Aristocracy must rule out of self defense, and out of defense for the future of mankind. The domestication of animal man and the organized intergenerational development of agency must continue. At current rates, all of western evolutionary progress will be lost in 80 years.
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-14 10:36:00 UTC
https://t.co/2gtFMiK1Sqhttps://t.co/2gtFMiK1SqRetweeted Rolf Degen (@DegenRolf):
Individuals with a kind personality are less likely to be successful in politics.
https://t.co/2gtFMiK1Sq https://t.co/POhk4SyNQj
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-14 10:04:00 UTC
https://t.co/2gtFMiK1SqRetweeted Rolf Degen (@DegenRolf):
Individuals with a kind personality are less likely to be successful in politics.
https://t.co/2gtFMiK1Sq https://t.co/POhk4SyNQj
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-14 10:04:00 UTC
One of the more insidious goals has been to arm more of the state operators and to consume the munitions supply. Guns are of no value without ammunition.
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-14 09:43:00 UTC
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289618300060 • In both the U.S. and Denmark intelligence failed to predict standard party choice. • This was due to opposing effects of intelligence on economic and social ideology. •Denmark’s multi-party system allows non-standard representations of party choice. •In Denmark, significant systematic intelligence differences observed between parties. Intelligence is rarely studied as a predictor of vote choice, and at first glance our data supports this neglect: In samples from the U.S. and Denmark (Ns = 1419 and 953), intelligence does not predict the standard operationalization of vote choice in which parties are placed on a single left-vs-right dimension. (Standardized coefficients predicting right-wing vote choice were 0.05 and −0.03, respectively.) However, this apparent non-effect in fact reflects approximately equal and opposite effects of intelligence on vote choice as transmitted through social and economic ideology. In both countries, higher ability predicts left-wing social and right-wing economic views. The impact of intelligence on vote choice is thus most visible in true multi-party systems like Denmark, in which parties do not simply pair similar levels of social and economic conservatism, but instead provide diverse combinations of social and economic ideology. Comparing the parties closest to representing authoritarian egalitarianism (social-right plus economic-left) and libertarianism (social-left plus economic-right), we observed a 0.9 SD intelligence gap.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289618300060 • In both the U.S. and Denmark intelligence failed to predict standard party choice. • This was due to opposing effects of intelligence on economic and social ideology. •Denmark’s multi-party system allows non-standard representations of party choice. •In Denmark, significant systematic intelligence differences observed between parties. Intelligence is rarely studied as a predictor of vote choice, and at first glance our data supports this neglect: In samples from the U.S. and Denmark (Ns = 1419 and 953), intelligence does not predict the standard operationalization of vote choice in which parties are placed on a single left-vs-right dimension. (Standardized coefficients predicting right-wing vote choice were 0.05 and −0.03, respectively.) However, this apparent non-effect in fact reflects approximately equal and opposite effects of intelligence on vote choice as transmitted through social and economic ideology. In both countries, higher ability predicts left-wing social and right-wing economic views. The impact of intelligence on vote choice is thus most visible in true multi-party systems like Denmark, in which parties do not simply pair similar levels of social and economic conservatism, but instead provide diverse combinations of social and economic ideology. Comparing the parties closest to representing authoritarian egalitarianism (social-right plus economic-left) and libertarianism (social-left plus economic-right), we observed a 0.9 SD intelligence gap.
—“In 21st century. We must make world safe FROM democracy.”—Jaromír Miškovský
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-13 12:19:18 UTC
Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1017745281033568256
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
—“In 21st century. We must make world safe FROM democracy.”—JaromÃr MiÅ¡kovský
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-13 12:19:06 UTC
—“In 21st century. We must make world safe FROM democracy.”—Jaromír Miškovský
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-13 08:19:00 UTC
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
THE IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY (RULE)
The iron law of oligarchy is a political theory, first developed by the German sociologist Robert Michels in his 1911 book, Political Parties. It claims that rule by an elite, or oligarchy, is inevitable as an “iron law” within any democratic organization as part of the “tactical and technical necessities” of organization.
Michels stated that the official goal of representative democracy of eliminating elite rule was impossible, that representative democracy is a façade legitimizing the rule of a particular elite, and that elite rule, which he refers to as oligarchy, is inevitable.
Michels’ theory states that all complex organizations, regardless of how democratic they are when started, eventually develop into oligarchies. Michels observed that since no sufficiently large and complex organization can function purely as a direct democracy, power within an organization will always get delegated to individuals within that group, elected or otherwise.
Michels addressed the application of this law to representative democracy, and stated: “Who says organization, says oligarchy.” He went on to state that “Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy.”
According to Michels all organizations eventually come to be run by a “leadership class”, who often function as paid administrators, executives, spokespersons or political strategists for the organization. Far from being “servants of the masses”, Michels argues this “leadership class,” rather than the organization’s membership, will inevitably grow to dominate the organization’s power structures.
By controlling who has access to information, those in power can centralize their power successfully, often with little accountability, due to the apathy, indifference and non-participation most rank-and-file members have in relation to their organization’s decision-making processes.
Michels argues that democratic attempts to hold leadership positions accountable are prone to fail, since with power comes the ability to reward loyalty, the ability to control information about the organization, and the ability to control what procedures the organization follows when making decisions. All of these mechanisms can be used to strongly influence the outcome of any decisions made ‘democratically’ by members.
Source date (UTC): 2018-07-13 05:30:08 UTC