy after some frustrating internal hand wringing about their feelings about the ethics of it. And so we continue the cycle of degenerative discourse. The underlying issue remains the same. We either use the caretaker strategy, which is a synonym for subsidizing the birth rates of the lower classes, or we use the aristocratic strategy which is a synonym for constraining the birth rates of the lower classes. The ‘framing’ in political discourse consists of using every possible distraction to avoid the underlying issue: that norms are dependent upon the behavioral ability of the majority and therefore the right’s concept of freedom requires individual accountability and the suppression of the birth rates of the lower classes in order to achieve improvements in the body politic. The left’s concept of freedom requires redistribution, tolerance for impulsivity over discipline, and an authoritarian government to perform administration of it. It is possible to create a compromise between these two worlds, but not while the ‘framing’ is conducted by either the right or the left as a means of avoiding the underlying problem.

  • Republicans attack ObamaContent as “socialized meaning” « fauxphilnews

    In a rare break from party infighting, Monday’s Republican primary debate saw the candidates unite in their derision of “ObamaContent,” the president’s newly unveiled theory of linguistic meaning.  The theory, which relies upon the practice of a speaker’s linguistic community to fix the semantic content of many words, was attacked as “socialized meaning” by the debate participants.

    via Republicans attack ObamaContent as “socialized meaning” « fauxphilnews.

    This is just the right making use of the left’s strategy (from Chomsky etc.). Just as they have adopted every other strategy after some frustrating internal hand wringing about their feelings about the ethics of it. And so we continue the cycle of degenerative discourse. The underlying issue remains the same. We either use the caretaker strategy, which is a synonym for subsidizing the birth rates of the lower classes, or we use the aristocratic strategy which is a synonym for constraining the birth rates of the lower classes. The ‘framing’ in political discourse consists of using every possible distraction to avoid the underlying issue: that norms are dependent upon the behavioral ability of the majority and therefore the right’s concept of freedom requires individual accountability and the suppression of the birth rates of the lower classes in order to achieve improvements in the body politic. The left’s concept of freedom requires redistribution, tolerance for impulsivity over discipline, and an authoritarian government to perform administration of it. It is possible to create a compromise between these two worlds, but not while the ‘framing’ is conducted by either the right or the left as a means of avoiding the underlying problem.

  • On Definitions and Moral Arguments

    And one more thing that I just see too much of – arguments over definitions. I. A definition is a contract between two or more people on the properties, causal relations and utility of those relations. I.I A term is the name for the set of properties, and causal relations and the utility of those relations. I.II One cannot debate what a term ‘means’ in the abstract. One can only (a) debate the validity of properties, causal relations and utility with others, (b) debate the assumedly normative properties, causal relations and utilities associated with the term and (c) debate what properties, causal relations and utility that someone else attributed to the term. But the properties, causal relations, and utility of an object of consideration are either true or they are not. In general, even most educated people rarely understand such terms that they commonly employ such as ‘true’, ‘freedom’ and ‘law’, or ‘right’, because they cannot express these concepts using non-contradictory, necessary and sufficient properties, causal relations and utility. Instead they rely on either normative, or personally biased usage, as convenient tools for justifying their existing biases. II. There is no other description of the term ‘definition’ that is applicable to the concept of rational debate. Since any non-contractual definition is an appeal to authority that is outside of the contract of debate between the parties. III. One cannot impose a definition. This is a logical fallacy. One can only negotiate it, or describe the properties and causal relations, then debate over the properties and relations, and the utility of those properties and relations. Debating about the ‘meaning’ of a term as normative, is not the same as debating the utility of it’s necessary properties. IV. One cannot QUOTE a definition as a means of appealing to an authority. This is a logical fallacy. You can only use a definition of a term as a means of clarifying your use of that term as a shorthand for the purpose of conveying properties, causal relations and the utility of those properties and causal relations. V. One cannot rely on a normative usage of the term as an appeal to authority. This is a logical fallacy. You can only use this as a starting point for debating on the true and false properties, causal relations, and utility of the properties and relations. Once at the starting point, one must then negotiate over the properties, causal relations and utility of the properties and causal relations. VI. One may defend one’s usage of the term by refering to a normative usage, or a quoted definition as justification for your USAGE of the term. But this does not mean that the properties, causal relations, and utilty of the property and causal relations is true, or even normative. (Evolution for example is assumed to be directional by most people, when in fact, it only favors complexity within a niche, which in turn leads to fragility.) VII. MORAL ARGUMENTS ARE UNIVERSALLY FRAUDULENT ATTEMPTS AT EXTORTION. PERIOD.

  • On Definitions and Moral Arguments

    And one more thing that I just see too much of – arguments over definitions. I. A definition is a contract between two or more people on the properties, causal relations and utility of those relations. I.I A term is the name for the set of properties, and causal relations and the utility of those relations. I.II One cannot debate what a term ‘means’ in the abstract. One can only (a) debate the validity of properties, causal relations and utility with others, (b) debate the assumedly normative properties, causal relations and utilities associated with the term and (c) debate what properties, causal relations and utility that someone else attributed to the term. But the properties, causal relations, and utility of an object of consideration are either true or they are not. In general, even most educated people rarely understand such terms that they commonly employ such as ‘true’, ‘freedom’ and ‘law’, or ‘right’, because they cannot express these concepts using non-contradictory, necessary and sufficient properties, causal relations and utility. Instead they rely on either normative, or personally biased usage, as convenient tools for justifying their existing biases. II. There is no other description of the term ‘definition’ that is applicable to the concept of rational debate. Since any non-contractual definition is an appeal to authority that is outside of the contract of debate between the parties. III. One cannot impose a definition. This is a logical fallacy. One can only negotiate it, or describe the properties and causal relations, then debate over the properties and relations, and the utility of those properties and relations. Debating about the ‘meaning’ of a term as normative, is not the same as debating the utility of it’s necessary properties. IV. One cannot QUOTE a definition as a means of appealing to an authority. This is a logical fallacy. You can only use a definition of a term as a means of clarifying your use of that term as a shorthand for the purpose of conveying properties, causal relations and the utility of those properties and causal relations. V. One cannot rely on a normative usage of the term as an appeal to authority. This is a logical fallacy. You can only use this as a starting point for debating on the true and false properties, causal relations, and utility of the properties and relations. Once at the starting point, one must then negotiate over the properties, causal relations and utility of the properties and causal relations. VI. One may defend one’s usage of the term by refering to a normative usage, or a quoted definition as justification for your USAGE of the term. But this does not mean that the properties, causal relations, and utilty of the property and causal relations is true, or even normative. (Evolution for example is assumed to be directional by most people, when in fact, it only favors complexity within a niche, which in turn leads to fragility.) VII. MORAL ARGUMENTS ARE UNIVERSALLY FRAUDULENT ATTEMPTS AT EXTORTION. PERIOD.

  • Spectrum Blindness: The Frequency Of Concepts, And Conceptual Networks As Production Cycles

    Time Preferences form a spectrum, from the very short (high), to the very long (low) — just as do frequencies of light. As one’s [glossary:time preference] increases in length (lowers), and the ability to perceive abstracts must necessarily increase. As one’s ability to perceive abstracts decreases, time preference also must necessarily decrease (lower). On average we all see a similar portion of the spectrum. Some the shorter and lower, some the longer and higher. Concepts are the equivalent of production cycles. And concepts of different lengths are incommensurable. Therefore human beings habituate and reinforce their time preferences, until they can no longer recognize or attribute value to concepts in the other portions of the spectrum. At that point of habituation, [glossary:Time Preference] becomes [glossary:Time Bias]. So for genetic, environmental, cultural, pedagogical, and habitual reasons, people are effectively ‘color blind’ to different areas of the conceptual spectrum. We cannot value each other’s time preferences because of our Time Biases. We are unable to. It is impossible to. [glossary:Time Bias] is the great unspoken problem with cognitive biases. Because cognitive biases are largely universal – equal among all people. But time bias creates social classes, and creates economic classes. This is one of the reasons that people cannot come to consensus in large numbers. There is no harmony on means even if there is some harmony on ends. —- NOTE: Perhaps I should separate out the different properties of Time Preference (high/low- emotive) from Time Preference Capacity (iq), and Realized or Habituated Time Preference ( the result). I will have to ask David for advice on whose writings to approach other than Banfield’s.

  • Updating English Spelling? Not so fast, maybe.

    For some reason, Joseph Fouche from The Committee On Public Safety found a proposal on revising English Spelling interesting enough to write about. He lifts this example:

    It woz in the ferst dae ov the nue yeer that the anounsment woz maed, aulmoest simultaeneusli from three obzervatoris, that the moeshen ov the planet Neptune, the outermoest ov aul the planets that w(h)eel about the sun, had bekum very eratik. A retardaeshen in its velositi had been suspekted in Desember. Then a faent, remoet spek ov lyt woz diskuverd in the reejen ov the perterbd planet. At ferst this did not cauz eni veri graet eksytment. Syentifik peepl, houever, found the intelijens remarkabl enuf, eeven befor it becaem noen that the nue bodi woz rapidli groeing larjer and bryter, and that the moeshen woz kwyt diferent from the orderli proegres ov the planets…

    For some other reason known only to those of us who are social science nerds, I felt the need to respond. Possibly because I am a conservative by nature. Possibly because I understand as an economist, the value of CAPITALIZING just about everything. And that language is a form of capital that can either amplify or discount human beings that use it. SPELLING IN ENGLISH CONVEYS INFORMATION The odd spelling certainly makes the language harder to learn but conveys with it much greater content, and it solves the problem of homonyms (words that sound the same but have different meanings) and context. Complex spellings approach abstract symbols that reduce the problem of defining context with similar sounds. All those spellings and oddities convey information. That information is useful. THERE IS NO REASON THE FUTURE OF WRITTEN LANGUAGE IS CONSONANTAL It might be better to see it as an advantage for a very complex language to approach becoming both phonetic and pictographic rather than purely phonetic. (Which is what has happened with english.) Imagine chinese by contrast, which is a very old language, and is constructed of a myraid of homonyms and complex tones. (languages start with clicks in the ancient past and end with tonal songs in the distant future.) There are only 30K images or words. Not the nearly 1M in english. They speak poetically because they can’t be more precise. It’s an old language but a primitive one. English, the germanic indo european languages in particular, are technical languages. They are the languages of craftsmen and soldiers: meant to convey precision. LANGUAGES CONTAIN METAPHYSICAL JUDGEMENTS Try to speak probabalistically in Spanish. Try to speak factually in polish. Try to eliminate emotional experience from Romanian or italian. Try to convey duty in the Slavics. Languages are more than sounds. They are complex constructs that frame and limit as well as amplify, different social ideas. English is wonderful for insulting someone’s intelligence. Eskimo is wonderful for describing weather. Talk about sex or emotional experience in italian or french. See other languages for what they are: vastly primitive. THE ECONOMICS OF WRITING ARE CHANGING Another argument might be, that we are rapidly approaching a position where reading and writing, which are very abstract very inexpensive forms of illustration, may be irrelevant to more than half of the population: where the future is most likely constructed of pictograms or videograms – moving illustrations that are constructed by and presented by machines. The only reason we use letters rather than images is that they are less expensive to produce. Especially for consonantal languages. However, as languages mature (which they are doing rapidly right now) they become lazy and tonal rather than consonantal. And our current symbolic representations of those languages with consonantal symbols that do NOT convey tones is limiting to representing the tonal. And while the above statement may seem economically impossible, because of the current perception of machines as expensive, we must remember that writing materials were as expensive in the past, during the development of writing, as we consider computers today. Today’s iPad is yesterday’s quill and parchment. LUDDITES ARE EVERYWHERE Effectively the author is promoting a pidgin: a language for simple people to hold simple conversations, rather than a language for conveying complex information. As such, he is, like many others, a Luddite. And luddites are searching for a simpler past rather than a complex, safer, and more prosperous future. And we do not need to dumb down our civilization any further. Even if it does make reading easier. Learning to read a hard language if it conveys greater information increases human capital. 🙂