Curt Doolittle

Source: Original Site Post

  • Why Is There Oil in The Middle East? (lessons)

    Hydrocarbons are from dead organic material – and you need an astonishing set of circumstances to make oil out of these things and preserve them. First, you’ve got to concentrate them somewhere where they’re not dispersed or oxidized – which means in swamps, marshes, lakes or something like that. (See “Peat Marshes” and “Bog Bodies”.) Then you’ve got to heat them up slowly over a long, long period to cook them up to make oil. And then, when they make oil and start to ‘ferment’, you’ve got to have some way of trapping the liquid and the gas. All these things, it turns out, happen on the margins of continents. Sediments just get washed in, and all those dead things get buried deeper and deeper and gently get cooked for a long time. So, the circumstances for making oil are very good on the margins of continents. Especially the margins of oceans that aren’t on a plate boundary – because there are no earthquakes there. Now, what happened in Saudi Arabia is that that happened to be on the margin of a huge ocean which separated Asia from the southern continents. So, a hundred million years ago, Africa, India and Arabia were all a long way further south from where they are now and they’ve all moved north and bashed into Asia. One of those places is [what is now] Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. And what’s happened is the margin of that ocean, with the margins of Arabia, and Africa and India, have all just popped up above sea level from the pressure of colliding together.

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    Millions of years ago, most of the Middle East was covered by what scientists call the Tethys Ocean (aka Tethys Sea). Rivers flowing into the ocean gave rise to trillions of microscopic organisms and other marine plants and animals. The corpses of these organisms on the ocean floor is where oil (and natural gas) comes from. This is why they are called fossil fuels. Over millions of years, this decomposing organic material became covered by miles of new organic matter and also the sand and salt flowing in from the rivers and streams. Yes, salt flows into the ocean from freshwater rivers and streams. Anyway, these layers became more and more packed as newer layers formed on top of the previous layers. The pressure and heat from these upper layers change the buried organic matter into a sludgy substance of hydrocarbons and other compounds that constitute what we know as crude oil. Theoretically, as long as marine life keeps dying, oil will keep being created So it’s not that there is more oil in the middle east than anywhere else. There’s loads of oil on the other continental margins – but that’s all underwater. It’s hard and expensive to get out. Whereas in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq it’s popped up nicely above sea level and also in. So it’s actually extremely easy to find, an cheap to take out. It’s just more that it is conveniently situated than anything else. (Source: From an interview with James Jackson from the University of Cambridge and other sources on the internet, map from paleomap project)

  • Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception)

    Jan 9, 2020, 5:45 PM Why Arabs Lose Wars meforum.org Source: Excerpt from meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars (Conversely: Staying on message: Islamism like Judaism (or christianity) is exceptional at undermining.)

    1. First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations.26 Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units (which throughout the Arab world have the same duty—to protect the regime, rather than the country). In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.
    2. Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The ‘Alawi minority controls Syria, East Bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi’a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit.

    The same lack of trust operates at the interstate level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel—that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when most of its planes had been destroyed)—was a classic example of deceit.27 Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception which included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes).28 With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.29

    1. Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority.30 They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler’s whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable.

    Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are a double-edged sword. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. The land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat at the same time. No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine; the usual excuse is financial expense, but that is unconvincing given their frequent purchase of hardware whose maintenance costs they cannot afford. In fact, combined arms exercises and joint staffs create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing. Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation. For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defense; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may be out of style, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work, it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. Arab regimes have learned how to be coup-proof.

  • Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception)

    Jan 9, 2020, 5:45 PM Why Arabs Lose Wars meforum.org Source: Excerpt from meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars (Conversely: Staying on message: Islamism like Judaism (or christianity) is exceptional at undermining.)

    1. First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations.26 Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units (which throughout the Arab world have the same duty—to protect the regime, rather than the country). In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.
    2. Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The ‘Alawi minority controls Syria, East Bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi’a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit.

    The same lack of trust operates at the interstate level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel—that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when most of its planes had been destroyed)—was a classic example of deceit.27 Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception which included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes).28 With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.29

    1. Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority.30 They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler’s whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable.

    Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are a double-edged sword. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. The land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat at the same time. No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine; the usual excuse is financial expense, but that is unconvincing given their frequent purchase of hardware whose maintenance costs they cannot afford. In fact, combined arms exercises and joint staffs create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing. Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation. For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defense; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may be out of style, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work, it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. Arab regimes have learned how to be coup-proof.

  • Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception)

    Jan 9, 2020, 5:45 PM Why Arabs Lose Wars meforum.org Source: Excerpt from meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars (Conversely: Staying on message: Islamism like Judaism (or christianity) is exceptional at undermining.)

    1. First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations.26 Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units (which throughout the Arab world have the same duty—to protect the regime, rather than the country). In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.

    2. Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The ‘Alawi minority controls Syria, East Bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi’a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit.

    The same lack of trust operates at the interstate level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel—that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when most of its planes had been destroyed)—was a classic example of deceit.27 Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception which included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes).28 With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.29

    1. Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority.30 They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler’s whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable.

    Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are a double-edged sword. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. The land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat at the same time. No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine; the usual excuse is financial expense, but that is unconvincing given their frequent purchase of hardware whose maintenance costs they cannot afford. In fact, combined arms exercises and joint staffs create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing. Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation. For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defense; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may be out of style, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work, it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. Arab regimes have learned how to be coup-proof.

  • Why Arabs Fail: Trust (Familism, Honor in Deception)

    Jan 9, 2020, 5:45 PM Why Arabs Lose Wars meforum.org Source: Excerpt from meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars (Conversely: Staying on message: Islamism like Judaism (or christianity) is exceptional at undermining.)

    1. First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations.26 Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units (which throughout the Arab world have the same duty—to protect the regime, rather than the country). In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.

    2. Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The ‘Alawi minority controls Syria, East Bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi’a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit.

    The same lack of trust operates at the interstate level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel—that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when most of its planes had been destroyed)—was a classic example of deceit.27 Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception which included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes).28 With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.29

    1. Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority.30 They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler’s whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable.

    Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are a double-edged sword. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. The land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat at the same time. No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine; the usual excuse is financial expense, but that is unconvincing given their frequent purchase of hardware whose maintenance costs they cannot afford. In fact, combined arms exercises and joint staffs create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing. Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation. For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defense; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may be out of style, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work, it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. Arab regimes have learned how to be coup-proof.

  • Wisdom Learned and Wisdom Earned: We Are Self Domesticating

    Jan 10, 2020, 11:02 AM

    —“The hardest thing over the last few years I’ve had to come to accept has had to be be the proposition that “we are self-domesticating.” That we must own efforts in every “agent-arena” relationship because no one but us will. For those of us like myself that “wandered through the existential desert”, wasting years of life without guidance, that we must climb near-vertical trajectories. All the while respecting Hanlon’s Razor[1] as you brush arms with others. It’s tough at times. The etiquette and refinement is a lifelong investment. It doesn’t get easier, you just get better. All the while expecting nothing, keeping humility, etc.”— Todd E. Magnusson

    Elegant. Honest. Heartfelt. From experience. True. Staying on message: This is the reason we need to teach the stoic method as basic emotional fitness. It provides mindfulness without the need for falsehoods (religion). Realism, Naturalism, Empiricism, Operationalism, Acquisitionism-Propertarianism, Cooperationism, Reciprocity, Reciprocity to our Ancestors, Mindfulness. That is the only ‘True’ Religion we know of.

    [1] Hanlon’s Razor: “Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.”

  • Wisdom Learned and Wisdom Earned: We Are Self Domesticating

    Jan 10, 2020, 11:02 AM

    —“The hardest thing over the last few years I’ve had to come to accept has had to be be the proposition that “we are self-domesticating.” That we must own efforts in every “agent-arena” relationship because no one but us will. For those of us like myself that “wandered through the existential desert”, wasting years of life without guidance, that we must climb near-vertical trajectories. All the while respecting Hanlon’s Razor[1] as you brush arms with others. It’s tough at times. The etiquette and refinement is a lifelong investment. It doesn’t get easier, you just get better. All the while expecting nothing, keeping humility, etc.”— Todd E. Magnusson

    Elegant. Honest. Heartfelt. From experience. True. Staying on message: This is the reason we need to teach the stoic method as basic emotional fitness. It provides mindfulness without the need for falsehoods (religion). Realism, Naturalism, Empiricism, Operationalism, Acquisitionism-Propertarianism, Cooperationism, Reciprocity, Reciprocity to our Ancestors, Mindfulness. That is the only ‘True’ Religion we know of.

    [1] Hanlon’s Razor: “Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.”

  • Parenting

    Jan 10, 2020, 12:41 PM Again: if parenting was that influential we couldn’t exist. Instead, parents primary control is ONLY who they mate with, and while you can’t make your kids ‘better’ you can do them harm. So in parenting, as in ethics, DO NO WRONG is far more important than trying to do right. Because once they are in the real world they will always and everywhere revert to type – hence why your ancestors and mine sought to give them enough MANNERS to get prestige jobs young. This is how we ‘buy’ positions for our children. The half-life of your parenting is short. Training in Hygiene, Dress, Manners, Diction, Active Listening, Vocabulary, Ethics, Morals, and especially the basics of lists, money, accounting, interest, and contract, help everyone. Because success is caused by conscientiousness (discipline) regardless of intellectual ability. Let me say that again for clarity: Economic returns on intelligence are marginal and economic returns on behavioral training (manners, ethics, morals etc) are exponential. And the importance of Active Listening, Seeking To Understand, Hygiene, Grooming, Dress and Vocabulary, Weightlifting for men and Dancing for Women, and team sports for both cannot be overstated. All those disciplines produce mindfulness. This is counter-intuitive to people but your stress in life is usually determined by your success at training yourself out of impulsivity through rituals, and training in Hygiene, Dress, Manners, Diction, Active Listening, Seeking to Understand, Vocabulary, Ethics, Morals, and especially the basics of list-making, money, accounting, interest, and contract, produce a calm mind far better and more productively than religion or therapy. One’s natural Intellectual ability only grants access to complexity, and marginal increases in income, while conscientiousness and training (above) grant access to opportunity, success, and wealth. Getting kids into ‘good schools’ etc doesn’t improve them it filters them (buys them access). That explains classes. (Uncomfortable truth warning) Different ethnic groups differ largely because of differences in neoteny(rate and depth of maturity) and as such sexual, social, and economic market value – more importantly in the short term, it affects ages for learning different skills. This is why our education system ‘treating us as equal’ is a failure since the most neotenous (east Asians) can learn anything young at the cost of ‘topping out’ young, where less neotenous (Europeans) need more development, and least neotenous afro-Asiatic and Africans more physicality and socialization, before they can be relaxed enough for intellectualization – even so, the Asian method of combining group movements, recitation, and learning are disproportionately more effective than seated classroom work. And seated classroom work is far more effective with lots of slowly incremental rather than short steep increases in difficulty. Girls aren’t ‘getting ahead’ of boys in mixed-gender, mixed-race schools – the schools are damaging boys development of physical movement, planning, and dominance play, making them care nothing about self others or society, and increasing psychosis in girls without a hierarchy of multiple ages to limit behavior and focus emotion on reciprocal training – and we are seeing it play out in all walks of life. Competition socializes. So, tiger moms are buying children access to filters not improving their children (and we see this in the workforce over time). And by not TRAINING in the basics (manners ethics and aggressive competition) that matter most we are creating an infantilized emotional population unfit or not only military service, the workforce, but a political system we call democracy.

  • Parenting

    Jan 10, 2020, 12:41 PM Again: if parenting was that influential we couldn’t exist. Instead, parents primary control is ONLY who they mate with, and while you can’t make your kids ‘better’ you can do them harm. So in parenting, as in ethics, DO NO WRONG is far more important than trying to do right. Because once they are in the real world they will always and everywhere revert to type – hence why your ancestors and mine sought to give them enough MANNERS to get prestige jobs young. This is how we ‘buy’ positions for our children. The half-life of your parenting is short. Training in Hygiene, Dress, Manners, Diction, Active Listening, Vocabulary, Ethics, Morals, and especially the basics of lists, money, accounting, interest, and contract, help everyone. Because success is caused by conscientiousness (discipline) regardless of intellectual ability. Let me say that again for clarity: Economic returns on intelligence are marginal and economic returns on behavioral training (manners, ethics, morals etc) are exponential. And the importance of Active Listening, Seeking To Understand, Hygiene, Grooming, Dress and Vocabulary, Weightlifting for men and Dancing for Women, and team sports for both cannot be overstated. All those disciplines produce mindfulness. This is counter-intuitive to people but your stress in life is usually determined by your success at training yourself out of impulsivity through rituals, and training in Hygiene, Dress, Manners, Diction, Active Listening, Seeking to Understand, Vocabulary, Ethics, Morals, and especially the basics of list-making, money, accounting, interest, and contract, produce a calm mind far better and more productively than religion or therapy. One’s natural Intellectual ability only grants access to complexity, and marginal increases in income, while conscientiousness and training (above) grant access to opportunity, success, and wealth. Getting kids into ‘good schools’ etc doesn’t improve them it filters them (buys them access). That explains classes. (Uncomfortable truth warning) Different ethnic groups differ largely because of differences in neoteny(rate and depth of maturity) and as such sexual, social, and economic market value – more importantly in the short term, it affects ages for learning different skills. This is why our education system ‘treating us as equal’ is a failure since the most neotenous (east Asians) can learn anything young at the cost of ‘topping out’ young, where less neotenous (Europeans) need more development, and least neotenous afro-Asiatic and Africans more physicality and socialization, before they can be relaxed enough for intellectualization – even so, the Asian method of combining group movements, recitation, and learning are disproportionately more effective than seated classroom work. And seated classroom work is far more effective with lots of slowly incremental rather than short steep increases in difficulty. Girls aren’t ‘getting ahead’ of boys in mixed-gender, mixed-race schools – the schools are damaging boys development of physical movement, planning, and dominance play, making them care nothing about self others or society, and increasing psychosis in girls without a hierarchy of multiple ages to limit behavior and focus emotion on reciprocal training – and we are seeing it play out in all walks of life. Competition socializes. So, tiger moms are buying children access to filters not improving their children (and we see this in the workforce over time). And by not TRAINING in the basics (manners ethics and aggressive competition) that matter most we are creating an infantilized emotional population unfit or not only military service, the workforce, but a political system we call democracy.

  • Re: The Neuroscience of Intelligence

    Jan 12, 2020, 3:47 PM @charlesmurray

    1. Correct but the opposite, via-negativa: The neuroscience is trivial. The causes of defects in intelligence are almost limitless. It’s not so much that we need to understand intelligence (g), it’s that we need to understand why defects in intelligence are so common.

    2. AFAIK, (g) is the most accurate measure in psychology, and stereotypes are the most accurate measure in social sciences. The problem with testing is casting (g) separately from personality traits (which it is), and therefore not ALSO testing for trait-conscientiousness.

    2 If we test intelligence, and the Big5 traits we see that success is determined MORE by trait conscientiousness than by intelligence, and that intelligence increases income only because it grants access to problems of greater complexity. Intelligence REDUCES ERROR in complexity.

    1. As such ADAPTABILITY (success) consists of applying trait conscientiousness and trait intelligence to exploit opportunities at one’s optimum of complexity. This means ‘the bell curve’ of overlapping bell curves from low IQ/conscientiousness to high IQ/conscientiousness.

    2. There are plenty of people who are high in both intelligence, high in conscientiousness, and high in agreeableness and therefore low in competitiveness. So once we stack the priority of these traits in the context of a given economy and rule of law, sortition is obvious.

    3. Furthermore, once we combine all 5/6 traits we see that personalities cluster around three archetypes: female mother(teach), ascendant male(experiment), and established or dominant male(defend).

    The world is simple – if and only if you use enough dimensions of measurement.