Curt Doolittle

Form: Mini Essay

  • COME HOME TO ARISTOCRATIC EGALITARIANISM – LEAVE THE GHETTO. I’m an aristocratic

    COME HOME TO ARISTOCRATIC EGALITARIANISM – LEAVE THE GHETTO.

    I’m an aristocratic egalitarian. I am willing to grant full spectrum Propertarian property rights to all who are equally willing to fight for it in word and deed to the best of their ability.

    That is the ancient source of liberty: the aristocratic egalitarianism of the indo-europeans.

    Libertarians from the Rothbardian movement are largely a collection of ‘pussy-tarians’, ‘coward-tarians’, ‘stupid-tarians’, ‘aspie-tarians’, ‘libertines’, and ‘dishonest-cheat-itarians’ who can be divided into two camps: those fooled by obscurantism, and those who are naturally liars, cheats, and dishonest.

    Ditch ghetto libertarianism as the immoral dishonest scheme that it is.

    Come home to aristocratic egalitarianism.

    Take liberty by force, for moral reasons, rather than beg for it for immoral reasons.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-06 05:19:00 UTC

  • WHERE LIBERTARIANS GO WRONG. Libertarians get lost in introspection. The central

    WHERE LIBERTARIANS GO WRONG.

    Libertarians get lost in introspection. The central problem of creating an anarchic society is fully articulating property rights such that they are possible to rationally adjudicate under the common law.

    It is this rational ability to adjudicate differences under the common law that makes possible ‘rule of law’. Without such rational articulation, rule by man’s discretion is necessary.

    The sufficiency of that articulated list of property is what determines if transaction costs are low enough that it’s rational for people to voluntarily join a polity in which plans can be made, and disputes can be resolved, according to that list of property rights.

    As I have written recently, libertarians (foolishly) discount these transaction costs because they tend to be above, and interact above, the threshold at which moral behavior is dominant.

    The NAP is either an insufficient test, or private property rights that are intersubjectively verifiable are an insufficient scope. Propertarianism extends property to that which people demonstrate they believe is their just property, and places the burden on the individuals with the greater knowledge. “Seller Beware”.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-05 14:56:00 UTC

  • THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION AND NON PRODUCTIVE INTERACTION (ed

    THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION AND NON PRODUCTIVE INTERACTION

    (edited and reposted)

    PROPERTARIAN ANALYSIS

    Let me ‘get all Propertarian’ here. Define properties, axis, actions, Property, and costs.

    BIOLOGICAL TRUTH TABLE:

    Ternary : Neutral(Null), Benefit (True), Harm False)

    RESULTS (In Descending Order)

    1) Mutualism: both organisms benefit. TT

    2) Commensalism: one benefits without affecting the other. TN

    3) Parasitism: one benefits while the other is harmed. TF

    4) Amensalism: one is unaffected and the other is harmed NF

    5) (?): both are harmed : FF

    OPPORTUNITY COSTS vs FIXED PRODUCTION/CONSUMPTION

    The biological model above does not account for opportunity costs from production, where production in a division of labor. We must correct the difference between organisms that engage in production and those that do not.

    An opportunity cost is the DIFFERENCE between one choice and another. In other words, only mutually productive exchanges are free of loss. ie: there is only one T position in the truth table. Unlike non-producing organisms. Biology is a poor analogy, because production is nearly unique to man.

    Lets see if I can simplify this even more without losing the central idea.

    EXAMPLE

    A and B engage in a mutually productive exchange.

    Neither A nor B at this moment have a more productive exchange to engage in.

    This is the maximum yield any action can produce, at zero opportunity cost.

    Every action OTHER than this one decreases the benefit and increases the opportunity cost from zero.

    CORRECTED TRUTH TABLE

    P= Production , ~P = Lost opportunity for production, H=harm

    1) Mutualism: both organisms benefit. TT => P1 + P2 = TRUE

    2) Commensalism: one benefits without affecting the other. TN=> P1 + ~P2 = FALSE

    3) Parasitism: one benefits while the other is harmed. TF=> P1 + ~P2 – H2 = FALSE

    4) Amensalism: one is unaffected and the other is harmed NF=>~P1 + ~P2 – H2 = FALSE

    5) (?): both are harmed : FF => ~P1 + H1 + ~P2 + H1 = FALSE

    EXCEPTION: MODIFIED BY KIN SELECTION

    Genetic Distance: |<-Self, Offspring, Kin, Associates, Neutrals, Competitors, Enemies->|

    Humans demonstrate kin selection; treatment of self, near genes and farther genes as priorities with marginal indifference applied to offspring.

    INSTINCTS

    a) desire for cooperation (to reduce costs by increasing productivity)

    b) prohibition on free riding (cheating as defense against parasitism)

    CONCLUSION

    Humans engage in cooperation, eschew free riding, and in any act of cooperation, opportunity costs guarantee that all non-productive exchanges (aside from kin selection) are net losses.

    This is different from biological organisms who do not have the ability to cooperate on production by choosing between opportunity costs.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev

    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-04 10:15:00 UTC

  • FROM FREE RIDING TO RENT SEEKING TO ANARCHY People form governments to suppress

    FROM FREE RIDING TO RENT SEEKING TO ANARCHY

    People form governments to suppress the high transaction costs of criminal, unethical, and immoral behavior. The consequence is that all that suppressed free riding is simply converted into rent seeking by the bureaucracy. By forming governments, we trade high transaction costs that are pervasive (rampant criminal, unethical and immoral behavior) for low transaction costs that are increasingly expensive (conspiratorial, corrupt and exploitative behavior).

    The question we face in advancing political theory, is how to prevent rent seeking as well as free riding.

    The answer is to allow insurance companies, the common law, the courts, and a fully articulated set of property rights to do their jobs for us.

    Yes, there are certain luxuries we may wish to produce as a commons. There is no reason that we cannot produce luxuries as a commons.

    But we cannot produce laws. We can only allow the courts to discover them.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-04 08:03:00 UTC

  • Why Are Libertarians Less Sensitive To The Transaction Costs Of Immoral And Unethical Actions?

    (the most important bit of philosophy that you will read today) [A]s intelligence increases morality increases, and concern about morality decreases. The reasons are still being debated, but the general theory is that (a) smarter people can identify dishonesty more easily, and (b) smarter people can rely upon wit and cunning as a competitive advantage so that they have less trouble competing honestly. To which I would like to add (c) that the higher you are in the food chain the more abstract property you are dealing with and therefore the harder it is to steal it. Libertarians tend to be very bright. But libertarians also test as abnormally insensitive to moral questions. The connection between the two facts is pretty obvious. We libertarians are less concerned with immorality because it’s easy for us to defend against. I don’t take the position that we’re less moral. Only that immorality is less of a challenge for us SO WE DISCOUNT THE TRANSACTION COSTS of immoral activity, whereas everyone else does NOT discount those transaction costs. This explains why libertarians are more easily fooled by Rothbardian ethics than conservatives (aristocratic egalitarians) and progressives (socialists). The moral economy is less valuable to us than to conservatives and progressives. We discount the cost of immoral and unethical behavior. But if we want to build a polity – the fact is: we’re wrong. Those transaction costs increase as intelligence and general knowledge decrease. And so it’s just not rational for a body of people to adopt Rothbardian ethics. They aren’t moral ENOUGH for suppression of immoral and unethical behavior, and the high transaction costs imposed upon people who must deal with pervasive immoral and unethical behavior. [P]rivate property is what remains when a polity suppresses all free riding: violence, theft, fraud, cheating, externalizing, privatizing, conspiracy, corruption and extortion. And people will not grant one another private property rights and reduce demand for the state unless suppression of free riding (immoral and unethical behavior) is present FIRST. Curt Doolittle

  • Why Are Libertarians Less Sensitive To The Transaction Costs Of Immoral And Unethical Actions?

    (the most important bit of philosophy that you will read today) [A]s intelligence increases morality increases, and concern about morality decreases. The reasons are still being debated, but the general theory is that (a) smarter people can identify dishonesty more easily, and (b) smarter people can rely upon wit and cunning as a competitive advantage so that they have less trouble competing honestly. To which I would like to add (c) that the higher you are in the food chain the more abstract property you are dealing with and therefore the harder it is to steal it. Libertarians tend to be very bright. But libertarians also test as abnormally insensitive to moral questions. The connection between the two facts is pretty obvious. We libertarians are less concerned with immorality because it’s easy for us to defend against. I don’t take the position that we’re less moral. Only that immorality is less of a challenge for us SO WE DISCOUNT THE TRANSACTION COSTS of immoral activity, whereas everyone else does NOT discount those transaction costs. This explains why libertarians are more easily fooled by Rothbardian ethics than conservatives (aristocratic egalitarians) and progressives (socialists). The moral economy is less valuable to us than to conservatives and progressives. We discount the cost of immoral and unethical behavior. But if we want to build a polity – the fact is: we’re wrong. Those transaction costs increase as intelligence and general knowledge decrease. And so it’s just not rational for a body of people to adopt Rothbardian ethics. They aren’t moral ENOUGH for suppression of immoral and unethical behavior, and the high transaction costs imposed upon people who must deal with pervasive immoral and unethical behavior. [P]rivate property is what remains when a polity suppresses all free riding: violence, theft, fraud, cheating, externalizing, privatizing, conspiracy, corruption and extortion. And people will not grant one another private property rights and reduce demand for the state unless suppression of free riding (immoral and unethical behavior) is present FIRST. Curt Doolittle

  • CRANKISH? Rationalist Pseudoscience Like Praxeology is Crankish. Science and Logic are Parsimonious.

    WHICH IS MORE CRANKISH? SIMPLE SCIENCE AND LOGIC, OR RATIONALIST PSEUDOSCIENCE? I am pretty confident that the praxeological line of reasoning, as currently constructed, is a dead end, as I’ve argued elsewhere. In no small part because it cannot compete with the universality of the language and processes of the ratio-scientific method. But while an inferior method, it’s still a useful method. And if it helps people understand micro and ethics then that’s good enough. The challenge at this inflection point in intellectual history, is that Hoppe has created the formal language of political ethics and political economy, and taught most of us to argue politics ethics and morality in economic terms. Yet that language is unnecessarily dependent upon Argumentation, Continental Rationalism, and a misguided attempt to conflate logic and science, in order to defend against a positivism that is not present in the philosophy or practice of science – if it ever was. Logic is axiomatic, and therefore both prescriptive and deductive. Science is theoretic, and therefore descriptive and deductive. But we can make statements in logic that are internally consistent yet not externally correspondent, yet we cannot make theories that fail external correspondence, whether or not our language is internally consistent. But the empirical test is obvious: if praxeology and rothbardian ethics are correct, then why are they both rejected almost universally? If these things are true, then why do we fail? Comparative ethics, empirically studied, yields a universal descriptive ethics that is theoretically rigid and more sustainable from criticism than rothbardian ethics. —“in all cultures and all civilizations, manners, ethics and morals reflect the necessary rules for organizing reproduction (the family) and the polity of families, such that they may cooperate in whatever structure of production is available to them. The content of those rules, under analysis, can be represented as property rights, each of which is distributed between the individual to the commons. Demand for third party authority as a means of resolving differences (the state) is determined by the degree of suppression of free riding (parasitism), and the number of competing sets of rules (family structures and classes) within any given structure of production. These sets of rules can be expressed as a simple formal grammar, which allows us to render all moral and ethical systems commensurable.”— Macro economics, experimental psychology, and cognitive science have contributed all economic insights over the past three decades, and none of these insights were deducible (cognitive biases in particular), or were emergent effects of economic cooperation (stickiness of prices, the time delay until money achieves neutrality, and the quantitative impact on interest and production in the interim, within each sustainable pattern of specialization and trade.) So, WHICH IS MORE PARSIMONIOUS A THEORY? Which theory is easier to understand? Which theory is more obscurant? Which more accurately reflects reality? I can explain and demonstrate this theory to anyone with a ratio-scientific background. I know this because it is simply an advancement to Ostrom’s work on institutions and she was able to do so. Cheers.

  • CRANKISH? Rationalist Pseudoscience Like Praxeology is Crankish. Science and Logic are Parsimonious.

    WHICH IS MORE CRANKISH? SIMPLE SCIENCE AND LOGIC, OR RATIONALIST PSEUDOSCIENCE? I am pretty confident that the praxeological line of reasoning, as currently constructed, is a dead end, as I’ve argued elsewhere. In no small part because it cannot compete with the universality of the language and processes of the ratio-scientific method. But while an inferior method, it’s still a useful method. And if it helps people understand micro and ethics then that’s good enough. The challenge at this inflection point in intellectual history, is that Hoppe has created the formal language of political ethics and political economy, and taught most of us to argue politics ethics and morality in economic terms. Yet that language is unnecessarily dependent upon Argumentation, Continental Rationalism, and a misguided attempt to conflate logic and science, in order to defend against a positivism that is not present in the philosophy or practice of science – if it ever was. Logic is axiomatic, and therefore both prescriptive and deductive. Science is theoretic, and therefore descriptive and deductive. But we can make statements in logic that are internally consistent yet not externally correspondent, yet we cannot make theories that fail external correspondence, whether or not our language is internally consistent. But the empirical test is obvious: if praxeology and rothbardian ethics are correct, then why are they both rejected almost universally? If these things are true, then why do we fail? Comparative ethics, empirically studied, yields a universal descriptive ethics that is theoretically rigid and more sustainable from criticism than rothbardian ethics. —“in all cultures and all civilizations, manners, ethics and morals reflect the necessary rules for organizing reproduction (the family) and the polity of families, such that they may cooperate in whatever structure of production is available to them. The content of those rules, under analysis, can be represented as property rights, each of which is distributed between the individual to the commons. Demand for third party authority as a means of resolving differences (the state) is determined by the degree of suppression of free riding (parasitism), and the number of competing sets of rules (family structures and classes) within any given structure of production. These sets of rules can be expressed as a simple formal grammar, which allows us to render all moral and ethical systems commensurable.”— Macro economics, experimental psychology, and cognitive science have contributed all economic insights over the past three decades, and none of these insights were deducible (cognitive biases in particular), or were emergent effects of economic cooperation (stickiness of prices, the time delay until money achieves neutrality, and the quantitative impact on interest and production in the interim, within each sustainable pattern of specialization and trade.) So, WHICH IS MORE PARSIMONIOUS A THEORY? Which theory is easier to understand? Which theory is more obscurant? Which more accurately reflects reality? I can explain and demonstrate this theory to anyone with a ratio-scientific background. I know this because it is simply an advancement to Ostrom’s work on institutions and she was able to do so. Cheers.

  • Logic vs Science

    (on praxeology) (getting closer) (attestation theory of truth) [S]o, if the defining property of the discipline of science is observation, and praxeology is purely deductive independent of observation, then how can praxeology honestly be termed a science? It cannot. Praxeology can be defined as a logic, but not a science. Formal Logic and mathematics are branches of logic that produce proofs, but not truths. Truth, to have any universal meaning at all must mean correspondence to reality with increasingly weaker definitions in niche application as we move into various branches of logic. Yet while truth is constrained by reality, axiomatic systems are not constrained by reality. We may produce theories, and rigid theories at that, but correspondence with reality is never axiomatic – axioms are limited to internal consistency. We are certainly missing a logic of cooperation with which to repair ethics. (I think I have articulated the criterion for that logic as voluntary transfer, symmetrically informed, warrantied, and free of externality.) But, I do not yet understand why we require a logic of action – or if there is any value in such a thing. But regardless of that question, logics are not identical to sciences and sciences not identical to logics, any more than proofs are identical to truths, or axioms identical to theories. We may pretend for amusement purposes that human actions are, by analogy, functionally axiomatic rather than functionally theories in a given context, but this is a mere pretense. Theoretic systems must retain correspondence with reality, while axiomatic systems are not bound by correspondence with reality. Human actions occur within reality and are bounded by reality. Axiomatic systems are imaginary and are only bounded by imagination. For this reason human actions can only be theoretically constructed as correspondent with reality, just as logical systems can only be axiomatically constructed. As such axiomatic systems tell us only about the internal consistency of our statements, and theoretical systems tell us only about the external correspondence of our theories – but not the internal consistency of our descriptions of those theories. If we use both tests of internal consistency and tests of external correspondence, and our statements are demonstrably valid proofs, and our theories are demonstrably valid tests, and both proofs and theories are stated operationally, then we can attest to the truth of our theories. And the only means by which we can subjectively test either axiomatic or theoretic statements is to reduce them to analogies to experience, by stating them in operational sequence – which we call “Constructionism”. If we cannot test the internal consistency or our arguments and external correspondence of our actions, then we cannot EVER honestly attest that our theories are true to our knowledge and understanding. [T]his is the only standard of truth for any theory that I know of: attestation. If a theory is both externally correspondent, internally consistent, operationally stated, and falsifiable, then to our current knowledge that theory as stated is true – one can attest to its truth, and not commit unethical attestation. This does not mean that the theory cannot be improved upon. But it means one’s attestation about it is true. And that is the best that we can ever hope for. There is a great difference between a true theory and a complete theory. At some point any theory must evolve into a tautology, at which point one cannot attest to one’s hypothesis (theory, conjecture). Than is non-sensical. So a theory free of attestation is merely complete – tautological. Identical. Not correspondent dependent upon attestation ‘true’, nor imaginary and proven ‘proof’.) Getting closer. It should be possible, if difficult, to follow that argument. I bet within six months I can get lightbulbs to come on. Not quite there yet. But very close. This approach reduces all statements to human actions and truth to attestation rather than the platonic.

  • Logic vs Science

    (on praxeology) (getting closer) (attestation theory of truth) [S]o, if the defining property of the discipline of science is observation, and praxeology is purely deductive independent of observation, then how can praxeology honestly be termed a science? It cannot. Praxeology can be defined as a logic, but not a science. Formal Logic and mathematics are branches of logic that produce proofs, but not truths. Truth, to have any universal meaning at all must mean correspondence to reality with increasingly weaker definitions in niche application as we move into various branches of logic. Yet while truth is constrained by reality, axiomatic systems are not constrained by reality. We may produce theories, and rigid theories at that, but correspondence with reality is never axiomatic – axioms are limited to internal consistency. We are certainly missing a logic of cooperation with which to repair ethics. (I think I have articulated the criterion for that logic as voluntary transfer, symmetrically informed, warrantied, and free of externality.) But, I do not yet understand why we require a logic of action – or if there is any value in such a thing. But regardless of that question, logics are not identical to sciences and sciences not identical to logics, any more than proofs are identical to truths, or axioms identical to theories. We may pretend for amusement purposes that human actions are, by analogy, functionally axiomatic rather than functionally theories in a given context, but this is a mere pretense. Theoretic systems must retain correspondence with reality, while axiomatic systems are not bound by correspondence with reality. Human actions occur within reality and are bounded by reality. Axiomatic systems are imaginary and are only bounded by imagination. For this reason human actions can only be theoretically constructed as correspondent with reality, just as logical systems can only be axiomatically constructed. As such axiomatic systems tell us only about the internal consistency of our statements, and theoretical systems tell us only about the external correspondence of our theories – but not the internal consistency of our descriptions of those theories. If we use both tests of internal consistency and tests of external correspondence, and our statements are demonstrably valid proofs, and our theories are demonstrably valid tests, and both proofs and theories are stated operationally, then we can attest to the truth of our theories. And the only means by which we can subjectively test either axiomatic or theoretic statements is to reduce them to analogies to experience, by stating them in operational sequence – which we call “Constructionism”. If we cannot test the internal consistency or our arguments and external correspondence of our actions, then we cannot EVER honestly attest that our theories are true to our knowledge and understanding. [T]his is the only standard of truth for any theory that I know of: attestation. If a theory is both externally correspondent, internally consistent, operationally stated, and falsifiable, then to our current knowledge that theory as stated is true – one can attest to its truth, and not commit unethical attestation. This does not mean that the theory cannot be improved upon. But it means one’s attestation about it is true. And that is the best that we can ever hope for. There is a great difference between a true theory and a complete theory. At some point any theory must evolve into a tautology, at which point one cannot attest to one’s hypothesis (theory, conjecture). Than is non-sensical. So a theory free of attestation is merely complete – tautological. Identical. Not correspondent dependent upon attestation ‘true’, nor imaginary and proven ‘proof’.) Getting closer. It should be possible, if difficult, to follow that argument. I bet within six months I can get lightbulbs to come on. Not quite there yet. But very close. This approach reduces all statements to human actions and truth to attestation rather than the platonic.