[C]onvenient. Isn’t it? You can feel good that you’re a beta, but you don’t have to do anything about it except whine. Feed the internal social status junkie? Just like progressives feed it by conspicuous consumption of other people’s wealth? (Nuff said?) If you’re not a beta. And you’re not a coward. And you’re not a free-rider, and you desire liberty in practice rather liberty in fantasy, come over to Aristocratic Egalitarianism. Liberty for alphas. No pussy-tarians allowed. Liberty is obtained against the will of free riders at the end of pointy objects. Property rights are obtained in exchange for insuring the property rights of others who do the same. www.propertarianism.com ht: Chris Lavan
Source: Original Site Post
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Strategy? Revolution Only Takes Individuals Now
STRATEGY? [N]ow, we have spent the past century or more criticizing the keynesians, leftists, and progressives for creating systemic fragility. Not only in our culture, our laws, our institutions, our economy – but in our complex infrastructure and systems. It used to take armies to implement political change. Then it took mobs. Recently is takes insurgents. And at present it takes only individuals. Welcome to fragility. They made it possible to get our freedom back.
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Strategy? Revolution Only Takes Individuals Now
STRATEGY? [N]ow, we have spent the past century or more criticizing the keynesians, leftists, and progressives for creating systemic fragility. Not only in our culture, our laws, our institutions, our economy – but in our complex infrastructure and systems. It used to take armies to implement political change. Then it took mobs. Recently is takes insurgents. And at present it takes only individuals. Welcome to fragility. They made it possible to get our freedom back.
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Ending The Debilitating Libertarian Dependence Upon Rothbard's NAP
All, *Ending the debilitating libertarian dependence on Rothbardian Libertarianism and the NAP.* [T]here is a very great difference between a general rule of thumb, and the necessary basis for a body of law whose properties are reducible to property rights, that are sufficient for the resolution of conflicts between individuals, such that they do not desire an authority to resolve or prevent conflicts via means other than the law reducible to property rights. Furthermore, the means of violation of a persons’ property is not, as Hoppe has demonstrated, important, but instead, the definition of property regardless of how it is violated. To define property by aggression is to confuse cause and consequence. Aggression (NAP) against Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) as the basis for the law and resolution of disputes, is not only insufficient in the coverage of human disputes that require resolution, but NAP/IVP licenses deception and externalities, and prohibits retaliation for deception (unethical) and externalities(immoral). Meaning that objectively, the NAP/IVP licenses deception(unethical) and externalized (immoral) actions. The fact that very few human beings seem to be able to rationally articulate that NAP/IVP is immoral, or that Aggression is an insufficient prohibition for constraining unethical and immoral trade, or that defining property by means of prohibition rather than its origin as human action is non-logical, doesn’t seem to alter the fact, that the majority of humans simply intuit that something is ‘wrong’ with Rothbardian Libertarian Ethics. Jan Lester has taken the logical route to define property as logically reflecting human actions, and quite nearly found the correct answer with ‘imposed costs’ – at least he has been closer than anyone else. However, as we have stated above, we must reduce imposed costs, up what precisely? We must have a definition of property to impose costs against. (He does, but it’s not sufficient either – and will clarify in a moment.) So how do we define property that can be transgressed against; upon which we prohibit the imposition of costs; and limit legal transfers to and from, to voluntary, fully informed, warrantied exchange? We can try to rely upon reason, or we can instead, look empirically at what is necessary for the elimination of demand for the state. My first question is, how do we eliminate the state, by eliminating demand for the state? It is not “what should we ask people to believe?” But what basis of organic law is sufficient for elimination of demand for the state as either a suppressor of unethical and immoral action, or a suppressor of retaliation for unethical and immoral actions, regardless of what people believe or desire. Now, while It is difficult to imagine people wanting to enter into contracts that permit unethical behavior, if people want to enter into contracts that license various forms of immoral behavior, then that is entirely permissible – in fact it is desirable. It allows us to ‘trade’ immoralities between classes. It sets terms and limits on immoral behavior, gives contractual license, but does not redefine the fact that immoral behavior is in fact, the involuntary transfer, or consumption, of paid in capital, or the ‘imposition of costs’ upon others. As such contractual exchange allows us to conduct voluntary exchanges of ‘immoral behavior’ via market means. When no other such means of exchange is possible. So if you were to choose some normative violation, as long as you exchanged contractual terms with some other class, an exchange occurs, not a violation of property rights. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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Ending The Debilitating Libertarian Dependence Upon Rothbard's NAP
All, *Ending the debilitating libertarian dependence on Rothbardian Libertarianism and the NAP.* [T]here is a very great difference between a general rule of thumb, and the necessary basis for a body of law whose properties are reducible to property rights, that are sufficient for the resolution of conflicts between individuals, such that they do not desire an authority to resolve or prevent conflicts via means other than the law reducible to property rights. Furthermore, the means of violation of a persons’ property is not, as Hoppe has demonstrated, important, but instead, the definition of property regardless of how it is violated. To define property by aggression is to confuse cause and consequence. Aggression (NAP) against Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) as the basis for the law and resolution of disputes, is not only insufficient in the coverage of human disputes that require resolution, but NAP/IVP licenses deception and externalities, and prohibits retaliation for deception (unethical) and externalities(immoral). Meaning that objectively, the NAP/IVP licenses deception(unethical) and externalized (immoral) actions. The fact that very few human beings seem to be able to rationally articulate that NAP/IVP is immoral, or that Aggression is an insufficient prohibition for constraining unethical and immoral trade, or that defining property by means of prohibition rather than its origin as human action is non-logical, doesn’t seem to alter the fact, that the majority of humans simply intuit that something is ‘wrong’ with Rothbardian Libertarian Ethics. Jan Lester has taken the logical route to define property as logically reflecting human actions, and quite nearly found the correct answer with ‘imposed costs’ – at least he has been closer than anyone else. However, as we have stated above, we must reduce imposed costs, up what precisely? We must have a definition of property to impose costs against. (He does, but it’s not sufficient either – and will clarify in a moment.) So how do we define property that can be transgressed against; upon which we prohibit the imposition of costs; and limit legal transfers to and from, to voluntary, fully informed, warrantied exchange? We can try to rely upon reason, or we can instead, look empirically at what is necessary for the elimination of demand for the state. My first question is, how do we eliminate the state, by eliminating demand for the state? It is not “what should we ask people to believe?” But what basis of organic law is sufficient for elimination of demand for the state as either a suppressor of unethical and immoral action, or a suppressor of retaliation for unethical and immoral actions, regardless of what people believe or desire. Now, while It is difficult to imagine people wanting to enter into contracts that permit unethical behavior, if people want to enter into contracts that license various forms of immoral behavior, then that is entirely permissible – in fact it is desirable. It allows us to ‘trade’ immoralities between classes. It sets terms and limits on immoral behavior, gives contractual license, but does not redefine the fact that immoral behavior is in fact, the involuntary transfer, or consumption, of paid in capital, or the ‘imposition of costs’ upon others. As such contractual exchange allows us to conduct voluntary exchanges of ‘immoral behavior’ via market means. When no other such means of exchange is possible. So if you were to choose some normative violation, as long as you exchanged contractual terms with some other class, an exchange occurs, not a violation of property rights. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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Ending The Debilitating Libertarian Dependence Upon Rothbard’s NAP
All, *Ending the debilitating libertarian dependence on Rothbardian Libertarianism and the NAP.* [T]here is a very great difference between a general rule of thumb, and the necessary basis for a body of law whose properties are reducible to property rights, that are sufficient for the resolution of conflicts between individuals, such that they do not desire an authority to resolve or prevent conflicts via means other than the law reducible to property rights. Furthermore, the means of violation of a persons’ property is not, as Hoppe has demonstrated, important, but instead, the definition of property regardless of how it is violated. To define property by aggression is to confuse cause and consequence. Aggression (NAP) against Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) as the basis for the law and resolution of disputes, is not only insufficient in the coverage of human disputes that require resolution, but NAP/IVP licenses deception and externalities, and prohibits retaliation for deception (unethical) and externalities(immoral). Meaning that objectively, the NAP/IVP licenses deception(unethical) and externalized (immoral) actions. The fact that very few human beings seem to be able to rationally articulate that NAP/IVP is immoral, or that Aggression is an insufficient prohibition for constraining unethical and immoral trade, or that defining property by means of prohibition rather than its origin as human action is non-logical, doesn’t seem to alter the fact, that the majority of humans simply intuit that something is ‘wrong’ with Rothbardian Libertarian Ethics. Jan Lester has taken the logical route to define property as logically reflecting human actions, and quite nearly found the correct answer with ‘imposed costs’ – at least he has been closer than anyone else. However, as we have stated above, we must reduce imposed costs, up what precisely? We must have a definition of property to impose costs against. (He does, but it’s not sufficient either – and will clarify in a moment.) So how do we define property that can be transgressed against; upon which we prohibit the imposition of costs; and limit legal transfers to and from, to voluntary, fully informed, warrantied exchange? We can try to rely upon reason, or we can instead, look empirically at what is necessary for the elimination of demand for the state. My first question is, how do we eliminate the state, by eliminating demand for the state? It is not “what should we ask people to believe?” But what basis of organic law is sufficient for elimination of demand for the state as either a suppressor of unethical and immoral action, or a suppressor of retaliation for unethical and immoral actions, regardless of what people believe or desire. Now, while It is difficult to imagine people wanting to enter into contracts that permit unethical behavior, if people want to enter into contracts that license various forms of immoral behavior, then that is entirely permissible – in fact it is desirable. It allows us to ‘trade’ immoralities between classes. It sets terms and limits on immoral behavior, gives contractual license, but does not redefine the fact that immoral behavior is in fact, the involuntary transfer, or consumption, of paid in capital, or the ‘imposition of costs’ upon others. As such contractual exchange allows us to conduct voluntary exchanges of ‘immoral behavior’ via market means. When no other such means of exchange is possible. So if you were to choose some normative violation, as long as you exchanged contractual terms with some other class, an exchange occurs, not a violation of property rights. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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Ending The Debilitating Libertarian Dependence Upon Rothbard’s NAP
All, *Ending the debilitating libertarian dependence on Rothbardian Libertarianism and the NAP.* [T]here is a very great difference between a general rule of thumb, and the necessary basis for a body of law whose properties are reducible to property rights, that are sufficient for the resolution of conflicts between individuals, such that they do not desire an authority to resolve or prevent conflicts via means other than the law reducible to property rights. Furthermore, the means of violation of a persons’ property is not, as Hoppe has demonstrated, important, but instead, the definition of property regardless of how it is violated. To define property by aggression is to confuse cause and consequence. Aggression (NAP) against Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) as the basis for the law and resolution of disputes, is not only insufficient in the coverage of human disputes that require resolution, but NAP/IVP licenses deception and externalities, and prohibits retaliation for deception (unethical) and externalities(immoral). Meaning that objectively, the NAP/IVP licenses deception(unethical) and externalized (immoral) actions. The fact that very few human beings seem to be able to rationally articulate that NAP/IVP is immoral, or that Aggression is an insufficient prohibition for constraining unethical and immoral trade, or that defining property by means of prohibition rather than its origin as human action is non-logical, doesn’t seem to alter the fact, that the majority of humans simply intuit that something is ‘wrong’ with Rothbardian Libertarian Ethics. Jan Lester has taken the logical route to define property as logically reflecting human actions, and quite nearly found the correct answer with ‘imposed costs’ – at least he has been closer than anyone else. However, as we have stated above, we must reduce imposed costs, up what precisely? We must have a definition of property to impose costs against. (He does, but it’s not sufficient either – and will clarify in a moment.) So how do we define property that can be transgressed against; upon which we prohibit the imposition of costs; and limit legal transfers to and from, to voluntary, fully informed, warrantied exchange? We can try to rely upon reason, or we can instead, look empirically at what is necessary for the elimination of demand for the state. My first question is, how do we eliminate the state, by eliminating demand for the state? It is not “what should we ask people to believe?” But what basis of organic law is sufficient for elimination of demand for the state as either a suppressor of unethical and immoral action, or a suppressor of retaliation for unethical and immoral actions, regardless of what people believe or desire. Now, while It is difficult to imagine people wanting to enter into contracts that permit unethical behavior, if people want to enter into contracts that license various forms of immoral behavior, then that is entirely permissible – in fact it is desirable. It allows us to ‘trade’ immoralities between classes. It sets terms and limits on immoral behavior, gives contractual license, but does not redefine the fact that immoral behavior is in fact, the involuntary transfer, or consumption, of paid in capital, or the ‘imposition of costs’ upon others. As such contractual exchange allows us to conduct voluntary exchanges of ‘immoral behavior’ via market means. When no other such means of exchange is possible. So if you were to choose some normative violation, as long as you exchanged contractual terms with some other class, an exchange occurs, not a violation of property rights. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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Which Is The Basis Of Social Order: The Prohibition On Free Riding Vs The Promotion Of Private Property
(worth repeating) If I am right, and I think I am, then we just look at private property incorrectly because it’s a positive assertion. But the negative assertion is more informative: free riding. Because it is free riding that mirrors the human moral instincts that evolved with us because they were necessary for cooperation. And while we can suppress free riding (and parasitism) and obtain private property as a defense against the state, in order to form a polity we must also suppress unethical and immoral conduct so that we do not have demand for the state. And to form an anarchic polity free of the state, we must further suppress conspiracy and statism so that those who desire to free ride cannot band together to do so. As such, ‘private property’ is not the basis for society, but the basis for the voluntary organization of, and execution of, production. The suppression of free riding then, is the basis for society, and private property is one of its byproducts. Instead of only codifying private property in law, if we restate all moral instincts as property rights, then we can construct a legal code that mirrors completely the human moral code, and one which, allows both the resolution of differences over property, but also eliminates demand for the state, as well as forbids the formation of a state (monopoly). In this sense, morality, stated as a prohibition on free riding, is the basis for the velocity of cooperation, private property is the basis of the voluntary structure of production, prohibition on unethical and immoral conduct is the basis for a polity, and prohibition on conspiracy to construct a monopoly is the basis for anarchy. And altogether this full spectrum of prohibitions on free riding, delivers us to liberty and the maximum opportunity for prosperity. I think this is the correct analysis.
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Which Is The Basis Of Social Order: The Prohibition On Free Riding Vs The Promotion Of Private Property
(worth repeating) If I am right, and I think I am, then we just look at private property incorrectly because it’s a positive assertion. But the negative assertion is more informative: free riding. Because it is free riding that mirrors the human moral instincts that evolved with us because they were necessary for cooperation. And while we can suppress free riding (and parasitism) and obtain private property as a defense against the state, in order to form a polity we must also suppress unethical and immoral conduct so that we do not have demand for the state. And to form an anarchic polity free of the state, we must further suppress conspiracy and statism so that those who desire to free ride cannot band together to do so. As such, ‘private property’ is not the basis for society, but the basis for the voluntary organization of, and execution of, production. The suppression of free riding then, is the basis for society, and private property is one of its byproducts. Instead of only codifying private property in law, if we restate all moral instincts as property rights, then we can construct a legal code that mirrors completely the human moral code, and one which, allows both the resolution of differences over property, but also eliminates demand for the state, as well as forbids the formation of a state (monopoly). In this sense, morality, stated as a prohibition on free riding, is the basis for the velocity of cooperation, private property is the basis of the voluntary structure of production, prohibition on unethical and immoral conduct is the basis for a polity, and prohibition on conspiracy to construct a monopoly is the basis for anarchy. And altogether this full spectrum of prohibitions on free riding, delivers us to liberty and the maximum opportunity for prosperity. I think this is the correct analysis.
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Duchesne On Hegel's Reason For Western Uniqueness
–“What drew Hegel’s attention was the seemingly restless desire of Western reason to become fully conscious of itself as **free activity**.”– Ok. so you know, this is what I mean. Translate that into operational language and tell me what the hell it means. I mean, I know what it *should* mean. –“According to Hegel, individuals become what they are potentially – rationally self-conscious agents – when they recognized themselves as free in their institutions and laws. …. the effort of human reason to become what it is intrinsically: the free author of its own concepts, values, and practices. “– –“The Phenomenology thus exhibits the ways in which diverse but interrelated outlooks held sway and conviction for some time only to be seen as limited in their inability to provide answers consistent with the demands of beings that are becoming more aware of themselves as the free creators of their own beliefs, laws, and institutions”– You are free when you think freely. But what is the cause? Why isn’t the cause property? The taste for property and status, and the distaste for losing one’s property and status to an authority. –“The Phenomenology, however, should not be viewed as a strictly chronological history of the development of consciousness”– Well, you know, I view intellectual history outside of the sciences as reactive and justificationary. Those justifications are later used as causes, but I don’t see much evidence that our thinkers all that innovative. It seems like we justify as a means of mitigating conflicts. Justifications solve problems for current and later generations. But the problem exists prior to its solution. So what was the problem or cause? I think that it’s not complicated, that it’s just the warrior tactics and private property. Gimbutas doesn’t reduce it to property, but that’s just because she wasn’t interested in economic institutions. And I really don’t know a lot of thinkers that have connected instinctual evolutionary morality and property other than myself. But if we start out with that instinctual prohibition against free riding and therefore in favor of some form of property, and we add voluntary associations of men who conduct cattle raiding, who because of risk, retain their stolen assets, and from that we get property and warriors who covet status and property, then we get heroism and individualism from that point forward. I think all intellectual activity is simply an effort to maintain that relationship of sovereignty in the context of current circumstances. It’s certainly the most simplistic explanation. It satisfies occam’s razor. If we add to the preference for private property, the fact that europe is riddled with waterways that make trade possible and relatively less expensive. If we add to that observation that our economic development was also aided by four seas: the Aegean, the Mediterranean, the North Sea and the Atlantic that both facilitate trade and form barriers to conflict – then we do not have to really account for intellectual history for western character as other than justificationary. The greeks then are merely improving means of exchanging property. Exchanging property requires objective truth to avoid conflict between sovereigns. And Aristotle (etc) invents science as a consequence of objective truth. (Greeks aren’t actually individualistic but familial but it’s close enough to produce the same outcome: property.) –“What Hegel suggests to me, albeit in a very general way, is that there were already in Greece – before the polis – characters unwilling to submit to despotic rule.”– –“let me state for now that the polis was created by a pre-existing aristocratic culture whose values were physical prowess, courage, fi erce protection of one’s family, friends, and property, and above all, one’s personal honor and reputation.”– –“The polis grew out of a peculiar social landscape of tribal republics in which individual rivalry for prestige and victory had the highest value, and in which hatred of monarchical government was the norm. Before citizenship was expanded to include independent farmers and hoplite soldiers, the Greek mainland was dominated by a warrior aristocracy. This expansive and aggressive aristocracy was the original persona of Western civilization.”– –“What Hegel criticized was the liberal contractual argument that there was an “original state of nature” in which man “was in the possession of his natural rights and the unlimited exercise and enjoyment of his freedom” (1978: 54). He rejected the assumption that, if all the products of culture and history were somehow stripped away, one would find humans living in a state of natural freedom, or in a condition in which each was the possessor of individual rights. The concept of right, for Hegel, was not “negative” in the sense that it was free from all “positive” content, from the weight of social norms and history. Man “in his immediate and natural way of existence” – that is, in the state of nature – was not the possessor of natural rights. The freedoms of men were “acquired and won…only through an infinite process of the discipline of knowledge and will power” (54). Humans had to acquire the capacity for self-control to achieve freedom, which was rather difficult in the state of nature (1971: 175). Hegel thus spoke of the state of nature in terms of the “primitive conditions” of human existence, as a time when human relations were “marked by brute passions and acts of violence.” *The state of nature, therefore, is rather the state of injustice, violence, untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and emotions (54).” Hegel wrote elsewhere, in fact, that “the fight for recognition…can only occur in the natural state, where men exist only as single, separate individuals” (1971: 172). The struggle for recognition ceases to be a violent engagement when civil society proper is consolidated. In civil society individuals can achieve recognition peacefully, or in a less capricious manner, by obeying the law and doing what is socially acceptable, pursuing a profession or following a trade. The state tries to achieve prestige by fighting other states but the state no longer condones violent feuding between citizens.”– CURT: The struggle for status. The universal availability of status. Limited to organizing or participating in production. (and by consequence the lesser status, and envy of status, of those who cannot engage in production). –“self consciousness makes its appearance in the decision “of Man” to fight to the death for the sake of recognition. Kojeve explains that “Man” starts to become “truly” self-conscious only to the extent that he “actively” engages in a fight where he risks his life “for something that does not exist really” – that is, “solely ‘for glory’ or for the sake of his ‘vanity’ alone (which by this risk, ceases to be ‘vain’ and becomes the specifi – cally human value of honor” (1999: 226).”–