(FB 1546201719 Timestamp) Libertarians always think small. War is a profitable exercise. For some of us it is our favorite occupation. The problems arise from ruling, colonizing, and commingling. But the lessons of history are unambiguous: the wholesale removal of people from territory is always and everywhere the optimum business venture.
Theme: Class
-
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
(FB 1546190998 Timestamp) by Tom McSweeny Talking to the Left doesn’t bring them on side because it doesn’t demonstrate value add/roi nor change their behaviour. The left is happy debating, discussing, talking, letting everyone say their piece and valuing the contribution they made out of principle rather than results, happy with instant grat and short term outcomes supporting their ideologies and ideals: “Would you look at that, the people fleeing their own shithole are happy they are in our green and pleasant lands…didn’t we do good.” And in all fairness: outcome achieved. Long term though, that way lies death. We play the long game: the survival of our people (eugenic conquest through space and time). Arguing with the short term gamers is like listening to a spiced soy latte t-shirt commie: “Pleeeease, can’t you just see this is the better way”. Fuck that. That’s not us. We don’t need to make the case to them, we are the case. We are largely also the current leverage holders (tradesman: rw, army: rw, engineers: rw). Why is that? Because we are those who deal in reality, as is. So how do we red pill them that will not listen? Well, people believe what they do rather than do what they believe. We win by demonstrating, offering the opportunity for them to mimic us, and personally assisting with training each other (which is what these ongoing convs online are). Talk means nothing. But taking the young woman currently “fun timing” her way down the value ladder and showing her there is plenty to enjoy without long term cost, or the skinny soy boy cringe and showing him with a bit of effort he too can be the chad family man with ten loving kids, a hundred loving grandkids, be stacked and rich…that how we do it. Let us recall Jesus’s statement: âI am the way and the truth and the life”. And remember we are seeking to provide what we can demonstrate to be the best way for all concerned. If the opportunity is there, then the only thing left to say is “fuck them” if they don’t take it.
-
Curt Doolittle shared a link.
(FB 1546739069 Timestamp) FROM DAN HOLLIDAY ON QUORA Why does the center not need the coasts?
-
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
(FB 1547125060 Timestamp) —“Western society is dominant through the propagation of western currency, which has taking the place of western warfare, in order to maintain western dominance do you think the value of economic currency needs to be maintained or the value of western warfare needs to become the currency?”— A Friend Smart Question. I think the short answer is that western currency, and in particular, the american takeover of the british empire at bretton woods, which was dependent upon providing open access to the american market, and american guarantee of policing of world trade.
Western dominance is not ‘needed’.
Conflict of civilizations will emerge.
Power evolved by increasingly subtle incentives: Violence > Religion > Administration > Economics > with next state being information (which scares me).
The west competed successfully by a combination of technologies. The competitive advantage in other than trust (culture) has mostly been eliminated. the competitive advantage of demographic distribution is in the process of being eliminated.
I do not see how the west can maintain military superiority. Military superiority requires technology. Technology requires wealth. Wealth requires population, trade routes, and all the rest…
At present, Trump is attempting to force europeans to remilitarize by withdrawing military force from the region, and then the rest of the world, more slowly, because america no longer has the relative economic and technological advantage. Worse, chinese organization, government, and culture is superior for the conduct of military, economic, and political expansion.
-
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
(FB 1547486221 Timestamp) RELATIVE COSTS AND INCOME BALANCE OUT MAJOR DIFFERENCES IS NOT STATE BUT URBAN VS RURAL Alabama Median household income: $44,765 Regional price parity out of 100: 86.8 Real income: $51,573 Alaska Median household income: $73,355 Regional price parity out of 100: 105.6 Real income: $69,465 Arizona Median household income: $51,492 Regional price parity out of 100: 96.2 Real income: $53,526 Arkansas Median household income: $41,995 Regional price parity out of 100: 87.4 Real income: $48,049 California Median household income: $64,500 Regional price parity out of 100: 113.4 Real income: $56,878 Colorado Median household income: $63,909 Regional price parity out of 100: 103.2 Real income: $61,927 Connecticut Median household income: $71,346 Regional price parity out of 100: 108.7 Real income: $65,636 Delaware Median household income: $61,255 Regional price parity out of 100: 100.4 Real income: $61,011 District of Columbia Median household income: $75,628 Regional price parity out of 100: 117 Real income: $64,639 Florida Median household income: $49,426 Regional price parity out of 100: 99.5 Real income: $49,674 Georgia Median household income: $51,244 Regional price parity out of 100: 92.6 Real income: $55,339 Hawaii Median household income: $73,486 Regional price parity out of 100: 118.8 Real income: $61,857 Idaho Median household income: $48,275 Regional price parity out of 100: 93.4 Real income: $51,686 Illinois Median household income: $59,588 Regional price parity out of 100: 99.7 Real income: $59,767 Indiana Median household income: $50,532 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.7 Real income: $55,713 Iowa Median household income: $54,736 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.3 Real income: $60,616 Kansas Median household income: $53,906 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.4 Real income: $59,631 Kentucky Median household income: $45,215 Regional price parity out of 100: 88.6 Real income: $51,033 Louisiana Median household income: $45,727 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.6 Real income: $50,471 Maine Median household income: $51,494 Regional price parity out of 100: 98 Real income: $52,545 Maryland Median household income: $75,847 Regional price parity out of 100: 109.6 Real income: $69,203 Massachusetts Median household income: $70,628 Regional price parity out of 100: 106.9 Real income: $66,069 Michigan Median household income: $51,084 Regional price parity out of 100: 93.5 Real income: $54,635 Minnesota Median household income: $63,488 Regional price parity out of 100: 97.4 Real income: $65,183 Mississippi Median household income: $40,593 Regional price parity out of 100: 86.2 Real income: $47,092 Missouri Median household income: $50,238 Regional price parity out of 100: 89.3 Real income: $56,258 Montana Median household income: $49,509 Regional price parity out of 100: 94.8 Real income: $52,225 Nebraska Median household income: $54,996 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.6 Real income: $60,702
-
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
(FB 1547486221 Timestamp) RELATIVE COSTS AND INCOME BALANCE OUT MAJOR DIFFERENCES IS NOT STATE BUT URBAN VS RURAL Alabama Median household income: $44,765 Regional price parity out of 100: 86.8 Real income: $51,573 Alaska Median household income: $73,355 Regional price parity out of 100: 105.6 Real income: $69,465 Arizona Median household income: $51,492 Regional price parity out of 100: 96.2 Real income: $53,526 Arkansas Median household income: $41,995 Regional price parity out of 100: 87.4 Real income: $48,049 California Median household income: $64,500 Regional price parity out of 100: 113.4 Real income: $56,878 Colorado Median household income: $63,909 Regional price parity out of 100: 103.2 Real income: $61,927 Connecticut Median household income: $71,346 Regional price parity out of 100: 108.7 Real income: $65,636 Delaware Median household income: $61,255 Regional price parity out of 100: 100.4 Real income: $61,011 District of Columbia Median household income: $75,628 Regional price parity out of 100: 117 Real income: $64,639 Florida Median household income: $49,426 Regional price parity out of 100: 99.5 Real income: $49,674 Georgia Median household income: $51,244 Regional price parity out of 100: 92.6 Real income: $55,339 Hawaii Median household income: $73,486 Regional price parity out of 100: 118.8 Real income: $61,857 Idaho Median household income: $48,275 Regional price parity out of 100: 93.4 Real income: $51,686 Illinois Median household income: $59,588 Regional price parity out of 100: 99.7 Real income: $59,767 Indiana Median household income: $50,532 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.7 Real income: $55,713 Iowa Median household income: $54,736 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.3 Real income: $60,616 Kansas Median household income: $53,906 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.4 Real income: $59,631 Kentucky Median household income: $45,215 Regional price parity out of 100: 88.6 Real income: $51,033 Louisiana Median household income: $45,727 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.6 Real income: $50,471 Maine Median household income: $51,494 Regional price parity out of 100: 98 Real income: $52,545 Maryland Median household income: $75,847 Regional price parity out of 100: 109.6 Real income: $69,203 Massachusetts Median household income: $70,628 Regional price parity out of 100: 106.9 Real income: $66,069 Michigan Median household income: $51,084 Regional price parity out of 100: 93.5 Real income: $54,635 Minnesota Median household income: $63,488 Regional price parity out of 100: 97.4 Real income: $65,183 Mississippi Median household income: $40,593 Regional price parity out of 100: 86.2 Real income: $47,092 Missouri Median household income: $50,238 Regional price parity out of 100: 89.3 Real income: $56,258 Montana Median household income: $49,509 Regional price parity out of 100: 94.8 Real income: $52,225 Nebraska Median household income: $54,996 Regional price parity out of 100: 90.6 Real income: $60,702
-
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
(FB 1547642170 Timestamp) We are not ruled by money but by human greed – where that worst greed is called ‘equality’.
-
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
(FB 1547642170 Timestamp) We are not ruled by money but by human greed – where that worst greed is called ‘equality’.
-
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
(FB 1547640050 Timestamp) THE HIDDEN DECLINE IN HUMAN CAPITALâAND THE DANGER AHEAD by Peter Temin, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology(MIT). U.S. GDP accounting underestimates intangible capital, overstates financial capital, and is all but oblivious to the the erosion of human and social capital. A serious growth slowdown is coming. The American economy changed rapidly in the last half-century. We kept track of this transformation through the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), a set of statistical constructs that were designed before these changes started. Our national accounts have stretched to accommodate new and growing service activities, but they are still organized by their original design. This can be seen in the growth of financial activity and the efforts of many economists to fit finance into our measurement of national product and of economic growth. I argue in my paper that our current economic data fail to describe accurately the path of growth in our new economy. They fail to see that the United States is consuming its capital stock now and will suffer later, rather like killing the family cow to have a steak dinner. Modern growth theory started with two papers by Robert M. Solow in the late 1950s. The first paper showed that it was possible to create a stable model of economic growth using a Keynesian model of investment and capital. The second paper showed that this model failed to explain most of American growth in the first half of the 20th century (Solow, 1956, 1957). Other economists expanded Solowâs model by adding additional types of capital: human capital, social capital, financial capital. The first addition was to add human capital by measuring the effect of education on productivity. This enabled economists to work with an expanded Solow model. The second addition was to add social capital. This was added in cross-sectional regressions and has not been applied to ongoing growth estimates. The third addition was added by assuming that wealth equals physical capital, that is, financial capital is indistinguishable from physical assets (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Hall and Jones, 1999; Dasgupta, 2007; Piketty 2014). These additions furnished explanations of economic growth in the United States and other countries. The importance of these contributions was confirmed in many empirical studies, but the NIPA continues to calculate Private Fixed Investment, a Keynesian construct, as the investment part of GDP. This problem is acute in the data for finance. Philippon (2015, 1435) concluded that, âThe unit cost of financial intermediation does not seem to have decreased significantly in recent years.â As he says, this is surprising on several grounds. I build on his work to understand whether this result is the result of how the underlying data were collected. This disconnect infects the calculation of economic growth. Griliches (1990, 1994) noted over two decades ago that more and more of GDP is composed of services, which also have been called intangibles. It is hard to estimate the output of the financial sector, for example, so it is measured by its inputs. As I will show, although this may give a useful measure of current activity, it is less informative about economic growth. There are two problems. It is hard to measure productivity if inputs and outputs are conflated. If we fail to include productivity growth of an increasing part of the national product, we increasingly will underestimate the growth of the national product. Further, if we do not have a good measure of output, it is almost impossible to measure investments in finance and other intangibles. If we do not have good measures of the various forms of capital listed here, we will not be able to think hard about longer-run growth. Concern about this latter point provides the motivation for this paper. Outside the literature on the national product, there are many treatments of these new forms of capital. In addition to financial capital, human capital has been the center of explanations for the United Statesâ economic domination in the twentieth century as well as the progress of individuals within the United States (Golden and Katz, 2008; Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev, 2013). Social capital has been the center of analyses of economic growth in the United States and elsewhere and in the long and short run (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Dasgupta, 2007). Measuring these forms of capital poses many of the same problems as measuring financial capital. I review in this paper the accounting methods used to compile investment data to understand how these other forms of capital behave in an economy that has changed markedly since the 1950s. I conclude that current accounting of growth in GDP fails to include the kind of investment that generates these other forms of capital. This conclusion has three implications. First, short-run growth as currently calculated bears more relation to short-run Keynesian analysis than to what we know about long-run economic growth. Second, financial capital increases inequality more than it generates growth for the entire economy. Third, we are now allowing human and social capital to depreciate, auguring ill for future economic growth in the United States. Peter Temin is Elisha Gray II Professor Emeritus of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His âThe Political Economy of Mass Incarceration and Crime: An Analytic Model,â has just been published by the International Journal of Political Economy. A revised version of an earlier INET Working Paper, it will be freely available on line for the month after January 5, 2019: https://www.tandfonline.com/do⦠References Dasgupta, Partha. 2007. Economics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Golden, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2008. The Race between Eduction and Technology. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press. Griliches, Zvi (ed.). Output Measurement in the Service Sectors. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990. Griliches, Zvi. 1994. âProductivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint.â American Economic Review, 84 (1): 1-23. Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones. 1999. âWhy Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?â Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83-116. Heckman, James, Rodrigo Pinto, and Peter Savelyev. 2013. âUnderstanding the Mechanisms Through Which an Influential Early Childhood Program Boosted Adult Outcomes.â American Economic Review, 103 (6): 2052-2086. Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer and David N. Weil. 1992. âA Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth.â Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2): 407-37. Philippon, Thomas. 2015. âHas the US Financial Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation.â American Economic Review 105 (4), 1408-1438. Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Shuster. Solow, Robert M. 1956. âA Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.â Quarterly Journal of Economics 70: 65-94. Solow, Robert M. 1957. âTechnical Change and the Aggregate Production Function.â Review of Economics and Statistics 39: 312-20. VIA: https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/the-hidden-decline-in-human-capital-and-the-danger-ahead? PAPER: https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_86-Temin-Finance-in-Economic-Growth.pdf
-
Curt Doolittle updated his status.
(FB 1547640050 Timestamp) THE HIDDEN DECLINE IN HUMAN CAPITALâAND THE DANGER AHEAD by Peter Temin, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology(MIT). U.S. GDP accounting underestimates intangible capital, overstates financial capital, and is all but oblivious to the the erosion of human and social capital. A serious growth slowdown is coming. The American economy changed rapidly in the last half-century. We kept track of this transformation through the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), a set of statistical constructs that were designed before these changes started. Our national accounts have stretched to accommodate new and growing service activities, but they are still organized by their original design. This can be seen in the growth of financial activity and the efforts of many economists to fit finance into our measurement of national product and of economic growth. I argue in my paper that our current economic data fail to describe accurately the path of growth in our new economy. They fail to see that the United States is consuming its capital stock now and will suffer later, rather like killing the family cow to have a steak dinner. Modern growth theory started with two papers by Robert M. Solow in the late 1950s. The first paper showed that it was possible to create a stable model of economic growth using a Keynesian model of investment and capital. The second paper showed that this model failed to explain most of American growth in the first half of the 20th century (Solow, 1956, 1957). Other economists expanded Solowâs model by adding additional types of capital: human capital, social capital, financial capital. The first addition was to add human capital by measuring the effect of education on productivity. This enabled economists to work with an expanded Solow model. The second addition was to add social capital. This was added in cross-sectional regressions and has not been applied to ongoing growth estimates. The third addition was added by assuming that wealth equals physical capital, that is, financial capital is indistinguishable from physical assets (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Hall and Jones, 1999; Dasgupta, 2007; Piketty 2014). These additions furnished explanations of economic growth in the United States and other countries. The importance of these contributions was confirmed in many empirical studies, but the NIPA continues to calculate Private Fixed Investment, a Keynesian construct, as the investment part of GDP. This problem is acute in the data for finance. Philippon (2015, 1435) concluded that, âThe unit cost of financial intermediation does not seem to have decreased significantly in recent years.â As he says, this is surprising on several grounds. I build on his work to understand whether this result is the result of how the underlying data were collected. This disconnect infects the calculation of economic growth. Griliches (1990, 1994) noted over two decades ago that more and more of GDP is composed of services, which also have been called intangibles. It is hard to estimate the output of the financial sector, for example, so it is measured by its inputs. As I will show, although this may give a useful measure of current activity, it is less informative about economic growth. There are two problems. It is hard to measure productivity if inputs and outputs are conflated. If we fail to include productivity growth of an increasing part of the national product, we increasingly will underestimate the growth of the national product. Further, if we do not have a good measure of output, it is almost impossible to measure investments in finance and other intangibles. If we do not have good measures of the various forms of capital listed here, we will not be able to think hard about longer-run growth. Concern about this latter point provides the motivation for this paper. Outside the literature on the national product, there are many treatments of these new forms of capital. In addition to financial capital, human capital has been the center of explanations for the United Statesâ economic domination in the twentieth century as well as the progress of individuals within the United States (Golden and Katz, 2008; Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev, 2013). Social capital has been the center of analyses of economic growth in the United States and elsewhere and in the long and short run (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Dasgupta, 2007). Measuring these forms of capital poses many of the same problems as measuring financial capital. I review in this paper the accounting methods used to compile investment data to understand how these other forms of capital behave in an economy that has changed markedly since the 1950s. I conclude that current accounting of growth in GDP fails to include the kind of investment that generates these other forms of capital. This conclusion has three implications. First, short-run growth as currently calculated bears more relation to short-run Keynesian analysis than to what we know about long-run economic growth. Second, financial capital increases inequality more than it generates growth for the entire economy. Third, we are now allowing human and social capital to depreciate, auguring ill for future economic growth in the United States. Peter Temin is Elisha Gray II Professor Emeritus of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His âThe Political Economy of Mass Incarceration and Crime: An Analytic Model,â has just been published by the International Journal of Political Economy. A revised version of an earlier INET Working Paper, it will be freely available on line for the month after January 5, 2019: https://www.tandfonline.com/do⦠References Dasgupta, Partha. 2007. Economics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Golden, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2008. The Race between Eduction and Technology. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press. Griliches, Zvi (ed.). Output Measurement in the Service Sectors. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990. Griliches, Zvi. 1994. âProductivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint.â American Economic Review, 84 (1): 1-23. Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones. 1999. âWhy Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?â Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83-116. Heckman, James, Rodrigo Pinto, and Peter Savelyev. 2013. âUnderstanding the Mechanisms Through Which an Influential Early Childhood Program Boosted Adult Outcomes.â American Economic Review, 103 (6): 2052-2086. Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer and David N. Weil. 1992. âA Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth.â Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2): 407-37. Philippon, Thomas. 2015. âHas the US Financial Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation.â American Economic Review 105 (4), 1408-1438. Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Shuster. Solow, Robert M. 1956. âA Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.â Quarterly Journal of Economics 70: 65-94. Solow, Robert M. 1957. âTechnical Change and the Aggregate Production Function.â Review of Economics and Statistics 39: 312-20. VIA: https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/the-hidden-decline-in-human-capital-and-the-danger-ahead? PAPER: https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_86-Temin-Finance-in-Economic-Growth.pdf