Most law is undecidable. That is why searching for liars is more fruitful than searching for facts.
Source date (UTC): 2015-01-13 05:58:00 UTC
Theme: Decidability
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JUSTIFICATION VS CRITICISM : WARRANTY IN NORMATIVE CONTRACT VS WARRANTY IN EXPLO
JUSTIFICATION VS CRITICISM : WARRANTY IN NORMATIVE CONTRACT VS WARRANTY IN EXPLORATION INDEPENDENT OF NORMS
First, what do we mean by “knowledge”, and of those things we mean, what is merely allegory, and what is necessity?
Little of the universe is absent regular patterns. However, some are very noisy and difficult to find. Some are very subtle and hard to find. Some are either too large or too small to observe without relying upon instruments, and others must be deduced using logical instruments. We call these regular patterns ‘information’.
Humans can modify the real world in a variety of ways, leaving information behind. We can do this as simply leaving evidence of passage through a forces or field, or in archeological evidence. We can do this intentionally with cave paintings and writing. And we can do it with our architecture, monuments and earth works. We can do this by the memories that we transfer between generations through repetition of experience, advice and story.
A computer must run a program to create the experience we see before us when using it. Information must mix with memories, to create the experience we call ‘knowing’.
Knowledge is reconstructed from information by mixing with existing memories, just as meaning is transferred by the use of analogies to transfer properties. So information exists without a knowing subject. And that information may be very good, or very bad at producing the experience of knowledge in a subject.
But in colloquial language we seem to have an intellectual bias that wants to separate untrue knowledge from true, or at least tested, knowledge thereby conflating QUALITY of knowledge and EXISTENCE of knowledge. We can forgive philosophers this common error, since they are concerned most often with the persuasive quality (truth) of propositions.
And if we look carefully at the discussion of ‘knowledge’ we find philosophers conflating (a)existence/awareness, (b) risk/willingness to act, (c) truth content.
And moreover, truth content consists of two additional properties: (c.i) persuasive power assuming an honest participant, and (c.ii) parsimonious correspondence with reality (what we mean by ‘true’).
The reason that discussion of knowledge is problematic is that this term is a sort of catch-all for these separate properties. And so like many concepts, argument is a problem of conflating properties, each of which exists on a separate spectrum.
“Knowing” could mean ‘awareness gained through experience’, or ‘given what we know from experience, I am willing to act upon it’, or knowing could mean ‘through experience we believe this is true’.
So I think that the only POSSIBLE meaning of the category ‘knowledge’ is ‘awareness of a regular pattern that allows us to predict something, even if it is only to predict in the sense of identifying something as part of a category – the most simple prediction possible.
And then we have the persuasive power of knowledge in convincing the self or others, first to state something is possible, then second to state something is worthy of action (risk).
For example, no one ‘knows’ how to build a computer (or a cheeseburger for that matter) in the sense that they possess knowledge of construction of the constituent parts. So some knowledge can never be centralized except as a hierarchy of abstractions – trust in one another’s claim to actionable knowledge.
For these reasons (the number of causal axis in the category we call knowledge), I think we cannot improve upon casting knowledge as:
(a) awareness (existence) of a regular pattern combining information and memory to create an experience, which we then also remember.
(b) all knowledge is theoretical, and open to revision (no premises are certain)
where theoretical propositions contain both:
(d) truth content(parsimonious correspondence with reality).
(c) persuasive power (sufficiency) in an honest discourse(risk reduction/reward increase),
JUSTIFICATOIN VERSUS CRITICISM = CONTRACT VS TRUTH
So I my problem is that ‘justified true belief’ is not false under the test of risk, but is not meaningful under the test of analytic truth. In this sense, it depends upon which thing we are talking about: willingness to act (justified true belief), willingness of others to insure actions (contractual justified true belief), and analytic truth (parsimonious correspondence with reality).
If a man gives witness in testimony and later on we find a video of the events, and it turns out that he is wrong, but that it is easy to understand how he was mistaken, we do not consider his testimony false. We only warranty what rational man is capable of warranting.
In science we warranty that we have done due diligence: we have criticized our own arguments. We testify that we have done due diligence – we have criticized our own position.
In this sense both justified true belief is necessary for contractual propositions, while critical rationalism (warranty) is the only epistemological possibility we can rely upon.
The fact that argument evolved out of law (debate in the polis) probably explains the origin of conflation of contractual justification according to the norms of the polity, with the pursuit of analytic truth in epistemological exploration.
The fact that most human action is contractual, and very little of our lives epistemic, explains the persistence of both the contractual (justificationary),and epistemic (critical scientific) as method, and the conflation of the term knowledge as a general term covering both contractual and epistemic uses.
Norms guide most human actions. Norms are habituated and therefore reduced to intuitions to function. The norms are contractual (justificationary – so that we avoid blame). Science by contrast, produces not actions but testimony. The problem is inverted. In science all we produce is testimony regardless of normative rules. In normative relations we produce actions that we justify as according to the normative rules of society.
So we testify that we were justified according to norms in contractual relations, and we testify that our statements are free of norms, imaginary, error, bias, habituated deception and outright deception, in science.
This is why science is a luxury good: it’s terribly expensive, and scientific testimony is terribly expensive. Justification allows us to use scientifically tested or evolutionarily tested general rules in real world actions – contractual relations.
And must. We cannot create general rules out of justificationary testimony, only out of critical testimony. For this reason, both justificationary and critical testimony will persist forever. While our warranties must be given by critical means, our testimony is forever justificationary. (I think that is fairly profound).
As far as I know, albeit in brief, this is the most accurate statement of our extant understanding of the question of knowledge, and why it has been so troublesome a concept.
Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev, Ukraine
Source date (UTC): 2015-01-10 16:10:00 UTC
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JUSTIFICATION VS CRITICISM : WARRANTY IN CONTRACT VS EXPLORATION (from elsewhere
JUSTIFICATION VS CRITICISM : WARRANTY IN CONTRACT VS EXPLORATION
(from elsewhere)
James Stevens Valliant :
Just wanted to say that you argued this topic quite well. And I was trying to think if I could give you any language that would help you in the future.
You have one position that I think is correct, and one that I think you should consider modifying. First, I agree that knowledge is reconstructed from information, just as meaning is transferred by the use of analogies to transfer properties. So information exists without a knowing subject. And that information may be very good, or very bad at producing the experience of knowledge in a subject.
Second is the problem of conflating (a)awareness, (b)risk, (c)truth content, and truth content consist of two additional properties: (c.i)persuasive power, and (c.ii)parsimonious correspondence with reality (what we mean by ‘true’).
The reason that discussion of knowledge is problematic is that this term is a sort of catch-all for these separate properties. And so like many concepts, argument is a problem of conflating properties, each of which exists on a separate spectrum.
“Knowing” could mean ‘awareness gained through experience’, or ‘given what we know from experience, I am willing to act upon it’, or knowing could mean ‘through experience we believe this is true’.
–“If you think that knowledge is something other than true belief, then we also strongly differ. For that old fashioned kind of knowledge, contact with reality is required. But at least you know that I know what we normally call “science” already assumes a mountain of knowledge.”–
So I think that the only POSSIBLE meaning of the category ‘knowledge’ is ‘awareness of a regular pattern that allows us to predict something, even if it is only to predict in the sense of identifying something as part of a category – the most simple prediction possible.
And then we have the persuasive power of knowledge in convincing the self or others, first to state something is possible, then second to state something is worthy of action (risk).
For example, no one ‘knows’ how to build a computer (or a cheeseburger for that matter) in the sense that they possess knowledge of construction of the constituent parts. So some knowledge can never be centralized except as a hierarchy of abstractions – trust in one another’s claim to actionable knowledge.
For these reasons (the number of causal axis in the category we call knowledge), I think we cannot improve upon casting knowledge as awareness, all knowledge theoretical, where theoretical contains both persuasive power in an honest discourse(risk reduction), and truth content( parsimonious correspondence with reality).
So I my problem is that ‘justified true belief’ is not false under the test of risk, but is not meaningful under the test of analytic truth. In this sense, it depends upon which thing we are talking about: willingness to act (justified true belief), willingness of others to insure actions (contractual justified true belief), and analytic truth (parsimonious correspondence with reality). If a man gives witness in testimony and later on we find a video of the events, and it turns out that he is wrong, but that it is easy to understand how he was mistaken, we do not consider his testimony false. We only warranty what rational man is capable of warranting. In science we warranty that we have done due diligence: we have criticized our own arguments. We testify that we have done due diligence – we have criticized our own position.
In this sense both justified true belief is necessary for contractual propositions, while critical rationalism (warranty) is the only epistemological possibility.
The fact that argument evolved out of law (debate in the polis) probably explains the origin of conflation of contractual justification according to the norms of the polity, with the pursuit of analytic truth in epistemological exploration.
The fact that most human action is contractual, and very little of it epistemic, explains the persistence of both the contractual (justificationary),and epistemic (critical scientific) as practices, and the conflation of the term knowledge as a general term covering both contractual and epistemic uses. Norms guide most human actions. Norms are habituated and therefore reduced to intuitions to function. The norms is contractual (justificationary – so that we avoid blame). Science produces not actions but testimony. The problem is inverted. In science all we produce is testimony regardless of normative rules. In normative relations we produce actions that we justify as according to the normative rules of society. So we testify that we were justified according to norms in contractual relations, and we testify that our statements are free of norms, imaginary, error, bias, habituated deception and outright deception, in science. This is why science is a luxury good: it’s terribly expensive, and scientific testimony is terribly expensive. Justification allows us to use scientifically tested or evolutionarily tested general rules in real world actions – contracts.
And must. We cannot create general rules out of justificationary testimony, only out of critical testimony. For this reason, both justificationary and critical testimony will persist forever. While our warranties must be given by critical means, our testimony is forever justificationary. (I think that is fairly profound).
As far as I know, albeit in brief, this is the most accurate statement of our extant understanding of the question of knowledge, and why it has been so troublesome a concept.
Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev, Ukraine
NOTE: I have Kenneth blocked for personal attacks in defense of his ideological position, so I can’t see his posts. But I can understand your frustration. There is a reason why people feel they want to externalize responsibility for actions. And there is a long standing tradition of attempting to treat imaginary concepts as existential rather than experiential. And worse, in German, Jewish and Islamic cultures (not Anglo or Sinic) this is an attempt to create authoritarianism by abstracting the existential into the spiritual (metaphysical or platonic world.) So you have to look at such arguments as non logical, non-truthful, but mere justificationary attempts to establish traditional textual authority – something learned from monotheism. I am not really finished with my analysis of suggestion, loading, framing, overloading, conflation, and obscurantism as rationalist means of deception. I think a quick read of Kevin MacDonald’s analysis of the deceptive argumentative technique of Critique is probably very helpful to most – we can trace monotheistic argument, through greek, christian, and enlightenment, german and jewish counter-enlightenment thinkers. But the more I study the problem the more obvious it is that the purpose of science is to eliminate authority and the purpose of rationalism in all its forms, is to construct scriptural authority out of cunning but deceptive arguments. Science uses logic(internal consistency), experiment (external correspondence), operational definitions (existential possibility), falsification (parsimony), to create a testimony that one is speaking truthfully and non-allegorically, and his work is as free of imaginary content, whether it be error, bias, habituated (unconscious) deception or intentional deception – even if we never know if we speak the most parsimonious theory possible.
Source date (UTC): 2015-01-10 07:39:00 UTC
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Turning Rationalism On Its Head
(from elsewhere)
[T]hanks Andrew:
In regard to my statement:
—“So no statement that is not open to sympathetic testing (falsification) by operational means (sympathetic testing) can be ‘true’, nor ‘scientific’ since ‘scientific’ refers to morally warrantable constraint upon one’s statements.”—
You argue:
–“It is important to consider if this statement itself is scientific or ‘true’ by its own terms. “–
Well, this is a rationalist position, not a scientific position. So what is important to a person who justifies arguments to see if they are true (a rationalist), and a person who criticizes hypotheses to see if they are provide predictive results (a scientist) is considerably different.
A frequent fallacy of philosophical argument is that there are two, not three arguments. They are 1) Rationalist, 2) Empiricist, and 3) Scientific. 1 and 2 are philosophical justifications. 3 is not. It merely seeks what works. Philosophers attempt quite often to cast as justificationary (under their control) that which does not seek justification, but only seeks to perform.
A scientist seeks to testify that he has done due diligence, he does not seek to make true statements. After his due diligence, and after the community’s due diligence, that which survives remains hypothesis theory or law.
Science is not philosophical, but like law, practical. By practical application law evolves, and by practical applicatoin, science evolves. We philosophers attempt to explain this, but we do not inform science. We inform others about the progress of science. (Which in itself is an interesting phenomenon.)
Science then does not bear a burden of analytic truth. It bears only its evolved polycentric, normative, laws against error, bias, and deception in the presentation of theories. Those laws are often poorly articulated (outside of experimental psychology). We can analyze those laws and translate them into philosophical terms as a warranty (promise) that theories are:
- i) internally consistent (logical)
- ii) externally correspondent (correlative)
- iii) empirical (observable)
- iv) operational (existentially possible)
- v) falsifiable
- vi) reasonably falsified
Now, a good critical rationalist would say that all those criteria are means of falsification (criticism), not justifications, as most rationalists would attempt to assert. However, I see this as again, non-performative (verbalist) rationalist language. And instead that these are our evolved conditions of intellectual warranty, that have survived the test of time by eliminating error, bias, and deception.
(a) “is the statement falsifiable?”
My statement is reducible to “only existentially possible human operations – whether mental or physical – can exist”. This is a metaphysical not epistemological assertion. So the proposition that we must falsify a metaphysical statement is inapplicable. Without this stipulation no further argument is possible on any grounds.Just for fun: If we could state that existentially impossible human actions can exist, then yes it is falsifiable. Just as if we state that existentially impossible mathematical operations can exist. While both of these things are hard to conceive of, that does not mean that they cannot be constructed, just as we did not imaging that length was a local rather than absolute concept. (Einstein/Brouwer). all premises are theoretical, even metaphysical premises.
Can something demonstrably exist, and can such a thing be observable? Since (this is the point of empiricist arguments) we can both sympathize with one another (or we could not cooperate on intentions) and observe our own reaction to incentive-producing phenomenon, we can in fact, make internal observations, and we can collect external, empirical observations from others. (We do. All the time. In many disciplines. )
Now it is possible that say, the quantum theory of subconscious communication is possible, but that would only state that we were not conscious, not that we reacted to incentives (information). And that we could not observe it, just as we cannot observe many of our intuitionistic functions of the mind. They are hidden from us.
Next;
(b) “Not being an empirical statement, it cannot itself be empirically tested.”Well, it being a metaphysical statement that is its definition.
But that said, this is a good example of the rationalist fallacy. Given that empirical means observable, that I know of, we cannot make non-empirical statements. This is the debate between empiricism and rationalism. Measurements are empirical observations. Internal observations of our own sensations are empirical observations. The question is whether we insert error, bias, and deception into those observations. We are not trying to assert observations are true, we are trying to assert that observations are reasonably free of all possible error, bias, and deception.
Moreover, isolating and constructing a demonstrative test is useful only in those circumstances where we seek to uncover first principles (reduce variables). Not in those cases where we seek to discover emergent phenomenon in fully informed (existential) reality, in real time (study variables). Economics requires the latter. In physics the former. In economics we can subjectively test incentives – that is why we can cooperate, and why apes don’t (well). It is why we can use juries in courts. But we cannot deduce from incentives all possible emergent economic phenomenon, which while based upon simple rules produces fractal results (emergent complexity we cannot anticipate). In physics by contrast we do not know the first principles – we cannot empathize or sympathize with the physical universe (yet).
Another rationalist fallacy: it is MORE accurate to collect unintentionally constructed data and see if it fits your model, than it is to construct an experiment and intentionally construct data. This is one of the benefits of economic data over other tests: we collect demonstrated preferences (performatively-true testimonies). Whereas we have demonstrated that we cannot collect performatively-true testimonies in most cases because of error bias and deception.
(c) “There is the question of science vs. orthodoxy.”
Orthodoxy is a justificationist position not a scientific one.
So, actually, the question is normative (as practiced), juridical(survives criticism), and metaphysical(existentially possible). Philosophy as practiced is largely justificationary for ancient reasons. Science is demonstrative and theoretical for equally ancient reasons – largely to avoid the politically normative, which is highly loaded with error, bias and deception.For this reason it behooves us to recognize that philosophy as practiced is a political activity, not a scientific one. That is why the most sophisticated deceptions in history have been constructed via rationalist means. First monotheism was developed argumentatively as an authoritarian vehicle. Next philosophical argument. Then pseudoscientific. Finally postmodern abandoned all truth and reason.
So the problem is not that science, must meet philosophical standards, but that rationalists must prove that they do not practice world history’s most successful art of lying, bias, and error. Since most great deceptions were carried out by rationalist rather than scientific means. Not the least of which were the church’s integration of aristotelianism, Rousseau’s justification and responsibility for the horrors of the revolution, Kant’s authoritarianism and responsibility for making marxism possible, marx’s responsibility for the death of 100M, Keynesianism’s responsibility for western civilization’s suicide, freudian psychology’s century long survival and all the damage it has done to individuals, Cantorian sets and the platonization of math and physics, scientific socialism and the loss of eastern Europe, and the postmodern and feminist attacks on the family – the central unit of reproduction.
So rationalists must warrant that they do no harm, scientists must not warrant, and do not warrant that they speak the truth. Only that they have done due diligence against doing harm to the informational commons via error bias and deception. Could we hold a court to convict both rationalists and scientists on the harm done by error, bias and deception, the prisons would be filled with rationalists and nearly empty of scientists.
Because the harm done by rationalists, is only exceeded by the great plagues. In that sense rationalism (justificationism) is an intellectual plague that we are justified in exterminating. (Which is to some small degree part of my work.)
(d) ” it is an interesting philosophy that states that philosophy is to be excluded from consideration.”
This statement requires that we agree on the term ‘philosophy’. Since in my work, I argue i think persuasively, that there isn’t any difference if both philosophy and science are subject to the same criterion. If science, philosophy, morality and law are not identical in content then someone is engaged in error, deception, or bias.Instead, I state that rationalism (at least german and jewish rationalism) is a justificationary, authoritarian cult that has produced catastrophic harm to man on the same scale as scriptural monotheism, and only slightly less terrible than the great plagues.
And that is simply the result of looking at the evidence.
CLOSING
Hopefully I put this conversation into perspective, not only correcting a number of common rationalist fallacies.
It might be a bit to swallow, but that’s just how it is.Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
L’viv Ukraine. - i) internally consistent (logical)
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Turning Rationalism On Its Head
(from elsewhere)
[T]hanks Andrew:
In regard to my statement:
—“So no statement that is not open to sympathetic testing (falsification) by operational means (sympathetic testing) can be ‘true’, nor ‘scientific’ since ‘scientific’ refers to morally warrantable constraint upon one’s statements.”—
You argue:
–“It is important to consider if this statement itself is scientific or ‘true’ by its own terms. “–
Well, this is a rationalist position, not a scientific position. So what is important to a person who justifies arguments to see if they are true (a rationalist), and a person who criticizes hypotheses to see if they are provide predictive results (a scientist) is considerably different.
A frequent fallacy of philosophical argument is that there are two, not three arguments. They are 1) Rationalist, 2) Empiricist, and 3) Scientific. 1 and 2 are philosophical justifications. 3 is not. It merely seeks what works. Philosophers attempt quite often to cast as justificationary (under their control) that which does not seek justification, but only seeks to perform.
A scientist seeks to testify that he has done due diligence, he does not seek to make true statements. After his due diligence, and after the community’s due diligence, that which survives remains hypothesis theory or law.
Science is not philosophical, but like law, practical. By practical application law evolves, and by practical applicatoin, science evolves. We philosophers attempt to explain this, but we do not inform science. We inform others about the progress of science. (Which in itself is an interesting phenomenon.)
Science then does not bear a burden of analytic truth. It bears only its evolved polycentric, normative, laws against error, bias, and deception in the presentation of theories. Those laws are often poorly articulated (outside of experimental psychology). We can analyze those laws and translate them into philosophical terms as a warranty (promise) that theories are:
- i) internally consistent (logical)
- ii) externally correspondent (correlative)
- iii) empirical (observable)
- iv) operational (existentially possible)
- v) falsifiable
- vi) reasonably falsified
Now, a good critical rationalist would say that all those criteria are means of falsification (criticism), not justifications, as most rationalists would attempt to assert. However, I see this as again, non-performative (verbalist) rationalist language. And instead that these are our evolved conditions of intellectual warranty, that have survived the test of time by eliminating error, bias, and deception.
(a) “is the statement falsifiable?”
My statement is reducible to “only existentially possible human operations – whether mental or physical – can exist”. This is a metaphysical not epistemological assertion. So the proposition that we must falsify a metaphysical statement is inapplicable. Without this stipulation no further argument is possible on any grounds.Just for fun: If we could state that existentially impossible human actions can exist, then yes it is falsifiable. Just as if we state that existentially impossible mathematical operations can exist. While both of these things are hard to conceive of, that does not mean that they cannot be constructed, just as we did not imaging that length was a local rather than absolute concept. (Einstein/Brouwer). all premises are theoretical, even metaphysical premises.
Can something demonstrably exist, and can such a thing be observable? Since (this is the point of empiricist arguments) we can both sympathize with one another (or we could not cooperate on intentions) and observe our own reaction to incentive-producing phenomenon, we can in fact, make internal observations, and we can collect external, empirical observations from others. (We do. All the time. In many disciplines. )
Now it is possible that say, the quantum theory of subconscious communication is possible, but that would only state that we were not conscious, not that we reacted to incentives (information). And that we could not observe it, just as we cannot observe many of our intuitionistic functions of the mind. They are hidden from us.
Next;
(b) “Not being an empirical statement, it cannot itself be empirically tested.”Well, it being a metaphysical statement that is its definition.
But that said, this is a good example of the rationalist fallacy. Given that empirical means observable, that I know of, we cannot make non-empirical statements. This is the debate between empiricism and rationalism. Measurements are empirical observations. Internal observations of our own sensations are empirical observations. The question is whether we insert error, bias, and deception into those observations. We are not trying to assert observations are true, we are trying to assert that observations are reasonably free of all possible error, bias, and deception.
Moreover, isolating and constructing a demonstrative test is useful only in those circumstances where we seek to uncover first principles (reduce variables). Not in those cases where we seek to discover emergent phenomenon in fully informed (existential) reality, in real time (study variables). Economics requires the latter. In physics the former. In economics we can subjectively test incentives – that is why we can cooperate, and why apes don’t (well). It is why we can use juries in courts. But we cannot deduce from incentives all possible emergent economic phenomenon, which while based upon simple rules produces fractal results (emergent complexity we cannot anticipate). In physics by contrast we do not know the first principles – we cannot empathize or sympathize with the physical universe (yet).
Another rationalist fallacy: it is MORE accurate to collect unintentionally constructed data and see if it fits your model, than it is to construct an experiment and intentionally construct data. This is one of the benefits of economic data over other tests: we collect demonstrated preferences (performatively-true testimonies). Whereas we have demonstrated that we cannot collect performatively-true testimonies in most cases because of error bias and deception.
(c) “There is the question of science vs. orthodoxy.”
Orthodoxy is a justificationist position not a scientific one.
So, actually, the question is normative (as practiced), juridical(survives criticism), and metaphysical(existentially possible). Philosophy as practiced is largely justificationary for ancient reasons. Science is demonstrative and theoretical for equally ancient reasons – largely to avoid the politically normative, which is highly loaded with error, bias and deception.For this reason it behooves us to recognize that philosophy as practiced is a political activity, not a scientific one. That is why the most sophisticated deceptions in history have been constructed via rationalist means. First monotheism was developed argumentatively as an authoritarian vehicle. Next philosophical argument. Then pseudoscientific. Finally postmodern abandoned all truth and reason.
So the problem is not that science, must meet philosophical standards, but that rationalists must prove that they do not practice world history’s most successful art of lying, bias, and error. Since most great deceptions were carried out by rationalist rather than scientific means. Not the least of which were the church’s integration of aristotelianism, Rousseau’s justification and responsibility for the horrors of the revolution, Kant’s authoritarianism and responsibility for making marxism possible, marx’s responsibility for the death of 100M, Keynesianism’s responsibility for western civilization’s suicide, freudian psychology’s century long survival and all the damage it has done to individuals, Cantorian sets and the platonization of math and physics, scientific socialism and the loss of eastern Europe, and the postmodern and feminist attacks on the family – the central unit of reproduction.
So rationalists must warrant that they do no harm, scientists must not warrant, and do not warrant that they speak the truth. Only that they have done due diligence against doing harm to the informational commons via error bias and deception. Could we hold a court to convict both rationalists and scientists on the harm done by error, bias and deception, the prisons would be filled with rationalists and nearly empty of scientists.
Because the harm done by rationalists, is only exceeded by the great plagues. In that sense rationalism (justificationism) is an intellectual plague that we are justified in exterminating. (Which is to some small degree part of my work.)
(d) ” it is an interesting philosophy that states that philosophy is to be excluded from consideration.”
This statement requires that we agree on the term ‘philosophy’. Since in my work, I argue i think persuasively, that there isn’t any difference if both philosophy and science are subject to the same criterion. If science, philosophy, morality and law are not identical in content then someone is engaged in error, deception, or bias.Instead, I state that rationalism (at least german and jewish rationalism) is a justificationary, authoritarian cult that has produced catastrophic harm to man on the same scale as scriptural monotheism, and only slightly less terrible than the great plagues.
And that is simply the result of looking at the evidence.
CLOSING
Hopefully I put this conversation into perspective, not only correcting a number of common rationalist fallacies.
It might be a bit to swallow, but that’s just how it is.Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute
L’viv Ukraine. - i) internally consistent (logical)
-
Propertarian reasoning is a formal logic. Once you understand it, it isn’t like
Propertarian reasoning is a formal logic. Once you understand it, it isn’t like dodgy philosophy or dishonest mysticism: you don’t really need to be very cunning.
Either some proposition is constructable out of human operations on property or it isn’t.
Once you know the four categories of property that humans demonstrate and the different reproductive strategies we demonstrate, and the different group evolutionary strategies we demonstrate, you can pretty much explain all human political activity.
And this is different from the physical sciences in the sense that we don’t know the first principles of the universe, but we do know the first principles of man: acquire, defend, cooperate, divide labor, develop information systems for extending cooperation – and justify our reproductive strategies constantly for the purpose of negotiating our cooperation.
Man is simple it turns out.
Source date (UTC): 2014-12-10 02:54:00 UTC
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SKETCH (massive headache so gotta stop for today – but might be interesting to s
SKETCH
(massive headache so gotta stop for today – but might be interesting to some)
Differences
———-
IDENTICAL: indistinguishable from one another.
FUNGIBLE: each unit of a commodity is replaceable other units of the same commodity.
SUBSTITUTABLE: performs the same utility in the context of a given purpose.
MARGINALLY INDIFFERENT: insufficiently different to cause a change in state.
MARGINALLY DIFFERENT: sufficiently different to cause a change in state.
COMMENSURABLE: measurable by the same standard.
INCOMMENSURABLE: having no common standard of measurement.
Propositions
—————–
DECIDABLE: A decision can be made without the addition of external information.
CALCULABLE: An operation can be performed without the addition of external information.
DEDUCIBLE: A prediction can be made without the need for external information.
OPERATIONAL: a conclusion can be reached by a series of existentially possible operations.
STRICTLY OPERATIONAL : the theory is constructible (i)using existentially possible operations, (ii)does not include use of analogy, (iii)does not require inference (deduction), and (iv) survives all argumentative falsification.
ORIGINAL INTENTION (CONTEXT / ARBITRARY PRECISION) : in interpreting a text, a court should determine what the authors of the text were trying to achieve, and to give effect to what they intended the statute to accomplish, the actual text of the legislation notwithstanding.
TEXTUAL / NARROW/ TRUE (Conservative – normative and legislative) vs ALLEGORICAL / WIDE / MEANING(judicial) interpretation.
In textual/Narrow/True (conservative) legal interpretation, a law is analogous to an operational recipe and changes to the recipe must be enacted by the legislature. In Allegorical / Wide / Meaning (Progressive) interpretation, the judges can invent law if they can justify the extension of the principle of the law into new areas of application not considered by it’s authors. In practice conservative TRUTH and progressive MEANING place the construction of law into the hands of the judiciary rather than the hands of the legislature and people.
HOLMES’ LIE
——————
The life of the law may have been experience but that is not license for judges to write law at will – it is an admission of the failure of legal theorists to develop propertarianism, and to separate the resolution of disputes according to the law, from the development of contracts (legislative law) on behalf of the citizenry. The separation of functions of government is necessary for the defense of the people against tyranny. Holmes justified tyranny with his deceptive use of rationalism.
Propertarianism
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See Wiki (or legal dictionary) Textualism (the law is only what is written in the text), Originalism(the text must be interpreted as the authors intended it) and Strict Constructionism ( which is weak textualism and is not practiced ).
In Propertarianism, have attempted to prevent deceptions by requiring law be written to include its precision – original intention – as a preamble for any prohibition, thus requiring both the obverse and inverse propositions, such that when conditions fail (precision is exceeded) then we must revert to strict operationalism to construct new law.
In history, judges ‘discovered’ law, and asked the people (the legislature) to approve it. This constraint – the request for legislative approval – extends the period of resolution of disputes. (Which I address elsewhere.) But under Propertarian Property rights, it should be possible to construct new precision from first principles – or not. If not, then it is not a matter of law, but a matter of contract. If it is a matter of contractual exchange, then it is a legislative matter, not one for the courts to decide.
Purpose
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The American constitution was an innovative experiment that nearly achieved law in logical form. However, the problem of contextual precision that we came to understand in the twentieth century was not known at the time.
The purpose of the law is to (negative or inverse) identify and prohibit involuntary operations, and to (positive or obverse) identify and codify voluntary operations.
Obverse statements determine precision (conditions), that operational analysis can later demonstrate conditions to have exceeded. Such extensions then require new law (new conditions) constructed as Obverse (positive) statements.
(Much more … but too much of a headache)
Source date (UTC): 2014-12-03 05:03:00 UTC
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RELIGION AND THE NEED FOR DECIDABILITY Mankind faces the problem of Buridan’s As
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buridan%27s_assMYTHOS RELIGION AND THE NEED FOR DECIDABILITY
Mankind faces the problem of Buridan’s Ass (which in itself is an elegant myth).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buridan%27s_ass
FORGETTING
we cannot forget that most propositions in life are undecidable. They are too complex for the information before us. And that we make propositions decidable using myths. These myths are narrative, metaphysical, justifications of certain reproductive, social, and productive strategies. And it is pedagogically IMPOSSIBLE to teach those things late in life by reason instead of early in life by narrative analogy. PERIOD.
SO RELIGIONS ARE NECESSARY AND UNAVOIDABLE FOR COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT.
The only question is, which religion produces the fewest negative externalities.
We already know that answer: pagan mythos. Hyperbolic emphasis on life lessons. Fairy tales, myths, legends the arthurian, roman and greek myths are merely children preparations for the study of great individuals in history. And it is the ‘remembrance’ of great people of history through organized ritual that produce little but positive externalities.
POSITIVE RELIGIONS HAVE POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
But in pursuit of tyranny, the tyrannical purposefully exterminated our positive religions: paganism, hero worship, and history.
It was the socialists, Christians , marxists who did this.
IF YOU KILL HISTORY YOU KILL A PEOPLE
And to concentrate capital necessary for war and exploitation they killed our paganism and history.
And gave us a dark age of a thousand years.
Only by restoring our history did we develop the enlightenment and escape ignorance.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY WAS THE SECOND ATTEMPT AT MYSTIFICATION.
By the same people who gave us Christianity, using alternative history, pseudoscience, postmodernism, and organized systemic gossip attacks in media, and then in both media, academy, and state.
The second mysticism of the west was accomplished by pseudoscience, pseudo rationalism, pseudo-mathematics, eradication of history, grammar, rhetoric and truth.
THANKFULLY IT IS REVERSABLE.
Source date (UTC): 2014-11-25 01:58:00 UTC
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“I should hasten to remind the court that we are here, in the presence of the co
—“I should hasten to remind the court that we are here, in the presence of the court, because someone must decide that which is difficult to decide – not because the court is particularly skilled at such decisions, not that the court is better at such decisions than I, and certainly not because the court’s time is more precious than mine.”—
Source date (UTC): 2014-11-21 20:10:00 UTC
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Liberarian Requirements for Legal Decidability
[W]e can construct libertarianism as a (a) sentimental, (b) ratio-moral, or (c) ratio-legal, or (d) legal-empirical framework – a body of interdependent arguments.
But if we rely upon sentimental, and ratio-moral construction, then statements are not decidable, and opinion still influences the decision – we leave open not only the possibility of, but the preference for the addition of subjective preference into any decision. That is why we cannot construct rule of law upon ratio-moral arguments – revisionism and evolutionary corruption.
This is why libertarianism in the anglo tradition has been constructed as a legal framework rather than moral framework of the cosmopolitan and continental traditions – by using strict construction and original intent.
However, while this construction – as a system of calculation, which prohibits, unlike rationalism, the introduction of information not present in the original construction – still leaves open the question as to what determines the scope and limits to property upon which a ratio-legal law is calculated.
Empirical-legal evidence tells us that if we wish to construct a libertarian society, that we must define property as that which people treat as property by defense of it, and retaliation for violations of it.
Without this knowledge we cannot eliminate demand for the state as an imposer of arbitrary norms, and suppressor of retaliation for violations of property that humans demonstrate they intuit as their property.
There is only one way to eliminate the state, and that is to eliminate demand for it, by providing a sufficient body of property rights law, that all disputes are rationally decidable without the addition of subjective information.