(pulled out and reposted) [L]ibertarianism argues that Non Aggression, (NAP) + Intersubjectively Verifiable Property (IVP) constitute a universal moral natural law. This is ‘almost real’. And any claim that natural rights or natural law exist is to claim moral realism (constant correspondence.) Now, I disagree with IVP and NAP, because I have learned that human moral standards are universally higher than that. That no groups exist and can exist by treating internal members as such. And that peoples who use the NAP with outsiders are usually outcast and exterminated. However, if we look at universally demonstrated human behaviors, we see that it is quite possible to identify a small number of constant moral constraints upon our action. And that these moral constraints reflect our reproductive strategies – and must. Further, that all cultures may implement more or less of these moral constraints, and that many of these moral constraints are mixed with signaling (which is not a moral constraint, but a signal of commitment to moral constraints – usually ritualistic costs that one must bear). This means that all moral systems include the universal moral rules, a level of adoption of those rules that suits their reproductive structure within the particular moral structure of production available to them, and a body of rituals and signals. And that all moral codes in all groups can be reduced to technical descriptions on the axes I have described. If this is true, and I am correct, and I think the evidence suggests that I am correct, then the underlying moral code is on that is in favor of cooperation while prohibiting free riding, where failing to engage in cooperation is also free riding. As such, the underlying moral intuition begins with the prohibition on free riding. Further that depending on a number of environmental variables such as geography and competition, humans will produce predictable moral codes, albeit a wide variety of signals. And yes, the genders differ in the distribution of weights that they give to those underlying moral codes. As such, we have finally uncovered the logic and science of morality. And as such, morality is both real, and non arbitrary. Thus the only means of moral action we possess is voluntary, fully informed, warrantied exchange, free of negative externalities, in which we contributed to production. It implies that one cannot refuse a trade that causes one no loss, takes no effort, exposes one to no risk, and benefits another. Everyone has something to trade. Even if it’s merely respect for life, property, manners, ethics, morals and rituals. And that is enough to trade for the benefits of the market, and the opportunity to conduct other trades with those who likewise enter into the bargain.
Form: Mini Essay
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Interesting: "Know", "Knowing" and "Knowledge" As Terms Of Obscurantism
[P]ossession of knowledge is not a binary condition, but a spectrum from awareness or intuition, through hypothesis, theory and law, through parsimonious theoretical completeness, through axiomatic declaration, through tautological identity. The context for use of such knowledge in pursuit of some action determines necessary sufficiency. Despite our habits, one cannot say that one knows something without stating the sufficiency of knowledge required, and still have a decidable proposition – there just isn’t enough information there. Now, we can assume the question of utility from the context, and therefore the standard of knowledge required. But knowledge cannot be divorced from action, even if that action is merely identity or perception. But like many empty verbalisms that are not problems, but merely inarticulate language masquerading as complexity. The common fallacy of using the language of experience rather than action. One cannot sever the qualitative expression “knowledge” either from the context of an act, from choice, nor from the cost of action. We can discount these values for arbitrary purposes, but to discount cost and context in pursuit of a general rule is very different from saying that in application of any general rule the action, choice and cost determine the sufficiency of knowledge. I have been making this general argument regarding the use of the scientific method for either (a) production, (b) technological or (c) purely scientific purposes. The method we use is the same in each circumstance, but we merely apply discounts or premiums to different outputs of the scientific method. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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Interesting: “Know”, “Knowing” and “Knowledge” As Terms Of Obscurantism
[P]ossession of knowledge is not a binary condition, but a spectrum from awareness or intuition, through hypothesis, theory and law, through parsimonious theoretical completeness, through axiomatic declaration, through tautological identity. The context for use of such knowledge in pursuit of some action determines necessary sufficiency. Despite our habits, one cannot say that one knows something without stating the sufficiency of knowledge required, and still have a decidable proposition – there just isn’t enough information there. Now, we can assume the question of utility from the context, and therefore the standard of knowledge required. But knowledge cannot be divorced from action, even if that action is merely identity or perception. But like many empty verbalisms that are not problems, but merely inarticulate language masquerading as complexity. The common fallacy of using the language of experience rather than action. One cannot sever the qualitative expression “knowledge” either from the context of an act, from choice, nor from the cost of action. We can discount these values for arbitrary purposes, but to discount cost and context in pursuit of a general rule is very different from saying that in application of any general rule the action, choice and cost determine the sufficiency of knowledge. I have been making this general argument regarding the use of the scientific method for either (a) production, (b) technological or (c) purely scientific purposes. The method we use is the same in each circumstance, but we merely apply discounts or premiums to different outputs of the scientific method. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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Interesting: "Know", "Knowing" and "Knowledge" As Terms Of Obscurantism
[P]ossession of knowledge is not a binary condition, but a spectrum from awareness or intuition, through hypothesis, theory and law, through parsimonious theoretical completeness, through axiomatic declaration, through tautological identity. The context for use of such knowledge in pursuit of some action determines necessary sufficiency. Despite our habits, one cannot say that one knows something without stating the sufficiency of knowledge required, and still have a decidable proposition – there just isn’t enough information there. Now, we can assume the question of utility from the context, and therefore the standard of knowledge required. But knowledge cannot be divorced from action, even if that action is merely identity or perception. But like many empty verbalisms that are not problems, but merely inarticulate language masquerading as complexity. The common fallacy of using the language of experience rather than action. One cannot sever the qualitative expression “knowledge” either from the context of an act, from choice, nor from the cost of action. We can discount these values for arbitrary purposes, but to discount cost and context in pursuit of a general rule is very different from saying that in application of any general rule the action, choice and cost determine the sufficiency of knowledge. I have been making this general argument regarding the use of the scientific method for either (a) production, (b) technological or (c) purely scientific purposes. The method we use is the same in each circumstance, but we merely apply discounts or premiums to different outputs of the scientific method. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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Interesting: “Know”, “Knowing” and “Knowledge” As Terms Of Obscurantism
[P]ossession of knowledge is not a binary condition, but a spectrum from awareness or intuition, through hypothesis, theory and law, through parsimonious theoretical completeness, through axiomatic declaration, through tautological identity. The context for use of such knowledge in pursuit of some action determines necessary sufficiency. Despite our habits, one cannot say that one knows something without stating the sufficiency of knowledge required, and still have a decidable proposition – there just isn’t enough information there. Now, we can assume the question of utility from the context, and therefore the standard of knowledge required. But knowledge cannot be divorced from action, even if that action is merely identity or perception. But like many empty verbalisms that are not problems, but merely inarticulate language masquerading as complexity. The common fallacy of using the language of experience rather than action. One cannot sever the qualitative expression “knowledge” either from the context of an act, from choice, nor from the cost of action. We can discount these values for arbitrary purposes, but to discount cost and context in pursuit of a general rule is very different from saying that in application of any general rule the action, choice and cost determine the sufficiency of knowledge. I have been making this general argument regarding the use of the scientific method for either (a) production, (b) technological or (c) purely scientific purposes. The method we use is the same in each circumstance, but we merely apply discounts or premiums to different outputs of the scientific method. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine
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WORTH REPEATING : ARBITRARY PRECISION AND INFORMATION LOSS In mathematics, (intu
WORTH REPEATING : ARBITRARY PRECISION AND INFORMATION LOSS
In mathematics, (intuitionist mathematics), the requirement that we demonstrate all operations eliminates the possibility of the excluded middle – which is an unnecessary constraint upon mathematics. (This constraint is equivalent somewhat to computability in computer science.)
However, in order to create mathematical statements in the form of general rules independent of scale, we divorce the statements from scale, maintaining only the relations themselves (ratios).
By doing so – loss of context – we lose the information necessary to determine contextual precision. In other words, we no longer know that 1/64 of an inch is the maximum precision necessary for the given calculation. But in any application of the general statement to a given context we then regain the information necessary to make decisions.
As such general mathematical statements are constructed with arbitrary precision that requires choice independent of context, or contextual application to supply the missing information.
This problem of creating general statements independent of context is why it was necessary to transition number theory from geometry (infinite precision) to sets (binary precision). Thus reducing all mathematics to truth tables. And binary precision (set membership) is the reason why binary mathematics is so crucial to computation: we are always in a true or false state: a truth table that is universally decidable regardless of contextual precision.
These discussions evolved in math as a war against mathematical platonism. And by applying the same principle to ethics the problem changes significantly since we never encounter the problem of arbitrary precision.
In ethics, we do not have the luxury that physics does, in that information cannot be lost and all relations are constant. We are stuck with bounded but relatively inconstant relations.
But we always can test the rationality of any economic statement that is reduced to a sequence of actions. ***And so we never encounter the problem of arbitrary scale and the insufficiency of information.***
So when I speak of empiricism ( observation), operationalism (actions in time), and instrumentalism (reducing the imperceptible to the perceptible) it is in the context of ethics not mathematics and as such is not subject to the failure if operationalism and intuitionism to satisfy the needs of mathematicians.
This is a revolutionary idea.
Source date (UTC): 2014-06-12 02:55:00 UTC
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A PLACE IN THE NATURAL ARISTOCRACY I consider myself a warrior – a physical, com
A PLACE IN THE NATURAL ARISTOCRACY
I consider myself a warrior – a physical, commercial and intellectual competitor. I have no desire to participate in an effete, affluent, managerial aristocracy. But I desire that others do, so that I need not. I prefer to have a leader who takes care of leadership duties. I just prefer to choose my leader from the best available. I prefer to choose a leader who is better than I.
The upper class – the perpetuating nobility – the natural aristocracy – produce families of consistent quality, as long as they demonstrate retention of their position by commercial, military, and intellectual performance.
This family scope is a very different burden from that of the individual warrior, who wishes to achieve his greatest personal possibilities. It is a very different thing to seek to build a noble family, from that which it is to seek to build great arts, great sciences, great commerce.
So the philosophy of aristocracy does not require that all of us seek the status of intergenerational familial nobility. But instead, that we pursue our excellences – only one of which is intergenerational familial nobility.
To be a great thinker, artist, tradesman, investor, warrior, scientist, does not require that my siblings do. Only that I have the will to demonstrated excellence – aristocracy – myself.
If I succeed and reproduce with others of the same ilk, then over time, perhaps my genes can participate in the natural aristocracy of families. And that is the greatest aspiration I care to dream of. Because it is the greatest aspiration that is possible for me to act upon.
Source date (UTC): 2014-06-11 07:11:00 UTC
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We Can Now Objectively And Scientifically Judge Good Philosophers And Bad Philosophers
(suggestions wanted) [I]f we acknowledge that democracy is a failure, and all philosophers who attempted to justify democracy failures, and all philosophers who attempted to expand democracy into socialism and postmodernism failures, we are left with instrumentalists (empiricists) and reactionaries of various fields. Philosophy as a discipline, must face the uncomfortable fact, that (a) the metaphysical program failed and was solved by cognitive science, and (b) the democratic program failed and was solved by economists (c) therefore the political program failed, and was solved by heterodox philosophers (d) the ethical problem failed and was solved by economists and heterodox philosophers. The reason for this is obvious: the incentives in Academia to attempt to replace the church’s mysticism with some sort of collectivist democratic rationalism, had it’s predictable influence. Philosophers can produce good neutral and bad influences. Unfortunately, the greater body of philosophers that have been influential since the american revolution, have been more destructive than beneficial. We can never forgive Marx and Freud, any more than we can forgive Kant and Rousseau. “Thou Shalt Not Harm” not only applies to doctors, but to philosophers, and to all of us. I give great weight to computer science because unlike the logic of language and unlike abstract and mathematical logic, computer science does not drop the property of operationalism in real time from its reasoning. As such it has higher correspondence with actionable reality than mathematics, and farm more so than formal logic. And if we seek to make informal logic of any value we must learn from computer science and return the property of operationalism to philosophical discourse. Because without it, it certainly appears to consist almost entirely of nonsense built upon linguistic deception. == 99. Aristotle 99. Niccolo Machiavelli 99. Adam Smith 99. Max Weber 99. Emile Durkheim 99. David Hume 99. John Locke 99. G.W.F. Hegel 99. Friedrich Nietzsche (lesser candidates) 99. Robert Michels 99. Steven Pinker 99. Jonathan Haidt == 99. Rene Descartes 99. Alan Turing 99. Karl Popper 99. Gottlob Frege 99. W.V.O. Quine 99. Saul Kripke THE BAD PHILOSOPHERS 99. Immanuel Kant 99. Ludwig Wittgenstein 99. Karl Marx 99. Soren Kierkegaard 99. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 20. John Rawls 99. Martin Heidegger 99. Jacques Derrida 99. Michelle Foucault 99. Jean-François Lyotard 99. Jean Baudrillard 99. Murray Rothbard THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL’S BAD PHILOSOPHERS Max Horkheimer Theodor W. Adorno Herbert Marcuse Friedrich Pollock Erich Fromm Otto Kirchheimer Leo Löwenthal Franz Leopold Neumann Siegfried Kracauer Alfred Sohn-Rethel Walter Benjamin Jürgen Habermas Claus Offe Axel Honneth Oskar Negt Alfred Schmidt Albrecht Wellmer
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The Measure of A Philosopher: Beneficially Novel, Good, Bad(wrong), And Dangerous
(Discussion on Bleeding Heart Libertarians: The Measure of an Economist or a Philosopher) All, [A] good economists provides us with insights into the state of affairs we live in. A novel economists provides us with new general rules (a theory). A good philosopher explains or re-explains the changes in the world to us in current language. A novel philosopher provides us with a new general rule (a theory). It is not better to be good or novel. It is most important that one not be dangerous. Freud, Marx and Cantor reintroduced mysticism in the form of obscurantism. Russell compounded that new mysticism. The postmoderns have been terribly damaging to institutions, morality and language. Rothbard did more damage than good. Most of his history is quite good. His ethics were a catastrophe and set us back by decades. A disaster I have been struggling to correct. So one can be novel, one can be good, one can be wrong and one can be destructive. I don’t care much about the first three. The fourth quadrant is what I worry about most. Because bad and dangerous philosophy turns out to spread far faster than good and beneficially novel philosophy. Just like bad news spreads faster than good. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute. Kiev.
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The Measure of A Philosopher: Beneficially Novel, Good, Bad(wrong), And Dangerous
(Discussion on Bleeding Heart Libertarians: The Measure of an Economist or a Philosopher) All, [A] good economists provides us with insights into the state of affairs we live in. A novel economists provides us with new general rules (a theory). A good philosopher explains or re-explains the changes in the world to us in current language. A novel philosopher provides us with a new general rule (a theory). It is not better to be good or novel. It is most important that one not be dangerous. Freud, Marx and Cantor reintroduced mysticism in the form of obscurantism. Russell compounded that new mysticism. The postmoderns have been terribly damaging to institutions, morality and language. Rothbard did more damage than good. Most of his history is quite good. His ethics were a catastrophe and set us back by decades. A disaster I have been struggling to correct. So one can be novel, one can be good, one can be wrong and one can be destructive. I don’t care much about the first three. The fourth quadrant is what I worry about most. Because bad and dangerous philosophy turns out to spread far faster than good and beneficially novel philosophy. Just like bad news spreads faster than good. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute. Kiev.