Curt Doolittle

Theme: Commons

  • Defining “Bad”

    Whenever gain takes precedence over imposition of costs Whenever profit takes precedence over commons. Whenever financial markets take precedence over culture. Whenever law takes precedence over family. Whenever government takes precedence over industry. Whenever state takes precedence over tribe. Whenever empire takes precedence over nation.

    The British press are whining about the short-term impact of financial markets. The British people are worried about the long-term consequences to family, commons, culture, nation, and people. The madness is endemic. Kill the Napoleonic state

  • Defining “Bad”

    Whenever gain takes precedence over imposition of costs Whenever profit takes precedence over commons. Whenever financial markets take precedence over culture. Whenever law takes precedence over family. Whenever government takes precedence over industry. Whenever state takes precedence over tribe. Whenever empire takes precedence over nation.

    The British press are whining about the short-term impact of financial markets. The British people are worried about the long-term consequences to family, commons, culture, nation, and people. The madness is endemic. Kill the Napoleonic state

  • Democracy’s Monopoly Commons vs Rule of Law’s Market Commons

    The value of democracy in the selection of commons decreases with the size of the population voting. Why? because the size of the population increases the diversity of interests. And because democracy allows us only to choose between priorities from within common interest – it’s a monopolistic means of choosing which commons to produce. So when we increase in scale, we require markets to conduct exchanges between different common interests, not monopolies, to ignore our uncommon interests.

  • Democracy’s Monopoly Commons vs Rule of Law’s Market Commons

    The value of democracy in the selection of commons decreases with the size of the population voting. Why? because the size of the population increases the diversity of interests. And because democracy allows us only to choose between priorities from within common interest – it’s a monopolistic means of choosing which commons to produce. So when we increase in scale, we require markets to conduct exchanges between different common interests, not monopolies, to ignore our uncommon interests.

  • The Criminality of Rothbardian Ethics

    Moreover, the this is why libertarians were wrong in privatization. The difference between a commons and private goods, is that owners can consume private goods, and others cannot, whereas no-one can consume commons whether one was a contributor or not. Instead the market (locality) itself benefits from the *externalities* produced by the construction of the commons. So private property prohibits others from consumption, and commons prevent all from consumption. And whereas competition in the market creates incentives to produce private goods, competition in the construction of commons produces malincentives. Why? Because of loss aversion. Given that commons product benefits only be externality, they must be free of privatization in order to provide incentive to produce them. The libertarian solution was to make commons either impossible to produce due to malincentives, or to create vehicles for extraction by externality without contributing to production. pathways through two-dimensional space are particularly problematic since the only way to create private property is with a militia or military funded by the commons.

    The answer instead is to increase incentives for the private production of commons as a status signal and personal monument that outlast’s one’s lifetime, and can be inherited by one’s offspring. And to increase the scale of commons that can be produced by the public (market) production of commons that are free from privatization.

  • The Criminality of Rothbardian Ethics

    Moreover, the this is why libertarians were wrong in privatization. The difference between a commons and private goods, is that owners can consume private goods, and others cannot, whereas no-one can consume commons whether one was a contributor or not. Instead the market (locality) itself benefits from the *externalities* produced by the construction of the commons. So private property prohibits others from consumption, and commons prevent all from consumption. And whereas competition in the market creates incentives to produce private goods, competition in the construction of commons produces malincentives. Why? Because of loss aversion. Given that commons product benefits only be externality, they must be free of privatization in order to provide incentive to produce them. The libertarian solution was to make commons either impossible to produce due to malincentives, or to create vehicles for extraction by externality without contributing to production. pathways through two-dimensional space are particularly problematic since the only way to create private property is with a militia or military funded by the commons.

    The answer instead is to increase incentives for the private production of commons as a status signal and personal monument that outlast’s one’s lifetime, and can be inherited by one’s offspring. And to increase the scale of commons that can be produced by the public (market) production of commons that are free from privatization.

  • Ancapism Cannot Survive Market Competition

    ***”anarchism lacks institutions for construction of decidable law, and the production of commons necessary for the continuous development of suppression of parasitism and continuous development of competitive commons. It’s an ethic for disasporic people who free ride upon nation states, but it cannot serve as the institutional basis of a voluntary polity because one cannot create a polity that can compete for members with other polities. in other words, ancapism cannot produce a polity that can survive in the market for polities without a host polity and institutions that it parasitically lives within”***

  • Ancapism Cannot Survive Market Competition

    ***”anarchism lacks institutions for construction of decidable law, and the production of commons necessary for the continuous development of suppression of parasitism and continuous development of competitive commons. It’s an ethic for disasporic people who free ride upon nation states, but it cannot serve as the institutional basis of a voluntary polity because one cannot create a polity that can compete for members with other polities. in other words, ancapism cannot produce a polity that can survive in the market for polities without a host polity and institutions that it parasitically lives within”***

  • Market Production of Commons?

    –“I’m confused about the market production of commons”–
    I use the term market government, and market production of commons do describe the fact that commons may be produced by at least three means: 1 – private production of commons via the usual market process 2 – use of the house of ‘parliament’ to negotiate the voluntary production of a common (which may not be imposed upon) 3 – use of the houses of parliament to negotiate a trade between classes for the exchange of monetary and non-monetary goods, services, and behavior, to product commons that may or may not be physically constructed, and may instead be normatively or behaviorally constructed. The problem of circumventing market demand for legislation is answered by providing options 2 and 3 in lieu of monopoly rule.

  • Market Production of Commons?

    –“I’m confused about the market production of commons”–
    I use the term market government, and market production of commons do describe the fact that commons may be produced by at least three means: 1 – private production of commons via the usual market process 2 – use of the house of ‘parliament’ to negotiate the voluntary production of a common (which may not be imposed upon) 3 – use of the houses of parliament to negotiate a trade between classes for the exchange of monetary and non-monetary goods, services, and behavior, to product commons that may or may not be physically constructed, and may instead be normatively or behaviorally constructed. The problem of circumventing market demand for legislation is answered by providing options 2 and 3 in lieu of monopoly rule.