Form: Quote Commentary

  • “Rule of thumb: The more words an anarchocapitalist uses to justify his claims f

    —“Rule of thumb: The more words an anarchocapitalist uses to justify his claims for a stateless society, the weaker he is, the easier for us to steal his his stuff and womanfolk.”— Johannes Meixner


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-22 01:33:00 UTC

  • “Don’t get me wrong, I think politicians are very useful. And I plan to buy my o

    —“Don’t get me wrong, I think politicians are very useful.

    And I plan to buy my own when I have the requisite funds.”— James Santagata


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-22 01:28:00 UTC

  • “Truth is a moral and ethical absolute. Truth works. By the time you’re thinking

    —“Truth is a moral and ethical absolute. Truth works. By the time you’re thinking it’s relative, and that it depends on a person’s character (or lack thereof), this reveals more about you than you would probably like to. And if you don’t see how the Truth benefits you even in the short term, I would advise you to try it, even if only for a month or two. Chances are you will not go back.”—Johannes Meixner


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-21 20:08:00 UTC

  • ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF NRx AND ITS RELATION TO PROPERTARIANISM (from elsewhere

    https://thespiritualsun.wordpress.com/2015/08/04/a-catalog-of-unforced-errors/AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF NRx AND ITS RELATION TO PROPERTARIANISM

    (from elsewhere)

    Hi,

    Great post. I’ve been looking for a way to riff off of someone else’s work. This is a good opportunity. Sorry if this is a bit long. I just went through the points and captured my thoughts as I went along. But I think it gets the point across.

    1) Scope?

    To what are you referring when referring to NRx? Do you mean Yarvin’s Critique? Do you mean the folks that claim to defend authority over arguments in that critique? Do you mean the body of people who participate in that set of criticisms and make use of those arguments? Do you mean the entire suite of arguments that suggest that the enlightenment experiment has failed?

    2) —What would a small measure of success look like for contemporary reaction? —

    Success would incrementally look like: (a) a body of language for signaling and ridicule of opponents (b) an ideological research program seeking post-democratic solutions (c) Awareness (mention) of the central criticism of the Cathedral Complex among the informed advocates of each of the three political compass points, (d) expansion of the pool of talent arguing the position of the criticism, (e) popular mention of the failure or success of democracy and the enlightenment project (f) The production of a set of solutions that were possible to implement, and therefore possible to demand, (g) proposal of policy and changes, (h) enactment of policy.

    3) Failure.

    —“Neoreaction has failed to obtain any wealthy patrons or even well-known proponents. For every serious, mature Neoreactionary there are ten juvenile snark-emitting anime avatars who use the hashtag. For everyone who uses the hashtag, there are probably twenty people who see the failure of progressivism and democracy, but are unwilling to be part of a “crab cult”. …. NRx has now retreated into a hermetically sealed inner circle which brooks no discussion with those who are critical.”—

    Reasons:

    (a) Yarvin’s critique of the failure of the enlightenment experiments is an instance of ‘critique’ not an actionable or scientific theory. The fact that one cannot reduce it like evolution to a theory is why it remains a critique. The world no longer operates on criticism except in the mass market. The world operates by scientific argument and popularization by moral loading. NRx does the opposite.

    (b) As such there is no means of obtaining political or economic power by a broad spectrum of the population which would include both those with money and those with time.

    (c) But there remains a moral criticism and a morally loaded criticism for those who require self-signals of moral righteousness to justify their separatism. It is this use of NRx for self-signaling by outcasts from the mainstream that you are observing.

    (I consider Propertarianism and Testimonialism post-NRx for these reasons.)

    4) Successes

    —” it’s worth acknowledging what NRx has gotten right. While there is no clear-cut consensus on many details, the general center-of-gravity acknowledges the irredeemable problems of Progressivism and Democracy, the unrealistic fantasy of Libertarianism, and the positive value of hierarchy and racial realism and sex/gender realism. “—-

    (a) I would love to see someone other than Yarin who has added content to NRx. I am not sure who has.

    (b) As I understand it, the criticisms are (i) that the enlightenment project seeking to extend the aristocratic franchise(political participation) and post-kinship-relations to all property holders, then to all men, then to all women, then to out-group members, has been a failure because the competing interests of each group cannot be satisfied by majority rule, and the result of majority rule was proletarian rule. (ii) And that the cathedral complex (state, academy, media, elites) have displaced the martial, judicial, and empirical complex, and have constructed a pseudoscientific and pseudo-rational mythology to replace the Aristocracy/Merchant/ChristianChurch+Academy and it’s division of responsibilities (jurisprudence, production, education) with a monopoly of state and academy supported by the media. Importantly: the west successfully resisted this centralization longer than all other cultures, and this is one of the many reasons for our technological, legal and military excellence.

    (c) Yarvin constructed his argument using critique. (Yarvin: Jewish criticism(gossip), Hoppe: German justificationary rationalism(philosophy), Doolittle: Anglo analytic-empiricism(science).) The criticism is largely correct. The solution (technology) is not. This is the problem with all philosophical Critique and Justifiationism. In failing to answer the why, the criticism alone provides no insight into the prior era’s success: extension of kinship trust and truth-telling to non-kin, and the extension of property rights(enfranchisement) by merit.

    —“Neoreaction wants a more stable, sustainable, anti-fragile society, one that is integrated and organic, with very little political activity, since politics is disruptive to the social fabric. Reaction has those same goals. The problem is that everything else in Neoreaction attenuates that one point of strength.”—

    Yes. The western tradition advocates Heroism/Truth/Honor while warning against Hubris/Vanity. And western hubris and vanity are demonstrated by our belief that our enlightenment visions have solved ancient problems rather than that we have been able to act hubristically because of the temporary wealth effect of our legal, financial, technological, and petrochemical innovations. As the world catches up to us, our advantage is no longer legal, financial, technological and petrochemical, but merely cultural: we still are the only high trust culture, and we are destroying it through that same legalistic hubris and immigration.

    5) Tech Culture

    —“A software system is fragile; a statesman has to be flexible. A software system is designed around a particular model of reality, and cannot “see” beyond that model.”—

    This is an excellent point but fails to get to the underlying problem:discretion. Rule of law requires decidability. The debate in economics for example is between the saltwater economists who seek to find opportunities to apply discretion; the freshwater economists who seek rules so that economic governance is articulated under rule of law (without discretion), and the austrian economists who seek to reduce the frictions of cooperation by improving institutions of cooperation.

    Software requries decideable propositions. I am unclear as to whether Yarvin understands that he was trying to solve the ancient problem of rule of law. What I am clear about is that software teaches you the (low) limits of your knowlege, the requirement that you demonstrate your knoweldge by creating algorithms, and that each step of which is decideable. And if you succeed then you have constructed the equivalent of well articulated law. In other words, rule of law should look very much like programming: lacking need for discretion (or in math what we call “choice” in a cases of arbitrary precision (lack of context)).

    So Yarvin intuits the approximately correct problem I think, and simply fails to come up with a solution. THe solution is that when we enfrancise new groups with different interests we can no longer rely upon majority rule, but require houses for each new group, within which majority rule may be practiced, but where trades can be conducted between houses and trades invalidated if illegal, rather than requiring assent. In other words, government should consist of a market for the production of commons between classes with dissimilar interests. (Genders, Social Classes).

    It is possible to develop this solution only because one does not rely on critique of failure, but reconstruction of success of the west. Criticism provides no insight. The success of the west requires we understand it.

    6) Social Darwinism

    I’m not going to criticize this paragraph (even though I should) but it’s not constructive or insightful. No ‘harmony’ no ‘positive assertion’ is knowable in cooperative matters, any more than it is in physical science. Western civilization has been practicing eugenics through at least three phases: (a) harsh winters (b) manorial allocation of property to capable married couples and (c) through hanging or killing .5-1% of malcontents annually. (So has China). As far as I can tell, the primary difference between the different tribal and racial groups is only in the degree of suppression of reproduction of the underclasses (how successful they were at eugenic culling), or in the case of india and south america, how successful the aristocracy was at creating a caste system. The problem is that reproductive suppression of the underclasses is least harmful, and produces superior distributions so that the pareto rule (80% of the property in the top 20% of hands) can place the means of organizing production in the hands of those most able to do it for profit rather than exploitation. (this is the problem facing india and south america.)

    So whether it is appealing or not, it’s true. The question is then, given the truth, how to best go about transferring reproduction from dysgenic to eugenic ends. And as far as I know, that’s only possible by paying the underclasses not to reproduce, and paying the upper classes (or at least the middle class) to reproduce.

    Right now we do precisely the opposite. Which since 1850 appears to have taken us from parity with ashkenazim to 1/2 standard deviation downward.

    6) Culture of Critique

    I think I’ve covered this already, but I agree wholeheartedly. This is because NRx, structured as Critique, attracts gossipers to easy criticism for the purpose of argumentative signaling, rather than serious intellectuals to the furtherance of challenging political solutions. It also explains the near absence of intellectuals in the NRx (and libertarian) movements. (Something I want to fix, by emphasis on solutions rather than criticisms.)

    7) No Constituency

    Correct. Gossip is used to rally, shame, and ostracize, not to organize solutions. Critique is merely advanced gossip used to rally, shame and morally outrage. Intellectuals and activists of above average ability, and those who are capable will pursue positive rather than critical ends. Leaving those who are less capable in the field. This is what has happened to libertarianism. Intellectuals have abandoned the field since the 70’s leaving only over-invested has-beens. (most of whom I know personally who I hope forgive the truth.)

    8) No Sacrifice

    —“There is no great spirit of sacrifice.”—

    I think this criticism should be restated as that there is no heroic call to action. But again, there is no call to action there is only call to moral indignation over being *lied to* for a century at so much expense.

    But your statement that individuals are seeking attention is probably not meaningful. This should be restated as the content of NRx is insufficient to advance a theory, so that individuals advance the criticism through rallying. Rallying requires leaders to rally. This is a natural consequence of the failure of Critique. At least the marxists proposed solutions, even if they were pseudoscientific. We lack the numbers (and women) for gossip (critique) to be distributed as is progressivism and political correctness, and we lack the incentives of the government (votes) academy (female student customers) and media (female and some male consumers) necessary to conduct rallying and shaming (although the alt-right is making some impressive progress in meme-generation that is certainly working).

    9) No Dialectic

    Well, I would argue that a ‘dialectic’ is an admission of failure, and a research program is evidence of success. Dialectic is an exceptional means of carrying upon deceit. Research programs are not. If you mean that an ineffective minority is trying to contain the discourse because they have no theoretical definitions to constrain it, then that is correct. But this is another example of consequence of the failure of the method, not that the criticism NRx puts forward is false.

    Unfortunately, moral rallying is more emotionally rewarding and easier to grasp than rational, legal, or scientific argument that by very nature eschew the subjective value of moral outrage.

    And this again presents an interesting problem since political power requires moral outrage, but in the scientific era it must be proposed as an actionable theory – we are no longer in the era of the french revolution or even the marxist and postmodern. The very reason we have the science to justify Reaction is the end of those eras and the current scientific era. Our arguments must depend upon the ratio scientific – which is why I am working to unite science, philosophy, morality and law. And I think (I am not yet certain) that I have done so.

    I do not matter however. I am irrelevant. What matters is whether the theory survives. And I think it will survive for many generations: truth (in the scientific sense I put forward) is enough to prevent and reverse the second levantine lie: the combination of cosmopolitan pseudoscience and anglo puritan and neo-puritan utopianism.

    10) Apocalyptic Mentality

    This is an ideologically necessary technique for implementing political change. See Andrew Heywood’d Political Ideologies : An Introduction. And they’re not wrong. This problem is indeed culturally and genetically apocalyptic. There is no reason to prevent yet another dark age. There have been multiple in our history. And in both the sea peoples, the classical period, and the contemporary period, they were caused by population migration by inferiors into established cultures.

    11) Metaphysical Foundations

    Well, that’s certainly true but I have almost as certainly corrected that, leaving the NRx criticism as ‘true’ and Testimonialism and Propertarianism as explanations and solutions. So this merely strengthens the NRX critique. I see NRx as the ideological incentive for revolution, while my work as the solution that we must demand to either reform or replace the enlightenment.

    12) Amorality

    I am not sure I should try to correct this paragraph. You mean to say something but I am not quite sure what it is. I think I would restate it as people need to feel moral justification if they are to forcibly implement change, but the NRx community is not giving people that justification in actionable terms.

    FROM MY PERSPECTIVE

    (a) People are already associating my work with the radical right even though my solution is certainly progressive by any measure. I see this as threatening the viability of my work just as Nietzche’s works were threatened. So I am reluctantly pleased that traditionalists see the value in my work as explaining why their civilization outpaced all others everywhere at all points in time, but equally nervous about casting me as anything other than a social scientists seeking economic prosperity and non-conflict. (I hate conflict)

    (b) I tend to disassociate myself with NRx because it is as you suggest, a fairly immature movement and aside from Land (who is himself an elegant practitioner of rational meaning in the continental tradition not an analytic philosopher in the scientific and critical rational traditions) it is a very lonely place to be. I don’t want to be labeled on the down side.

    So: Classical Liberal->Libertarian->Ancap->NRx->Testimonialism/Propertarianism seems to be the trajectory I follow. We have taken the classical liberal program, criticized it for its incremental failures in each generation, and now have produced a sufficient criticism that we can REFORM the classical liberal program such that we restore the ability for houses of government to represent various classes and to conduct contractual exchanges between them (legislation) but that they cannot make law. This process of pacification first uses centralized government to suppress local parasitism and decrease transaction costs producing economic velocity, at the cost of an increasingly self-serving monopoly bureaucracy. But it is our generation’s function to now eliminate the cost of self serving monopoly bureaucracy, and to return western government to the function of producing commons within the limits of the civic society that we so uniquely developed in this world.

    (c) The rate of revolutionary incentive and consensus is accelerating, but a revolution without an objective that provides everyone who agrees with our moral incentives and not is much more difficult to bring into fruition. There were generations of thinkers prior to the last revolutionary era. The world moves faster now and our generation needs to complete a political solution that can be implemented in law without the need for ‘belief’ or ‘shared values’ which are code-words for monopoly of opinion, if we are to achieve the restoration of our civilization.

    I hope this was helpful as a means of giving those who are sympathetic to the NRx movement some ideas about why they’re both right but insufficient, and where they might turn next, given that they’re insufficient. I find no reason to really attack the NRx movement as I have the cosmopolitan libertine (ancap) movement. However, my preferred objective is that if we recognize these movements as failures, that we can all unite behind some variation which gives each of us most of what we desire, and our opposition much of what they desire. The reason being that in game theory while no one achieves all his wants, the best wants that all can achieve are the best wants POSSIBLE to achieve.

    Truth is enough. It’s the source of western exceptionalism. We just need to put truth into law. Aristocracy is an empirical means of government. We assert no positives other than that if we prevent negatives then all of mankind is free to experiment by trial and error. And that is the very definition of ‘scientific’.

    Ancap was a step. NRx was a step. One foot in front of the other, we soldier onward.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine (Tallinn, Estonia)

    http://thespiritualsun.wordpress.com/2015/08/04/a-catalog-of-unforced-errors/


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-18 04:53:00 UTC

  • over realism have been at the center of the philosophy of science for at least s

    http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2015/08/niiniluoto-on-scientific-realism.htmlDebates over realism have been at the center of the philosophy of science for at least seventy-five years. The fundamental question is this: what exists in the world? And how do we best gain knowledge about the nature and properties of these real things? The first question is metaphysical, while the second is epistemic.

    Scientific realism is the view that “mature” areas of science offer theories of the nature of real things and their properties, and that the theories of well-confirmed areas of science are most likely approximately true. So science provides knowledge about reality independent from our ideas; and the methods of science justify our belief in these representations of the real world. Scientific methods are superior to other forms of belief acquisition when it comes to successful discovery of the entities and properties of the world in which we live.

    But this statement conceals a number of difficult issues. What is involved in asserting that a theory is true? We have the correspondence theory of truth on the one hand — the idea that the key concepts of the theory succeed in referring to real entities in the world independent of the theory. And on the other hand, we have the pragmatist theory of truth — the idea that “truth” means “well confirmed”. A further difficulty arises from the indisputable fallibility of science; we know that many well confirmed scientific theories have turned out to be false. Finally, the idea of “approximate truth” is problematic, since it seems to imply “not exactly true,” which in turn implies “false”. Hilary Putnam distinguished two kinds of realism based on the polarity of correspondence and justification, metaphysical realism and internal realism; and it seems plain enough that “internal realism” is not a variety of realism at all.

    Another central issue in the metatheory of realism is the question, what kinds of considerations are available to permit us to justify or refute various claims of realism? Why should we believe that the contents of current scientific theories succeed in accurately describing unobservable but fundamental features of an independent world? And the strongest argument the literature has produced is that offered by Putnam and Boyd in the 1970s: the best explanation of the practical and predictive successes of the sciences is the truth of the theoretical assumptions on which they rest.

    Ilkka Niiniluoto’s 1999 Critical Scientific Realism proceeds from the general orientation of Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism. But it is not a synthesis of the philosophy of critical realism as much as it is an analytical dissection of the logic and plausibility of various claims of scientific realism. As such it is an excellent and rigorous introduction to the topic of scientific realism for current discussions. Niiniluoto analyzes the metatheory of realism into six areas of questions: ontological, semantical, epistemological, axiological, methodological, and ethical (2). And he provides careful and extensive discussions of the issues that arise under each topic. Here is a useful taxonomy that he provides for the many variants of realism (11):

    Here is how Niiniluoto distinguishes “critical scientific realism” from other varieties of realism:

    R0: At least part of reality is ontologically independent of human minds.

    R1: Truth is a semantical relation between language and reality (correspondence theory).

    R2: Truth and falsity are in principle applicable to all linguistic products of scientific enquiry.

    R3: Truth is an essential aim of science.

    R4: Truth is not easily accessible or recognizable, and even our best theories can fail to be true.

    R5: The best explanation for the practical success of science is the assumption that scientific theories in fact are approximately true.

    These are credible and appealing premises. And they serve to distinguish this version of realism from other important alternatives — for example, Putnam’s internal realism. But it is evident that Niiniluoto’s “critical scientific realism” is not simply a further expression of “critical realism” in the system of Bhaskar. It is a distinctive and plausible version of scientific realism; but its premises equally capture the realisms of other philosophers of science whose work is not within the paradigm of standard critical realism. As the diagram indicates, other philosophers who embrace R0-R5 include Popper, Sellars, Bunge, Boyd, and Nowak, as well as Niiniluoto himself. (It is noteworthy that Bhaskar’s name does not appear on this list!)

    So how much of a contribution does Critical Scientific Realism represent in the evolving theory of scientific realism within philosophy of science? In my reading this is an important step in the evolution of the arguments for and against realism. Niiniluoto’s contribution is a synthetic one. He does an excellent job of tracing down the various assumptions and disagreements that exist within the field of realism and anti-realism debates, and the route that he traces through these debates under the banner of “critical scientific realism” represents (for me, anyway) a particularly plausible combination of answers to these various questions. So one might say that the position that Niiniluoto endorses is a high point in the theory of scientific realism — the most intellectually and practically compelling combination of positions from metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, and methodology that are available in the assessment of the truthiness of science.

    What it is not, however, is the apotheosis of “critical realism” in the sense intended by the literature extending from Bhaskar to the current generation of critical realist thinkers. Niiniluoto’s approach is appealingly eclectic; he follows the logic of the arguments he entertains, rather than seeking to validate or extend a particular view within this complicated field of realist arguments. And this is a good thing if our interest is in making the most sense possible of the idea of scientific realism as an interpretation of the significance of science in face of the challenges of constructivism, conceptual and theoretical underdetermination, and relativism.


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-17 16:15:00 UTC

  • no other culture, even the catholic states, approaches protestant high trust (an

    http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2015/08/america_takes_o.htmlUnfortunately, no other culture, even the catholic states, approaches protestant high trust (and therefore economic velocity). We have genetically pacified northern Europe aggressively for a millennium, practiced delayed reproduction an eugenic mating for just as long, and pacified through eugenic manorialism less so for millennia before that.

    Cultures can adopt technology, but it has yet to be seen if anyone can adopt high trust. Truth telling, and even the very concept of it, much less contractual adherence, diminish very, very rapidly, and corruption increases very rapidly outside of the Hanjal line.

    I don’t see much reason for optimism. We have a very poor record of spreading truth telling and trust, even if we have a great record of spreading money, accounting, banking, interest, and consumer capitalism.

    Other cultures wear our clothes, eat our food, listen to our music, watch their movies, and employ our technology. But they remain familial, inbred, tribal, corrupt, and unpacified.

    The western miracle was caused by our accidental discovery of truth. From that discovery all of consequence was derived. Without that, little of consequence will be constructed.

    Our frequent self congratulation is merely signaling and hubris. We should leave the brits to specialize in it. They’re better at it. 😉


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-17 15:51:00 UTC

  • SEE THE VIRTUE OF COMPUTER SCIENCE? Something that is not well understood, even

    http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/jesse.shapiro/research/CodeAndData.pdfECONOMISTS SEE THE VIRTUE OF COMPUTER SCIENCE?

    http://www.env-econ.net/2015/08/coding.html

    Something that is not well understood, even in computer science, is that just as they syllogism, the ratio, the calculus, and statistical relation were innovations in human thought, so was programming an innovation in the process of human thought.

    It is hard to accept the fact that programming may be as important as mathematics, the scientific method, and logical reasoning, grammar and rhetoric.

    For the single reason that unlike statistical relations programs consist of existentially possible operations.

    The 20th century failure of operationalism, intuitionism and praxeology is due to the failure to grasp that justification (confirmation) is not meaningful, and that correlation provides us with a source of inquiry, but only a sequence of operations provide us with evidence of existential possibility. And only parsimony assists us in choosing truth candidates between existentially possible sequences of operations.

    In other words, if statements of social science cannot be reduced to sympathetically testable, rationally decidable sequences of choices, they we have no idea if they CAN be true.

    We train ourselves to be intolerant of inserting information that does not exist, because the entire purpose of science is to eliminate error, bias, wishful thinking and deception from propositions that we construct by means of free association. And that is what statistical analysis helps us do: extend our senses so that we can construct possible free associations from that which we cannot sense without such technological devices.

    Cheers

    http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/jesse.shapiro/research/CodeAndData.pdf


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-17 15:23:00 UTC

  • HICKS TRIES TO GIVE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION TO REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT “—we live

    HICKS TRIES TO GIVE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION TO REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

    “—we live in something that should be called a Doubly-Indirect Paternalist Democracy or a Thrice-Removed Benevolent Aristocracy. Citizens can makes some choices, but within a framework selected and enforced by our intellectual superiors.”–Stephen Hicks

    SEE: http://www.thesavvystreet.com/can-a-free-society-work-for-the-less-clever/

    I want to write a little about how non-discretionary rule of law which prohibits involuntary transfer “Rule of Law” is the only necessary check on the grant of positive discretion by ‘specialists’.

    There is no difference between government under rule of law and corporation under rule of law, as long as citizens and shareholders have a means of juridical defense against the imposition of unwanted costs, or the choice of policy that harms them.

    We non-specialists (citizens, shareholders) do not need to understand positives(policy), we need only understand that policy is constructed truthfully, productively, with full accounting, and consisting of mutually beneficial transfers.

    While this may sound like legal gobbeldy-gook it is trivial to place such contractarian constraints of strict construction upon the state and it’s bureaucrats.

    Curt


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-11 15:01:00 UTC

  • USE OF LITERATURE. Damn. Great article. Other points I thought of while reading

    https://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/why-college-kids-are-avoiding-the-study-of-literature/THE USE OF LITERATURE.

    Damn. Great article.

    Other points I thought of while reading it:

    (a) another (failed) twentieth century attempt at ‘scientizing’ an art to increase the status of it’s professors. There are indeed basic rules to the craft of writing. But that in the end result, fiction is a parable: it gives us experiences of hypotheses at a discount and in compressed time. As such we can carry rich and complex parables, sometimes amounting to the entire mental framework of the author in his time, with us, as if we are Methuselah, having lived a thousand lives.

    (b) I have been concerned about the use of literature as a vehicle for empathic suggestion and therefore as a means of deceit as it has been by the postmoderns – but now that I know it is possible to objectively test the moral content of actions, I know it is just as possible to teach people to morally judge literature, just as they rationally judge arguments, or scientifically judge the possibility of physical phenomenon. We merely would need teach objective morality, and the construction of moral political, social , moral, and commercial contract. Since this is the only form of accounting we can sense, perceive and measure without instruments, moral science should be the easiest science to teach. Leaving authors of literature as unconstrained with moral challenges for characters as science fiction authors are unchallenged with challenges of physics for their readers.

    (c) science describes the universe. history describes man. fiction produces theory about what might be, how we might act, and in doing so is the most abstract, but most richly loaded method of teaching how one might live one’s life (and how one might not want to.)

    (d) I can’t afford to read literature any longer, even if I love it as a kid. Too informationally sparse, and too time consuming. And I have too much experience in the world. And unless it’s mystery almost all of it is predictable. I am also too cognizant of the agendas of authors (Dickens),and too intolerant of their (shallow) attempts at manipulation, as well as that of liberation theology (Steinbeck), or even more subtle cultural competition (Dr.Seuss). While I can appreciate the artistry of Joyce’ Ulysses, I quickly lose patience with his and Pynchon’s works. Only Shakespeare seems to warrant the investment.

    (e) So yes, I find cliff or spark notes, or even amazon reviews, useful in selecting those rare investments I choose to make. And I can see the value of teens and adults merely referring to them, and wikipedia entries. Why? Because scanning multitudinous sources for similar information in brief form provides less opportunity for deception by framing, overloading and suggestion. Which is why I find the whole idea of the near infinite discount on information access that comes with the information era more important than the literary era.

    All communication is dependent upon technology. Novels provided entertainment and experiential enlightenment and most importantly, insight into the minds of characters. And novels were profitable vehicles. Movies do this poorly, but they show us rich information about the world and even now, about imagination of the world. And they were profitable vehicles.. But summary articles often do the same. And we can cover so much more thought in articles than we can in books. We can learn more, choose our own paths like a game, and compare dozens hundreds if not thousands of opinions and perspectives. However, one cannot make money at these things.

    That is what I find most interesting about the information era. Incentives to produce truth rather than deception. And the use of comparison rather than argument to circumvent deception.

    Conversely, authors no longer have much ability to influence the reader except with insight and fact. And it is this I think that creates opportunity for ours and future generations. We can perhaps all of us master the small number of basic principles of the physical and social realms, independent of the error, bias, wishful thinking, loading, framing, overloading and deceit that has plagued past generations.

    But what will happen then is the loss of the influence of the narrator. And the relegation of such narrators to vaudeville. And that I think, is the real objection of the narrative (middle) intellectual class, compared to the factual (upper) intellectual class. Isn’t that something to ponder!?

    (As such ( Troy Camplin ) I have lost my concern over the use of literature. All theories can be tested. All moral theories can be tested. The problem was creating the means by which moral theory and argument could be tested. And that was not so hard really in retrospect. )


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-09 04:53:00 UTC

  • CHOKED WITH NEWS (DEPENDENCE) AND STARVED OF HISTORY(SOVEREIGNTY) –“We are chok

    CHOKED WITH NEWS (DEPENDENCE) AND STARVED OF HISTORY(SOVEREIGNTY)

    –“We are choked with news, and starved of history. We know a thousand items about the day or yesterday, we learn the events and troubles and heartbreaks of a hundred peoples, the policies and pretensions of a dozen capitals, the victories and defeats of causes, armies, athletic teams. But how, without history, can we understand these events, discriminate their significance, sift out the large from the small, see the basic currents underlying surface movements and changes, and foresee the result sufficiently to guard against fatal error or the souring of unreasonable hopes?

    May I give you a few examples of how history illuminates the present? After the wars of Caesar and Pompey in the last century before Christ, Rome emerged the only strong power in the white man’s world. Through that unchallenged supremacy she was able to give two centuries of peace to her vast realm, a Roman Empire stretching from Scotland to the Euphrates, from Gibraltar to the Caucasus. This was the famous Pax Romana; or Roman Peace – the greatest achievement in the history of statesmanship. Anyone knowing the history of Rome could have foreseen – some of us definitely predicted – that international affairs after this war would be more unstable, less pacific, than after the First World War, for the obvious reason that from this war two rival powers were emerging – the English-speaking powers supreme on the seas, and the power of Russia supreme on the European continent; two powers so dangerously balanced, and in such irritating contact on a dozen frontiers, that peace would be more difficult to organize than ever before. Even the statesmanship of an Augustus would hesitate to promise a Shangri-La of international accord in this jungle of conflicting interests and distrustful power.

    Or consider the origin of the great peoples and civilizations of history; how nearly every one of them began with the slow mixture of varied racial stocks entering from any direction into some conquered or inviting region, mixing their blood in marriage or otherwise, gradually producing a homogeneous people, and thereby creating, so to speak, the biological basis of a new civilization. So the Egyptians were formed of Ethiopians, Lybians, Arabs, Syrians, Mesopotamians; so the ancient Hebrews were the composite of their own various stocks, and of Canaanites, Edomites, Ammonites, Moabites, Hittites, and a dozen other peoples that swirled around the Euphrates, the Jordan, and the Orontes. It is not clear, in the perspective, that we Americans are in the stage of racial mixture, that we are not caught in the downward flow of Europe’s civilization, and that – Spengler to the contrary notwithstanding – our future lies before us? But that is an excellent place for a future to be.

    Or consider the revolutions that have taken place in history, in the routes of trade, and see what a light they shed upon out time. Most civilizations and cities rise along trade routes. First along rivers, for these are the natural , easiest routes of trade; so great cultures rose along the Nile, the Tigris, the Ganges, the Yellow River, the Tiber, Rhone, Loire, Seine, Thames, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Dnieper, Danube, Volga, Don. Then, as hearts grew bolder and ships grew large, men sailed into the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and squatted noisily along their shores, as Plato said, “like frogs croaking on the edge of a pond.” What made Greece was the perception of the early Greeks, or Achaeans, that if they could conquer Troy they would control the Dardanelles or Hellespont, and be able to send their merchant vessels without toll or hindrance through the Aegean into the Black Sea, and down the rivers of the Caucasus into Central Asia; in this way they would possess a trade route to Asia far cheaper and safer than the land route of the caravans that bound Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia over weary routes of mountain and desert infested with brigands. That dream of commercial power, and not Helen’s fair face, “launched a thousand ships” on Ilium, and brought Hector and Priam to Achille’s feet. Persia, part of the land route, challenged the victorious Greeks; and note how both Darius in 490, and Xerxes in 480 B.C., in their wars against Greece, moved first to take possession of the Dardanelles – just as a British fleet hovers there now, clinging to strategic Greece, and fearful that the Straits may suddenly be pounced upon by Russian armies lying a few leagues inland in Bulgaria. When Greece defeated Persia at Marathon and Salamis, she was left in control of the eastern Mediterranean and its trade; she blossomed like a flower, while the river cultures, locked to the land, decayed; and for two thousand years the Mediterranean was the home of the white man’s highest civilization.

    Why did the Mediterranean cease, with Michelangelo, about 1560, to dominate the commerce and politics of the world? Because Columbus had stumbled upon America, and had unwittingly opened new routes of trade, and new sources of wealth. Soon the Atlantic nations rose to power – Spain, Portugal, France, England, Holland; each prospered on the exploitation of colonies in America and Asia overseas; each financed in this way its magnificent Renaissance; while Italy, mistress of civilization for fifteen centuries, almost disappeared from history.”—


    Source date (UTC): 2015-08-09 03:06:00 UTC