Form: Quote Commentary

  • Elegant New Weapon in the Anti-Krugman Wars

    —“The real difference between Chicago and MIT macro is Chicago’s commitment to rules over discretion. Milton Friedman’s endorsement of a constant 3% increase in the money supply was meant to minimize the chance of hyperinflation and to make running the Fed a boring job such that investors had clear expectations of how Policy would be set. When “leaders” have discretion with respect to how they set policy, they have more fun on the jobbut “uncertainty” increases and this reduces investment.”—Matthew Kahn

    [I]n other words, the Chicago program seeks to define rules that will eliminate discretion. The MIT program seeks to identify opportunities for discretion. Rule of law = Lack of Discretion.

    I wasn’t able to come up with that myself. And it’s wonderful.

    MORE

    ANTI-KRUGMAN — THIS IS SO GOOD THAT I HAVE TO POST MORE OF IT.

     —-“At M.I.T., however, Keynes never went away. To be sure, stagflation showed that there were limits to what policy can do. But students continued to learn about the imperfections of markets and the role that monetary and fiscal policy can play in boosting a depressed economy. And the M.I.T. students of the 1970s enlarged on those insights in their later work. Mr. Blanchard, for example, showed how small deviations from perfect rationality can have large economic consequences; Mr. Obstfeld showed that currency markets can sometimes experience self-fulfilling panic.”—-Paul Krugman 

    Point #1 Note the eagerness to introduce ideas from behavioral economics into economic policy making. A dangerous precedent arises here. If the “people are foolish“, then this creates an ugly elitist possibility that only the wise technocrats (the MIT graduates) can protect us. I don‘t like this worldview on a number of levels. Moral hazard lurks when sophisticated investors and economic decision makers are aware that the technocrats will step in and “save the world“ when ugly economic events take place (such as a plunging stock market, or rising unemployment). 

    Point #2: The real difference between Chicago and MIT macro is Chicago‘s commitment to rules over discretion. Milton Friedman‘s endorsement of a constant 3% increase in the money supply was meant to minimize the chance of hyperinflation and to make running the Fed a boring job such that investors had clear expectations of how Policy would be set. When “leaders“ have discretion with respect to how they set policy, they have more fun on the job but “uncertainty“ increases and this reduces investment. 

    Point #3; Dr. Krugman also refuses to acknowledge the power of Ed Prescott‘s work on time consistency and policy. Clear rules of the game create dynamically stable rules and this fosters investment. In Dr. Krugman‘s short run focus on the business cycle, he ignores the long run growth implications caused by the activist policies that he supports. 

    Point #4; In the absence of randomized trials, the MIT trained technocrats (the 5 people listed above) do not actually know what policies are effective in mitigating business cycles. If they know that they do not know how the macro economy really works, then does this affect Dr. Krugman‘s optimism that MIT has won the policy debates. His piece isn‘t that modest (or honest) about the modeling uncertainty that now exists in modern macro economics. He makes the past debates sound settled. If he attended MIT‘s current 1st year PHD macro sequence, he would see a variety of different models being worked on and taught and I bet that the policy conclusions are very sensitive to the modeling choices.” —- Matthew Kahn (Environmental and Urban Economics )

  • Elegant New Weapon in the Anti-Krugman Wars

    —“The real difference between Chicago and MIT macro is Chicago’s commitment to rules over discretion. Milton Friedman’s endorsement of a constant 3% increase in the money supply was meant to minimize the chance of hyperinflation and to make running the Fed a boring job such that investors had clear expectations of how Policy would be set. When “leaders” have discretion with respect to how they set policy, they have more fun on the jobbut “uncertainty” increases and this reduces investment.”—Matthew Kahn

    [I]n other words, the Chicago program seeks to define rules that will eliminate discretion. The MIT program seeks to identify opportunities for discretion. Rule of law = Lack of Discretion.

    I wasn’t able to come up with that myself. And it’s wonderful.

    MORE

    ANTI-KRUGMAN — THIS IS SO GOOD THAT I HAVE TO POST MORE OF IT.

     —-“At M.I.T., however, Keynes never went away. To be sure, stagflation showed that there were limits to what policy can do. But students continued to learn about the imperfections of markets and the role that monetary and fiscal policy can play in boosting a depressed economy. And the M.I.T. students of the 1970s enlarged on those insights in their later work. Mr. Blanchard, for example, showed how small deviations from perfect rationality can have large economic consequences; Mr. Obstfeld showed that currency markets can sometimes experience self-fulfilling panic.”—-Paul Krugman 

    Point #1 Note the eagerness to introduce ideas from behavioral economics into economic policy making. A dangerous precedent arises here. If the “people are foolish“, then this creates an ugly elitist possibility that only the wise technocrats (the MIT graduates) can protect us. I don‘t like this worldview on a number of levels. Moral hazard lurks when sophisticated investors and economic decision makers are aware that the technocrats will step in and “save the world“ when ugly economic events take place (such as a plunging stock market, or rising unemployment). 

    Point #2: The real difference between Chicago and MIT macro is Chicago‘s commitment to rules over discretion. Milton Friedman‘s endorsement of a constant 3% increase in the money supply was meant to minimize the chance of hyperinflation and to make running the Fed a boring job such that investors had clear expectations of how Policy would be set. When “leaders“ have discretion with respect to how they set policy, they have more fun on the job but “uncertainty“ increases and this reduces investment. 

    Point #3; Dr. Krugman also refuses to acknowledge the power of Ed Prescott‘s work on time consistency and policy. Clear rules of the game create dynamically stable rules and this fosters investment. In Dr. Krugman‘s short run focus on the business cycle, he ignores the long run growth implications caused by the activist policies that he supports. 

    Point #4; In the absence of randomized trials, the MIT trained technocrats (the 5 people listed above) do not actually know what policies are effective in mitigating business cycles. If they know that they do not know how the macro economy really works, then does this affect Dr. Krugman‘s optimism that MIT has won the policy debates. His piece isn‘t that modest (or honest) about the modeling uncertainty that now exists in modern macro economics. He makes the past debates sound settled. If he attended MIT‘s current 1st year PHD macro sequence, he would see a variety of different models being worked on and taught and I bet that the policy conclusions are very sensitive to the modeling choices.” —- Matthew Kahn (Environmental and Urban Economics )

  • Untitled

    http://abcnews.go.com/US/court-oks-barring-high-iqs-cops/story?id=95836


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-27 02:37:00 UTC

  • ANTI-KRUGMAN — THIS IS SO GOOD THAT I HAVE TO POST MORE OF IT. —“At M.I.T., h

    ANTI-KRUGMAN — THIS IS SO GOOD THAT I HAVE TO POST MORE OF IT.

    —“At M.I.T., however, Keynes never went away. To be sure, stagflation showed that there were limits to what policy can do. But students continued to learn about the imperfections of markets and the role that monetary and fiscal policy can play in boosting a depressed economy. And the M.I.T. students of the 1970s enlarged on those insights in their later work. Mr. Blanchard, for example, showed how small deviations from perfect rationality can have large economic consequences; Mr. Obstfeld showed that currency markets can sometimes experience self-fulfilling panic.”—Paul Krugman

    “Point #1 Note the eagerness to introduce ideas from behavioral economics into economic policy making. A dangerous precedent arises here. If the “people are foolish”, then this creates an ugly elitist possibility that only the wise technocrats (the MIT graduates) can protect us. I don’t like this worldview on a number of levels. Moral hazard lurks when sophisticated investors and economic decision makers are aware that the technocrats will step in and “save the world” when ugly economic events take place (such as a plunging stock market, or rising unemployment).

    “Point #2: The real difference between Chicago and MIT macro is Chicago’s commitment to rules over discretion. Milton Friedman’s endorsement of a constant 3% increase in the money supply was meant to minimize the chance of hyperinflation and to make running the Fed a boring job such that investors had clear expectations of how Policy would be set. When “leaders” have discretion with respect to how they set policy, they have more fun on the job but “uncertainty” increases and this reduces investment.

    “Point #3; Dr. Krugman also refuses to acknowledge the power of Ed Prescott’s work on time consistency and policy. Clear rules of the game create dynamically stable rules and this fosters investment. In Dr. Krugman’s short run focus on the business cycle, he ignores the long run growth implications caused by the activist policies that he supports.

    “Point #4; In the absence of randomized trials, the MIT trained technocrats (the 5 people listed above) do not actually know what policies are effective in mitigating business cycles. If they know that they do not know how the macro economy really works, then does this affect Dr. Krugman’s optimism that MIT has won the policy debates. His piece isn’t that modest (or honest) about the modeling uncertainty that now exists in modern macro economics. He makes the past debates sound settled. If he attended MIT’s current 1st year PHD macro sequence, he would see a variety of different models being worked on and taught and I bet that the policy conclusions are very sensitive to the modeling choices.”

    — Matthew Kahn (Environmental and Urban Economics )


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-26 00:18:00 UTC

  • WEAPON IN THE ANTI-KRUGMAN WARS —“The real difference between Chicago and MIT

    http://greeneconomics.blogspot.com/2015/07/dr-krugmans-discussion-of-mit-vs.htmlELEGANT WEAPON IN THE ANTI-KRUGMAN WARS

    —“The real difference between Chicago and MIT macro is Chicago’s commitment to rules over discretion. Milton Friedman’s endorsement of a constant 3% increase in the money supply was meant to minimize the chance of hyperinflation and to make running the Fed a boring job such that investors had clear expectations of how Policy would be set. When “leaders” have discretion with respect to how they set policy, they have more fun on the job but “uncertainty” increases and this reduces investment.”—Matthew Kahn

    In other words, the Chicago program seeks to define rules that will eliminate discretion. The MIT program seeks to identify opportunities for discretion. Rule of law = Lack of Discretion.

    I wasn’t able to come up with that myself. And it’s wonderful.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-25 18:46:00 UTC

  • CURT, I DON’T UNDERSTAND YOUR CRITICISM OF MISES… —“I’ve seen you criticize

    http://www.propertarianism.com/propertarian-posts-by-chapter/Q&A: CURT, I DON’T UNDERSTAND YOUR CRITICISM OF MISES…

    —“I’ve seen you criticize Mises and I’m not sure I’ve fully understood your critique. Would it be fair to compare your criticism to modern science’s correction of the Greeks? I’m referring to the definition of modern science as inductive reasoning based on observation (empiricism) in contrast to the Greeks’ deduction based on self-evident truth. (Intuition vs. sensory information)

    Well, if it was easily reducible to something simple, someone would have figured this problem out before. And it wouldn’t have stumped mises, hayek, popper and dozens of others in other fields.”—

    ANSWER

    I could be lazy and point you to the series of posts on this topic:

    http://www.propertarianism.com/propertarian-posts-by-chapter/

    Scroll down to (or search for) “REFORMING THE SCIENCES” That section covers it pretty thoroughly.

    Or, I could try to make it easy for you and point you to this single post:

    http://www.propertarianism.com/2014/06/21/mises-praxeology-as-the-failure-to-develop-economic-operationalism-yes/

    Or, I could spend a little effort and tell you that a whole bunch of philosophers failed to expand the scientific method in the 19th and 20th when our means of instrumental measurement exceeded our understanding of the limits of our perceptions.

    Mises is one of the philosophers who failed. In failing he created a pseudoscience. Whereas the others merely failed to understand what they had discovered.

    Economics is as empirical as any other science. But just as we cannot state that a formula is existentially possible in mathematics without a proof that it can be constructed from possible mathematical operations, we cannot state that an economic statement is possible if we cannot construct it from possible human operations. Conversely, we cannot possibly deduce all of economics. Yet we can explain all of economics if we try.

    Mises made a profound mistake of conflating a negative test – a form of falsification – with a positive means of discovery.

    He made the error all germans did: that justification can be used in matters of science. It cannot be.

    Contracts and moral arguments can be justified, but truth propositions merely survive criticism.

    This is a very advanced bit of a failure of philosophy in intellectual history so it’s not trivial to grasp.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-25 16:23:00 UTC

  • “New institutions, or the demise of old institutions, alter incentives and conse

    —“New institutions, or the demise of old institutions, alter incentives and consequently mechanically affect material behavior and reproductive behavior, and metaphysically affecting spiritual condition. The resulting changes in material and reproductive behavior can be immense and rapid – as the normative changes in family support and reproductive behavior over the last 50-75 years illustrate. The spiritual changes are less rapid, perhaps due in some part to cultural inertia and to genetic memory as 50 generations of megalomaniacs and charming psychopaths were caught out and punished by their peers in the nobility and church.”— Karl Brooks


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-23 04:38:00 UTC

  • Umbrellas are thankfully, an inexpensive, and dependable technology for safeguar

    Umbrellas are thankfully, an inexpensive, and dependable technology for safeguarding against the damaging effects of rain.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-22 10:03:28 UTC

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/623795489775951872

    Reply addressees: @Sacerdotus

    Replying to: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/623787348950691841


    IN REPLY TO:

    @Sacerdotus

    It was raining she said https://t.co/GuITvR5LrB

    Original post: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/623787348950691841

  • ASIANS GET LONGER LIFE SPANS IN EXCHANGE FOR LOWER TESTOSTERONE? —“Asians have

    ASIANS GET LONGER LIFE SPANS IN EXCHANGE FOR LOWER TESTOSTERONE?

    —“Asians have less developed genitalia and the effect seems to be sustained. A meta-analysis made in May 2007 found the smallest average penis size, in a comparison amongst many areas worldwide, in Korea. Biologically, this could mean a lower testosterone level in men, a weaker libido, compensated by a higher immune stability (testosterone decreases immunity) and a larger lifespan. In the end, the Japanese people have the highest life expectancy on the planet. The result seems to be this: the Mongoloid race is the most common in the planet.”—


    Source date (UTC): 2015-07-20 10:23:00 UTC

  • The Anglo-Saxon Subversion of French Elites

    [T]he combination of “Anglo-Saxon” economics (accepting the dynamism of open markets) and of “Anglo-Saxon” politics (governments as seriously responsible–British version–or accountable–Washington version–to their voters) is doubly subversive to the French elite’s entire modus operandi. The “Anglo-Saxons” provide an identity to define oneself against and, in the case of the US, a counterpoint to seek to surpass. (One cannot really say “rival” because the US fails to feel threatened by European unity–indeed, actively promotes it; which is, if anything, even more infuriating.) –Michael Philip