Source: Original Site Post

  • Why Do We Need a Monopoly Form of Commons?  We don’t.

    [A]ll we need is monopoly Rule. Defense (military), Rule (rule of law), Government (market production of commons), Market (market production of goods and services). Why, instead of debating over whether to institute a universal socialist(consumptive), libertarian(productive), or conservative(accumulative), social(normative), economic(productive), and political(commons) order, do we not institute universal rule of law affirming property-en-toto, and let people choose the social, economic, and political order that they will ‘join’, and then use houses of government to conduct contractual trades between those classes? Why can’t socialists redistribute to one another, libertarians invest in production, and conservatives accumulate capital, and we conduct trades with one another in order to achieve our common ends? Why is monopoly necessary? We have technology today that can enforce these contracts. Why? Because we have electronic money, and the ability to issue multiple currencies for multiple purposes. In essence, creating trade policy internally between classes as well as trade policy externally between polities. Good government isn’t a problem. We can do it. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Why Are All Books On Cosmopolitan Libertinism Introductory? (They Must Be)

    [T]here is a reason that all works on libertarianism are introductions and so very few are advanced, as are works in economics, capital, public choice, democracy, social democracy, marxism and even neo-conservatism. We really have what, Hayek on classical liberal law, and Garrison and Reissman in classical economics? But advanced works on libertarianism don’t exist other than rothbard’s revisionist history and his works on banking. Criticisms (man economy and state) are not the same as advocacy of actionable production of institutions that can survive competition from opposing preferences. The reason people rely upon catchphrases is because there is very little else to rely upon. And those other things we can rely upon (the business cycle, capital formation) are not special to us, but matters of mainstream argument. As an empirical measure, why is it that largely intro works exist? Why is it that the near near propaganda level advocacy of Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe fails to include the critics? Why is it that of the scholars in the field only David Friedman survives – and he survives precisely because he makes preferential rather than rational or empirical arguments? Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Why Are All Books On Cosmopolitan Libertinism Introductory? (They Must Be)

    [T]here is a reason that all works on libertarianism are introductions and so very few are advanced, as are works in economics, capital, public choice, democracy, social democracy, marxism and even neo-conservatism. We really have what, Hayek on classical liberal law, and Garrison and Reissman in classical economics? But advanced works on libertarianism don’t exist other than rothbard’s revisionist history and his works on banking. Criticisms (man economy and state) are not the same as advocacy of actionable production of institutions that can survive competition from opposing preferences. The reason people rely upon catchphrases is because there is very little else to rely upon. And those other things we can rely upon (the business cycle, capital formation) are not special to us, but matters of mainstream argument. As an empirical measure, why is it that largely intro works exist? Why is it that the near near propaganda level advocacy of Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe fails to include the critics? Why is it that of the scholars in the field only David Friedman survives – and he survives precisely because he makes preferential rather than rational or empirical arguments? Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • Our Mistaken Emphasis on Government Rather than Juridical Defense From It.

    [W]e are always ruled. We are often governed. The law is the minimum rule. We can never escape law and commons and hold territory. We spend far too much ink on how to insure good rule, government, rulers, and governors. And we cannot make a good ruler or governor. We spend too little ink on universal standing and juridical defense from rulers and governors. This is because we not only seek advocacy of political orders in order to rally allies with whom me seek advantage from both rule and government – but would be constrained ourselves by rule of law if our preferred leaders obtained it. All political advocacy in favor of one form of rule, or one form of government, and another, is an attempt to circumvent the cost of exchange. But if I am correct – and the science increasingly suggests so – then we libertarians are partly morally blind, progressives are almost entirely morally blind (libertarians and progressives) and conservatives not only see clearly but are over-sensitive. And all attempts at political power are merely attempts to circumvent voluntary exchanges of cooperation that occur in the family, tribe and market. Rule that prohibits parasitism in the tribe, market and government forces us to conduct voluntary exchanges (compromises) none of which are optimum for the long term capital accumulators (conservatives), medium time frame producers (libertarians) and short time frame consumers(progressives). Just as we use voluntary exchange in the market to organize production, distribution, trade, and consumption, we organize the production of commons via government. But if government is not a vehicle for the facilitation of trade between the long(conservative), medium(libertarian), and short(progressive) factions, it is no different from not possessing a free market for the production goods and services, an not possessing money to signal demand. When free market advocates call for infinitely open markets this imposes costs on the other factions. When socialists call for redistribution this imposes costs on the other factions. When Conservatives call for the payment of normative costs, this imposes a cost on the other factions. But if we instead of imposing costs upon one another, conduct trades, then those costs are the expenses that we pay to cooperate on means despite our cognitively biased different ends. Cooperation lets a species specialize. Cooperation by voluntary exchange lets us specialized without dying off and producing a new generation. Cooperation by voluntary exchange collects information from the specialists in intertemporal reproduction: short consumption progressives, medium productive libertarians, and long term, conservative capital accumulators. By satisfying the wants of all through voluntary exchange, together we ‘calculate’ the optimum possible reproduction for all, the same way that the market calculates the optimum possible production for all. If I have not converted you to market production of commons (a market government) consisting of at least four if not five houses, each of which splits by gender, then hopefully at least I will help you understand mankind’s long struggle to increase the scope and rewards of cooperation by the use of market and voluntary exchange to produce the information necessary for us to act in our collective interests. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine (Tallinn, Estonia)

  • Our Mistaken Emphasis on Government Rather than Juridical Defense From It.

    [W]e are always ruled. We are often governed. The law is the minimum rule. We can never escape law and commons and hold territory. We spend far too much ink on how to insure good rule, government, rulers, and governors. And we cannot make a good ruler or governor. We spend too little ink on universal standing and juridical defense from rulers and governors. This is because we not only seek advocacy of political orders in order to rally allies with whom me seek advantage from both rule and government – but would be constrained ourselves by rule of law if our preferred leaders obtained it. All political advocacy in favor of one form of rule, or one form of government, and another, is an attempt to circumvent the cost of exchange. But if I am correct – and the science increasingly suggests so – then we libertarians are partly morally blind, progressives are almost entirely morally blind (libertarians and progressives) and conservatives not only see clearly but are over-sensitive. And all attempts at political power are merely attempts to circumvent voluntary exchanges of cooperation that occur in the family, tribe and market. Rule that prohibits parasitism in the tribe, market and government forces us to conduct voluntary exchanges (compromises) none of which are optimum for the long term capital accumulators (conservatives), medium time frame producers (libertarians) and short time frame consumers(progressives). Just as we use voluntary exchange in the market to organize production, distribution, trade, and consumption, we organize the production of commons via government. But if government is not a vehicle for the facilitation of trade between the long(conservative), medium(libertarian), and short(progressive) factions, it is no different from not possessing a free market for the production goods and services, an not possessing money to signal demand. When free market advocates call for infinitely open markets this imposes costs on the other factions. When socialists call for redistribution this imposes costs on the other factions. When Conservatives call for the payment of normative costs, this imposes a cost on the other factions. But if we instead of imposing costs upon one another, conduct trades, then those costs are the expenses that we pay to cooperate on means despite our cognitively biased different ends. Cooperation lets a species specialize. Cooperation by voluntary exchange lets us specialized without dying off and producing a new generation. Cooperation by voluntary exchange collects information from the specialists in intertemporal reproduction: short consumption progressives, medium productive libertarians, and long term, conservative capital accumulators. By satisfying the wants of all through voluntary exchange, together we ‘calculate’ the optimum possible reproduction for all, the same way that the market calculates the optimum possible production for all. If I have not converted you to market production of commons (a market government) consisting of at least four if not five houses, each of which splits by gender, then hopefully at least I will help you understand mankind’s long struggle to increase the scope and rewards of cooperation by the use of market and voluntary exchange to produce the information necessary for us to act in our collective interests. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine (Tallinn, Estonia)

  • Loyalty: Forgoing Opportunities.

    [L]OYALTY: Not seizing opportunities that impose costs upon the capital structure (genetic, normative, physical, institutional, territorial) that you and others have been contributing to. The limit of opportunity. (The family, tribe, and nation)

    James: Can “loyalty” also be the assumption or even shouldering of risks or costs, without a clear or immediate return?

    Curt Doolittle: Yes

  • Loyalty: Forgoing Opportunities.

    [L]OYALTY: Not seizing opportunities that impose costs upon the capital structure (genetic, normative, physical, institutional, territorial) that you and others have been contributing to. The limit of opportunity. (The family, tribe, and nation)

    James: Can “loyalty” also be the assumption or even shouldering of risks or costs, without a clear or immediate return?

    Curt Doolittle: Yes

  • Contra NRx’s Techno Commericalism

    [W]hile technology (a)decreases the cost of relationship acquisition, (b)decreases the cost of property registries, (c) decreases the cost of and often need for, escrow services (financial transaction costs), (d) reduces the need for regulation, (e) decreases the cost of geographic and temporal constraints, technology does NOT change the fundamental problem of cooperation: the incremental suppression of parasitism and the decidability of conflicts across different or competing regulations, norms, property allocations, and institutional processes. Technology reduces costs. Good law reduces costs. And that is the best that we can do. Everything else is achieved by trial and error. Because we cannot necessarily know what is good. We can only know with confidence that which is bad: parasitism.

  • Contra NRx’s Techno Commericalism

    [W]hile technology (a)decreases the cost of relationship acquisition, (b)decreases the cost of property registries, (c) decreases the cost of and often need for, escrow services (financial transaction costs), (d) reduces the need for regulation, (e) decreases the cost of geographic and temporal constraints, technology does NOT change the fundamental problem of cooperation: the incremental suppression of parasitism and the decidability of conflicts across different or competing regulations, norms, property allocations, and institutional processes. Technology reduces costs. Good law reduces costs. And that is the best that we can do. Everything else is achieved by trial and error. Because we cannot necessarily know what is good. We can only know with confidence that which is bad: parasitism.

  • Love Reduces Transaction Costs

    [L]OVE REDUCES COSTS –“Love reduces transaction costs, just as truth reduces transaction costs, just as law reduces transaction costs. Love is an economically rewarding investment.”— That’s the secret to western christendom.