FIGHT THIS WAR NOT THE LAST ONE I wouldn’t recommend fighting a revolution in favor of fascism, any more than I would recommend conducting a war using horse cavalry. Every generation we get an opportunity to modernize our weapons. Truth is enough. Aristocratic Egalitarianism, Testimonial Truth, Propertarian Ethics. Nomocratic Rule of Law, with Natural Law, Market Government, And Treasury Credit. Deprive the financial sector off fiat money gains. Deprive the media of copyright. Deprive everyone of unwarranted statements in the commons. Grant everyone universal standing in matters of the commons. Lying, Statism and Corporatism will evaporate under the weight of our prosecutions.
Theme: Governance
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To The Economist on Putin
(posted as a comment about putin on the economist) You’re largely correct but there is a middle position that would be more correct than the one you mentioned. Putin has done a great deal for his people, and we cannot underestimate, and we must respect and admire him for the change in their quality of life. He had his vision of restoring 1-the scope of the Russian empire, and 2-orthodox civilization. But he is also very afraid, not so much for himself, but for his people, and their future. They have not the economy, nor the population to return to great power status in the 21st century. While he has improved order in the country, and he as improved rule of law – enough – he still has an undiversified resource economy, a secret service that runs the drug and smuggling trade, relies upon Chechens as enforcers, and is surrounded (like a mafia godfather) by those that would replace him with glee. Prior to his invasion of Ukraine he was possibly the most respected and influential politician in the world. When Ukraine was successful in ousting the puppet president who denied them EU membership – contrary to everyone’s wildest imaginings – there were immediate uprisings in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and chants everywhere that Russia was next to join the western sphere. But Putin sees American spies and manipulation everywhere, where we Americans see our politicians, state department, intelligence services, and NGO’s as a bunch of largely overpaid incompetent ‘clowns’ that couldn’t do anything right if they tried. And he believed his puppet. The correct answer, however, was that the young militant men in the streets, having lost relatives and friends, if they found him, would certainly kill him. When the ambassadors confirmed the circumstance, Putin sent Russian special forces to fetch him, loaded the presidential jet with money, sent it to Dubai (I followed it) and he snuck off to Russia – I have no idea how, since it did not appear in an obvious way on radar tracking systems. So for Putin, he could lose his only warm water port (Crimea) to NATO (not that I can grasp for a moment how anyone would think closing the Bosphorus to Russia would be a challenge. And worse, he’s been trying to repair and modernize the armed forces, but all the manufacturing was done in the Donbas Basin in Ukraine. So in what I see as a panic, in typical Russian fashion, he did not call up Germany, UK, and USA and say: “Folks it is a strategic problem for us face even the smallest chance of losing that port, and we propose that we acquire it from Ukraine on a 99 year irrevocable lease, after which it returns to Russian sovereignty. Because honestly, otherwise, I am derelict in my duty if I let it pass out of our strategic hands. And I am sorry but I must have tacit approval from you on this phone call, and I ask you to use moral judgment in this matter.” Now it really doesn’t matter what anyone says really, because Putin gets on the air, tells Ukrainians that he’s terribly proud of them, but that this poses a strategic problem for Russia, so we propose 20% discount on market price of gas in exchange for a 99 year lease on Crimea and the Donbas. This will ensure that you are successful, the people in the Donbas can keep their manufacturing and mining jobs, obtain Russian pensions, and the rest of Ukraine will have an easier time financing its modernization program.” And really, he just then sends in the soldiers HONESTLY, and it’s all done, because (a) Ukrainians see the people in the east as ‘degenerates’ that hold onto the dream of communism, (b) they just care that they can go to Crimea for holidays, (c) the price of gas is a serious burden for such a poor country. Now part of the reason we have this problem between west and Russia is the Russian inability to admit vulnerability even in such matters. So just as when Putin approached the USA about nato membership, and the Americans were stupid, he didn’t take his message to the American people and educate them. Just as he didn’t take the Crimean problem to other world leaders and educate them. Just as he didn’t take his message to the Ukrainian people and educate them. I suspect it is almost incomprehensible to a Russian that Americans are actually naive utopian idealists, but they really do believe they do the right thing – despite overwhelmingly contrary evidence. But as the Israelis have demonstrated, taking your case to the American people via the press if you’re trying to exchange something and be reasonable is a guaranteed win. So I view Putin in fairly charitable terms, as a man who saw his world fall apart, his people suffer, and himself as the hero who can restore them and their world, and possibly go down in history as an example for them. He has one problem really: *He doesn’t sell, he only tells.* And he has no one on his staff that ‘sells’ the Russian position. Which is pretty damned rational really. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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To The Economist on Putin
(posted as a comment about putin on the economist) You’re largely correct but there is a middle position that would be more correct than the one you mentioned. Putin has done a great deal for his people, and we cannot underestimate, and we must respect and admire him for the change in their quality of life. He had his vision of restoring 1-the scope of the Russian empire, and 2-orthodox civilization. But he is also very afraid, not so much for himself, but for his people, and their future. They have not the economy, nor the population to return to great power status in the 21st century. While he has improved order in the country, and he as improved rule of law – enough – he still has an undiversified resource economy, a secret service that runs the drug and smuggling trade, relies upon Chechens as enforcers, and is surrounded (like a mafia godfather) by those that would replace him with glee. Prior to his invasion of Ukraine he was possibly the most respected and influential politician in the world. When Ukraine was successful in ousting the puppet president who denied them EU membership – contrary to everyone’s wildest imaginings – there were immediate uprisings in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and chants everywhere that Russia was next to join the western sphere. But Putin sees American spies and manipulation everywhere, where we Americans see our politicians, state department, intelligence services, and NGO’s as a bunch of largely overpaid incompetent ‘clowns’ that couldn’t do anything right if they tried. And he believed his puppet. The correct answer, however, was that the young militant men in the streets, having lost relatives and friends, if they found him, would certainly kill him. When the ambassadors confirmed the circumstance, Putin sent Russian special forces to fetch him, loaded the presidential jet with money, sent it to Dubai (I followed it) and he snuck off to Russia – I have no idea how, since it did not appear in an obvious way on radar tracking systems. So for Putin, he could lose his only warm water port (Crimea) to NATO (not that I can grasp for a moment how anyone would think closing the Bosphorus to Russia would be a challenge. And worse, he’s been trying to repair and modernize the armed forces, but all the manufacturing was done in the Donbas Basin in Ukraine. So in what I see as a panic, in typical Russian fashion, he did not call up Germany, UK, and USA and say: “Folks it is a strategic problem for us face even the smallest chance of losing that port, and we propose that we acquire it from Ukraine on a 99 year irrevocable lease, after which it returns to Russian sovereignty. Because honestly, otherwise, I am derelict in my duty if I let it pass out of our strategic hands. And I am sorry but I must have tacit approval from you on this phone call, and I ask you to use moral judgment in this matter.” Now it really doesn’t matter what anyone says really, because Putin gets on the air, tells Ukrainians that he’s terribly proud of them, but that this poses a strategic problem for Russia, so we propose 20% discount on market price of gas in exchange for a 99 year lease on Crimea and the Donbas. This will ensure that you are successful, the people in the Donbas can keep their manufacturing and mining jobs, obtain Russian pensions, and the rest of Ukraine will have an easier time financing its modernization program.” And really, he just then sends in the soldiers HONESTLY, and it’s all done, because (a) Ukrainians see the people in the east as ‘degenerates’ that hold onto the dream of communism, (b) they just care that they can go to Crimea for holidays, (c) the price of gas is a serious burden for such a poor country. Now part of the reason we have this problem between west and Russia is the Russian inability to admit vulnerability even in such matters. So just as when Putin approached the USA about nato membership, and the Americans were stupid, he didn’t take his message to the American people and educate them. Just as he didn’t take the Crimean problem to other world leaders and educate them. Just as he didn’t take his message to the Ukrainian people and educate them. I suspect it is almost incomprehensible to a Russian that Americans are actually naive utopian idealists, but they really do believe they do the right thing – despite overwhelmingly contrary evidence. But as the Israelis have demonstrated, taking your case to the American people via the press if you’re trying to exchange something and be reasonable is a guaranteed win. So I view Putin in fairly charitable terms, as a man who saw his world fall apart, his people suffer, and himself as the hero who can restore them and their world, and possibly go down in history as an example for them. He has one problem really: *He doesn’t sell, he only tells.* And he has no one on his staff that ‘sells’ the Russian position. Which is pretty damned rational really. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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Do We Choose Our Rulers?
Actually, it depends on the organization’s SIZE, and method of adapting. – For very large organizations, it’s that no one wills change of leader sufficiently, because of the cost of change. – For medium organizations, people choose the leader possible for the group to preserve its power. – For small organizations, it’s absolutely true that people choose leaders. Choice of leadership is a game: it’s the best one we can get among those that enough people want, not the leader we want. Leadership is necessary if for no other reason than to maintain group solidarity while providing decidability, although consensus building is why we prefer to use them. leaders prevent defection. I could go on about this, but leaders exist because we need them to. We choose the ones we CAN choose, and we change or resist change dependent upon the cost of doing so. In markets we need only negative leaders (judges), but it is very hard to defect and survive. In the production of commons we need positive leaders (deciders), but it is very hard to defect and survive. In commercial organizations we need both judges and deciders, but we have the opportunity to defect, and we are constantly aware of the choices. This is then, the same reason we are compensated, not for production, but for our value in the ORGANIZATION of production. As far as I know, this well researched, well understood, and effectively a law of organization. Economics in everything. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute (ps: any moral argument is suspect. if the argument is not reduced to costs, someone is likely trying to fool you.)
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Do We Choose Our Rulers?
Actually, it depends on the organization’s SIZE, and method of adapting. – For very large organizations, it’s that no one wills change of leader sufficiently, because of the cost of change. – For medium organizations, people choose the leader possible for the group to preserve its power. – For small organizations, it’s absolutely true that people choose leaders. Choice of leadership is a game: it’s the best one we can get among those that enough people want, not the leader we want. Leadership is necessary if for no other reason than to maintain group solidarity while providing decidability, although consensus building is why we prefer to use them. leaders prevent defection. I could go on about this, but leaders exist because we need them to. We choose the ones we CAN choose, and we change or resist change dependent upon the cost of doing so. In markets we need only negative leaders (judges), but it is very hard to defect and survive. In the production of commons we need positive leaders (deciders), but it is very hard to defect and survive. In commercial organizations we need both judges and deciders, but we have the opportunity to defect, and we are constantly aware of the choices. This is then, the same reason we are compensated, not for production, but for our value in the ORGANIZATION of production. As far as I know, this well researched, well understood, and effectively a law of organization. Economics in everything. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute (ps: any moral argument is suspect. if the argument is not reduced to costs, someone is likely trying to fool you.)
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What Are Conservatism, Libertarianism, Progressivism?
A Genetic Predisposition – an Instinct An Intuition – an instinct and experience A Tradition – a surviving portfolio of habits An Ideology – a Justification A Philosophy – a Moral Model A FormalPhilosophy – An Institutional Model A SocialScience (law)
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What Are Conservatism, Libertarianism, Progressivism?
A Genetic Predisposition – an Instinct An Intuition – an instinct and experience A Tradition – a surviving portfolio of habits An Ideology – a Justification A Philosophy – a Moral Model A FormalPhilosophy – An Institutional Model A SocialScience (law)
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The only way to win is not to play the game. The only way to rule justly is to e
The only way to win is not to play the game. The only way to rule justly is to eliminate discretionary rule: Rule of Law: Nomocracy.
Source date (UTC): 2016-09-19 05:47:00 UTC
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The only way to win is not to play the game. The only way to rule justly is to e
The only way to win is not to play the game. The only way to rule justly is to eliminate the discretionary rule: Rule of Law: Nomocracy.
Source date (UTC): 2016-09-19 05:45:00 UTC
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State Incentives
By Eli Harman The allegation is often made (by libertarian anarchists) that what states do is fundamentally incalculable, but that it is always negative sum. In other words, we cannot know the absolute value of any state or state policy, but we can be certain about its sign. Voluntary trades in the marketplace – as the argument goes – are always mutually beneficial (else they wouldn‘t occur) and positive sum. State policies differ in requiring coercion. If they did not require coercion, they could occur in the marketplace. But if they do, then someone is losing out, so there is no way to be sure they represent a net gain. Without the mechanism of voluntary exchange, the information transmitted by prices in a marketplace are absent and no calculation is possible. In all likelihood they represent a net loss, certainly a loss relative to the opportunity cost of the purely voluntary marketplace foregone. But it doesn’t seem that states ever would have become ubiquitous or persistent if this were true. Empirically, state-ridden peoples have proven competitive against stateless ones. If error and parasitism were the whole story, they would not be. States, after all, are in constant conflict and competition with one another and with alternatives (or at least they were at one time.) However, the argument is incomplete and therefore incorrect. We can reasonably expect voluntary, fully-informed, exchanges – free of externality – to be Pareto improvements. (They make someone better off and no one worse off.) But in the first place, market transactions don’t always live up to this standard, because they are not necessarily fully informed nor free of externality. And in the second place, some of the things states do might; because they are of the nature of voluntary exchanges. An individual exchanges the sum total of costs a state imposes (on them) for the sum total of benefits it offers (to them) every time they voluntarily choose not to move to the jurisdiction of another state. (And these exchanges can be made more precisely calculable by reducing the exit costs and increasing the number and variety of states on offer.) Furthermore, all states require the voluntary consent of at least enough individuals and groups to successfully compel the submission of the remainder. And the coalition that arises to perform this function arises by a process of reciprocal exchange (You want such and such a boon to participate in our coalition? Well we want this concession and that from you in exchange.) In brokering these exchanges, a Monarchy offers several advantages over a democratically elected government. A democracy will be inherently and irreparably susceptible to negative-sum corruption because of the problem of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. A policy which benefits 1,000 people $10,000 each may be politically profitable even if it costs a million people $100 each. The concentrated interest will be relatively less hampered by information costs and coordination problems. So it will be able to muster more votes and resources in defense of the policy than those harmed will be able to muster against it, though the harm be much greater. Nothing would stop anyone from proposing such a policy to a king. And a king could get away with implementing it. But a king, who owns his realm and title, as well as its capital value, would not benefit from doing so. The future revenue he could expect to derive from his realm and subjects would decline as a result. And so his incentive would be to veto such proposals. Furthermore, in a majority democracy, if your ruling coalition encompasses more than 51 percent of voters, it’s leaving rents on the table. If you’re getting, say, 70 percent of the vote, that simply means you’re delivering more value than you need to and failing to extract as much as you could. You could take a little more and give a little less without losing the election. So in a democracy, we can expect the ruling coalition at any given time to consist of about 51% of voters (and those the worst 51%) and that does indeed seem to be what we see. But conflict and compulsion, though inevitable and irresolvable under democracy, are costly and actually largely unnecessary. So we can expect a wise monarch to start building his coalition of supporters with the best and keep working his way down the list until the only people that remain in need of compulsion are those who have nothing to offer which is worth what they demand in exchange for voluntary cooperation: in short, people who probably should be coerced.