Form: Full Essay

  • WISDOM LITERATURE PAST AND PRESENT: UNITS OF MEASUREMENT (very, very, important

    WISDOM LITERATURE PAST AND PRESENT: UNITS OF MEASUREMENT

    (very, very, important piece)

    So, you know, how some fiction author creates a ‘universe’ and writes multiple books using that universe? Well, some authors write stories for other authors’ universes. And then publishers combine these stories into a compendium of short stories (anthologies)?

    Paul (Saul of Tarsus) created a fantasy ‘universe’, just like Tolkien’s Middle Earth, Saberhagen’s Berserkers, Herbert’s Dune, Martin’s Song (Game of Thrones), Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, the Arthurian Legends, or the greek and roman myths, or any of our original natural mythologies.

    And a lot of other authors made up stories and attributed them to paul’s characters. (And whomever converted christian literature to islamic). Then the only debate was over which stories were included in the anthology (bible).

    These stories consist of a rather small set of archetypal characters and archetypal plots, in a host of circumstances. And we use these characters, circumstances and plots as units of measurement for making decisions in the kaleidic complexity of real life. And in this sense we do need stories the same way we need logic, mathematics, weights and measures, norms and laws.

    So these stories are no less important than any other system of measurement and standard of weights and measures. The differences is we do not see the consequences (and externalities) of mass use of these systems of measurement, and we are unable to correct these stories once we release them into the ‘wild’ (market).

    In other words, while in most systems of measurement (what we call ‘weights and measures’) we can prohibit fraudulent systems of measure, and fraudulent exchanges. It’s not so much that we need to create standards (while we do for the purposes of commensurability, and as such for the prevention of fraud by incommensurability), it’s that we must ensure that our weights and measures are not fraudulent or harmful either directly, indirectly, or by externality.

    In the ancient world, modernity was disrupting tribal hierarchies and traditions, and as such nearly all the underclass (vast majority of peoples) lost any hope of expressing dominance, success, or excellence. They lacked the genetics, agency, knowledge, and institutions to produce the confidence necessary to make decisions in a kaleidic universe undergoing dramatic change. They were losing their ability to calculate a feeling of success at whatever level of success or failure they were achieving.

    And this is a serious problem, because evolution provided us with a set of cognitive biases to keep us pursuing lifespan even in the most hopeless of circumstances. And in order to prevent in the ancient world what middle age white men are doing today (committing suicide) young men are doing today (withdrawing from society), and women are doing today (forgoing children, then taking anti-depressants), they inverted the heroic legends of dominance with an heroic legend of submission and resistance – primarily resistance against the roman-greco-persian and less so egyptian empires: the people of fertile crescent slavery and impoverished pastoralists, against the people of armies, metal, reason, mathematics, farm, and trade.

    In the recent era, we have seen Marxism and it’s suite of literatures, the continuation of Democratic literature (anti-aristocratic literature), Postmodern literature (all of these meaning the political literatures), and Science Fiction(our modern aryan mythos), Medieval fantasy, the War story, the Western, and the spy and detective story (the personal literatures). We have devolved into effeminate literatures (Japanese), and childish literatures (superheroes) – an attempt to create heroes without armies. And we have seen the active suppression of our ancestral literatures – of armies – as the democratic, marxist, and postmodern seek to erase them, just as the jewish, christian, and islamic sought to erase them in the ancient world – and all but succeeded.

    Now, creating a conflationary wisdom literature that combines a fictional world, archetypal characters and plots, into stories and from stories into an anthology as a mythology( pseudohistory), that includes prescribed rules (pseudolaw), and a method of argument (pseudo rationalism), and justifies it by some sort of magic (pseudoscience), is to some degree necessary to create commensurability between the units of measurement (stories).

    The difference is that the west began with sovereignty, and divided into specialized literatures: logic, mathematics, science, history, law, philosophy, literature, mythology – and all competed against each other using different terminologies and sometimes different languages (in english: german, french, latin, and greek). The chinese reacted to greek reason with confucian, dao, and eventually buddhism – a class based set of logics rather than a discipline base set of logics. The Persians reacted to greek reason and greek reason to persian, with a cult that slowly transformed the sky god into mithra. The semites reacted to greek reason by inverting every single dimension of the markets and creating a mandatory monopoly system of thought.

    The west’s use of competing markets of measurements (stories) rather than chinese hierarchy of stories, or semitic authoritarian monopoly stories is a natural consequence of western sovereignty. However, while the western system can adapt to changes faster than all others – it can be defeated by Overloading (immigration, conversion, propaganda) precisely because the underlying system of measurement (truth, sovereignty, reciprocity, duty, markets) was never written down – only practiced out of habit in our traditional (pre urban) (indo-)european law.

    Had this underlying system of weights measures and values (truth, sovereignty, reciprocity, duty, markets) been articulated, the market for disciplines (grammars and semantics) would have remained possible. The reason being that our aryan system of weights and measures and values, (truth, sovereignty, reciprocity, duty, markets) is purely via-negativa. It does not tell us what to do, only what we may not. As such each discipline may compete for what we should do, even though we prohibit discretion in what we may not do: violate truth, sovereignty, reciprocity, duty, markets.

    And while our law contains implicitly a record of decisions using truth, sovereignty, reciprocity, duty, and markets, our law does not articulate the mandate for truth, sovereignty, reciprocity, duty, and markets.

    So what I have tried to do for my people, and perhaps if they wish to use it, the rest of mankind, is to articulate those first principles in a formal logic, as a via negativa, so that those markets for stories (systems of measurement) may continue to compete via positiva, but so that we can prohibit stories (systems of measurement) that violate those first principles of formal logic that make the rapid adaptation and therefor rapid innovation, and therefore rapid wealth, of western aryan civilization possible.

    In this way I seek to modify (amend, rewrite) our constitutions such that they make explicit these first principles in formal logic, and their objective and purpose as a via negativa commensurable system of decidability, across all competing grammars, as a defense against another abrahamic dark age that inverted those values, and the marxist-postmoder-feminist age that seeks through immigration, takeover of the academy, the media, and the state, to replace that system once again- and deliver us and mankind into another dark age like the jewish-christian-islamic, and the loss of another thousand years, and the suffering that is produced, by the inversion of the first principles of western (aryan) civilization.

    The cost of this defense against the second abrahamic dark age is the criminalization of literatures that violate truth(scientific truth), sovereignty, reciprocity, duty, and markets.

    In other words, we will be able to suppress invasion by fraudulent systems of measurement that seek to create monopolies by which we undermine and replace markets.

    And the cost of persisting that prosperity is the upward redistribution of reproduction and the downward redistribution of compensation, in order to maintain a polity that is far more invulnerable to desirable monopoly frauds. And the reversal of underclass immigration and forced integration the purpose of which is to achieve through culture-cide and genocide that which could not be achieved by the veracity of their ideas.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Philosophy of Aristocracy: Nomocracy

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2018-05-07 10:29:00 UTC

  • Economic Intuitionism (or Scientific Praxeology)

    “Reforming Mises, and the Jewish (Ukrainian) Wing of Austrian Economics.”

    A RECONSTRUCTION OF PRAXEOLOGY AS ECONOMIC INTUITIONISM FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH RATIO-EMPIRICAL SCIENCE

    I. PURPOSE: 1) To restore credibility to Austrian Economics by transforming it from Rationalist and pseudoscientific, to consistent with all scientific and logical disciplines. 2) To quash rationalist and pseudoscientific fallacies that have discredited Austrian economics, discredited the quest for moral economics, distracted from the quest for moral institutions through moral constraint on political economy, and cast the quest for liberty itself as the province of ‘the lunatic fringe’. 3) To provide a language for dividing economics into moral (Austrian operational economics) and immoral (Keyensian redistributive economics) disciplines. 4) To provide a scientific and critical rather than ideological and justificationary discussion of Austrian Economics (at least the German wing) as a method for testing the truthfulness and morality of economic theories – and to advocate restoring morality and truthfulness to economic science. What follows is a series of posts I have written in the past few months as I have worked on Propertarianism. It may require that you have a non-trivial understanding of philosophy. And your average passionate advocate of political ideas does not have that understanding. But hopefully you will glean some ideas from it, and provide me with some useful criticism. Thanks Select Continue Reading to continue… II. BACKGROUND TERMS: 0) BASIC TERMS (And yes, you probably need to read these rather than assume you know what they mean.) – Rationalism vs Empiricism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ – Intuitionism in Mathematics http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/ – Operationalism in Physics http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/operationalism/ – Operationism in Psychology http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/199/1/operat.htm – Instrumentalism (Eccentric Usage) I am a scientific realist, however, I use the term “instrumentalism” (probably a bad choice of words) in a much narrower sense: to refer to our use of logical and physical instruments to reduce phenomenon to that which we can somehow experience and compare, contrast, qualify, quantify or decide.   III. CONTENTS: CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT The first post summarizes the argument. The remaining articles expand the Introduction take you from basic philosophical concepts, through a series of short essays 1) REFORMING AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IS NECESSARY (To return the dialog to truthful and moral Austrian economics, and deceptive and immoral macro economics) 2) WHY ARE YOU REFUTING MISES, ROTHBARD AND HOPPE? (To Save Austrian Economics from the lunatic fringe) 3) PRAXEOLOGY AS MISES FAILURE TO DEVELOP ECONOMIC OPERATIONALISM (Restoring Austrian Economics To Compatibility with Ratio-empirical science) 4) MISES POSITION IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 5) THE STRUGGLE TO PRODUCE A MORAL ECONOMIC SCIENCE 6) SCIENCE IS THE DISCIPLINE OF SPEAKING TRUTHFULLY 7) MORAL CONSTRAINT FROM LAW THROUGH MATHEMATICS 8) CRITICISM: EMPIRICISM, INSTRUMENTALISM, OPERATIONALISM, FALSIFICATIONISM VS JUTIFICATION: RATIONALISM 9) JUSTIFICATION AS ADHERENCE TO CONTRACT, CRITICISM AS ADHERENCE TO DUE DILIGENCE 10) SCIENCE AS TRUTHFUL SPEECH – GERMAN RATIONALISM AND JEWISH COSMOPOLITANISM AS IMMORAL INFORMATION DISTORTION EQUAL TO THE INFORMATION DISTORTION OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS. 11) TRANSLATING KANTIAN RATIONALISM INTO SCIENTIFIC TERMS 12) WHICH IS MORE LIKELY: A PURPOSEFUL DECEPTION OR ANTI-SCIENTIFIC RATIONALISM? 13) THE ANTI ROTHBARDIAN CANON 14) A LIST OF HANS HERMANN HOPPE’S ERRORS 15) LIBERTARIANISM IS JUST COMMON PROPERTY MARXISM 16) THE REFORMATION OF WESTERN THOUGHT 17) THE ONLY MEANS OF ELIMINATING THE STATE AND CONSTRUCTING A CONDITION OF LIBERTY   ADDITIONAL INFORMATION – “Praxeology and Its Critics” by Bruce Caldwell. http://public.econ.duke.edu/…/Praxeology%20and%20Its%20Crit… – Do We Reason When We Think We Reason, or Do We Think? http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/…/peop…/associates/miller/lfd-.pdf – The Objectives of Science http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/…/…/associates/miller/poincare.pdf – Truth Defined http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/…/associa…/miller/TruthDefined.pdf Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    YES, REFORMING AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IS NECESSARY

    —“Calling Mises pseudoscientific is the typical positivistic criticism to Austrian Economics. It adds nothing. The young Austrian economists who are pupils of Don Lavoie had been working on Popper, Lakatos, Machlup and Hayek for a long time.”—Gabriel Zanotti, Philosophy Professor at Austral University Gabriel Let me see if I can summarize the argument and put an end to rationalist obfuscation of economics: 1) Calling science positivistic (justificationary) is a typical Rothbardian/Misesian misrepresentation of the scientific method, which is critical not justificationary. 2) Calling a logic (axiomatic, prescriptive, complete) a science (theoretical, descriptive, incomplete) is simply false. (And adds nothing, other than casting Austrian economics as a source of ridicule). Models can be built out of axioms or laws, but all axiomatic deductions are tautologies, producing proofs of operational possibility, while all laws remain incomplete and therefore non-tautological, producing additional hypotheses, which are candidates for theories and laws. But all theoretical statements remain theoretical. The reason being that all non-tautological premises remain forever theoretical. 3) The ‘axiom’ of purposeful human action tells us precisely nothing since it may constitute a test, but not an axiom since it tells us nothing of the scope of possible purposeful human action. We can instead say that any economic hypothesis, theory, or law, must be reducible to a sequence of rational human actions, (operations) in order to be existentially possible. 4) This difference is why we rely upon ratio-empiricism, not rationalism, and not positivism for scientific (truthful) investigation. Logical arguments test internal consistency but not external correspndence, and external correspondence does not tell us about the internal consistency of our arguments, and without operational-intuitionistic testing (operational definitions) we cannot know if what we imagine is existentially possible. And without falsification, assuming we are both internally consistent, externally correspondent, and existentially possible, we have not tested our internal, external, and operational theory for parsimony – leaving open the possibility of error, bias and deception in all three. 5) The differences between mainstream (orthodox) economics, and Austrian (heterodox) economics, are (a)that manipulation of credit is disinformation (lying) which produces cumulative effects of disinformation (lying), and (b) that as an act of disinformation (fraud), manipulation of credit produces involuntary transfers (immorality), because it lacks fully informed, productive, warrantied, voluntary exchange, free of externality (moral constraint). 6) Rationalists tend to be, and by definition, must be, justificationists – they are not critical. Justification in rationalism, is indifferent from positivism in science. They are identical propositions. No matter how much justification we do, we are merely engaging in confirmation bias. Instead, it is irrelevant which method we use to construct a theory. The means of constructing a theory are irrelevant. Justification is irrelevant. Truth candidates (internally consistent, externally correspondent, operationally possible, and ultimately parsimonious, yet incomplete statements) are produced by criticism: whether they survive scrutiny: testing. 7) One *CAN* however, work through purely rational, non-positivistic processes, however, this is not to to say they are not working empirically (through observation). As far as I know this is impossible. But that does not mean they are not working ratio-empirically. It merely means that they are engaging in tests of internal consistency given current knowledge, and working using operational possibility (existential possibility), but that they are not criticizing their work through tests of external correspondence – although as far as we know, no one makes theories without tests of external correspondence, because that would mean we were not explaining economic phenomenon – which would be somewhat fruitless. 8) This ‘Austrian’ (heterodox) investigation remains ratio-empirical, and consistent with all other scientific investigation. However, so does mainstream economics (orthodoxy). And the ONLY DIFFERENCE between mainstream and Austrian economics then, is that the mainstream seeks to lie to us, and Austrians seek to speak the truth. So the difference is not methodological – it is whether we attempt to find improvements to institutions of cooperation that retain the western principle of truth telling, or we engage in lying. Keynesian economics is dishonest, not necessarily unscientific. Austrian economics suggests only that economics must be practiced scientifically (ratio-empirically), not axiomatically or statistically: that sequences of operational possibility actions, informed by incentives, each of which is subjectively testable, is necessary to make a truth statement, while statistical correlation ignores these choices. Ergo, economics is indifferent from all other sciences: ratio-empirical discipline. The question is only whether we seek to tell the truth (Austrian) or to lie (Keynesian). 9) And it is equally dishonest and pseudoscientific to state that an axiomatic system is identical to a theoretical system, and equally dishonest to cast mainstream economics as methodologically flawed. Particularly when Austrians have contributed nothing to the study of economics in nearly a century, while in the past twenty years alone, the orthodox community has expanded our knowledge of general rules and insight into our existing economies with regularity. 10) The Cosmopolitan thinkers, like the german rationalists, are exceptional at this kind of deceptive conflation. A few of us think that it is a natural consequence of talumudic authoritarian dual ethics in the jewish community, and kantian authoritarian conflation of truth and duty in german philosophy. However, Mises and ROthbard and to some lesser degree Hoppe, have all tried to assert fallacies that cast the difference as possible, logical and methodological rather than as moral. Meanwhile the social democrats continue to justify the morality of takings (involuntary transfers) rather than treating every ‘taking’ as a lost opportunity for productive voluntary exchange – and therefore returning us to manorial era constraints upon the behavior of the unproductive classes that contributed to the rise of the west. CLOSING I hope this helped you understand my position. In my view I am attempting to restore Morality and truth telling to economics. But that will not be done using fallacious arguments in the rationalist tradition. It will be by demonstrating that moral action using institutions that do not engage in lying, produce superior economic conditions: greater prosperity without the fragility caused by decade after decade of institutional lying. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute L’viv Ukraine

    WHY ARE YOU REFUTING MISES, ROTHBARD and HOPPE IF YOU ADVOCATE AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS?

    Because Austrian Economics if stated scientifically, rather than rationally, constrains economics to moral theories and policies, and correctly repositions economics as a moral discipline: the search for institutional improvements to voluntary exchange – in the same way that I have tried to reposition science as a moral discipline: the search to speak the truth; and philosophy as the construction of meaning from the truth that we discover with science – a discipline which expressly lacks meaning (and must). (Note: You might want to re-read that paragraph a few times – it’s very important.) This is a profound transformation of multi-disciplinary intellectual history into a single, unified theory of peer-cooperation in pursuit of prosperity. And it corrects the errors inserted into the Cosmopolitan (Jewish) branch of Austrian economics by Mises (pseudoscience), and Rothbard (ghetto immorality – the absence of truth-telling), and Hoppe (German Rationalism) This transformation of western thought into truth-telling for the purpose of moral cooperation (voluntary exchanges among warriors of universally equal rank), explains why the west innovates and prospers at higher rates than the rest of the world, whenever it is not bound by babylonian-levantine mysticism, barbaric deception, or Asian systemic truth-avoidance: we work constantly to eliminate transaction costs and seize opportunities at lowest cost (early). This approach to man’s intellectual struggle correctly positions truth-telling along with trust (transaction costs), property, voluntary exchange, and contract as the necessary institutions of prosperity creation: the high trust society. Anglos attempted to combine science and morality – trusting man in the absence of moral authority. But anglos, were an island people without borders to defend, an homogenous in-bred people, and a heavily commercialized people. They had fewer fears. Defectors from moral norms are not a problem for an in-bred island people. There is no group to defect to. Germans attempted to combine philosophy and morality – a less radical transformation of religious authoritarian morality. Germans were a landed people with borders under constant question, and who were intermixed with other groups on all sides, and were not as economically diverse as the anglos and as such not as bound to trade. So, “defectors” – those who no longer pay the high cost of the normative commons, were more of a concern. Jewish cosmopolitan authors, an un-landed diasporic and separatist people, attempted to preserve internal rule-authoritarianism, separatism, and the parasitic value of separatist dual-ethics. They viewed host civilizations as hostile, generated separatist hostility internally by intention as a means of group cohesion, and often practiced dualist ethics that guaranteed their moral separatism. So each of these groups were, as all groups must, attempting to react to the enlightenment using their group evolutionary strategies: island naval and commercial, landed martial and agrarian-commercial, and un-landed, diasporic commercial. It is sometimes hard for us to imagine that our use of “Truth” reflects our group’s evolutionary strategy, and that many of our judgements are unconscious. But all groups use truth differently. Truth is unknowable and therefore merely contractual in Jewish philosophy – it is a purely pragmatic vision. In German philosophy, truth is dangerous and must be inseparable from duty, which is why all german philosophy conflates truth and duty. In anglo philosophy, truth is divine and its consequences divine – knowing the mind of god. Our duty is truth regardless of consequences, because we believe all consequences are optimum. Neo-puritanism, in the anglo world, which is the dominant postmodern philosophy in government and academy, does not practice anglo truth, but has adopted german and jewish counter-enlightenment philosophy of the sociology of knowledge and truth: truth is what we desire it to be. This is systematically destroying our rule of law, which has been, in the past, the source of our empiricism. The source of our science. Not the other way round. Without scientific law, we cannot have a scientific society. Law is the most influential property of any society because it determines what one must do, not what one prefers. As such, an un-empirical laws, is an incalculable, un-decidable, and therefore subjective law. The solution is to restore truth telling. To increase the scope of property to include the normative and informational commons. To use law to restore truth-telling. All society will adapt rapidly to this change. No authority is necessary. No leadership is necessary. No belief is necessary. No agreement is necessary. No ideology is necessary. It is just true, insufficient to know, or not true, and that is enough. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute L’viv Ukraine

    MISES’ PRAXEOLOGY AS THE FAILURE TO DEVELOP ECONOMIC OPERATIONALISM

    (important)(profound) [I] have been working to reform anarcho capitalist arguments by translating them from troublesome Kantian rationalism, into the transparent common language of science: ratio-empiricism. And, at least for the past few months, I’ve been struggling to develop a narrative structure that would allow me to easily demonstrate the solution to the promise of praxeology as a failed version of the same problems addressed by Intuitionism, Operationalism and Constructivism in mathematics and science. Mises’ work was another example of the multi-disciplinary failure to provide a solution to the common intuition that there is a problem with science and mathematics, and our application of science and math to other fields – particularly to economics and ethics. That is the conclusion that I have come to – it’s the logical positioning of Mises’ praxeology in the development of 20th century thought – albeit he was even less successful in economics than peers were in physics, math, logic and psychology. They were able to identify the solution but not able to convince peers to implement it, because it was burdensome. This narrative, positioning Misesian thought as a failed attempt at Operationalism in human cooperation, provides a vehicle whereby I can describe Misesian arguments in the same context as those in physics, psychology, logic and mathematics. All of them as failed experiments in operationalism only because the authors did not and possibly could not look across disciplines and discover that they were merely adding or removing the properties desirable or not for their field of inquiry – but that while they were seeking a logical solution, that they were all making similar arguments – ethical arguments: And that the problem they intuited, that Poincaré criticized them for, was an ethical one: recreating mysticism through the use of verbalism to obscure causality that they did not understand. All the major disciplines went through a somewhat failed transformation and only psychology, which was most in need of reformation, fully adopted operationalism as “operationism”. And the result was a wealth of research in experimental psychology and the success of experimental psychology versus the pseudoscience that dominated the field before hand. [W]hy is this important? Because the requirements for construction and operational language, are not only logical but ethical. And while ethics has limited place in mathematical principles, and physical laws, it has a great significance to the promise that one is advocating a truth in mathematical and physical propositions – and therefore not ‘polluting’ the intellectual domain with fallacies that might impact others’ work. But in the logic of cooperation we call ethics it is inseparable both from the promise that one is advocating a truth AND in the articulation of its principles and the laws that enforce those principles. If we had discovered operationalism in ethics first, then perhaps, we would have had an easier time justifying the additional burden that operationalism places upon physics, science, psychology math and logic – and we might have saved a century of pseudoscientific inquiry, just as Bridgman worried; and just as we have seen in a century of fallacious and immoral economics. As Bridgman noted, the only reason Einstein was innovative, was because he operationalized the problem of measurement of bodies – something that had we done earlier would have saved a generation or more of wasted effort in science – just as we have wasted a generation or more in the pursuit of a logic of cooperation leading to liberty. The issue for us, in economics, politics and in ethics, is that the problem of arbitrary precision in the construction of general rules – hypothesis, theories and laws – affects only the precision of economic laws in time, but not our ability to state those laws. However, unlike say, mathematics or logic, we never run into decidability in the logic of cooperation, because all phenomenon are reducible to human actions that are open to subjective testing (sympathetic experience). Unlike axiomatic systems such as math and logic, we are never short of information necessary for decidability. Humans are marginally indifferent in their preferences – which is why we can experience shared intent, cooperate, and empathize. As such we can always decide. Buridan’s Ass never starves. Information is always sufficient. It may not be sufficient for the choice of preference, but it is sufficient for rational choice. Again, arguments that someone versed in mathematical philosophy might have understood. Although, with decades of computer science, we have learned that it’s computer science that is more trustworthy than mathematics, because computers are constrained by operational rules of necessity, and unlike mathematics we cannot use imagination and ‘fudging’ obscured by verbalism. Operations must be open to performance and results must be computable. To counter the problem of imagination adding information to arguments, and the problem of using verbalism to obscure ignorance, under operationalism and constructivism, **truth is replaced by (algorithmic) proof as a primitive notion, and existence requires demonstration of constructibility.** This statement is possible to translate into the axiom that moral (ethical) propositions must be reducible to a series of human actions, open to subjective testing (sympathetic verification). This is the argument that mises was looking for, and could not construct, possibly because (a) he lacked sufficient understanding of mathematics, (b) he lacked a demonstrably insufficient understanding of the terms ‘scientific’ and ‘logical’, because he conflated them with abandon, despite their opposite properties, and (c) because an ethical constraint was insufficient to provide an authoritative response to the moral arguments of statists and socialists alike. Whether he understood the ethical constraint not the logical one was all that a solution to praxeological analysis would provide, or simply, like most cosmopolitans, because preferred an authoritarian, verbalist, and pseudoscientific argument is something it is impossible to answer in our era. Since Marx, Freud, Cantor, Mises and Rothbard all make the same error of constructing verbal pseudosciences, it’s hard to imagine that it’s intentional rather than a cultural bias or strategy. (Something I have written about elsewhere under the heading of competing uses of truth.) The problem I face, and the work I must do, to help others understand Mises’ position in intellectual history, and his failure, and then to construct a logic of cooperation, where Mises mistakenly tries to construct a logic of ‘action’ is to enumerate examples of axioms and laws in different fields and thereby demonstrate the problem of the sufficiency of information for deduction under arbitrary precision in the construction of hypotheses, theories, laws, and axioms; and then placing Mises’ work in the context of all fields struggling with the definition of truth (as ultimately performative – and therefore ethical). So positioning economics and ethics using performative truth, operationalism and constructivism will help demonstrate the concept across ALL domains of inquiry, rather than just within economics, ethics, physics, psychology, mathematics and logic. And thus eliminate the objections to performative truth, intuitionism, constructivism, and operationalism by demonstrating that all philosophical and logical disciplines rest upon the action that one claims to have demonstrated a an action that he can testify truthfully to have observed (rather than imagined, or used verbalisms to obscure that he has not. Unfortunately, we didn’t discover ethics first – perhaps had Mises solved the problem in ethics, other fields would have grasped the significance. Although, other fields have addressed ethics with softer variants of operationalism and construction – particularly science. They have never reformed ’truth’ as performative: as testimony, or ‘true witness’, as evidenced by that which is operational and constructible. At least in the discipline of law, strict construction, original intent, and deliberate modification of law is an understood if not obeyed principle. Operationalism may allow us to make truthful testimony, and truthful testimony is the only truth that humans are capable of creating. All else is imaginary, as is infinity. But whether we retain the approximation of classical reasoning as a practical matter of utility, or adopt construction and operation as a requirement for attestable truth in other disciplines really doesn’t matter as much as it does in ethics, politics and law. Physics, science, psychology, math and logic are luxury goods and rarely involve involuntary transfer and provide an incentive for conflict. But, cooperation is a necessary good. Politics and law are necessary goods. Strict construction is necessary and beneficial since it permits the rational resolution of conflicts, and as such prevents them. Strict construction makes it impossible to use empty verbalisms to advocate involuntary transfers as ‘moral’. Operational definitions make it much harder to lie, cheat and steal. Under operationalism, performative truth, constructivism, the field of ethics, including the domains of criminal, unethical, immoral and conspiratorial, and conquest prohibitions, can be described as an objective uniform logic as Mises suggested it might be. We can construct a formal logic of cooperation – ethics. And, we can do it using ratio-scientific language, via operational and constructive means. We can do it in the common universal and transparent language of science using hypothesis, theory and law, and model our laws using axioms constrained by correspondence to this empirical laws. We do not need false authoritarianism, pseudoscientific obscurant terminology, or a cult or obscure continental language to do it. An irony perhaps that Mises did not grasp that he was justifying the logic of human action, which is by definition operational and constructive in an argumentative structure that was not operational nor constructive. In hindsight this approach is either humorous or tragic. While we are not sure yet, it is possible that Popper was correct, and that we can never know if we possess the most parsimonious description of any phenomenon – what we call ‘truth’ or ‘ultimate truth’ – we can, instead of spending our lives in a quest for the non-existant and logically unknowable, instead, publish recipes that we can testify truthfully to the construction of, and performance of, as correspondent with reality. This is the difference between european commitment to always speaking the truth, and producing many, many technological successes, versus academic publishing a welfare queens, never responsible for our words, and never accountable for the consequences. This is the difference between anglo empirical truth, and cosmopolitan pragmatic truth. [T]he 20th century’s failed quest for a definition of truth, is the narrative structure that I’ve been searching for. Until recently, I just couldn’t find a way of talking about Mises’ work in the broader context of intellectual development. He clearly intuited the problem, as did those in other fields, but besides having the Jewish obsession with words-as-reality, and the German obsession with authority, he did not understand math and science well enough, and certainly had no exposure to computer science and the problem of computability. Why he proceeded onward and constructed an elaborate nonsensical pseudoscience in the Cosmopolitan tradition is something that only he could answer. And why subsequent generations have created a cult out of this pseudoscience, complete with typical cosmopolitan saturation of the informational commons with propaganda supporting of the pseudosicence, including heroic figure worship, and heaping unworthy praise at every opportunity, is up to those still living to explain. It is worth noting that Popper too largely relied on narrative verbalisms, such as his ‘three worlds’ hypothesis, and we know that he resorted to Krugman-like distortion of facts in his criticisms of the left. And we know that Popper’s real purpose was not about science it self, but his agenda to undermine scientific certainty, much as did Mises, by rendering truth in to platonic form, removing responsibility from the scientist for true testimony, and casting cosmopolitan Critique, originated in hermeneutic interpretation of scripture, as the means of scientific social organization, rather than the previous anglo saxon and german requirement for truthful testimony. ALl these thinkers failed to stem the tide of marx’s socialism, rothbardian libertinism, and Straussian neoconservatism, because all tried to counter pseudoscience with pseudoscience, and empty verbalism with empty verbalism. However the manner of correcting those people was always available to us, and had been for centuries if not millennia: a requirement that we tell the truth, and persecution under law for not doing so. As Hoppe states, Hayek failed as well, both to make this connection with performative truth as a means of social order, and to move from the classical liberal and therefore psychological school of thought to the calculative rigor of logic by identifying property as the first and necessary object or unit of commensurability. He did understand the law and the common law, clearly, as the institutional means for resolving conflicts – better than anyone else as far as I know. But he did not grasp the difference between legal REASON (approximation necessary for discovery) and logical CALCULATION (precision necessary for truth). Nor between knowledge of use (correspondence as truth) and knowledge of construction (truth in existence). (Although I’m willing to admit that I might be one of the few people who currently does.) Later in life Mises appears to waffle a bit, if not reverse himself. But because of what appears to be his fascination with Kantian a priorism, he didn’t see the parallel between his (inarticulate) argument that economics was both empirical and logical, and reverse mathematics, in which one constructs necessary axioms one can testify to as extant, after using empirical and logical means by which to approximate the solution to a problem. My original goal was to provide conservatives a vehicle for argument using what I saw as libertarian rationalism. Conversely, I wanted to make it impossible to conduct deceptive arguments in the religious, progressive and postmodern forms, but in doing so I found an answer to a century or more old conflict in the history of thought. And I think I can rescue Mises and Hoppe from the ‘fruitcake fringe’ of rationalist argument. Which is helpful. Since I want, like most, a plan to obtain liberty in my lifetime. And while any value Mises had has been already incorporated into economic thought, only fringe groups have incorporated Hoppe’s criticism of democracy and use of competing private insurance organizations to replace monopoly bureaucracy in the production of regulation. Unfortunately, Hoppe appears too entrenched and committed to praxeology as pseudoscience, the fallacy of aggression which is merely a means of licensing fraud by verbal means and creating a parasitic class immune from both physical and legal punishment. And has merely adopted the marxist ‘commune’ as his model of rebellion. Which just because we desire liberty, is just as economically impossible as it is if we desire communism. Wishful thinking is not action. Its wishing others will do the work for you. Liberty was created only by europeans, because of rare ancient circumstances, whereby warriors granted one another insurance against theft of their property obtained from their cattle raids, and required equality of one another because of their battle tactics requiring independent financing, action and maneuver, at high risk. These people built an ethic that would give birth to science, reason, property and liberty, because it forces man to use his mind in terms which accurately correspond to reality: Tell the truth, and only the truth. Fulfill your commitments at risk of life. Construct a brotherhood of property owners two whom familial trust is extended. And force all free riding out of society so that all persons must participate in production, and none can resort to parasitism. Liberty is obtained at the point of metal object, by denying others access to power. Everything else is merely wishful thinking, or an attempt to free ride on the efforts of those who do construct liberty. The natural aristocracy is not created by a small population. It is created by every living soul willing to bear arms to prevent the accumulation of sufficient power to deny others sovereignty over their property: For one and all, to deny one and all, access to the property of one and all by other than voluntary, fully informed, warrantied, exchange free of externality. Cheers Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine LINKS Constructive Mathematics: Mathematical Intuitionism:  Operationalism: Praxeology

    MISES POSITION IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY?

    Mises Human Action as Cosmopolitan Stoicism. [H]e was almost right. If Rothbard and the Rothbardians had not damaged his legacy so severely, he would not be ostracized by the main stream intellectual community. At present any mention of his name associates a public intellectual, an economist, or philosopher, with the pseudoscientific lunatic fringe. Praxeology is a failed attempt at Operationalism, sure – but no one ELSE came close to developing economic operationalism but Mises. I only did it because I have the luxury of a century of additional development in computability (especially Turing), and because it’s clear now that the analytic program (attempt to convert philosophy into a science) has been a failure, and that the success in reforming both science and psychology has almost entirely been because of Operationalism. Had Mises joined with Brouwer and Bridgman, the three of them might have saved us from a century of pseudoscience. But without a philosopher of ethics to unify them, Popper in the philosophy of science, Mises in Economics, Brouwer in mathematics, and Bridgman in physics all failed to come to the correct conclusion: that they were not in fact articulating logical constraints – because there is no logical constraint to theory-development. The logical constraint is only in the statement of promise (that you are telling the truth) that such a theory can be expressed existentially, as a sequence of operations (actions) or operational measures of observations. And as such, one’s theory, in any discipline, is free of content that was added by error, imagination, or deception. Man can testify to observation in the execution of recipes – all else is imagination. As such the practice of the sciences (or rather, the practice of *disciplined testimony* which the sciences developed, but which consists of nothing unique to the physical sciences) is a moral one, with ethical constraints. As such, praxeology, mathematical intuitionism, operationalism, operationism, Popper’s critical preference, and the scientific method, as well as the discipline of science as currently practiced, are moral constraints, not logical ones. One can intuit a theory by whatever means possible. One can believe whatever he wishes to justify. But one’s promise of testimony to the actions that did or may produce consequences is a moral one, not a logical one. [A]s far as I know, the only meaningful reason to study economics for use in ethics and politics, is to justify the rule of law (Nomocracy), under the single rule of property rights, where property rights is as defined under Propertarianism, as property-en-toto (demonstrated property). And where that body of law suppresses sufficient involuntary transfer of property-en-toto, that the formation of a Nomocratic polity is possible. And where the formation and perpetuation of that polity is possible, because transaction costs are sufficiently suppressed that a rational choice for Nomocracy is possible, over a rational choice for statism. And that the normative preference of nomocratic rule over statist rule is maintained by the constant exercise of that body of law in daily life, rather than a phillosophical-rational, religio-moral, pedagogically-instructional, or normatively-habituated means of persistence. If we look at his human action as an attempt to develop an economic version of stoicism – a mental discipline – I think it is probably a better frame of reference for his work than as economics or analytic philosophy. As such I see him as creating a Cosmopolitan version of stoicism (economic/intellectual character) rather than western (Aryan if you will) stoicism (political/craftsmanship character). Both forms of stoicism are early attempts at operationalizing philosophy for disciplinary action as an individual member of a complex division of labor in which we possess fragmentary information. Since I quote him endlessly for his analysis of money and fiduciary media, which again, he (“a sequence of human actions” = “operational observations”) correctly uses operational analysis to isolate and articulate the causal rather than normative properties – I am clearly an advocate. But I am not an advocate of the misuse of Mises’ errors – his failed attempt to develop economic operationalism – to justify Rothbardian libertinism – an outright assault on the production of both high trust, and the commons – both of which are the primary competitive advantages constituent in the western indo-european (Aryan if you will) evolutionary strategy. [I] walk by Mises’ childhood home every day. It has tempered my criticism. I see him making natural errors of Cosmopolitanism – as Hayek said “a victim of his upbringing”. Just as the Germans have made endless errors in conflating religion and philosophy to preserve their hierarchy and duty as a group competitive strategy. Just as British (Anglo/Irish/Scots if not the Belgae) have fought to preserve their island universalism despite the necessary suicide that results from universalism outside of their island (or the american island, or the Australian island.) I will venture this post is one of the more important things that has been written about Mises in recent history, and my arguments, if not my criticisms will assist us in RESCUING Mises from the lunatic fringe, and RESCUING his work for use in intellectual discourse – as the first attempt at saving Economics through operationalism, the way that science and psychology (if not also mathematics and logic) have been saved by operationalism. **I see myself as rescuing ALL of the Misesian/Hoppeian program from the fruitcake fringe: by laundering German, Jewish and British enlightenment fallacies – the attempt to universalize local evolutionary strategy – rather than simply adopt scientific epistemology (operationalism) as the only neutral tool for the use of studying group evolutionary strategies.** Although it is, I am sure, somewhat difficult for those religiously devoted to immoral, libertine, Rothbardianism to either understand or accept. I am quite sure I do not err in this analysis. A statement which I am aware further taunts libertines. But which my fellow aristocrats (libertarians-proper) both understand and expect from me as a promise. Because the anglo-empirical model of truth telling, quite opposite from the cosmopolitan, is that truth is the name for testimony. And as such I testify that to the best of my knowledge my statement is true. And that I bear the reputational consequences of my promise that this statement is true. This is the polar opposite of the Popperian, Analytic, and Cosmopolitan version of true: that truth is the unknowable province of god alone, and as such we can only ‘do what we can’, and as such are unaccountable for our words. This ethic, this definition of truth, as performative – as operational, is what Kant was searching for, but could not find. And it is why both Jewish and German philosophy are dead ends. And it is why english philosophy became lost through its influence by the germans and the cosmopolitans. We lost a century of philosophy to cosmopolitan pseudoscience in economics, politics, ethics and logic. Germans lost centuries to pseudo-philosophical religio-moralism. Mises can be seen in context as the most successful – if still failed – attempt to rescue german and cosmopolitan thought from its religious constraints. – Cheers. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine  

    THE STRUGGLE TO PRODUCE A MORAL ECONOMIC SCIENCE

    THE BRANCHES OF AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS The German branch of Austrian economics offered an alternative proposition: that we can and should pursue inquiry into economics as a means of discovering how we may improve our institutions while preserving moral principles of cooperation. This position favors kin selection without encouraging parasitism. The mainstream (anglo) position is instead, that we should pay the cost of immoral actions via our institutions if the aggregate benefits are justifiable. This is a philosophical bias that ist he result of the heavily outbred culture of the anglos who for all intents and purposes function as kin, and operate under the principle of kin selection. This position encourages parasitism. By contrast, the Jewish branch of Austrian economics attempted, and failed, to cast this argument as one of science(instrumentalism and empiricism) versus logic(axiomatic deduction), while at the same time naming this axiomatic argument a ‘science’, despite not relying upon the scientific method – thus constructing a pseudoscience (meaning: using the term science for credibility without relying on the scientific method to establish credibility). This position seeks to make both parasitism and contribution to the commons impossible. Just as universalism is common to the English, and duty common to the German, this attempt to create a pseudoscientific authoritarian philosophy was a result of the cultural bias of Judaism which itself relies upon authoritative law and contractual agreement rather than the european aristocratic egalitarian cultural demand for testifiable truth regardless of circumstances. Contract is a sufficient substitute for truth in low trust polities. But it is not a substitute for truth in high trust polities. A TALE OF THREE CULTURES Of these three positions, the German was the optimum: scientific, rational, and moral actions to achieve moral ends. The anglo position uses science and aggregates and accepts immoral actions in order to attempt to achieve moral ends. The German position uses science, reason and individualism in order to preserve moral conditions while achieving economic optimums. The Jewish position relies upon pseudoscience to achieve individual optimums but ignores morality and commons altogether – because judaic law is constructed contractually, not on principle (truth telling), and as a diasporic culture, it does not require contribution to the commons as do land holding social orders. Each of these cultural strategies is beneficial for island dwelling anglo universalists(truth), continent-dwelling german martial culture (duty), and disasporic un-landed jewish culture (contract). However, if we separate the pragmatism of cultural group evolutionary strategy from that which is true independent of those cultural strategies – cultural definitions of true – only the German model survives scrutiny as containing the full suite of properties: truth, duty, commons, individual and collective morality, under science and reason. THE PREFERENCE FOR THE AUSTRIAN MODEL IS A PREFERENCE FOR A MORAL DICIPLINE OF ECONOMICS Had not the world wars disrupted the Austrian school and destroyed german civilization in a fractious civil war, this debate might have evolved and been completed earlier, instead of devolving into mainstream half-moral anglo aggregate morality, and a discredited heterodox school. But at present the Austrian vision of a moral economics constructed for nations, preserving kin selection, preventing parasitism, preserving both individual and aggregate morality, preserving the commons, requiring truth-telling, and operating under ratio-scientific methods, is displaced for two reasons: 1) The post-war dominance of (dysgenic, suicidal) anglo universalism justified under Keynesian socialism and Rawlsian ethics. A suicidal strategy only possible under the unique conditions of western altruistic punishment. (See Wiki) Westerners are the only people to develop universal high trust and to break the familial cycle of corruption. However, this appears to have created a weakness in that we extend this trust suicidally and ignore the reproductive and evolutionary importance of the family, tribe, and nation, and in creating that high trust society in the first place. 2) The marginalization of the Austrian ambition for a moral economics because of the adoption of marxist ideological and propaganda techniques in advocating the pseudoscientific Jewish Austrian program – in no small part by the Mises Institute (without whom, and the use of the new medium of the internet, the pseudoscientific branch would likely have been extinguished.) As such the term Austrian is categorized under pseudoscientific and anti-scientific, rather than as the german branch originally evolved: the institutional means of improving moral cooperation in the pursuit of prosperity. ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY Mises’s praxeology is a failed attempt at developing economic Intuitionism and Operationalism. Economics is of necessity, like all scientific investigation, a ratio-empirical methodology for the study of phenomenon beyond our direct perception. In his failure he attempted to create a pseudoscience to justify his authoritarian preferences. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    SCIENCE IS THE DISCIPLINE OF SPEAKING TRUTHFULLY – IN ALL DISCIPLINES ———————————————————————————-

    Science is a moral discipline wherein we criticize our ideas, so that we can speak them truthfully: — We test our reasoning with logic for internal consistency. — We test our observations with external correspondence. — We test existence of our premises with operations. — We test the scope of our theory with falsifications. Once we have tested our theories by these means, then we can say that we speak truthfully – and as such do no harm. The central argument regarding truth: … that humans in order to cooperate, humans evolved sympathy for intent – and are marginally indifferent in their judgement of intentions. This allows us to sympathetically test most human incentives if subject to the same stimuli (information). It is also why juries can functions, since this sympathetic testing of intentions is the criteria by which juries render decisions. … that we cannot however sympathize with the equivalent of intentions (first principles) of the physical universe. So while we intuit and and can test man’s intentions, we cannot measure and test the universe’s first principles. As such, the best we can do is testify to observations and measurements of those phenomenon until at some point we know those first principles – if that is ever possible. … but our observations must also be reduced to stimuli that can be sympathetically tested by others, and insulated from our deception, bias and error. … we call this process ‘science’, but the practice of science is little more than a set of moral rules that instruct us as to how to eliminate deception, bias and error. The scientific method then, is merely a moral discipline: the means by which we struggle to speak the truth, as truthfully as we may possibly accomplish given the frailty of our reason. … that giving witness to one’s observations, is testable by reproduction of a set of operational definitions. That operational definitions produce the equivalent of names, just as positional numbering provides quantities with names. Such names are insulated from deception, distraction, loading, framing and overloading. Theories are not. While we cannot demonstrate the absolute parsimony of a theory (that we know of), we can demonstrate that we truthfully conveyed our observations. In other words, we can testify truthfully to an ordered set of facts, even if we cannot testify truthfully to parsimony of a theory. ….that it is possible to state instead that all outputs of scientific investigation are true, if they are truthfully represented – where ‘scientific investigation” refers to the use of the scientific method, regardless of field of inquiry. But that we seek the most parsimonious statement of a theory, and we can never know that we have obtained it, we can only develop consensus that we cannot cause it to fail. This is, as far as I know, the best non-platonic description of truth available. Everything else is a linguistic contrivance for one purpose or another – possibly to obscure ignorance, and possibly to load ideas with moral motivation. Scientists load their contrivance of truth, and mathematicians load their contrivance of numbers, limits, and a dozen other things – most of which obscure linguistic ‘cheats’ to give authority to that which is necessary for the construction of general rules. (ie: the problem of arbitrary precision). … that Popper did no investigation into science or the history of science prior to making his argument, and that as yet, we do not have a systematic account of the history of science. However, what history we do have, both distant and recent, is that science operates by criticism upon failure, where failure is demonstrated by via overextension of the theory. …The reason for overextension rather than criticism as the operational preference being that it is economically inefficient (expensive) to pursue criticism rather than to extend a theory to its point of failure then criticize it. And as far as we know, this is how science functions in practice, and must work, because it is how all human endeavors must work. Because while a small number of scientists may seek the ‘truth’ (or whatever a platonist means by it), what scientists try to do is solve problems – ie: to manufacture recipes for useful cognition. … Popper’s advice was merely moral given that the scope of inquiry in all human fields had surpassed that of human scale, where tests are subjectively verifiable. (I think this is an important insight because it occurred in all fields.) Einstein for example, operationalized observations (relative simultaneity for example) over very great distances approaching the speed of light using Lorenz transformations. And as Bridgman demonstrated, the reason Einstein’s work was novel was because prior generations had NOT been operationalizing statements ,and as such, more than a generation and perhaps two were lost to failure of what should have been an obvious solution. (See the problem of length, which I tend to refer to often as the best example.) I addressed this in a previous post, and what popper did was give us good advice, and while he made an argument that appears logical, like most rational arguments, unsupported by data, it is not clear he was correct, and in fact, it appears that he was not. The question is not a rational but empirical one. … Popper unlike Misesian Pseudoscience, or Rothbardian Immoral Verbalisms, was engaged in a moral attempt both in politics and in science, and perhaps in science as a vehicle for politics, to prevent the pseudoscientific use of science – particularly by fascist and communists, to use the findings of science as a replacement for divine authority by which to command man. What popper did, particularly with his platonism, was to remove the ability for the findings of science to be used as justification for the removal of human choice. Popper, Mises, and Hayek were responsible for undermining pseudoscientific authoritarianism. Of the three popper is perhaps less articulate (possibly to obscure his objective), but certainly not wrong, so to speak. While mises’ appeal to authoritarianism (which is part and parcel of jewish culture) was entirely pseudoscientific, by claiming that economics was deductive rather than empirical, and justifying it under apriorism, instead of as I’ve stated, understanding that he was merely trying to apply operationalism to economic activity, which would merely demonstrate that Keynesian economics was immoral and deterministic, not unscientific. But Popper, Mises, Hayek, Bridgman and Brouwer, did not find a solution to restoring the western aristocratic conditions for public speech. They too were a lost in platonism a bit. Bridgman and Brouwer did understand that something was wrong, and were very close,b ut they could not make the moral argument. We have had a century now of attacks by verbal contrivance and we can demonstrate the destruction of our civilization by way of it. So the moral argument is no longer one of undemonstrated results. WE have the results. And we have a generation of men, myself included, trying to repair it. One must speak truthfully, because no other truth is knowable. Intellectual products that are brought to market must be warrantied just as are all other products that are brought to market, and the warranty that you can provide is operational definitions (recipes, experience), not theories (psychologism, projections). And if you are not willing to stand behind your product then you should not bring it to market. Because you have no right to subject others to harm. Intellectuals produce ideas (myself included), that is our product. We are paid in measly terms most of the time, for our product, but that is what we do. But it is no different from hot coffee or dangerous ladders, or defective gas tanks. And given that one particularly prolific group of people has created marxism, socialism, postmodernism, libertine-libertarianism, and neoconservatism, it is about time we stopped allowing them to ship lousy products into society. And rather than regulate them by government, the common law and universal standing will allow punishment of those who bring bad products to market. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    MORAL CONSTRAINT FROM LAW THROUGH MATHEMATICS

    I hope that this spectrum: law, economics, assists us in understanding the position of praxeology in the list of moral constraints that require operational and intuitionistic tests of propositions, prior to making truth claims. LAW: STRICT CONSTRUCTION Strict Construction is an abused term where the courts instead use the terms Textualism and Original Intent. But under propertarian property rights theory Strict Construction refers to requiring that any law passed be accompanied by argument showing that such a law is specifically authorized by the constitution. In other words, laws constitute the permissible legal operations. And none of them can violate property rights. This is important because otherwise, if discretion is required, then judges can insert deception, imaginary content, bias and error into the body of law. (As they have done, circumventing the legislature, the constitution, and property rights.) As such the principle of Propertarian Strict Construction (as opposed to textualism’s strict construction) requires that we operationally define the construct of all any law. This principle is important because laws have the greatest affect on a polity – and often the greatest unintended effect upon individuals and the polity. ECONOMICS: PRAXEOLOGY Intuitionism (praxeology) in economics is important because manipulation of the economy causes redistributions, gains and losses. As a moral constraint, it is only slightly less influential than law. PSYCHOLOGY: OPERATIONISM Operationism in psychology was important in the recent transformation of psychology from a pseudoscience, to an experimental discipline, and because psychologists do produce, and did produce negative externalities – harm, to others. Not the least of which was multiple generations suffering from illnesses cast as cognitive problems. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/199/1/operat.htm MEDICINE: PROTOCOLISM (MEDICAL OPERATIONALISM) Medical treatments and tests are discussed as protocols. PHYSICS: OPERATIONALISM Operationalism is physics was important because it demonstrated that we expended a great deal of time and money by NOT practicing operationalism and that Einstein’s innovation should have been much earlier and could have been if we had practiced it. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/operationalism/ MATHEMATICS: INTUITIONISM Intuitionism in mathematics was less important because there are few if any externalities produced by classical mathematical operations other than the psychological fallacy that there exists some separate mathematical reality. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/ ECONOMIC INTUITIONISM/OPERATIONALISM IS MEANINGFUL Therefore the HIGHEST moral requirement for demonstration of construction is in the domain of economics wherein the greatest externalities are caused by economic policy. https://www.facebook.com/groups/750292715060100/

    Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    RATIONALISTS JUST HAVE IT BACKWARDS – JUSTIFICATION RATHER THAN CRITICISM.

    “The Silver Rule Wins over The Golden Rule Too – for the same reason.” Macro economic phenomenon are emergent and non-deducible even if they are explainable. As such economics is no different from any other constructed upon laws : theories of arbitrary precision open to constant reformation. For economic theories to be testified as true, we must demonstrate that they are open to construction by sympathetic tests. As such, just as the golden rule is backwards, and the silver rule is correct, Mises just has praxeology backwards, it’s that we can’t claim something is true unless we can explain it as rational actions, but that does not mean we cannot rely upon observations and instrumentation to help us observe and criticize emergent phenomenon. Empiricists claim that other than some intrinsic simple intuitions (grammar, intention, status signal, and empathy etc), all knowledge is gained from sense experience, and this includes all deductions (cognitive science agrees with this hypothesis). This is obvious to people educated after 1980, when cognitive science began to replace psychology, and accelerated after 2000, when pinker restated cognition. Instrumentalists argue, correctly, that phenomenon must be reduced to stimuli open to human sense experience and comparison. This is also obvious. But then how do we test our hypothesies? We cannot subjectively test physical phenomenon, nor can we reason with the first principles of the universe – we don’t know them. So for physical phenomenon we must create experiments to test our hypothesis, where in human phenomenon the same test results are obtained by introspection: if subject to the same stimuli would a reasonable person come to the same conclusion? We could not judge intent or trust others if we did not have this ability so we are marginally indifferent in our ability to judge intentions if possessed of similar (symmetric) knowledge. (This is why informational symmetry is so important.) So in matters of human action where we know the first principles, all phenomenon, whether deducible or emergent, must be explainable as a sequence of rational human actions each of which is subject to subjective testing by means of information and sympathy – or it cannot be true. Just as all measurements (observations) of physical tests must be possible to perform in order for the claims of the test to be true. (Bridgman). Just as all mathematical proofs must be open to construction via basic mathematical operations for them to be true. Just as any propertarian law must be constructed from productive, fully informed, warrantied, voluntary transfers free of negative externality. So all scientific disciplines are identical in dependence upon empirical (sense experience) instrumental (reduction to sense experience) operational (existentially possible) constraints. THE COUNTER-PROPOSITION No one disagrees that if economic phenomenon are not explainable in rational terms that the theory cannot be true. The question of economic science is how we can take advantage of emergent phenomenon to bring forward productivity and consumption (wealth) as a means of improving the commons. This is the purpose of credit and interest. But this principle can be applied in hundreds of permutations throughout the economy. The moral (German Austrian) implication, is that this study must eschew immoral manipulation (thefts) and work only to improve the institutional means of moral cooperation without the conduct of thefts. The immoral (anglo empirical) implication is that this study should seek Pareto optimums (Rawlsian ethics) by reframing ‘harm’ by discounting loss of choice by some to redistribute choice to others. I agree with the German thesis, and expressly disagree with the anglo universalist fallacy which has gotten us to this state entirely because anglos were able to seduce the germans into the world war. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine

    JUSTIFICATION VS CRITICISM : WARRANTY IN NORMATIVE CONTRACT VS WARRANTY IN EXPLORATION INDEPENDENT OF NORMS

    First, what do we mean by “knowledge”, and of those things we mean, what is merely allegory, and what is necessity? Little of the universe is absent regular patterns. However, some are very noisy and difficult to find. Some are very subtle and hard to find. Some are either too large or too small to observe without relying upon instruments, and others must be deduced using logical instruments. We call these regular patterns ‘information’. Humans can modify the real world in a variety of ways, leaving information behind. We can do this as simply leaving evidence of passage through a forces or field, or in archeological evidence. We can do this intentionally with cave paintings and writing. And we can do it with our architecture, monuments and earth works. We can do this by the memories that we transfer between generations through repetition of experience, advice and story. A computer must run a program to create the experience we see before us when using it. Information must mix with memories, to create the experience we call ‘knowing’. Knowledge is reconstructed from information by mixing with existing memories, just as meaning is transferred by the use of analogies to transfer properties. So information exists without a knowing subject. And that information may be very good, or very bad at producing the experience of knowledge in a subject. But in colloquial language we seem to have an intellectual bias that wants to separate untrue knowledge from true, or at least tested, knowledge thereby conflating QUALITY of knowledge and EXISTENCE of knowledge. We can forgive philosophers this common error, since they are concerned most often with the persuasive quality (truth) of propositions. And if we look carefully at the discussion of ‘knowledge’ we find philosophers conflating (a)existence/awareness, (b) risk/willingness to act, (c) truth content. And moreover, truth content consists of two additional properties: (c.i) persuasive power assuming an honest participant, and (c.ii) parsimonious correspondence with reality (what we mean by ‘true’). The reason that discussion of knowledge is problematic is that this term is a sort of catch-all for these separate properties. And so like many concepts, argument is a problem of conflating properties, each of which exists on a separate spectrum. “Knowing” could mean ‘awareness gained through experience’, or ‘given what we know from experience, I am willing to act upon it’, or knowing could mean ‘through experience we believe this is true’. So I think that the only POSSIBLE meaning of the category ‘knowledge’ is ‘awareness of a regular pattern that allows us to predict something, even if it is only to predict in the sense of identifying something as part of a category – the most simple prediction possible. And then we have the persuasive power of knowledge in convincing the self or others, first to state something is possible, then second to state something is worthy of action (risk). For example, no one ‘knows’ how to build a computer (or a cheeseburger for that matter) in the sense that they possess knowledge of construction of the constituent parts. So some knowledge can never be centralized except as a hierarchy of abstractions – trust in one another’s claim to actionable knowledge. For these reasons (the number of causal axis in the category we call knowledge), I think we cannot improve upon casting knowledge as: (a) awareness (existence) of a regular pattern combining information and memory to create an experience, which we then also remember. (b) all knowledge is theoretical, and open to revision (no premises are certain) where theoretical propositions contain both: (d) truth content(parsimonious correspondence with reality). (c) persuasive power (sufficiency) in an honest discourse(risk reduction/reward increase), JUSTIFICATOIN VERSUS CRITICISM = CONTRACT VS TRUTH So I my problem is that ‘justified true belief’ is not false under the test of risk, but is not meaningful under the test of analytic truth. In this sense, it depends upon which thing we are talking about: willingness to act (justified true belief), willingness of others to insure actions (contractual justified true belief), and analytic truth (parsimonious correspondence with reality). If a man gives witness in testimony and later on we find a video of the events, and it turns out that he is wrong, but that it is easy to understand how he was mistaken, we do not consider his testimony false. We only warranty what rational man is capable of warranting. In science we warranty that we have done due diligence: we have criticized our own arguments. We testify that we have done due diligence – we have criticized our own position. In this sense both justified true belief is necessary for contractual propositions, while critical rationalism (warranty) is the only epistemological possibility we can rely upon. The fact that argument evolved out of law (debate in the polis) probably explains the origin of conflation of contractual justification according to the norms of the polity, with the pursuit of analytic truth in epistemological exploration. The fact that most human action is contractual, and very little of our lives epistemic, explains the persistence of both the contractual (justificationary),and epistemic (critical scientific) as method, and the conflation of the term knowledge as a general term covering both contractual and epistemic uses. Norms guide most human actions. Norms are habituated and therefore reduced to intuitions to function. The norms are contractual (justificationary – so that we avoid blame). Science by contrast, produces not actions but testimony. The problem is inverted. In science all we produce is testimony regardless of normative rules. In normative relations we produce actions that we justify as according to the normative rules of society. So we testify that we were justified according to norms in contractual relations, and we testify that our statements are free of norms, imaginary, error, bias, habituated deception and outright deception, in science. This is why science is a luxury good: it’s terribly expensive, and scientific testimony is terribly expensive. Justification allows us to use scientifically tested or evolutionarily tested general rules in real world actions – contractual relations. And must. We cannot create general rules out of justificationary testimony, only out of critical testimony. For this reason, both justificationary and critical testimony will persist forever. While our warranties must be given by critical means, our testimony is forever justificationary. (I think that is fairly profound). As far as I know, albeit in brief, this is the most accurate statement of our extant understanding of the question of knowledge, and why it has been so troublesome a concept. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine  

    SCIENCE AS TRUTHFUL SPEECH – GERMAN RATIONALISM AND JEWISH COSMOPOLITANISM AS IMMORAL INFORMATION DISTORTION EQUAL TO THE INFORMATION DISTORTION OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS.

    Occam’s razor: Is it more likely that German rationalism and Jewish cosmopolitanism, both of which were intentionally designed as obscurant anti-scientific deceptions to re-impose their culture’s authoritarianism as a replacement for the faith needed to maintain group competitive evolutionary strategy, are correct in their classification of economics as an axiomatic logic (logically operational system), and that such a discipline is somehow not subject to the same moral and epistemological constraint in demonstrative method, as are all disciplines that claim to construct laws? Or is it more likely that all disciplines – economics and mathematics included – seek to produce laws from which they can construct models – and that the hypotheses, theories, and laws within those models, require the same moral constraints in demonstrated method regardless of discipline – logical(internally consistent), experimental (externally correspondent), operational(existentially possible), intuitionistic (subjectively testable), and moral (constrained to voluntary transfers) – BUT (and that BUT is important) that each discipline requires only some subset of such properties given the domain of inquiry? In other words, do not the moral rules developed in science constitute a universal method of moral inquiry into the production of true statements, regardless of discipline? Or are there no universal laws of moral inquiry for the purpose of developing truthful statements? Is it more likely that more complex systems require greater moral constraint (testing) prior to making truth claims, and less complex systems less moral constraint (testing) prior to making truth claims, and that whether we require more or less constraint prior to making truth claims, depends upon the properties from which any given system of reasoning is constituted? COMPARISONS So lets compare the different approaches on just a few axis: 1) Some economic laws are deducible VS Economic Regularities are explainable by deduction, and thus those hypothesis obtain the status of theory, and when all marginally impactful permutations are identified, these theories can be claimed truthfully as laws. 2) All economic laws are deducible VS Some economic laws are deducible perhaps, but that does not they are not empirically based (obtained through observation). It means only that no instrumentation other than human-sense-perception is needed to make those observations and deductions. While most non-trivial economic phenomenon and the hypotheses theories and laws we use to describe them are ONLY instrumentally and empirically observable. But once observed, with the assistance of further empirical observations, they are also explainable by deduction using sympathetic testing. 3) Economic laws are deterministic VS Economic Laws are imprecise general rules of arbitrary precision, that demonstrate the greatest variation in outcome, of all general rules of arbitrary precision in all systems dependent upon the operational use of regular patterns (other than language), in all the logics (identity, mathematics, physics, economics, and language) with the least (precise) determinacy of the logics; because: (a) humans act to bend such laws constantly, for personal gain, and; (b) humans attempt to mitigate determinacy (equilibrium) by constructing various permanent disequilibrium that they can continue to extract benefit from, and; (c) because causal density (opportunity) is so high, any equilibrating effect can be offset by any other equilibrating effect, and often function in combination, and; (d) because non-regular events, outside the normal distribution (shocks/black swans) are more influential and less predictable than regular patterns. 4) that economics is unique methodological area of inquiry VS economics benefits merely from the fact that we can subjectively test first principles, whereas in physical science, as yet, we do not know the first principles, while in identity, naming, mathematics, we do. Even if we do not know it *yet* in physics, economics, language, and imagination. If we know the first principles of any system, we can in fact, explain all phenomenon using those first principles. Even if we cannot imagine or deduce or hypothesize all consequentially emergent phenomenon. And since we cannot deduce all economic phenomenon (there are many unsolved problems of economics, as well as mathematics, and certainly of science). It may be possible that in any complex system we will never exhaust all emergent phenomenon (although this certainly seems unlikely if the universe is deterministic). UNDERSTANDING ARBITRARY PRECISION IN GENERAL RULES (note: this sequence is a particularly interesting new idea) The meaning of “arbitrary precision” across disciplines must be understood: (a) The predictive precision of Identity (laws of categorization) remains tautological no matter what we do. (b) The predictive precision of naming (laws of numbering) remains operational and tautological no matter what we do. (c) The predictive precision of Mathematical laws (laws of relations) remains constant independent of physical scale. But since mathematics is an axiomatic system, we cannot take action to alter the consequences of mathematical systems (grok that for a second). (d) The predictive precision of Physical laws (laws of causality) currently varies dependent upon physical scale because we do not know the first principles of the physical universe – yet. And we can alter the course of physical events and benefit from them – in fact the purpose of human action is to predict and alter the course of physical events in order to benefit from them. (e) The predictive precision of Economic Laws (laws of human cooperation) varies considerably, and we constantly alter the course of events to benefit from them, by attempting to outwit the altered course of events. (f) The predictive precision of Linguistic laws (laws of communication/negotiation) are extremely imprecise,demonstrating extraordinary variability, with only a few general, and somewhat deterministic rules such as the evolution toward song, or tonal speech, which requires less effort from the speaker, but the meaning of such speech appears both functional (increasing in information density while gradually losing earlier meaning). (g) The predictive precision of Laws of Imagination (laws by which we can imagine things) is unknown, but at least if operationally limited, appears to be FUNCTIONALLY unlimited. (A function is the name for collection of mental operations reduced to a general rule that obviates the need for performing more primitive operations – a mental habit that we can trust.) (h) The predictive precision of Inverse Laws of Imagination (laws by which we can describe categories that we cannot imagine), even if we can ever construct such a set of laws, is nearly useless except as a check on our claims of Laws of Imagination. This is because functions (general rules of arbitrary precision constituting deterministic results of complex operations) even if we cannot conceptualize the content of those functions (cannot operationalize them), appear at present to be infinitely scalable even if decreasingly precise. This is the problem with economic laws – they are extremely imprecise compared to physical laws, although possibly more precise than linguistic, imaginary and inverse-imaginary laws. Predicting the future location of water and gas molecules in real world phenomenon is almost impossible except at very loose degrees of precision. Predicting the future actions of man in real world scenarios is even less precise. We can explain, historically, what man accomplished, but we cannot predict what any individual will experience. Because of the time and complexity of human phenomenon, just as in physical phenomenon, we can act to alter the course of events to some degree, within the bounds of those imprecise laws. Now there may be consequences to these actions: saving and interest have positive cumulative consequences, and expansionary credit has negative cumulative consequences. But that is not to say that we cannot distinguish between those actions that we can take to alter the course of events that produce positive and negative consequences. And that we cannot act to profit from the positive, and avoid actions that are negative. Banking and interest are economic actions. Weights and measures are positive economic actions. Laws that suppress free riding in all forms are positive economic actions. States as Insurer of last resort appear to produce a mix of positive and negative but overwhelmingly positive results. All these institutional actions constitute good policy – the production of beneficial commons that facilitate cooperation and prosperity. Furthermore, the extension of organized suppression of free-riding into the bureaucracy, and into the system of representation, by eliminating the monopoly bureaucracy, and eliminating political representation, and eliminating legislative law, might be an additional institutional improvement that would facilitate human cooperation and prosperity. Now we can argue that the Keynesian attempt to distort the monetary information system by involuntarily increasing everyone’s risk through ‘lying’ about demand, and therefore increasing employment and consumption is a terrible means by which to interfere with the economy. It is only slightly better than the destruction of the information system by which we cooperate in the economy by socialist and communist folly. But we may not say that there are other economic institutions that we could experimentally construct that would provide improved means of cooperation, and prosperity that would not constitute lies, any more than credit and interest constitute lies. For example, – To create an urban market, members (shareholders) must suppress the profitability of raiding and conquest of their market by those who are not shareholders. – If tribal raiders and herdsman want to participate in an urban market then they must eschew theft and raiding for entry into the market. That is a voluntary exchange. – If farmers work the land, and want to participate in the market using their excess production in order to buy goods that they cannot produce themselves, they must obey the rules of buyers and sellers set by the shareholders of the market. – If people wish to abandon self production, and work entirely within the market they must adopt the behavior of shareholders and defend the exclusive means of their sustenance. – If people no longer can work in self production, nor can they work in the market in order to obtain their sustenance, then they have no means of survival so continuing to participate in the shareholder agreement is no longer a rational exchange. – If people who cannot work in the market are willing to work to maintain the shareholder agreement for shareholders (maintain the commons, including the commons of property rights, which makes the voluntary organization of production possible) then it is rational to pay them to construct the voluntary organization of production and to return to being consumers within that market – their contribution being not the consumption, but the production of the voluntary organization of production itself. However it is also rational to limit those people to one child so that they both can reproduce, but not commit the immoral act of imposing costs upon those who are productive, by generating additional offspring. This then constitutes a voluntary exchange and productive work, even if those people are not participating in the production of goods and services, they are participating in and being paid for the effort of constructing the voluntary organization of production. So to say that it is not rational or scientific or necessary to experiment in the economy, or that such experimentation is not empirical (open to observation and measurement), is clearly false. It is merely that there are moral and immoral means of doing so, and that monetary policy as we currently practice it is immoral – and not very intelligent. It produces the predicted results. So it is clearly scientific and ‘true’. But that does not mean it isn’t immoral and harmful. And the cumulative effect of this policy is empirically genocidal by all extant measures. SO BACK TO OCCAM’S RAZOR: Isn’t the purpose of Rationalist and Cosmopolitan arguments of the heterodox so-called, Austrians, merely convoluted verbal justification for rebelling against political experimentation in the manipulation of the economy for the purpose of producing commons? Isn’t all their obscurantism just pseudoscientific justification for the desire to justify non-contribution to the commons? Isn’t it just an elaborate excuse for free riding? Isn’t the more simple answer that each logic that we have developed was developed to test certain subsets of properties, and that each subset of properties requires testing against error, bias and deception. And that as the complexity of the phenomenon increases we must test or not test those properties intrinsic to the system that we seek to test? Isn’t our fascination with the rules of mathematics simply because the means of deduction and the means of explanation are nearly identical: mathematical operations? Whereas mathematical discovery, all conclusions are assumed in the axioms and state-independent, whereas the result of human cooperation is determined more so by externalities than by the general rules? And that for any individual, events they experience are kaleidic and economic laws are only predictive in the aggregate? Isn’t all the information necessary for prediction in an axiomatic system present at the definition of the axioms, while limited and insufficiently predictive information is present in economic laws? Aren’t economic laws the equivalent of bell-curves, rather than demonstrated tails? Isn’t the information necessary to predict tail events many orders of magnitude higher than predicting events in a regular distribution? So the demonstrated evidence in the history of rationalism, the obvious incentives of rationalists as authoritarians, and the logical conclusion we must come to, is that deductive reasoning is non-predictive. Because deduction did not produce general economic rules, and it cannot identify candidates for general rules. It can only test whether general rules are true regardless of their origins, and explain those general rules as a set of operations. Because we are not scientifically testing, experimenting with, those laws of human behavior, but we are scientifically testing the interactions of those various laws of human behavior in kaleidic action, and taking advantage of altering those phenomenon of human activity just as we take advantage of altering the course of events of physical phenomenon. We are not testing first principles but the interaction between emergent phenomenon caused by the use of those principles in real time. The laws of the physical universe and of man, appear to be trivial, but the emergent phenomenon of those simple rules appears to be infinite and unpredictable, even if they are explainable. The physical universe and man, may in fact, follow predictable regular rules. Those rules are only interesting and useful in so far as we can learn how to bend them, and break them, for our use. Property rights for example, bend and break human behavior. Credit and interest for example let us bend and break human behavior. Monogamous marriage lets us bend and break human behavior. The extension of property rights and the prohibition on inbreeding bent and broke the human behavior that made high velocity economies possible. First principles of human behavior may exist but novel means of manipulating it for the production of prosperity are always available to us. THE PURPOSE OF TRUTH IS TESTIMONY – OUR INFORMATION SYSTEM Just as we may not interfere with the monetary system because of the cumulative effect of ‘lies’ created by informational distortion, we may not interfere with the ‘truthful’ information system created by verbal error, bias, distortion and deception, because of the cumulative effect of ‘lies’ created by error, bias, and deception. There is no reason we must hide our group evolutionary strategies, other than for the purposes of parasitism – lying. And if we wish to understand the law of human cooperation, it is that cooperation is only rational in the absence of parasitism, and that only truthful, fully informed, productive, warrantied, voluntary exchange free of negative externality constitutes ‘true’ information. And that all else is, just as monetary information is, THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER SOMETHING IS EMPIRICAL OR RATIONAL, BUT WHETHER IT IS TRUE, TRUTHFULLY STATED, AND WARRANTED. And there is but one universal moral principle: (a) truthfully stated (b) fully informed (c) productive (d) warrantied (e) voluntary exchange (f) free of negative externality And there is but one universal moral warrant: that any statement is: (a) internally consistent (logically tested) (b) externally correspondent (evidentially tested as meaningfully predictive and/or explicative) (c) falsifiable and falsified (tested for parsimony) (d) existentially possible (operationally defined) (e) moral(independent of immoral transfer) As such, since German Rationalism, and Jewish Cosmopolitan Rationalism is not warranted, truthful speech, and cannot constitute a moral, voluntary exchange, and is equal in immorality to economic disinformation created by distortion of the money supply. It’s not that Keynesian economics is unscientific it’s that it’s immoral. It’s not so much that German Rationalism and Jewish Cosmopolitan rationalism are not simply a backwards-expression of intuitionism and operationalism under empiricism, despite it’s inability to produce insights and only explain them. It’s instead, that the rationalist position is an attempt to intellectual outlaw investigation into emergent economic phenomenon – which is the purpose of scientific investigation, just as much as experimental psychology is the discipline that investigates first principles – and which has discovered the reason for our long list of cognitive biases that produce non-rational actions not anticipated by the classical model. There is no need for German and Jewish dishonest Rationalism, any more than there is a need for Keynesian dishonest economics. Liberty is possible under science, because science is the language of morality – of truthful speech free of involuntary transfer, by fraud. Liberty is a synonym for objective morality. Our solution is neither British Keynesian immorality nor German and Jewish immorality, nor anglo-american pseudoscientific immorality (neo-puritanism), but truth speaking, and moral, voluntary exchange across peoples with different evolutionary strategies. Truth, Science, and Morality are synonyms. And we would all be better off without all the immorality, pseudoscience, rationalism, and lying. Voluntary exchange is enough. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    THE REFORMATION OF WESTERN THOUGHT

    Science as we understand it is an attempt to create a discipline of truthful speech. Science as we understand it does not ‘recognize’ this attribute of science. Science as we understand it does not include those properties we call costs. Science as we understand it does not include those properties we call moral. Science as we understand it can be extended to include those properties we call costs and morality. Science as we understand it can then be restated as the discipline of constructing moral truthful speech. Science then is identical to epistemology in philosophy, and philosophy en toto as a discipline is begun, as its first purpose, with ethics (morality), not metaphysics. Law can now be scientifically constructed. Truth, science, law, morality are now identical. All else currently masquerading as philosophy, is no longer categorizable as philosophy, but as theology, psychology, or deception. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine.

    TRANSLATING KANTIAN RATIONALISM INTO SCIENTIFIC AND TESTIMONIAL SPEECH

    Lets translate Kantian Rationalism into scientific and testimonial speech. I’m going to teach epistemology by using economics in order to repair much of the damage that has been done to epistemology by the Platonists(mathematics), and the Rationalists (Kant etc), and the Analytic Philosophers (Just about all of the 20th century). *Reality consists of a limited number of actionable dimensions and by using economics we are able to include all of them, and therefore avoid the errors that the platonists, rationalists, and analytics have introduced into philosophy. “DEFINITIONS AND SERIES” 1) Empirical: Based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic. “From Observation”. 2) A Priori: “independent of observation.” There are three dimensions to claims of a priori truth claim: i) Aprioricity vs A posteriori, ii) Analyticity vs Syntheticity, and iii) Necessity vs Contingency Therefore we can produce at least the following spectrum of a priori claims. (a) Analytic A Priori: tautological: 2+2=4 and all deductions thereof. (b) Synthetic A Priori : Increasing money increases inflation. (c) Necessary Synthetic A Priori: Childless women will have no grandchildren. (d) Contingent Synthetic A Priori: “all other things being equal, as a general trend, increasing demand will increase supply, although we cannot know the composition of that supply in advance, we can identify it from recorded evidence.” This produces a an ordered spectrum of declining precision: (a) Identity(categorical consistency) – Analytic A Priori (b) Logical:(internal consistency) – Nec. Synthetic a priori (c) Empirical: (external consistency) – Gen. Synth. a priori (d) Existential: (operational consistency) – Cont. Synth. a priori Which corresponds to the testable dimensions of numbers. (a) identity (numbers) (b) logical (sets) (c) empirical (ratios) (d) existential (constructible) (e) time is unaccounted for in the a priori model. Which corresponds to dimensions of physical reality (a) point (b) line (c) shape (d) object (e) time (change) Which corresponds to a subset of the dimensions of actionable reality , the full set of which we express in fully express in Testimonialism as: (a) Identity(categorical consistency)(point) (b) Logical:(internal consistency)(line) (c) Empirical: (external consistency)(shape) (d) Existential: (operational consistency)(object) (e) Volitional: (rational choice of rational actor)(change) (f) Reciprocal: ( rational exchange between rational actors)(changes) (g) Limited: (Limits: At what points does the description fail?) (h) Fully Accounted: (Have all costs and consequences been accounted for – defense against cherry picking and special pleading.) Which together account for the totality of actionable reality (by man) that we currently know of (and its quite hard to imagine anything else is possible). DEDUCTIBILITY FROM A-PRIORI PROPOSITIONS Ergo, while one can claim the tautological truth (the Analytic A Priori), and one can claim the ideal(logical) truth (the Necessary Synthetic A Priori), one cannot ever know the non-tautological(identity, The Synthetic A Priori), non-ideal(Contingent Synthetic A Priori ) truth, because we rarely possess sufficient information to do so. What does this mean? It means that we can deduce from Analytic A Priori and Necessary Synthetic A Priori, but we cannot deduce from General Synthetic A Priori, or Contingent Synthetic A Priori Statements because we cannot know if such deductions are true (for specific cases). So the problem with making a priori claims in economics is that you can say statements about statements but not about consequences in reality. You can only say ‘all other things being equal’, we should observe this effect. You cannot say, “we will always observe this effect’. Why? Because we don’t always observe such effects, and economics is rife with examples, the most commonly cited being unemployment does not necessarily increase, and prices are sticky – and for good reason. (NOTE: Now that’s sufficiently complicated that I almost confused myself, and I might need a day away from it to make sure I didn’t screw up what someone might read into those last two paragraphs, but otherwise it’s correct.) The innovation that menger brought to the table was to bring the principle of relative change from calculus to economics. The principle contribution of hayek was to transform transform the use of materials to the use of information as the model for all social phenomenon. The principle contribution of Popper was to bring the information model to philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of science and to model scientific investigation on a market. This followed the transition in physics from the use of electromagnetic fields to that of information. Which then brought physics and mathematics into full correspondence. What Hayek and popper and the classicals and the keynesians all missed and brouwer in math, bridgman in physics, and mises in economics, and the entire analytic and continental movements missed was that man cannot make truth claims. For example, we did not think the ideas of time(velocity of change), length(distance), and space(volume) varied. Einstein’s discovery was the same as mises’, brouwer’s and bridgman’s: that all our pretense of axioms are false. If our idea of length and time can be false, every other idea that is obvious to our senses and reason can be false. The difference between economics and physics is in : (a) volition vs determinism (b) reciprocity vs transformation (c) sympathetic testing of rational choice vs entropy. THE SCIENTIFIC (UNIVERSAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL) METHODDEFLATION” (0) The purpose of the scientific method is to eliminate ignorance, error, bias, wishful thinking, suggestion, obscurantism, fictionalism, and deceit from our statements about reality. “DIMENSION” (1) We can make: (a) statements about experiences(metaphysical), or (b) statements about statements(ideal), or (c) statements about existential properties(existential/real), or (d) statements about existential cause and effect(change). (e) statements about volition “CLOSURE” (2) No test of any dimension can be completed without appeal to the subsequent dimension. (ie: godel. this is profoundly important. no dimension can provide a self-test.) Ergo, all speech is deflationary. “CRITICAL RATIONALISM” (3) All descriptive propositions of existential cause and effect (change) are contingent. “CRITICAL PREFERENCE” (4) The only method of decidability between two or more non-false cause and effect propositions(change) is cost. This is a clarification of Occam’s razor. And appears to be true, for the simple reason that nature cannot but choose the least cost method, and man generally chooses the least cost method – even if we cannot know the full causal density of his considerations. DUE DILIGENCE AGAINST IGNORANCE, ERROR, BIAS, DECEIT (5) The only method of making a truth claim is to perform due diligence in each dimension of reality (a ‘premise’ of the consequential dimension) applicable to the cause and effect phenomenon. (ie:physical world can’t engage in rational choice, or voluntary exchanges) Again, those dimensions are: (a) Identity(categorical consistency)(point) (b) Logical:(internal consistency)(line) (c) Empirical: (external consistency)(shape) (d) Existential: (operational consistency)(object) (e) Volitional: (rational choice of rational actor)(change) (f) Reciprocal: ( rational exchange between rational actors)(changes) (g) Limited: (Limits: At what points does the description fail?) (h) Fully Accounted: (Have all costs and consequences been accounted for – defense against cherry picking and special pleading.) “DARWINIAN SURVIVAL OF IDEAS” (6) All propositions (facts, propositions, theories) must survive the markets for criticism at the observer-mental-testing, observer-action testing, market application testing, and market survival testing. In other words, the universal epistemological method follows this lifecycle: (a) observation (b) *Free association* (F -> observation) (c) test of reasonability (F -> free association ) (d) *Hypothesis* (e) Perform Due Diligence (a-h) above. (F -> free association ) (f) *Theory* (g) Publish to the market for application (h) Survival in the market for application(F ->observation – of failures ) (i) *Law* (j) Survival in the market for refutation (F-> observation – of failures) (k) *Habituation into metaphysical assumptions* “SPECIAL CASES” 7) This universal epistemological process is universal despite the fact that various results can be identified with it. Because just as we find prime numbers largely by trial and error we find special cases of statements by trial and error. But when we find these statements we have to ask ourselves what is it we are finding? (a) Sensations: statements about experiences(metaphysical), or (b) Logic(analytic): statements about statements(ideal), or (c) Fact: statements about existential properties(existential/real), or (d) Theory(Synthetic): statements about existential cause and effect(change). (e) Morality: statements about volition (f) Testimony: statements about the fully accounted change in state of a given instance of the statement we are making (I have a credit card report that shows John Doe, on 1/1/2018 at 4:06:32 exchanged $2.00 for a hershey’s candy bar at Don’s newspaper stand then existing on 225th and Main in Cityname.”) EXAMPLES The most common special cases that we find are those that are impossible to contradict at the same dimension. (a,b,c,d,e) above. (a) Sense(Metaphysics): we cannot sense a ball is green and red all over at the same time. (b) Logic: If I issue credit on fractional reserves, I will increase the supply of money. (c) Fact: The differences between commodity money and note money include but are not limited to: liquidity, demand, exchange fee or interest gain, portability(weight/volume), reserve risk, vendor risk. (d) Theory: All other things being equal, if we increase the supply of money, prices will eventually increase accordingly and lower the purchasing power of payments against debts. (e) Morality: All other things being equal, when we force majoritarian decisions on the polity by using representative democracy, we create a monopoly out of the market for the commons, and eliminate the possibility of cooperating on means even if we pursue different ends. “ECONOMIC LEVERS” Polities can generally use this series of levers to affect the economy. -Near Term- (a) Monetary Policy (b) Fiscal Policy (Spending) -Medium Term- (c) Trade Policy (import export policies, foreign trade policies) (d) Regulatory/Legislative Policy (also includes price controls etc) (e) Immigration-Deporation policy / Expand military, WPA etc. -Long Term- (f) Human Capital Policy (Education policy) (g) Institutional Policy (laws, regulations, bureaucracies, institutions, banks) (h) Strategic (military) Policy “SCHOOLS OF ECONOMICS” The schools of economics reflect the culture and class of their origins. These groups do not acknowledge that their strategies and biases are as I”ve stated them here but their research evidence states the contrary. So I have tried to provide a general Spectrum of the institutions by what I understand is their culture/class bias. a) “Austrian / Rothbardian” (“Jewish”, Separatist) : Rule of Credit, Parasitic Optimum, Separatist / Anarchism. +Financial Class Bias. Anti-Commons Bias. (As far as I know, no university teaches the Jewish Austrian method.) b) “Mason-ism” (“Anglo Libertarian”, Right ) : Optimum Rule of Law, Nash Optimum, Minimal State / Christian Monarchy +Entrepreneurial Class Bias. (the only University I know of using this program is George Mason.) The “Mason-Libertarian” school places greater emphasis on maximizing the voluntary cooperation of individuals and organizations through reduction of impediments to ethical and moral cooperation. c) “Classical” (“Chicago”, Anglo, Center Right), Rule of Law, Insured Nash Optimum, Parliamentary State / Classical Liberalism. +Middle classes bias. (I would argue ‘not biased’) All other things being equal, the Chicago school places greater emphasis on policy that insures against error and failure by seeking formulas and rules that investors, businesses, and consumers can predict, thereby preserving rule of law, and maintaining the prohibition on discretionary rule. d) “Mainstream” (“Saltwater”, Center Left) : Mixed Discretionary Rule, Pareto Optimum, Social Democracy +Working Class Bias, Consumer Bias, Female bias(anti-male bias). Minority(anti-white) bias. Underclass Bias (anti-entreprenurial bias). All other things being equal the mainstream seeks to optimize consumption at all times, using every lever available, and favors abandoning rule of law, and adopting rule that is increasingly empirical, reactive, and discretionary. e) “Left Mainstream” (“Saltwater”, “Jewish left”) : Authoritarian Rule, Anti-Aristocracy(War), Extractive Maximum (Predatory), Socialism/Communism +Underclass (outsider) Bias. This is the Krugman/Stiglitz/Delong club of leftist economists maximizing both consumption and financial extraction as a means of undermining western aristocratic civilization and western norms and traditions and rule of law. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS –“…performative…” You keep using terms that I don’t think you understand, which is why Kant invented those terms: to conflate the empirical and the rational. He was afraid of the anglo empirical revolution. For good reason. —“…morality…”— Correct. Morality (reciprocity) requires inter-agent action. So does all economic activity. Economic activity can consist of moral (reciprocal) and immoral (unequal, irreciprocal) actions. We can make a claim that statements about irreciprocal (involuntary) actions in economics are immoral or we can claim that they are false. Whether you understand it or not, Mises is saying that its false not immoral, when he says ‘it’s not economics’. —“That you can verify something in reality doesn’t mean you need to empirically test it.”— We cannot solve the problem of ‘all other things being equal’ in order to understand why predicted phenomenon either vary widely, or do not exist. The neutrality of money does not appear to exist, because relative changes can propagate into various niches that absorb those changes, just like pennies being lost in landfills (so to speak). —“I can observe that two plus two equals four but I don’t need to design an empirical test to prove it.”— Yes but then it’s a tautology, whereas the nearly all economic phenomenon are only general rules. —“Likewise, I can observe that minimum wages increase unemployment all other things being equal, but I don’t need to conduct an empirical test to prove it.”— That’s just the thing, we aren’t trying to prove that it should increase unemployment, only that it turns out it that a lot of the time it doesn’t. Or rather, that the consequences of it are externalized and invisible. So where does it go? Well first it increases prices to consumers in the case of minimum wage workers it maintains employment but it prevents rotation of new workers into the economy. And the question is, is that a net gain or a net loss for everyone? Well, it’s immoral to both conduct the test, and the consequences are immoral. But does that mean the those consequences are not empirically measurable and therefore whether the policy is net beneficial? That is what economists measure. Secondly, if we think some good is achieved through raising the minimum wage, how can we accommodate the externality of lower rotation through the job pool? For example what if raising the minimum wage prevents least common denominator service economies? (Racing to the bottom). Is that something people prefer? In other words, would you rather have better service and higher unemployment (and greater subsidies for non-performers?) The underlying question is this: if prices are increasing profits can we capture more of that increase for hourly employees than we do for management, owners, and investors (or creditors)? So there is no difference between increasing the supply of money in order to temporarily increase consumer purchasing power at the expense of debt-holders, and increasing the minimum wage in order to capture a rise in prices for laborers at the expense of owners and investors. Or stated even more simply: given that economies are always changing velocities, can we redirect changes in state between participants without ‘killing the goose’ (destroying the system of production). Well the answer is a moral one, not a logical or empirical one. And the reason to claim otherwise is to use the false pretense of ‘unscientific’ or ‘logical positivism’ or ‘a priori’ or ‘logical contradiction’ to create a straw man as a means of preventing investigation into the science of economic immorality: economic manipulation by the forcible involuntary transfer of property between individuals. (Which is exactly what mises and rothbard were doing: shaming via straw man using obscurantism by overloading even well intended people with half truths that when fully expressed are false.) That’s the question people ask with these issues. No one questions if it will increase unemployment. They question the limit before it increases negative unemployment. The same as taxation. No one questions that taxation will produce declining revenues. But empirically, what is the maximum taxation that they govt can achieve before that happens – and what are the consequences. CLOSING Now you probably have no idea how profound this bit of text is. And I suspect you could spend a few months integrating it into your thought process. But that’s in large part, the state of the art in epistemology. THUS ENDETH THE LESSON. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    WHICH IS MORE LIKELY THE CASE: A PURPOSEFUL DECEPTION OR THE POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-SCIENTIFIC RATIONALISM?

    That people “do things for reasons” tells us precisely nothing about the emergent effects of economic phenomenon, nor how to manipulate the economic information system such that we shift production and consumption forward. That people do things for reasons tells us precisely nothing about the temporal relations between cause and effect, and whether we can manipulate conditions to mitigate effects or change time. That people do things for reasons tells us precisely nothing about how to deduce emergent phenomenon. Scientists were borne out and praxeology abandoned: praxeology was unfruitful as a means of exploration. And it was unfruitful because the information necessary to perform a deduction (which what a deduction requires) does not exist in the axioms. THIS IS NON ESCAPABLE DEFECT OF AXIOMATIC PRAXEOLOGY – which is why Mises and Rothbard both had to admit that economics was both rational and empirical. One cannot deduce true conclusions from false premises. And incomplete premises provide insufficient information for the construction of deductive truths. So what is more likely? That instrumentalism empiricism, operational definitions and intuitionistic testing are necessary in economics just as they are in all fields? Or that economics is somehow “unique”, and that rationalism is just another authoritarian program with a deceptive hidden agenda masked by obscurantist language? Even if both propositions were demonstrably equally fruitful, which one is warrantable? In other words, if you will be put to death for being wrong, in a choice between a rationally deduced justification and a ratio empirically criticized definition, which do you choose to bet your life upon? It is one thing to make a statement of faith, another to review the history of rationalist thought, and particularly of cosmopolitan rationalism, and concluding that it has been and remains a failed enterprise. Mises only wants to ban government interference in the economy so that he can persist in non-contribution to the commons, and systemic parasitism. All his work is a justification of that separatist ambition. Mises suggests we create a model out of economic laws, but admits that we must use empirical evidence to identify those laws. So just as we create a model of physical reality without nowing first principles, we create a model of cooperative economic reality knowing first principles. But just as we may never deduce the full compliment of permutations and emergent phenomenon from simple physical rules (see Fractal logic) we may never deduce the full compliment of permutations and emergent phenomenon from simple behavioral rules. This is the nature of complexity. As such, while we can explain emergent phenomenon we cannot deduce it. And without instrumentation we cannot observe it. I think the entire intellectual world has explained sufficiently that the promise of praxeology is nonsense. I think that we now understand the anglo, german and cosmopolitan errors. I think it is obvious that praxeology is a defense of cosmopolitan separatism – an attempt to prohibit the production of an economic commons that is inescapable by free riders. I think the whole intellectual world has demonstrated convincingly that economics is practiced as a science, and must be practiced as a science, and that all insights of the German Austrians were added to mainstream economics, and the jewish Austrian movement was abandoned as unscientific (untrue). It is only recently that we know the motivations for creating an untrue proposition – or at least an unproductive pseudoscientific resistance movement. Just as marx, cantor, and freud were cosmopolitan pseudoscientific reactionaries, mises and rothbard were cosmopolitan pseudoscientific reactionaries. I am trying only to demonstrate the libertine movement, like all three cosmopolitan movements, is an obscurantist and dishonest one, so that in the future others can outlaw all obscurantists attacks on high trust civilization by mystical, rationalist and pseudoscientific means. I originally meant only to criminalize Postmodernism, until I understood that socialism, postmodernism, libertinism, and neo-conservatism had the same objective – the destruction of the western high trust ethic, and the western competitive advantage of creating commons, by preventing the construction of commons, licensing parasitism on any commons, and forcing the people to pay the costs of adventurism that is against their self interest but within their moral dispositions. As such, all libertine arguments, like all cosmopolitan arguments, are either lies by their originators, or vectors for lies by unwitting fools. As such it is necessary to construct an honest, truthful, scientific institutional model for the construction of a condition of liberty by the only means possible: expansion of property rights to prohibit all such forms of fraud and theft by obscurantist deception. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine  

    THE ANTI-ROTHBARDIAN CANON

    (intellectual arms dealing) (retaking the brand of liberty from the lunatic fringe) [R]othbardians are relying upon and spreading numerous fallacies: (a) the fallacy of the NAP/IVP as the moral and legal basis for an anarchic polity, (b) the fallacy of aggression rather than the necessity of trust, (c) and the fallacies of the origin of property rights as either intrinsic or augmentative, (d) and the fallacy that economics is aprioristic rather than empirical and operational. And because of these fallacies, all Rothbardians – and in practice, all anarcho-libertarians who subscribe to these fallacies – expend politically wasted effort themselves, distract from more productive efforts of others, perpetuate ideas that have been demonstrated to fail in the market for political preference, materially harmed the brand of liberty, and hindered our possibility of obtaining liberty by confusion, misdirection and delay. Rothbardian ethics are objectively immoral under rational analysis, and the market has deemed them immoral by experience, consideration and intuition. All forward motion on liberty has been toward classical liberalism and classical liberal ethics, and decidedly against rothbardian ethics – contrary to the claims of rothbardians. Since libertarian leaders have worked for and achieved a cult language and cult status that is insulated from criticism and innovation by faith in these principles; then the only alternative is to make rothbardian and misesian arguments intellectually embarrassing, and argumentatively impossible to use in public discourse, by arming opponents with the means to defeat them. At the very least this will limit the damage that they can do. But it will also cleanse the liberty movement, and the brand name ‘libertarian’ of its acquired continental and cosmopolitan absurdity, and allow classical liberals, aristocratic egalitarians, and private government advocates, all of whom advocate for high trust societies, to return the discourse on liberty to rational, empirical, and historical grounds. CONTRARY TO ROTHBARDIAN AND MISESIAN COSMOPOLITAN FALLACIES:FREE RIDING -free riding vs natural rights- 1) Upon agreeing to cooperate, one takes upon the moral hazard of free riding. Free riding is an logical antagonist to cooperation. If free riding is present, then it is not logical to cooperate. Property emerged prior to economic production as a prohibition on free riding prior to the division of labor and most likely as monogamy. The property rights constitute a precise, positive legal articulation of the general negative necessity of preventing free riding such that cooperation is a rational choice. MINIMUM RIGHTS – minimum necessary set of property rights- 2) The minimum necessary prohibitions on free riding include both the criminal and the ethical, with the option for negotiation on the moral. Otherwise transaction costs are too high for the rational choice of an anarchic polity over an authoritarian one. No ingroup polity of any kind exists without inclusively criminal, ethical, and moral prohibitions. It is possible to construct a federation of polities, as the medieval monarchies demonstrated, wherein cooperation between factions is limited to low trust – enforcement of merely criminal prohibitions – but it is not possible to form a voluntary polity without prohibition of at least criminal and ethical, if not some modicum of moral prohibitions. People demonstrate that they will demand an authority to suppress immoral action, or to mandate universal moral behavior, if the common law does not provide a means of preventing immoral behavior. (Where immoral behavior constitutes an involuntary transfer of costs by moral hazard, most commonly in the form of free riding.) In other words, the jewish quarter and the transient gypsies can only survive if they constitute small minorities at the will of an omnipotent host ruler – which we saw under both byzantine, muslim and aristocratic european societies. That is not liberty. That is merely a form of tolerance used to reduce costs. INSUFFICIENCY OF NAP – the NAP/ISV is insufficient in scope for the formation of a voluntary polity – 3) The NAP under ISV only prohibits criminal, but not unethical or immoral or conspiratorial, or conquest behaviors. For this reason it is insufficient basis for the discipline of cooperation: ethics and morality, and as basis for the institution of law: the definition of property rights. Instead, property rights must address all ethical and moral conflicts that are necessary to eliminate market demand for authoritarian intervention. And since all objective moral arguments and corresponding property definitions, consist of involuntary transfers that violate the prohibition on free riding, we can construct no libertarian argument against it. Unless the scope of prohibitions on free riding is sufficient, transaction costs render demand for the state preferable to demand for liberty. IGNORING TRUST -the degree of trust determines economic velocity: wealth- 4) Secure, and extensive Property rights, that suppress free riding, such that all are required to contribute to production, rather than survive off of parasitism, create trust: the ability to take risks, and to increase the velocity of production and trade, by reducing transaction costs. The level of trust corresponds directly to the degree of suppression of free riding created by the scope of prohibition of property rights, enforceable under law. The economic velocity of an economy corresponds directly to the degree of trust formed in a polity by the legal enforcement of property rights. FAILED CONSTRUCTIVISM -Mises’ legacy is that he failed to produce a constructivist argument- 4) During the late nineteenth century a movement to prevent a newly emergent form of logical mysticism (platonism) emerged under various names: intuitionistic and constructivist mathematics, operationalism in science, various linguistic movements in logic, and misesian praxeology in economics. All of these movements correctly intuited some problem with the emerging platonic concept of truth, but failed to accomplish it. This is because, constructive proof, correspondent proof (testing) and correspondent hardening (falsification) were not understood as ethical prohibitions on truth claims – and that truth was performative. That the act of testimony required demonstration of construction (internal consistency) demonstrating knowledge of construction, in addition to correspondence (external correspondence which demonstrates knowledge of use), and attempted falsification (demonstrating knowledge of durability). Mises intuited correctly, like intellectuals in other fields, that something was erroneous with the work of positivist (correlative, but not causal) economists. But he failed to grasp that praxeology was a problem of empirical observation, reduction to operations, testing those operations by sympathetic experience, before one could make a truth claim about any economic phenomenon. Mises simply failed. He failed worse than the advocates of operationalism and intuitionism. Who only failed to overcome objections. But his failure was compounded by the fact that had he correctly identified the problem of performative truth – that the constraint upon economic statements was one of testimony (truth telling), rather than deduction from first principles, it is possible that the leaders of other fields would have understood their predicament, and correctly distinguished between performative truth, constructive truth, correspondent truth, and ultimate truth. ETHICAL AND EMPIRICAL NOT LOGICAL -praxeology is both an empirical, and an ethical constraint- 5) As such, praxeology, whether we constaint it to action (rational action), cooperation (ethics), or economics (the voluntary organization of production) is a scientific process like all other epistemic processes, where we make observations, construct a theory, test it for proof of correspondence, falsify it for proof of durability, test our knowledge of construction for proof construction, and testify that we have proofs of correspondence, falsification, construction, and therefore possess the ethical right to make a truth claim. Once we have made such a claim we have a theory. If we, as all specialists, cannot find a means of falsifying it, then we have a law. All empirical concepts must follow this process. All technological innovation must follow this process. All acts of production must follow this process. All pursuit of knowledge must follow this process. (Note: I am not sure if falsification is a test of parsimony or not. I think that may be the correct terminology – or something close.) CONFLATION OF THEORETICAL AND SCIENTIFIC -Conflation of Theoretically Descriptive Science with Axiomatically Prescriptive Logic- 6) The conflation of theoretical systems which are limited to their correspondence to reality, and axiomatic systems which are limited only to their statements. Theoretical systems consist of descriptive statements constrained by reality, and axiomatic systems consist of *prescriptive* statements, not constrained by reality. Mises claim that economics is both aprioristic, axiomatic and scientific is by definition a pseudoscientific statement, since the definition of a science is that which adheres to the scientific method. Models may be constructed by axiomatic declarations, but any correspondence with reality requires that we accept that those axiomatic declarations, constitute analogies to theoretical descriptions whose basis is always empirical. FALLACY OF A PRIORISM VS EMPIRICISM -Analysis of human behavior is an empirical pursuit- 7) Praxeology (the study of action) , The Logic of Cooperation (the study of ethics), and Economics (the study of the voluntary organization of production) meet the criteria for empirical sciences, under which, through observation, we can reduce to hypothesis, theory and law. And with these laws we can construct axioms, for use in models, which function as logical instruments that allow us to contemplate what our limited cognitive abilities cannot contemplate without the use of various logical instruments: language, narrative, Operationalism, logic, numbers, mathematics. We can then test the truth of these axioms operationally and attempt to deduce whether it is possible for rational actors to perform according to the hypothesis, theory and law. If we cannot operationally describe those actions, and validate them through sympathetic experience as being rational, then they are not true. (This is the technique used in intuitionist mathematics.) -constancy of relations vs arbitrary precision- While cooperative relations are inconstant, and arguably each action is unique, patterns of relations are not inconstant and unique, and because of chaotic distribution of information, information, incentives and actions (changes in state) organically distribute (evolve) at different rates. Therefore we can predict trends of patterns, but not individual actions, any more than we can predict the position of any given physical entity at the subatomic level. That we cannot predict anything other than as a probability over a given period of time, does not render something unobservable, or unscientific. We need only be able to demonstrate that in fact, regularity exists at some given level of precision over some period of time. That is what determines whether a deductive statement is expressible as an hypothesis, theory or law: whether we can determine some regularity at some **scale** – some level of precision. Infinite precision is not possible, but the standard of precision is determined by the maximum utility we can obtain at the minimum level of regularity we can observe and describe. This constitutes “the problem of arbitrary precision”: General rules (theories) require us to adopt the available level of precision. Pure mathematics uses completely arbitrary precision, which is why it scales infinitely. But once we apply any general mathematical rule, to any particular description of reality, we include the necessary level of precision in the context. Machining valve, sawing a 2×4, navigating a ship, navigating an interplanetary satellite, and measuring the distance to the farthest observable object require different levels of precision, and we can only achieve certain levels of precision. That does not mean we cannot perform those operations using the same mathematics. It merely means we must apply contextual precision. -the scope of newton’s laws- Newton’s laws for example, and geometry for that matter, remain constant at human scale. But at very large and very small scale, due to the problems of velocity and immeasurability these rules fail. There are no universal statements expressible as operations that are not reductio fallacies. All hypotheses, theories and laws are subject to increases in precision or loss of utility by replacement with other hypotheses theories and laws. -the unpredictability of gasses- We cannot predict the course of any particular molecule when releasing a gas, but that does not mean that we cannot predict the overall distribution of molecules upon their release, and the rate of its dispersion. -the neutrality of money- We argue that money is neutral, but only over long and unpredictable periods of time. Is that an empirical question, or a logical one? We can deduce it, and it appears logical, but is our evidence sufficient to consider it a Law, Theory or Hypothesis. At present it is merely an hypothesis. But it is certainly not a law. -the minimum wage- We argue that minimum wage increases unemployment. Is that a logical or empirical question but it does not increase unemployment for all of those employed, and it occurs over unpredictable periods of time. -emergent phenomenon: the stickiness of prices- We did not deduce that prices would be as sticky as they are. We discovered it empirically – by observation. Is the stickiness of prices sufficient to meet the standard of hypothesis, theory or law? At present it is a theory that is widely accepted. -the non-deducibility of emergent phenomenon- We cannot deduce nor have we deduced emergent economic phenomenon. We can validate economic propositions deductively by reducing them to a series of actions, each of which is subject to sympathetic experience, and as such open to a subjective test of rationality. But that too is an empirical test. We observe and sense our reactions. ARGUMENTATION (I don’t state this well enough yet) -The fallacy of argumentation ethics- 8) Argumentation Ethics are fallacious because the choice of the strong is always between the use of violence to obtain what one desires, or the value of voluntary exchange, or boycott of worthless interactions. Human choice is always ternary: violence, cooperation or boycott, and never, under any condition, reduced to the binary choice of cooperation or boycott – argumentative contradiction is a fallacy since and agreement to temporarily cooperate on a given scope is merely utilitarian, and conveys nothing beyond the matter in question. Whereas, a contract for cooperation consists of a gamble that long term cooperation will be more beneficial, even if it results in various profits and losses. Numerous authors have stated similar arguments in non operational means. But Operationalism tells us that argumentation is empty – because we never surrender our violence, and as such never enter into a contradiction, merely demonstrate a preference. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine.

    A LIST OF HANS HERMANN HOPPE’S ERRORS

    [I] consider my work as a restatement of Hoppe’s aprioristic justificationary rationalism in ratio-scientific terms. Hoppe’s errors are natural for a German philosopher who was trained by Marxists. And while the errors are substantial by today’s standards, they are limited to errors in construction (justification), with his conclusions from his justifications surviving. This is important. From Hoppe’s earliest work onward, his deductions from incentives are correct. – We justify moral actions within a normative system of evolved rules, and we criticize truth propositions to test whether the theories survive. We do not find truth in justification – we find permission. We find truth in survival against all known criticism. Justification translates to “I can get away with saying this so you cannot say I violated the rules of cooperation: morality or law” while truth propositions under ratio-scientific criticism translate to “I have done due diligence to determine if this argument survives all known attempts at failure, regardless of preference, morality or law.”  Hoppe confuses legal justification (excuse making), with truth (survival from all competition). As Mises discovered but failed to understand, truth propositions including human choice require the possibility of constructing a sequence of rational choices  AND the survival from categorical, logical, empirical falsification. Truth propositions survive competition. – Possession demonstrably (empirically) exists prior to cooperation, and property exist after an agreement to cooperate.  Scarcity exists prior to cooperation. But scarcity is imperceptible. Cost is perceptible. The origin of demonstrable property is in the cost to acquire. Scarcity explains why things are costly, but not the origination of possession nor the origination of property. – Different sets of Property rights evolve in communities due to the disproportionate returns on cooperation at the given level of division of ability, knowledge and labor – and the necessity of preserving those returns by prohibiting parasitism. Property rights do not originate in scarcity of goods, they originate in the scarcity and disproportionate return on cooperation. We pay for cooperation by forgoing opportunities to use or consume that which others have already invested in using and consuming. Man like other animals retaliates against the imposition of costs upon that which he has himself born costs with the intent to inventory. The universal demonstration of altruistic punishment (disproportionately costly punishment of free riders, parasites, predators) demonstrates the evolutionary necessity and value of cooperation as the most costly and scarce good. (thus upending libertarianism’s attempt to suggest cooperation can be obtained for free, or that it is the natural bias of man or animal. instead, man and animal are rational. we cooperate when possible, parasite when possible and prey when possible, depending upon costs.) – Argumentationand non-contradiction originate in legal justification post-cooperation, not in constraints prior to cooperation. The first question of cooperation is ‘why don’t I kill you and take your stuff’, and only once we enter into an agreement do we justify our words and deeds within that agreement – thereby relying upon internal consistency (non-contradiction). Prior to that factm no cooperation and nor moral constraint exists – it is only desired.  Moreover, the logic of cooperation is not binary.  We live in an amoral world of  violence, theft, conspiracy and deception,  and while we  can construct cooperation, we construct cooperation at will given the costs and returns. And our choices at any time are to: (a) preserve the options of violence, theft, deception and conspiracy until opportunity avails to use it, (b) agree not to aggress but not to cooperate either (c) cooperate when useful preserving future opportunity for cooperation (d) cooperate whenever possible, expecting the same, (e) cease any level of cooperation and retreat to a prior level. So, contradiction is a test for a judge in matters of dispute resolution. It is not a necessary property of cooperation. We can test violations of reciprocity (cooperation) during disputes but no such dependence upon internal consistency exists prior to establishing a agreement (contract) for cooperation. – The minimum scope of property necessary to construct a reciprocal exchange, in order to provide minimum incentives for the rational formation of a voluntary polity is property-en-toto, or what we call “demonstrated-property” (demonstrated defense of that which we have paid costs to acquire), and the minimum scope of property is not IVP: intersubjectively verifiable property – (property that is epistemologically easy to test if we transfer). Hoppe and Rothbard misapply separatist ethics between polities (between states) as sufficient for the formation of a polity. (Ghetto Ethics.)  Arguably Hoppe suggests that IVP is merely a minimum criteria and that all other properties must be arbitrarily constructed upon it.  However, this means that IVP is an insufficient criteria for a basis for law.  Whereas Property in Toto (demonstrated property) is a sufficient criteria for the basis for law. In other words, physical property is insufficient for the formation of a polity, it is merely sufficient for cooperation between states (organized polities). – The formation of a voluntary (anarchic) polity requires that local transaction costsare low enough to limit demand for authority to either prevent retaliation for violations of property in toto, and to provide sufficient incentives to join such a polity rather than say, a democratic humanist polity. The reason is we must choose between high local transaction costs with low political costs that prohibit economic velocity, and low local transaction costs that encourage economic velocity with high political costs. Humans rationally choose government over anarchy unless anarchy provides the lower transaction costs. This means that anarchy is only possible under high trust. High trust is only possible under property en toto with it’s total prohibition on deception (cheating) rather than intersubjectively verifiable property with its tolerance for deception and cheating.  A rational anarchic polity can only form under property en toto, not IVP. – Those arguably voluntary anarchic polities that have existed, on the few occasions that they have existed, because larger states have used squatters and settlers and given away territorial rights  in borderlands in order to hold it from competitors cheaply, without having to invest heavily, but still giving them an excuse to conduct war if attempts taken against it. If those have evolved for other reasons, they  have been the target of extermination by neighbors. Because the only reason to seek a low trust polity is some variation of parasitism: gypsies on the low end, pirates in the center, and financial predators (moral hazards) on the high end. – The formation of a voluntary polity (anarchic) will only be possible under western aristocratic martial egalitarianism (a militia) and the independent common law, prohibiting all parasitism against demonstrated property (what we bore costs for and defend), whether that parasitism is by violence, theft, extortion (blackmail, racketeering), fraud, (fraud by obscurantism, fraud by moralizing, fraud by omission), externality, (free riding, privatization of commons, socialization of losses), or conspiracy (statism, conversion, immigration, conquest, war and genocide). – Mises was, like many of his contemporaries, trying to solve the problem of his era, and incorrectly cast operational testing by subjective analysis of rational incentives (praxeology) as a positive means of exploration sufficient for the investigation of cooperative and economic phenomenon, instead of a test of existential possibility of claims. Economics is empirical as any other of the science and only differs in that we know the first principles of cooperation (rational incentives on the positive side and non-imposition of costs – parasitism- on the negative side.) Whereas the first principles of the physical universe are as yet unknown to us. And where the first principles of declarative systems (logics) are matters of our discretion. (This is a rather difficult subject for all but those of us who specialize in epistemology.) I could go on a bit, but Hoppe’s insights have been in the perverse incentives of bureaucracies – even under democracy, and the exposition of all moral and legal argument as reducible to property rights. All his justificationary argument is pure Kantian,Cosmopolitan and Marxist nonsense. We do not justify truth propositions. Truth propositions survive attempts to refute them. I love the man, honestly. But he was a product of his time and place just as I am a product of mine. Science wins. Rationalism loses. Not only because science is necessary for the provision of truth, but because PHILOSOPHY HAS LARGELY BEEN USED TO LIE. Rothbardian libertarianism is just the extremism of the Marxist prohibition on Private Property inverted into an the extremism of a Marxist prohibition on Common Property – despite the fact that property rights can only exist as a commons, and no polity can survive competition for people and trade, and against competitors without providing commons as the multipliers necessary to do so. I hope this is of some value to you. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine (Tallinn, Estonia)

    LIBERTARIANS ARE JUST COMMON PROPERTY MARXISTS.

    Libertarians get it wrong every day, multiple times a day. If you’re objective is an anarchic polity, you must eliminate demand for the state – wishing it away is not only ineffective but childish. The judicial state as we understand it, evolved everywhere, to suppress retaliation cycles between individuals, families, clans, and tribes by standardizing punishments, and prohibiting further cycles of retaliation. The universality of this historical fact contradicts all libertarian dogma both about the nature of man, the state of man, and the process of resolving disputes. To eliminate demand for the state, one must eliminate demand for aggression (suppress opportunity) AND, eliminate demand for retaliation (provide a means of resolution of differences) and eliminate retaliation cycles from forming (insure against retaliation). People are never happy with the outcome of court cases, they merely fear retaliation by the insurers. Whenever we have used competing insurers, they have devolved into feuding insurers. Feuding insurers are more dangerous than individual, family and clan feuds because they profit from it. Organizations seek dominance (a monopoly) and this is where states of all sizes originate: as monopoly insurers of last resort sufficient to hold other insurers (states) at bay. This is the historical narrative and counters the private-property-marxist dogma (socialism), and the common-property-marxist dogma (libertarianism). (I hope you saw what I said just then. Because that is the uncomfortable truth.) Libertarians opine (give opinions) on what constitutes aggression, and despite *decades* of hot air failing to define it, they never seem to determine that it is not the actor who determines but the victim who will sense a violation of his investments and retaliate and therefore determine the scope of property. And it is the community of insurers (the polity) that prevent retaliation cycles (feuds). And it is a monopoly insurer (the state however organized) that prevents it. The state overreach arises from discretionary regulatory power (legislation), discretionary tax power, and discretionary rent seeking power, rather than from it’s function as a monopoly insurer. So, the problems of the state originate in discretion and in full time employment of services organizations, rather than direct economic democracy, and subcontracted employment. As far as I know rule of law eliminates regulatory discretion. As far as I know direct democracy eliminates discretionary taxation. As far as I know subcontractors delivering services are superior to bureaucrats. As far as I know a judiciary can function independently. And all that is necessary is a monarchy as a judge of last resort, and a military as an insurer of last resort. In other words, the ancient monarchies ran the best ‘companies’: private estates. As far as I know there is no model superior to rule of natural common law, an independent judiciary, a hereditary monarch as judge of last resort, a set of houses for each class with differing interests used as a market for the production of commons, and direct economic democracy such that individuals who are enfranchised and contributing to the taxes make choices as to their allocations. Conversely, Libertarianism (jewish diasporic separatism) is another product of marxism and marxist history. And it does nothing but license immorality while prohibiting retaliatory violence against it. There is only one source of liberty: an armed militia, an independent judiciary, a monarch as judge of last resort, and the natural, common, judge discovered law, as the sacred political religion of all of them. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine (Tallinn, Estonia)

    THE ONLY MEANS OF ELIMINATING THE STATE AND CONSTRUCTING LIBERTY

    [T]he only way to eliminate the state, is to eliminate demand for the state. To eliminate demand for the state, we must construct institutions that provide the services of the state, without the free riding endemic to the state. The state provides just these services: …1) an allocation of property and property rights, and means of transfer. …2) a means of resolving all differences that lead to conflict. …3) a means of constructing and protecting commons from free riding. …4) a means of exclusion of competing allocations, means of resolution, means of construction. The only means of providing these services without the state, is to construct institutions that do not require a state. …1) the law of non-parasitism positively expressed as Property-en-Toto, the common organic law, an independent professional judiciary RATHER THAN an independent professional bureaucracy. ie: the fourth wave. …2) a market for commons consisting of houses of common interest in the commons, in which non-monopoly contracts are negotiated for the construction of commons. …3) a universal (or near universal ) militia, caretaking, emergency and rescue, in order to participate in the market for commons – participation must be earned, even if protection from parasitism need not be. A bureaucratic state then, is an evidence of the failure to construct institutions necessary for the provision of services that allow groups to compete against other groups. [F]ukuyama has not identified the alternative to social democracy, nor has he identified the transitory nature of monopoly institutions, as necessary for the construction of a commons prior to the development of a competing market for the provision of those commons. He failed to grasp the difference between research and development of expensive common institutions, and the conversion of those monopoly institutions to non-monopoly institutions that exclude conflicting institutions, while competing on the efficient provision of services. The end of history is quite different from that which Fukuyama imagines, and what the academy (as a profiteering church) advocates and desires. There is an alternative to monopoly government, if not an alternative to a monopoly of property rights articulated as property-en-toto. He is a product of the academy and history despite his honest intellectual interests – because he is not a product of economics and law: political economy. He is forgivable as are most students of history, of looking backward at patterns, without understanding the causal properties of human cooperation and the necessity of increasingly complex means of calculation. [A]s advocates for liberty, it is our function, our mission, to provide these superior solutions to the problem of cooperation at scale that we call “government” by the invention of, advocacy of, demand for, and rebellion in pursuit of, formal institutions that prohibit tyranny, and preserve our unique western rate of innovation, by prohibiting all parasitism (rent seeking) in all walks of life, at all times. …1) The universal requirement for productivity and it’s obverse, the prohibition on parasitism. …2) The institutionalization of that rule as property rights encompassing property-en-toto. …3) The common organic law, the independent professional judiciary, universal standing, the jury, truth telling, restitution, multiples of restitution, punishment and ostracization (imprisonment). …4) The nuclear family (and perhaps not the absolute nuclear) as the first commons in which gender competition is resolved outside of the production of commons. …5) An hereditary monarch (a head of state) with veto power, but without positive power. …6) A set of houses representing the classes, populated by random selection, who act as a jury, in the selection of contracts proposed for the annum and specific prohibition from the construction of law….7) The inclusion of the informational commons in property rights and therefore (a) the requirement for truthful (‘scientific and Propertarian’) speech in matters of the commons.(b) the requirement for operational language, (c) the prohibition on pooling and laundering (d) the prohibition on intertemporal and transferred commitment, and (e) the liability of jurors (representatives and voters) for their actions on behalf of others. The only defense is requirement for production, the common law, the jury, the truth, universal standing, universal liability, and competitive markets. This produces the least opportunity for rent seeking and privatization and forces all into the market for the production of goods and services in order to survive and reproduce. Insurance of one another against error and failure, and a limit of one child to those who are unproductive solves the problem of charity without the problem of eugenic immorality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine    
  • Economic Intuitionism (or Scientific Praxeology)

    “Reforming Mises, and the Jewish (Ukrainian) Wing of Austrian Economics.”

    A RECONSTRUCTION OF PRAXEOLOGY AS ECONOMIC INTUITIONISM FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH RATIO-EMPIRICAL SCIENCE

    I. PURPOSE: 1) To restore credibility to Austrian Economics by transforming it from Rationalist and pseudoscientific, to consistent with all scientific and logical disciplines. 2) To quash rationalist and pseudoscientific fallacies that have discredited Austrian economics, discredited the quest for moral economics, distracted from the quest for moral institutions through moral constraint on political economy, and cast the quest for liberty itself as the province of ‘the lunatic fringe’. 3) To provide a language for dividing economics into moral (Austrian operational economics) and immoral (Keyensian redistributive economics) disciplines. 4) To provide a scientific and critical rather than ideological and justificationary discussion of Austrian Economics (at least the German wing) as a method for testing the truthfulness and morality of economic theories – and to advocate restoring morality and truthfulness to economic science. What follows is a series of posts I have written in the past few months as I have worked on Propertarianism. It may require that you have a non-trivial understanding of philosophy. And your average passionate advocate of political ideas does not have that understanding. But hopefully you will glean some ideas from it, and provide me with some useful criticism. Thanks Select Continue Reading to continue… II. BACKGROUND TERMS: 0) BASIC TERMS (And yes, you probably need to read these rather than assume you know what they mean.) – Rationalism vs Empiricism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ – Intuitionism in Mathematics http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/ – Operationalism in Physics http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/operationalism/ – Operationism in Psychology http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/199/1/operat.htm – Instrumentalism (Eccentric Usage) I am a scientific realist, however, I use the term “instrumentalism” (probably a bad choice of words) in a much narrower sense: to refer to our use of logical and physical instruments to reduce phenomenon to that which we can somehow experience and compare, contrast, qualify, quantify or decide.   III. CONTENTS: CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT The first post summarizes the argument. The remaining articles expand the Introduction take you from basic philosophical concepts, through a series of short essays 1) REFORMING AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IS NECESSARY (To return the dialog to truthful and moral Austrian economics, and deceptive and immoral macro economics) 2) WHY ARE YOU REFUTING MISES, ROTHBARD AND HOPPE? (To Save Austrian Economics from the lunatic fringe) 3) PRAXEOLOGY AS MISES FAILURE TO DEVELOP ECONOMIC OPERATIONALISM (Restoring Austrian Economics To Compatibility with Ratio-empirical science) 4) MISES POSITION IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 5) THE STRUGGLE TO PRODUCE A MORAL ECONOMIC SCIENCE 6) SCIENCE IS THE DISCIPLINE OF SPEAKING TRUTHFULLY 7) MORAL CONSTRAINT FROM LAW THROUGH MATHEMATICS 8) CRITICISM: EMPIRICISM, INSTRUMENTALISM, OPERATIONALISM, FALSIFICATIONISM VS JUTIFICATION: RATIONALISM 9) JUSTIFICATION AS ADHERENCE TO CONTRACT, CRITICISM AS ADHERENCE TO DUE DILIGENCE 10) SCIENCE AS TRUTHFUL SPEECH – GERMAN RATIONALISM AND JEWISH COSMOPOLITANISM AS IMMORAL INFORMATION DISTORTION EQUAL TO THE INFORMATION DISTORTION OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS. 11) TRANSLATING KANTIAN RATIONALISM INTO SCIENTIFIC TERMS 12) WHICH IS MORE LIKELY: A PURPOSEFUL DECEPTION OR ANTI-SCIENTIFIC RATIONALISM? 13) THE ANTI ROTHBARDIAN CANON 14) A LIST OF HANS HERMANN HOPPE’S ERRORS 15) LIBERTARIANISM IS JUST COMMON PROPERTY MARXISM 16) THE REFORMATION OF WESTERN THOUGHT 17) THE ONLY MEANS OF ELIMINATING THE STATE AND CONSTRUCTING A CONDITION OF LIBERTY   ADDITIONAL INFORMATION – “Praxeology and Its Critics” by Bruce Caldwell. http://public.econ.duke.edu/…/Praxeology%20and%20Its%20Crit… – Do We Reason When We Think We Reason, or Do We Think? http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/…/peop…/associates/miller/lfd-.pdf – The Objectives of Science http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/…/…/associates/miller/poincare.pdf – Truth Defined http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/…/associa…/miller/TruthDefined.pdf Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    YES, REFORMING AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IS NECESSARY

    —“Calling Mises pseudoscientific is the typical positivistic criticism to Austrian Economics. It adds nothing. The young Austrian economists who are pupils of Don Lavoie had been working on Popper, Lakatos, Machlup and Hayek for a long time.”—Gabriel Zanotti, Philosophy Professor at Austral University Gabriel Let me see if I can summarize the argument and put an end to rationalist obfuscation of economics: 1) Calling science positivistic (justificationary) is a typical Rothbardian/Misesian misrepresentation of the scientific method, which is critical not justificationary. 2) Calling a logic (axiomatic, prescriptive, complete) a science (theoretical, descriptive, incomplete) is simply false. (And adds nothing, other than casting Austrian economics as a source of ridicule). Models can be built out of axioms or laws, but all axiomatic deductions are tautologies, producing proofs of operational possibility, while all laws remain incomplete and therefore non-tautological, producing additional hypotheses, which are candidates for theories and laws. But all theoretical statements remain theoretical. The reason being that all non-tautological premises remain forever theoretical. 3) The ‘axiom’ of purposeful human action tells us precisely nothing since it may constitute a test, but not an axiom since it tells us nothing of the scope of possible purposeful human action. We can instead say that any economic hypothesis, theory, or law, must be reducible to a sequence of rational human actions, (operations) in order to be existentially possible. 4) This difference is why we rely upon ratio-empiricism, not rationalism, and not positivism for scientific (truthful) investigation. Logical arguments test internal consistency but not external correspndence, and external correspondence does not tell us about the internal consistency of our arguments, and without operational-intuitionistic testing (operational definitions) we cannot know if what we imagine is existentially possible. And without falsification, assuming we are both internally consistent, externally correspondent, and existentially possible, we have not tested our internal, external, and operational theory for parsimony – leaving open the possibility of error, bias and deception in all three. 5) The differences between mainstream (orthodox) economics, and Austrian (heterodox) economics, are (a)that manipulation of credit is disinformation (lying) which produces cumulative effects of disinformation (lying), and (b) that as an act of disinformation (fraud), manipulation of credit produces involuntary transfers (immorality), because it lacks fully informed, productive, warrantied, voluntary exchange, free of externality (moral constraint). 6) Rationalists tend to be, and by definition, must be, justificationists – they are not critical. Justification in rationalism, is indifferent from positivism in science. They are identical propositions. No matter how much justification we do, we are merely engaging in confirmation bias. Instead, it is irrelevant which method we use to construct a theory. The means of constructing a theory are irrelevant. Justification is irrelevant. Truth candidates (internally consistent, externally correspondent, operationally possible, and ultimately parsimonious, yet incomplete statements) are produced by criticism: whether they survive scrutiny: testing. 7) One *CAN* however, work through purely rational, non-positivistic processes, however, this is not to to say they are not working empirically (through observation). As far as I know this is impossible. But that does not mean they are not working ratio-empirically. It merely means that they are engaging in tests of internal consistency given current knowledge, and working using operational possibility (existential possibility), but that they are not criticizing their work through tests of external correspondence – although as far as we know, no one makes theories without tests of external correspondence, because that would mean we were not explaining economic phenomenon – which would be somewhat fruitless. 8) This ‘Austrian’ (heterodox) investigation remains ratio-empirical, and consistent with all other scientific investigation. However, so does mainstream economics (orthodoxy). And the ONLY DIFFERENCE between mainstream and Austrian economics then, is that the mainstream seeks to lie to us, and Austrians seek to speak the truth. So the difference is not methodological – it is whether we attempt to find improvements to institutions of cooperation that retain the western principle of truth telling, or we engage in lying. Keynesian economics is dishonest, not necessarily unscientific. Austrian economics suggests only that economics must be practiced scientifically (ratio-empirically), not axiomatically or statistically: that sequences of operational possibility actions, informed by incentives, each of which is subjectively testable, is necessary to make a truth statement, while statistical correlation ignores these choices. Ergo, economics is indifferent from all other sciences: ratio-empirical discipline. The question is only whether we seek to tell the truth (Austrian) or to lie (Keynesian). 9) And it is equally dishonest and pseudoscientific to state that an axiomatic system is identical to a theoretical system, and equally dishonest to cast mainstream economics as methodologically flawed. Particularly when Austrians have contributed nothing to the study of economics in nearly a century, while in the past twenty years alone, the orthodox community has expanded our knowledge of general rules and insight into our existing economies with regularity. 10) The Cosmopolitan thinkers, like the german rationalists, are exceptional at this kind of deceptive conflation. A few of us think that it is a natural consequence of talumudic authoritarian dual ethics in the jewish community, and kantian authoritarian conflation of truth and duty in german philosophy. However, Mises and ROthbard and to some lesser degree Hoppe, have all tried to assert fallacies that cast the difference as possible, logical and methodological rather than as moral. Meanwhile the social democrats continue to justify the morality of takings (involuntary transfers) rather than treating every ‘taking’ as a lost opportunity for productive voluntary exchange – and therefore returning us to manorial era constraints upon the behavior of the unproductive classes that contributed to the rise of the west. CLOSING I hope this helped you understand my position. In my view I am attempting to restore Morality and truth telling to economics. But that will not be done using fallacious arguments in the rationalist tradition. It will be by demonstrating that moral action using institutions that do not engage in lying, produce superior economic conditions: greater prosperity without the fragility caused by decade after decade of institutional lying. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute L’viv Ukraine

    WHY ARE YOU REFUTING MISES, ROTHBARD and HOPPE IF YOU ADVOCATE AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS?

    Because Austrian Economics if stated scientifically, rather than rationally, constrains economics to moral theories and policies, and correctly repositions economics as a moral discipline: the search for institutional improvements to voluntary exchange – in the same way that I have tried to reposition science as a moral discipline: the search to speak the truth; and philosophy as the construction of meaning from the truth that we discover with science – a discipline which expressly lacks meaning (and must). (Note: You might want to re-read that paragraph a few times – it’s very important.) This is a profound transformation of multi-disciplinary intellectual history into a single, unified theory of peer-cooperation in pursuit of prosperity. And it corrects the errors inserted into the Cosmopolitan (Jewish) branch of Austrian economics by Mises (pseudoscience), and Rothbard (ghetto immorality – the absence of truth-telling), and Hoppe (German Rationalism) This transformation of western thought into truth-telling for the purpose of moral cooperation (voluntary exchanges among warriors of universally equal rank), explains why the west innovates and prospers at higher rates than the rest of the world, whenever it is not bound by babylonian-levantine mysticism, barbaric deception, or Asian systemic truth-avoidance: we work constantly to eliminate transaction costs and seize opportunities at lowest cost (early). This approach to man’s intellectual struggle correctly positions truth-telling along with trust (transaction costs), property, voluntary exchange, and contract as the necessary institutions of prosperity creation: the high trust society. Anglos attempted to combine science and morality – trusting man in the absence of moral authority. But anglos, were an island people without borders to defend, an homogenous in-bred people, and a heavily commercialized people. They had fewer fears. Defectors from moral norms are not a problem for an in-bred island people. There is no group to defect to. Germans attempted to combine philosophy and morality – a less radical transformation of religious authoritarian morality. Germans were a landed people with borders under constant question, and who were intermixed with other groups on all sides, and were not as economically diverse as the anglos and as such not as bound to trade. So, “defectors” – those who no longer pay the high cost of the normative commons, were more of a concern. Jewish cosmopolitan authors, an un-landed diasporic and separatist people, attempted to preserve internal rule-authoritarianism, separatism, and the parasitic value of separatist dual-ethics. They viewed host civilizations as hostile, generated separatist hostility internally by intention as a means of group cohesion, and often practiced dualist ethics that guaranteed their moral separatism. So each of these groups were, as all groups must, attempting to react to the enlightenment using their group evolutionary strategies: island naval and commercial, landed martial and agrarian-commercial, and un-landed, diasporic commercial. It is sometimes hard for us to imagine that our use of “Truth” reflects our group’s evolutionary strategy, and that many of our judgements are unconscious. But all groups use truth differently. Truth is unknowable and therefore merely contractual in Jewish philosophy – it is a purely pragmatic vision. In German philosophy, truth is dangerous and must be inseparable from duty, which is why all german philosophy conflates truth and duty. In anglo philosophy, truth is divine and its consequences divine – knowing the mind of god. Our duty is truth regardless of consequences, because we believe all consequences are optimum. Neo-puritanism, in the anglo world, which is the dominant postmodern philosophy in government and academy, does not practice anglo truth, but has adopted german and jewish counter-enlightenment philosophy of the sociology of knowledge and truth: truth is what we desire it to be. This is systematically destroying our rule of law, which has been, in the past, the source of our empiricism. The source of our science. Not the other way round. Without scientific law, we cannot have a scientific society. Law is the most influential property of any society because it determines what one must do, not what one prefers. As such, an un-empirical laws, is an incalculable, un-decidable, and therefore subjective law. The solution is to restore truth telling. To increase the scope of property to include the normative and informational commons. To use law to restore truth-telling. All society will adapt rapidly to this change. No authority is necessary. No leadership is necessary. No belief is necessary. No agreement is necessary. No ideology is necessary. It is just true, insufficient to know, or not true, and that is enough. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute L’viv Ukraine

    MISES’ PRAXEOLOGY AS THE FAILURE TO DEVELOP ECONOMIC OPERATIONALISM

    (important)(profound) [I] have been working to reform anarcho capitalist arguments by translating them from troublesome Kantian rationalism, into the transparent common language of science: ratio-empiricism. And, at least for the past few months, I’ve been struggling to develop a narrative structure that would allow me to easily demonstrate the solution to the promise of praxeology as a failed version of the same problems addressed by Intuitionism, Operationalism and Constructivism in mathematics and science. Mises’ work was another example of the multi-disciplinary failure to provide a solution to the common intuition that there is a problem with science and mathematics, and our application of science and math to other fields – particularly to economics and ethics. That is the conclusion that I have come to – it’s the logical positioning of Mises’ praxeology in the development of 20th century thought – albeit he was even less successful in economics than peers were in physics, math, logic and psychology. They were able to identify the solution but not able to convince peers to implement it, because it was burdensome. This narrative, positioning Misesian thought as a failed attempt at Operationalism in human cooperation, provides a vehicle whereby I can describe Misesian arguments in the same context as those in physics, psychology, logic and mathematics. All of them as failed experiments in operationalism only because the authors did not and possibly could not look across disciplines and discover that they were merely adding or removing the properties desirable or not for their field of inquiry – but that while they were seeking a logical solution, that they were all making similar arguments – ethical arguments: And that the problem they intuited, that Poincaré criticized them for, was an ethical one: recreating mysticism through the use of verbalism to obscure causality that they did not understand. All the major disciplines went through a somewhat failed transformation and only psychology, which was most in need of reformation, fully adopted operationalism as “operationism”. And the result was a wealth of research in experimental psychology and the success of experimental psychology versus the pseudoscience that dominated the field before hand. [W]hy is this important? Because the requirements for construction and operational language, are not only logical but ethical. And while ethics has limited place in mathematical principles, and physical laws, it has a great significance to the promise that one is advocating a truth in mathematical and physical propositions – and therefore not ‘polluting’ the intellectual domain with fallacies that might impact others’ work. But in the logic of cooperation we call ethics it is inseparable both from the promise that one is advocating a truth AND in the articulation of its principles and the laws that enforce those principles. If we had discovered operationalism in ethics first, then perhaps, we would have had an easier time justifying the additional burden that operationalism places upon physics, science, psychology math and logic – and we might have saved a century of pseudoscientific inquiry, just as Bridgman worried; and just as we have seen in a century of fallacious and immoral economics. As Bridgman noted, the only reason Einstein was innovative, was because he operationalized the problem of measurement of bodies – something that had we done earlier would have saved a generation or more of wasted effort in science – just as we have wasted a generation or more in the pursuit of a logic of cooperation leading to liberty. The issue for us, in economics, politics and in ethics, is that the problem of arbitrary precision in the construction of general rules – hypothesis, theories and laws – affects only the precision of economic laws in time, but not our ability to state those laws. However, unlike say, mathematics or logic, we never run into decidability in the logic of cooperation, because all phenomenon are reducible to human actions that are open to subjective testing (sympathetic experience). Unlike axiomatic systems such as math and logic, we are never short of information necessary for decidability. Humans are marginally indifferent in their preferences – which is why we can experience shared intent, cooperate, and empathize. As such we can always decide. Buridan’s Ass never starves. Information is always sufficient. It may not be sufficient for the choice of preference, but it is sufficient for rational choice. Again, arguments that someone versed in mathematical philosophy might have understood. Although, with decades of computer science, we have learned that it’s computer science that is more trustworthy than mathematics, because computers are constrained by operational rules of necessity, and unlike mathematics we cannot use imagination and ‘fudging’ obscured by verbalism. Operations must be open to performance and results must be computable. To counter the problem of imagination adding information to arguments, and the problem of using verbalism to obscure ignorance, under operationalism and constructivism, **truth is replaced by (algorithmic) proof as a primitive notion, and existence requires demonstration of constructibility.** This statement is possible to translate into the axiom that moral (ethical) propositions must be reducible to a series of human actions, open to subjective testing (sympathetic verification). This is the argument that mises was looking for, and could not construct, possibly because (a) he lacked sufficient understanding of mathematics, (b) he lacked a demonstrably insufficient understanding of the terms ‘scientific’ and ‘logical’, because he conflated them with abandon, despite their opposite properties, and (c) because an ethical constraint was insufficient to provide an authoritative response to the moral arguments of statists and socialists alike. Whether he understood the ethical constraint not the logical one was all that a solution to praxeological analysis would provide, or simply, like most cosmopolitans, because preferred an authoritarian, verbalist, and pseudoscientific argument is something it is impossible to answer in our era. Since Marx, Freud, Cantor, Mises and Rothbard all make the same error of constructing verbal pseudosciences, it’s hard to imagine that it’s intentional rather than a cultural bias or strategy. (Something I have written about elsewhere under the heading of competing uses of truth.) The problem I face, and the work I must do, to help others understand Mises’ position in intellectual history, and his failure, and then to construct a logic of cooperation, where Mises mistakenly tries to construct a logic of ‘action’ is to enumerate examples of axioms and laws in different fields and thereby demonstrate the problem of the sufficiency of information for deduction under arbitrary precision in the construction of hypotheses, theories, laws, and axioms; and then placing Mises’ work in the context of all fields struggling with the definition of truth (as ultimately performative – and therefore ethical). So positioning economics and ethics using performative truth, operationalism and constructivism will help demonstrate the concept across ALL domains of inquiry, rather than just within economics, ethics, physics, psychology, mathematics and logic. And thus eliminate the objections to performative truth, intuitionism, constructivism, and operationalism by demonstrating that all philosophical and logical disciplines rest upon the action that one claims to have demonstrated a an action that he can testify truthfully to have observed (rather than imagined, or used verbalisms to obscure that he has not. Unfortunately, we didn’t discover ethics first – perhaps had Mises solved the problem in ethics, other fields would have grasped the significance. Although, other fields have addressed ethics with softer variants of operationalism and construction – particularly science. They have never reformed ’truth’ as performative: as testimony, or ‘true witness’, as evidenced by that which is operational and constructible. At least in the discipline of law, strict construction, original intent, and deliberate modification of law is an understood if not obeyed principle. Operationalism may allow us to make truthful testimony, and truthful testimony is the only truth that humans are capable of creating. All else is imaginary, as is infinity. But whether we retain the approximation of classical reasoning as a practical matter of utility, or adopt construction and operation as a requirement for attestable truth in other disciplines really doesn’t matter as much as it does in ethics, politics and law. Physics, science, psychology, math and logic are luxury goods and rarely involve involuntary transfer and provide an incentive for conflict. But, cooperation is a necessary good. Politics and law are necessary goods. Strict construction is necessary and beneficial since it permits the rational resolution of conflicts, and as such prevents them. Strict construction makes it impossible to use empty verbalisms to advocate involuntary transfers as ‘moral’. Operational definitions make it much harder to lie, cheat and steal. Under operationalism, performative truth, constructivism, the field of ethics, including the domains of criminal, unethical, immoral and conspiratorial, and conquest prohibitions, can be described as an objective uniform logic as Mises suggested it might be. We can construct a formal logic of cooperation – ethics. And, we can do it using ratio-scientific language, via operational and constructive means. We can do it in the common universal and transparent language of science using hypothesis, theory and law, and model our laws using axioms constrained by correspondence to this empirical laws. We do not need false authoritarianism, pseudoscientific obscurant terminology, or a cult or obscure continental language to do it. An irony perhaps that Mises did not grasp that he was justifying the logic of human action, which is by definition operational and constructive in an argumentative structure that was not operational nor constructive. In hindsight this approach is either humorous or tragic. While we are not sure yet, it is possible that Popper was correct, and that we can never know if we possess the most parsimonious description of any phenomenon – what we call ‘truth’ or ‘ultimate truth’ – we can, instead of spending our lives in a quest for the non-existant and logically unknowable, instead, publish recipes that we can testify truthfully to the construction of, and performance of, as correspondent with reality. This is the difference between european commitment to always speaking the truth, and producing many, many technological successes, versus academic publishing a welfare queens, never responsible for our words, and never accountable for the consequences. This is the difference between anglo empirical truth, and cosmopolitan pragmatic truth. [T]he 20th century’s failed quest for a definition of truth, is the narrative structure that I’ve been searching for. Until recently, I just couldn’t find a way of talking about Mises’ work in the broader context of intellectual development. He clearly intuited the problem, as did those in other fields, but besides having the Jewish obsession with words-as-reality, and the German obsession with authority, he did not understand math and science well enough, and certainly had no exposure to computer science and the problem of computability. Why he proceeded onward and constructed an elaborate nonsensical pseudoscience in the Cosmopolitan tradition is something that only he could answer. And why subsequent generations have created a cult out of this pseudoscience, complete with typical cosmopolitan saturation of the informational commons with propaganda supporting of the pseudosicence, including heroic figure worship, and heaping unworthy praise at every opportunity, is up to those still living to explain. It is worth noting that Popper too largely relied on narrative verbalisms, such as his ‘three worlds’ hypothesis, and we know that he resorted to Krugman-like distortion of facts in his criticisms of the left. And we know that Popper’s real purpose was not about science it self, but his agenda to undermine scientific certainty, much as did Mises, by rendering truth in to platonic form, removing responsibility from the scientist for true testimony, and casting cosmopolitan Critique, originated in hermeneutic interpretation of scripture, as the means of scientific social organization, rather than the previous anglo saxon and german requirement for truthful testimony. ALl these thinkers failed to stem the tide of marx’s socialism, rothbardian libertinism, and Straussian neoconservatism, because all tried to counter pseudoscience with pseudoscience, and empty verbalism with empty verbalism. However the manner of correcting those people was always available to us, and had been for centuries if not millennia: a requirement that we tell the truth, and persecution under law for not doing so. As Hoppe states, Hayek failed as well, both to make this connection with performative truth as a means of social order, and to move from the classical liberal and therefore psychological school of thought to the calculative rigor of logic by identifying property as the first and necessary object or unit of commensurability. He did understand the law and the common law, clearly, as the institutional means for resolving conflicts – better than anyone else as far as I know. But he did not grasp the difference between legal REASON (approximation necessary for discovery) and logical CALCULATION (precision necessary for truth). Nor between knowledge of use (correspondence as truth) and knowledge of construction (truth in existence). (Although I’m willing to admit that I might be one of the few people who currently does.) Later in life Mises appears to waffle a bit, if not reverse himself. But because of what appears to be his fascination with Kantian a priorism, he didn’t see the parallel between his (inarticulate) argument that economics was both empirical and logical, and reverse mathematics, in which one constructs necessary axioms one can testify to as extant, after using empirical and logical means by which to approximate the solution to a problem. My original goal was to provide conservatives a vehicle for argument using what I saw as libertarian rationalism. Conversely, I wanted to make it impossible to conduct deceptive arguments in the religious, progressive and postmodern forms, but in doing so I found an answer to a century or more old conflict in the history of thought. And I think I can rescue Mises and Hoppe from the ‘fruitcake fringe’ of rationalist argument. Which is helpful. Since I want, like most, a plan to obtain liberty in my lifetime. And while any value Mises had has been already incorporated into economic thought, only fringe groups have incorporated Hoppe’s criticism of democracy and use of competing private insurance organizations to replace monopoly bureaucracy in the production of regulation. Unfortunately, Hoppe appears too entrenched and committed to praxeology as pseudoscience, the fallacy of aggression which is merely a means of licensing fraud by verbal means and creating a parasitic class immune from both physical and legal punishment. And has merely adopted the marxist ‘commune’ as his model of rebellion. Which just because we desire liberty, is just as economically impossible as it is if we desire communism. Wishful thinking is not action. Its wishing others will do the work for you. Liberty was created only by europeans, because of rare ancient circumstances, whereby warriors granted one another insurance against theft of their property obtained from their cattle raids, and required equality of one another because of their battle tactics requiring independent financing, action and maneuver, at high risk. These people built an ethic that would give birth to science, reason, property and liberty, because it forces man to use his mind in terms which accurately correspond to reality: Tell the truth, and only the truth. Fulfill your commitments at risk of life. Construct a brotherhood of property owners two whom familial trust is extended. And force all free riding out of society so that all persons must participate in production, and none can resort to parasitism. Liberty is obtained at the point of metal object, by denying others access to power. Everything else is merely wishful thinking, or an attempt to free ride on the efforts of those who do construct liberty. The natural aristocracy is not created by a small population. It is created by every living soul willing to bear arms to prevent the accumulation of sufficient power to deny others sovereignty over their property: For one and all, to deny one and all, access to the property of one and all by other than voluntary, fully informed, warrantied, exchange free of externality. Cheers Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine LINKS Constructive Mathematics: Mathematical Intuitionism:  Operationalism: Praxeology

    MISES POSITION IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY?

    Mises Human Action as Cosmopolitan Stoicism. [H]e was almost right. If Rothbard and the Rothbardians had not damaged his legacy so severely, he would not be ostracized by the main stream intellectual community. At present any mention of his name associates a public intellectual, an economist, or philosopher, with the pseudoscientific lunatic fringe. Praxeology is a failed attempt at Operationalism, sure – but no one ELSE came close to developing economic operationalism but Mises. I only did it because I have the luxury of a century of additional development in computability (especially Turing), and because it’s clear now that the analytic program (attempt to convert philosophy into a science) has been a failure, and that the success in reforming both science and psychology has almost entirely been because of Operationalism. Had Mises joined with Brouwer and Bridgman, the three of them might have saved us from a century of pseudoscience. But without a philosopher of ethics to unify them, Popper in the philosophy of science, Mises in Economics, Brouwer in mathematics, and Bridgman in physics all failed to come to the correct conclusion: that they were not in fact articulating logical constraints – because there is no logical constraint to theory-development. The logical constraint is only in the statement of promise (that you are telling the truth) that such a theory can be expressed existentially, as a sequence of operations (actions) or operational measures of observations. And as such, one’s theory, in any discipline, is free of content that was added by error, imagination, or deception. Man can testify to observation in the execution of recipes – all else is imagination. As such the practice of the sciences (or rather, the practice of *disciplined testimony* which the sciences developed, but which consists of nothing unique to the physical sciences) is a moral one, with ethical constraints. As such, praxeology, mathematical intuitionism, operationalism, operationism, Popper’s critical preference, and the scientific method, as well as the discipline of science as currently practiced, are moral constraints, not logical ones. One can intuit a theory by whatever means possible. One can believe whatever he wishes to justify. But one’s promise of testimony to the actions that did or may produce consequences is a moral one, not a logical one. [A]s far as I know, the only meaningful reason to study economics for use in ethics and politics, is to justify the rule of law (Nomocracy), under the single rule of property rights, where property rights is as defined under Propertarianism, as property-en-toto (demonstrated property). And where that body of law suppresses sufficient involuntary transfer of property-en-toto, that the formation of a Nomocratic polity is possible. And where the formation and perpetuation of that polity is possible, because transaction costs are sufficiently suppressed that a rational choice for Nomocracy is possible, over a rational choice for statism. And that the normative preference of nomocratic rule over statist rule is maintained by the constant exercise of that body of law in daily life, rather than a phillosophical-rational, religio-moral, pedagogically-instructional, or normatively-habituated means of persistence. If we look at his human action as an attempt to develop an economic version of stoicism – a mental discipline – I think it is probably a better frame of reference for his work than as economics or analytic philosophy. As such I see him as creating a Cosmopolitan version of stoicism (economic/intellectual character) rather than western (Aryan if you will) stoicism (political/craftsmanship character). Both forms of stoicism are early attempts at operationalizing philosophy for disciplinary action as an individual member of a complex division of labor in which we possess fragmentary information. Since I quote him endlessly for his analysis of money and fiduciary media, which again, he (“a sequence of human actions” = “operational observations”) correctly uses operational analysis to isolate and articulate the causal rather than normative properties – I am clearly an advocate. But I am not an advocate of the misuse of Mises’ errors – his failed attempt to develop economic operationalism – to justify Rothbardian libertinism – an outright assault on the production of both high trust, and the commons – both of which are the primary competitive advantages constituent in the western indo-european (Aryan if you will) evolutionary strategy. [I] walk by Mises’ childhood home every day. It has tempered my criticism. I see him making natural errors of Cosmopolitanism – as Hayek said “a victim of his upbringing”. Just as the Germans have made endless errors in conflating religion and philosophy to preserve their hierarchy and duty as a group competitive strategy. Just as British (Anglo/Irish/Scots if not the Belgae) have fought to preserve their island universalism despite the necessary suicide that results from universalism outside of their island (or the american island, or the Australian island.) I will venture this post is one of the more important things that has been written about Mises in recent history, and my arguments, if not my criticisms will assist us in RESCUING Mises from the lunatic fringe, and RESCUING his work for use in intellectual discourse – as the first attempt at saving Economics through operationalism, the way that science and psychology (if not also mathematics and logic) have been saved by operationalism. **I see myself as rescuing ALL of the Misesian/Hoppeian program from the fruitcake fringe: by laundering German, Jewish and British enlightenment fallacies – the attempt to universalize local evolutionary strategy – rather than simply adopt scientific epistemology (operationalism) as the only neutral tool for the use of studying group evolutionary strategies.** Although it is, I am sure, somewhat difficult for those religiously devoted to immoral, libertine, Rothbardianism to either understand or accept. I am quite sure I do not err in this analysis. A statement which I am aware further taunts libertines. But which my fellow aristocrats (libertarians-proper) both understand and expect from me as a promise. Because the anglo-empirical model of truth telling, quite opposite from the cosmopolitan, is that truth is the name for testimony. And as such I testify that to the best of my knowledge my statement is true. And that I bear the reputational consequences of my promise that this statement is true. This is the polar opposite of the Popperian, Analytic, and Cosmopolitan version of true: that truth is the unknowable province of god alone, and as such we can only ‘do what we can’, and as such are unaccountable for our words. This ethic, this definition of truth, as performative – as operational, is what Kant was searching for, but could not find. And it is why both Jewish and German philosophy are dead ends. And it is why english philosophy became lost through its influence by the germans and the cosmopolitans. We lost a century of philosophy to cosmopolitan pseudoscience in economics, politics, ethics and logic. Germans lost centuries to pseudo-philosophical religio-moralism. Mises can be seen in context as the most successful – if still failed – attempt to rescue german and cosmopolitan thought from its religious constraints. – Cheers. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine  

    THE STRUGGLE TO PRODUCE A MORAL ECONOMIC SCIENCE

    THE BRANCHES OF AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS The German branch of Austrian economics offered an alternative proposition: that we can and should pursue inquiry into economics as a means of discovering how we may improve our institutions while preserving moral principles of cooperation. This position favors kin selection without encouraging parasitism. The mainstream (anglo) position is instead, that we should pay the cost of immoral actions via our institutions if the aggregate benefits are justifiable. This is a philosophical bias that ist he result of the heavily outbred culture of the anglos who for all intents and purposes function as kin, and operate under the principle of kin selection. This position encourages parasitism. By contrast, the Jewish branch of Austrian economics attempted, and failed, to cast this argument as one of science(instrumentalism and empiricism) versus logic(axiomatic deduction), while at the same time naming this axiomatic argument a ‘science’, despite not relying upon the scientific method – thus constructing a pseudoscience (meaning: using the term science for credibility without relying on the scientific method to establish credibility). This position seeks to make both parasitism and contribution to the commons impossible. Just as universalism is common to the English, and duty common to the German, this attempt to create a pseudoscientific authoritarian philosophy was a result of the cultural bias of Judaism which itself relies upon authoritative law and contractual agreement rather than the european aristocratic egalitarian cultural demand for testifiable truth regardless of circumstances. Contract is a sufficient substitute for truth in low trust polities. But it is not a substitute for truth in high trust polities. A TALE OF THREE CULTURES Of these three positions, the German was the optimum: scientific, rational, and moral actions to achieve moral ends. The anglo position uses science and aggregates and accepts immoral actions in order to attempt to achieve moral ends. The German position uses science, reason and individualism in order to preserve moral conditions while achieving economic optimums. The Jewish position relies upon pseudoscience to achieve individual optimums but ignores morality and commons altogether – because judaic law is constructed contractually, not on principle (truth telling), and as a diasporic culture, it does not require contribution to the commons as do land holding social orders. Each of these cultural strategies is beneficial for island dwelling anglo universalists(truth), continent-dwelling german martial culture (duty), and disasporic un-landed jewish culture (contract). However, if we separate the pragmatism of cultural group evolutionary strategy from that which is true independent of those cultural strategies – cultural definitions of true – only the German model survives scrutiny as containing the full suite of properties: truth, duty, commons, individual and collective morality, under science and reason. THE PREFERENCE FOR THE AUSTRIAN MODEL IS A PREFERENCE FOR A MORAL DICIPLINE OF ECONOMICS Had not the world wars disrupted the Austrian school and destroyed german civilization in a fractious civil war, this debate might have evolved and been completed earlier, instead of devolving into mainstream half-moral anglo aggregate morality, and a discredited heterodox school. But at present the Austrian vision of a moral economics constructed for nations, preserving kin selection, preventing parasitism, preserving both individual and aggregate morality, preserving the commons, requiring truth-telling, and operating under ratio-scientific methods, is displaced for two reasons: 1) The post-war dominance of (dysgenic, suicidal) anglo universalism justified under Keynesian socialism and Rawlsian ethics. A suicidal strategy only possible under the unique conditions of western altruistic punishment. (See Wiki) Westerners are the only people to develop universal high trust and to break the familial cycle of corruption. However, this appears to have created a weakness in that we extend this trust suicidally and ignore the reproductive and evolutionary importance of the family, tribe, and nation, and in creating that high trust society in the first place. 2) The marginalization of the Austrian ambition for a moral economics because of the adoption of marxist ideological and propaganda techniques in advocating the pseudoscientific Jewish Austrian program – in no small part by the Mises Institute (without whom, and the use of the new medium of the internet, the pseudoscientific branch would likely have been extinguished.) As such the term Austrian is categorized under pseudoscientific and anti-scientific, rather than as the german branch originally evolved: the institutional means of improving moral cooperation in the pursuit of prosperity. ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY Mises’s praxeology is a failed attempt at developing economic Intuitionism and Operationalism. Economics is of necessity, like all scientific investigation, a ratio-empirical methodology for the study of phenomenon beyond our direct perception. In his failure he attempted to create a pseudoscience to justify his authoritarian preferences. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    SCIENCE IS THE DISCIPLINE OF SPEAKING TRUTHFULLY – IN ALL DISCIPLINES ———————————————————————————-

    Science is a moral discipline wherein we criticize our ideas, so that we can speak them truthfully: — We test our reasoning with logic for internal consistency. — We test our observations with external correspondence. — We test existence of our premises with operations. — We test the scope of our theory with falsifications. Once we have tested our theories by these means, then we can say that we speak truthfully – and as such do no harm. The central argument regarding truth: … that humans in order to cooperate, humans evolved sympathy for intent – and are marginally indifferent in their judgement of intentions. This allows us to sympathetically test most human incentives if subject to the same stimuli (information). It is also why juries can functions, since this sympathetic testing of intentions is the criteria by which juries render decisions. … that we cannot however sympathize with the equivalent of intentions (first principles) of the physical universe. So while we intuit and and can test man’s intentions, we cannot measure and test the universe’s first principles. As such, the best we can do is testify to observations and measurements of those phenomenon until at some point we know those first principles – if that is ever possible. … but our observations must also be reduced to stimuli that can be sympathetically tested by others, and insulated from our deception, bias and error. … we call this process ‘science’, but the practice of science is little more than a set of moral rules that instruct us as to how to eliminate deception, bias and error. The scientific method then, is merely a moral discipline: the means by which we struggle to speak the truth, as truthfully as we may possibly accomplish given the frailty of our reason. … that giving witness to one’s observations, is testable by reproduction of a set of operational definitions. That operational definitions produce the equivalent of names, just as positional numbering provides quantities with names. Such names are insulated from deception, distraction, loading, framing and overloading. Theories are not. While we cannot demonstrate the absolute parsimony of a theory (that we know of), we can demonstrate that we truthfully conveyed our observations. In other words, we can testify truthfully to an ordered set of facts, even if we cannot testify truthfully to parsimony of a theory. ….that it is possible to state instead that all outputs of scientific investigation are true, if they are truthfully represented – where ‘scientific investigation” refers to the use of the scientific method, regardless of field of inquiry. But that we seek the most parsimonious statement of a theory, and we can never know that we have obtained it, we can only develop consensus that we cannot cause it to fail. This is, as far as I know, the best non-platonic description of truth available. Everything else is a linguistic contrivance for one purpose or another – possibly to obscure ignorance, and possibly to load ideas with moral motivation. Scientists load their contrivance of truth, and mathematicians load their contrivance of numbers, limits, and a dozen other things – most of which obscure linguistic ‘cheats’ to give authority to that which is necessary for the construction of general rules. (ie: the problem of arbitrary precision). … that Popper did no investigation into science or the history of science prior to making his argument, and that as yet, we do not have a systematic account of the history of science. However, what history we do have, both distant and recent, is that science operates by criticism upon failure, where failure is demonstrated by via overextension of the theory. …The reason for overextension rather than criticism as the operational preference being that it is economically inefficient (expensive) to pursue criticism rather than to extend a theory to its point of failure then criticize it. And as far as we know, this is how science functions in practice, and must work, because it is how all human endeavors must work. Because while a small number of scientists may seek the ‘truth’ (or whatever a platonist means by it), what scientists try to do is solve problems – ie: to manufacture recipes for useful cognition. … Popper’s advice was merely moral given that the scope of inquiry in all human fields had surpassed that of human scale, where tests are subjectively verifiable. (I think this is an important insight because it occurred in all fields.) Einstein for example, operationalized observations (relative simultaneity for example) over very great distances approaching the speed of light using Lorenz transformations. And as Bridgman demonstrated, the reason Einstein’s work was novel was because prior generations had NOT been operationalizing statements ,and as such, more than a generation and perhaps two were lost to failure of what should have been an obvious solution. (See the problem of length, which I tend to refer to often as the best example.) I addressed this in a previous post, and what popper did was give us good advice, and while he made an argument that appears logical, like most rational arguments, unsupported by data, it is not clear he was correct, and in fact, it appears that he was not. The question is not a rational but empirical one. … Popper unlike Misesian Pseudoscience, or Rothbardian Immoral Verbalisms, was engaged in a moral attempt both in politics and in science, and perhaps in science as a vehicle for politics, to prevent the pseudoscientific use of science – particularly by fascist and communists, to use the findings of science as a replacement for divine authority by which to command man. What popper did, particularly with his platonism, was to remove the ability for the findings of science to be used as justification for the removal of human choice. Popper, Mises, and Hayek were responsible for undermining pseudoscientific authoritarianism. Of the three popper is perhaps less articulate (possibly to obscure his objective), but certainly not wrong, so to speak. While mises’ appeal to authoritarianism (which is part and parcel of jewish culture) was entirely pseudoscientific, by claiming that economics was deductive rather than empirical, and justifying it under apriorism, instead of as I’ve stated, understanding that he was merely trying to apply operationalism to economic activity, which would merely demonstrate that Keynesian economics was immoral and deterministic, not unscientific. But Popper, Mises, Hayek, Bridgman and Brouwer, did not find a solution to restoring the western aristocratic conditions for public speech. They too were a lost in platonism a bit. Bridgman and Brouwer did understand that something was wrong, and were very close,b ut they could not make the moral argument. We have had a century now of attacks by verbal contrivance and we can demonstrate the destruction of our civilization by way of it. So the moral argument is no longer one of undemonstrated results. WE have the results. And we have a generation of men, myself included, trying to repair it. One must speak truthfully, because no other truth is knowable. Intellectual products that are brought to market must be warrantied just as are all other products that are brought to market, and the warranty that you can provide is operational definitions (recipes, experience), not theories (psychologism, projections). And if you are not willing to stand behind your product then you should not bring it to market. Because you have no right to subject others to harm. Intellectuals produce ideas (myself included), that is our product. We are paid in measly terms most of the time, for our product, but that is what we do. But it is no different from hot coffee or dangerous ladders, or defective gas tanks. And given that one particularly prolific group of people has created marxism, socialism, postmodernism, libertine-libertarianism, and neoconservatism, it is about time we stopped allowing them to ship lousy products into society. And rather than regulate them by government, the common law and universal standing will allow punishment of those who bring bad products to market. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    MORAL CONSTRAINT FROM LAW THROUGH MATHEMATICS

    I hope that this spectrum: law, economics, assists us in understanding the position of praxeology in the list of moral constraints that require operational and intuitionistic tests of propositions, prior to making truth claims. LAW: STRICT CONSTRUCTION Strict Construction is an abused term where the courts instead use the terms Textualism and Original Intent. But under propertarian property rights theory Strict Construction refers to requiring that any law passed be accompanied by argument showing that such a law is specifically authorized by the constitution. In other words, laws constitute the permissible legal operations. And none of them can violate property rights. This is important because otherwise, if discretion is required, then judges can insert deception, imaginary content, bias and error into the body of law. (As they have done, circumventing the legislature, the constitution, and property rights.) As such the principle of Propertarian Strict Construction (as opposed to textualism’s strict construction) requires that we operationally define the construct of all any law. This principle is important because laws have the greatest affect on a polity – and often the greatest unintended effect upon individuals and the polity. ECONOMICS: PRAXEOLOGY Intuitionism (praxeology) in economics is important because manipulation of the economy causes redistributions, gains and losses. As a moral constraint, it is only slightly less influential than law. PSYCHOLOGY: OPERATIONISM Operationism in psychology was important in the recent transformation of psychology from a pseudoscience, to an experimental discipline, and because psychologists do produce, and did produce negative externalities – harm, to others. Not the least of which was multiple generations suffering from illnesses cast as cognitive problems. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/199/1/operat.htm MEDICINE: PROTOCOLISM (MEDICAL OPERATIONALISM) Medical treatments and tests are discussed as protocols. PHYSICS: OPERATIONALISM Operationalism is physics was important because it demonstrated that we expended a great deal of time and money by NOT practicing operationalism and that Einstein’s innovation should have been much earlier and could have been if we had practiced it. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/operationalism/ MATHEMATICS: INTUITIONISM Intuitionism in mathematics was less important because there are few if any externalities produced by classical mathematical operations other than the psychological fallacy that there exists some separate mathematical reality. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/ ECONOMIC INTUITIONISM/OPERATIONALISM IS MEANINGFUL Therefore the HIGHEST moral requirement for demonstration of construction is in the domain of economics wherein the greatest externalities are caused by economic policy. https://www.facebook.com/groups/750292715060100/

    Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    RATIONALISTS JUST HAVE IT BACKWARDS – JUSTIFICATION RATHER THAN CRITICISM.

    “The Silver Rule Wins over The Golden Rule Too – for the same reason.” Macro economic phenomenon are emergent and non-deducible even if they are explainable. As such economics is no different from any other constructed upon laws : theories of arbitrary precision open to constant reformation. For economic theories to be testified as true, we must demonstrate that they are open to construction by sympathetic tests. As such, just as the golden rule is backwards, and the silver rule is correct, Mises just has praxeology backwards, it’s that we can’t claim something is true unless we can explain it as rational actions, but that does not mean we cannot rely upon observations and instrumentation to help us observe and criticize emergent phenomenon. Empiricists claim that other than some intrinsic simple intuitions (grammar, intention, status signal, and empathy etc), all knowledge is gained from sense experience, and this includes all deductions (cognitive science agrees with this hypothesis). This is obvious to people educated after 1980, when cognitive science began to replace psychology, and accelerated after 2000, when pinker restated cognition. Instrumentalists argue, correctly, that phenomenon must be reduced to stimuli open to human sense experience and comparison. This is also obvious. But then how do we test our hypothesies? We cannot subjectively test physical phenomenon, nor can we reason with the first principles of the universe – we don’t know them. So for physical phenomenon we must create experiments to test our hypothesis, where in human phenomenon the same test results are obtained by introspection: if subject to the same stimuli would a reasonable person come to the same conclusion? We could not judge intent or trust others if we did not have this ability so we are marginally indifferent in our ability to judge intentions if possessed of similar (symmetric) knowledge. (This is why informational symmetry is so important.) So in matters of human action where we know the first principles, all phenomenon, whether deducible or emergent, must be explainable as a sequence of rational human actions each of which is subject to subjective testing by means of information and sympathy – or it cannot be true. Just as all measurements (observations) of physical tests must be possible to perform in order for the claims of the test to be true. (Bridgman). Just as all mathematical proofs must be open to construction via basic mathematical operations for them to be true. Just as any propertarian law must be constructed from productive, fully informed, warrantied, voluntary transfers free of negative externality. So all scientific disciplines are identical in dependence upon empirical (sense experience) instrumental (reduction to sense experience) operational (existentially possible) constraints. THE COUNTER-PROPOSITION No one disagrees that if economic phenomenon are not explainable in rational terms that the theory cannot be true. The question of economic science is how we can take advantage of emergent phenomenon to bring forward productivity and consumption (wealth) as a means of improving the commons. This is the purpose of credit and interest. But this principle can be applied in hundreds of permutations throughout the economy. The moral (German Austrian) implication, is that this study must eschew immoral manipulation (thefts) and work only to improve the institutional means of moral cooperation without the conduct of thefts. The immoral (anglo empirical) implication is that this study should seek Pareto optimums (Rawlsian ethics) by reframing ‘harm’ by discounting loss of choice by some to redistribute choice to others. I agree with the German thesis, and expressly disagree with the anglo universalist fallacy which has gotten us to this state entirely because anglos were able to seduce the germans into the world war. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine

    JUSTIFICATION VS CRITICISM : WARRANTY IN NORMATIVE CONTRACT VS WARRANTY IN EXPLORATION INDEPENDENT OF NORMS

    First, what do we mean by “knowledge”, and of those things we mean, what is merely allegory, and what is necessity? Little of the universe is absent regular patterns. However, some are very noisy and difficult to find. Some are very subtle and hard to find. Some are either too large or too small to observe without relying upon instruments, and others must be deduced using logical instruments. We call these regular patterns ‘information’. Humans can modify the real world in a variety of ways, leaving information behind. We can do this as simply leaving evidence of passage through a forces or field, or in archeological evidence. We can do this intentionally with cave paintings and writing. And we can do it with our architecture, monuments and earth works. We can do this by the memories that we transfer between generations through repetition of experience, advice and story. A computer must run a program to create the experience we see before us when using it. Information must mix with memories, to create the experience we call ‘knowing’. Knowledge is reconstructed from information by mixing with existing memories, just as meaning is transferred by the use of analogies to transfer properties. So information exists without a knowing subject. And that information may be very good, or very bad at producing the experience of knowledge in a subject. But in colloquial language we seem to have an intellectual bias that wants to separate untrue knowledge from true, or at least tested, knowledge thereby conflating QUALITY of knowledge and EXISTENCE of knowledge. We can forgive philosophers this common error, since they are concerned most often with the persuasive quality (truth) of propositions. And if we look carefully at the discussion of ‘knowledge’ we find philosophers conflating (a)existence/awareness, (b) risk/willingness to act, (c) truth content. And moreover, truth content consists of two additional properties: (c.i) persuasive power assuming an honest participant, and (c.ii) parsimonious correspondence with reality (what we mean by ‘true’). The reason that discussion of knowledge is problematic is that this term is a sort of catch-all for these separate properties. And so like many concepts, argument is a problem of conflating properties, each of which exists on a separate spectrum. “Knowing” could mean ‘awareness gained through experience’, or ‘given what we know from experience, I am willing to act upon it’, or knowing could mean ‘through experience we believe this is true’. So I think that the only POSSIBLE meaning of the category ‘knowledge’ is ‘awareness of a regular pattern that allows us to predict something, even if it is only to predict in the sense of identifying something as part of a category – the most simple prediction possible. And then we have the persuasive power of knowledge in convincing the self or others, first to state something is possible, then second to state something is worthy of action (risk). For example, no one ‘knows’ how to build a computer (or a cheeseburger for that matter) in the sense that they possess knowledge of construction of the constituent parts. So some knowledge can never be centralized except as a hierarchy of abstractions – trust in one another’s claim to actionable knowledge. For these reasons (the number of causal axis in the category we call knowledge), I think we cannot improve upon casting knowledge as: (a) awareness (existence) of a regular pattern combining information and memory to create an experience, which we then also remember. (b) all knowledge is theoretical, and open to revision (no premises are certain) where theoretical propositions contain both: (d) truth content(parsimonious correspondence with reality). (c) persuasive power (sufficiency) in an honest discourse(risk reduction/reward increase), JUSTIFICATOIN VERSUS CRITICISM = CONTRACT VS TRUTH So I my problem is that ‘justified true belief’ is not false under the test of risk, but is not meaningful under the test of analytic truth. In this sense, it depends upon which thing we are talking about: willingness to act (justified true belief), willingness of others to insure actions (contractual justified true belief), and analytic truth (parsimonious correspondence with reality). If a man gives witness in testimony and later on we find a video of the events, and it turns out that he is wrong, but that it is easy to understand how he was mistaken, we do not consider his testimony false. We only warranty what rational man is capable of warranting. In science we warranty that we have done due diligence: we have criticized our own arguments. We testify that we have done due diligence – we have criticized our own position. In this sense both justified true belief is necessary for contractual propositions, while critical rationalism (warranty) is the only epistemological possibility we can rely upon. The fact that argument evolved out of law (debate in the polis) probably explains the origin of conflation of contractual justification according to the norms of the polity, with the pursuit of analytic truth in epistemological exploration. The fact that most human action is contractual, and very little of our lives epistemic, explains the persistence of both the contractual (justificationary),and epistemic (critical scientific) as method, and the conflation of the term knowledge as a general term covering both contractual and epistemic uses. Norms guide most human actions. Norms are habituated and therefore reduced to intuitions to function. The norms are contractual (justificationary – so that we avoid blame). Science by contrast, produces not actions but testimony. The problem is inverted. In science all we produce is testimony regardless of normative rules. In normative relations we produce actions that we justify as according to the normative rules of society. So we testify that we were justified according to norms in contractual relations, and we testify that our statements are free of norms, imaginary, error, bias, habituated deception and outright deception, in science. This is why science is a luxury good: it’s terribly expensive, and scientific testimony is terribly expensive. Justification allows us to use scientifically tested or evolutionarily tested general rules in real world actions – contractual relations. And must. We cannot create general rules out of justificationary testimony, only out of critical testimony. For this reason, both justificationary and critical testimony will persist forever. While our warranties must be given by critical means, our testimony is forever justificationary. (I think that is fairly profound). As far as I know, albeit in brief, this is the most accurate statement of our extant understanding of the question of knowledge, and why it has been so troublesome a concept. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine  

    SCIENCE AS TRUTHFUL SPEECH – GERMAN RATIONALISM AND JEWISH COSMOPOLITANISM AS IMMORAL INFORMATION DISTORTION EQUAL TO THE INFORMATION DISTORTION OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS.

    Occam’s razor: Is it more likely that German rationalism and Jewish cosmopolitanism, both of which were intentionally designed as obscurant anti-scientific deceptions to re-impose their culture’s authoritarianism as a replacement for the faith needed to maintain group competitive evolutionary strategy, are correct in their classification of economics as an axiomatic logic (logically operational system), and that such a discipline is somehow not subject to the same moral and epistemological constraint in demonstrative method, as are all disciplines that claim to construct laws? Or is it more likely that all disciplines – economics and mathematics included – seek to produce laws from which they can construct models – and that the hypotheses, theories, and laws within those models, require the same moral constraints in demonstrated method regardless of discipline – logical(internally consistent), experimental (externally correspondent), operational(existentially possible), intuitionistic (subjectively testable), and moral (constrained to voluntary transfers) – BUT (and that BUT is important) that each discipline requires only some subset of such properties given the domain of inquiry? In other words, do not the moral rules developed in science constitute a universal method of moral inquiry into the production of true statements, regardless of discipline? Or are there no universal laws of moral inquiry for the purpose of developing truthful statements? Is it more likely that more complex systems require greater moral constraint (testing) prior to making truth claims, and less complex systems less moral constraint (testing) prior to making truth claims, and that whether we require more or less constraint prior to making truth claims, depends upon the properties from which any given system of reasoning is constituted? COMPARISONS So lets compare the different approaches on just a few axis: 1) Some economic laws are deducible VS Economic Regularities are explainable by deduction, and thus those hypothesis obtain the status of theory, and when all marginally impactful permutations are identified, these theories can be claimed truthfully as laws. 2) All economic laws are deducible VS Some economic laws are deducible perhaps, but that does not they are not empirically based (obtained through observation). It means only that no instrumentation other than human-sense-perception is needed to make those observations and deductions. While most non-trivial economic phenomenon and the hypotheses theories and laws we use to describe them are ONLY instrumentally and empirically observable. But once observed, with the assistance of further empirical observations, they are also explainable by deduction using sympathetic testing. 3) Economic laws are deterministic VS Economic Laws are imprecise general rules of arbitrary precision, that demonstrate the greatest variation in outcome, of all general rules of arbitrary precision in all systems dependent upon the operational use of regular patterns (other than language), in all the logics (identity, mathematics, physics, economics, and language) with the least (precise) determinacy of the logics; because: (a) humans act to bend such laws constantly, for personal gain, and; (b) humans attempt to mitigate determinacy (equilibrium) by constructing various permanent disequilibrium that they can continue to extract benefit from, and; (c) because causal density (opportunity) is so high, any equilibrating effect can be offset by any other equilibrating effect, and often function in combination, and; (d) because non-regular events, outside the normal distribution (shocks/black swans) are more influential and less predictable than regular patterns. 4) that economics is unique methodological area of inquiry VS economics benefits merely from the fact that we can subjectively test first principles, whereas in physical science, as yet, we do not know the first principles, while in identity, naming, mathematics, we do. Even if we do not know it *yet* in physics, economics, language, and imagination. If we know the first principles of any system, we can in fact, explain all phenomenon using those first principles. Even if we cannot imagine or deduce or hypothesize all consequentially emergent phenomenon. And since we cannot deduce all economic phenomenon (there are many unsolved problems of economics, as well as mathematics, and certainly of science). It may be possible that in any complex system we will never exhaust all emergent phenomenon (although this certainly seems unlikely if the universe is deterministic). UNDERSTANDING ARBITRARY PRECISION IN GENERAL RULES (note: this sequence is a particularly interesting new idea) The meaning of “arbitrary precision” across disciplines must be understood: (a) The predictive precision of Identity (laws of categorization) remains tautological no matter what we do. (b) The predictive precision of naming (laws of numbering) remains operational and tautological no matter what we do. (c) The predictive precision of Mathematical laws (laws of relations) remains constant independent of physical scale. But since mathematics is an axiomatic system, we cannot take action to alter the consequences of mathematical systems (grok that for a second). (d) The predictive precision of Physical laws (laws of causality) currently varies dependent upon physical scale because we do not know the first principles of the physical universe – yet. And we can alter the course of physical events and benefit from them – in fact the purpose of human action is to predict and alter the course of physical events in order to benefit from them. (e) The predictive precision of Economic Laws (laws of human cooperation) varies considerably, and we constantly alter the course of events to benefit from them, by attempting to outwit the altered course of events. (f) The predictive precision of Linguistic laws (laws of communication/negotiation) are extremely imprecise,demonstrating extraordinary variability, with only a few general, and somewhat deterministic rules such as the evolution toward song, or tonal speech, which requires less effort from the speaker, but the meaning of such speech appears both functional (increasing in information density while gradually losing earlier meaning). (g) The predictive precision of Laws of Imagination (laws by which we can imagine things) is unknown, but at least if operationally limited, appears to be FUNCTIONALLY unlimited. (A function is the name for collection of mental operations reduced to a general rule that obviates the need for performing more primitive operations – a mental habit that we can trust.) (h) The predictive precision of Inverse Laws of Imagination (laws by which we can describe categories that we cannot imagine), even if we can ever construct such a set of laws, is nearly useless except as a check on our claims of Laws of Imagination. This is because functions (general rules of arbitrary precision constituting deterministic results of complex operations) even if we cannot conceptualize the content of those functions (cannot operationalize them), appear at present to be infinitely scalable even if decreasingly precise. This is the problem with economic laws – they are extremely imprecise compared to physical laws, although possibly more precise than linguistic, imaginary and inverse-imaginary laws. Predicting the future location of water and gas molecules in real world phenomenon is almost impossible except at very loose degrees of precision. Predicting the future actions of man in real world scenarios is even less precise. We can explain, historically, what man accomplished, but we cannot predict what any individual will experience. Because of the time and complexity of human phenomenon, just as in physical phenomenon, we can act to alter the course of events to some degree, within the bounds of those imprecise laws. Now there may be consequences to these actions: saving and interest have positive cumulative consequences, and expansionary credit has negative cumulative consequences. But that is not to say that we cannot distinguish between those actions that we can take to alter the course of events that produce positive and negative consequences. And that we cannot act to profit from the positive, and avoid actions that are negative. Banking and interest are economic actions. Weights and measures are positive economic actions. Laws that suppress free riding in all forms are positive economic actions. States as Insurer of last resort appear to produce a mix of positive and negative but overwhelmingly positive results. All these institutional actions constitute good policy – the production of beneficial commons that facilitate cooperation and prosperity. Furthermore, the extension of organized suppression of free-riding into the bureaucracy, and into the system of representation, by eliminating the monopoly bureaucracy, and eliminating political representation, and eliminating legislative law, might be an additional institutional improvement that would facilitate human cooperation and prosperity. Now we can argue that the Keynesian attempt to distort the monetary information system by involuntarily increasing everyone’s risk through ‘lying’ about demand, and therefore increasing employment and consumption is a terrible means by which to interfere with the economy. It is only slightly better than the destruction of the information system by which we cooperate in the economy by socialist and communist folly. But we may not say that there are other economic institutions that we could experimentally construct that would provide improved means of cooperation, and prosperity that would not constitute lies, any more than credit and interest constitute lies. For example, – To create an urban market, members (shareholders) must suppress the profitability of raiding and conquest of their market by those who are not shareholders. – If tribal raiders and herdsman want to participate in an urban market then they must eschew theft and raiding for entry into the market. That is a voluntary exchange. – If farmers work the land, and want to participate in the market using their excess production in order to buy goods that they cannot produce themselves, they must obey the rules of buyers and sellers set by the shareholders of the market. – If people wish to abandon self production, and work entirely within the market they must adopt the behavior of shareholders and defend the exclusive means of their sustenance. – If people no longer can work in self production, nor can they work in the market in order to obtain their sustenance, then they have no means of survival so continuing to participate in the shareholder agreement is no longer a rational exchange. – If people who cannot work in the market are willing to work to maintain the shareholder agreement for shareholders (maintain the commons, including the commons of property rights, which makes the voluntary organization of production possible) then it is rational to pay them to construct the voluntary organization of production and to return to being consumers within that market – their contribution being not the consumption, but the production of the voluntary organization of production itself. However it is also rational to limit those people to one child so that they both can reproduce, but not commit the immoral act of imposing costs upon those who are productive, by generating additional offspring. This then constitutes a voluntary exchange and productive work, even if those people are not participating in the production of goods and services, they are participating in and being paid for the effort of constructing the voluntary organization of production. So to say that it is not rational or scientific or necessary to experiment in the economy, or that such experimentation is not empirical (open to observation and measurement), is clearly false. It is merely that there are moral and immoral means of doing so, and that monetary policy as we currently practice it is immoral – and not very intelligent. It produces the predicted results. So it is clearly scientific and ‘true’. But that does not mean it isn’t immoral and harmful. And the cumulative effect of this policy is empirically genocidal by all extant measures. SO BACK TO OCCAM’S RAZOR: Isn’t the purpose of Rationalist and Cosmopolitan arguments of the heterodox so-called, Austrians, merely convoluted verbal justification for rebelling against political experimentation in the manipulation of the economy for the purpose of producing commons? Isn’t all their obscurantism just pseudoscientific justification for the desire to justify non-contribution to the commons? Isn’t it just an elaborate excuse for free riding? Isn’t the more simple answer that each logic that we have developed was developed to test certain subsets of properties, and that each subset of properties requires testing against error, bias and deception. And that as the complexity of the phenomenon increases we must test or not test those properties intrinsic to the system that we seek to test? Isn’t our fascination with the rules of mathematics simply because the means of deduction and the means of explanation are nearly identical: mathematical operations? Whereas mathematical discovery, all conclusions are assumed in the axioms and state-independent, whereas the result of human cooperation is determined more so by externalities than by the general rules? And that for any individual, events they experience are kaleidic and economic laws are only predictive in the aggregate? Isn’t all the information necessary for prediction in an axiomatic system present at the definition of the axioms, while limited and insufficiently predictive information is present in economic laws? Aren’t economic laws the equivalent of bell-curves, rather than demonstrated tails? Isn’t the information necessary to predict tail events many orders of magnitude higher than predicting events in a regular distribution? So the demonstrated evidence in the history of rationalism, the obvious incentives of rationalists as authoritarians, and the logical conclusion we must come to, is that deductive reasoning is non-predictive. Because deduction did not produce general economic rules, and it cannot identify candidates for general rules. It can only test whether general rules are true regardless of their origins, and explain those general rules as a set of operations. Because we are not scientifically testing, experimenting with, those laws of human behavior, but we are scientifically testing the interactions of those various laws of human behavior in kaleidic action, and taking advantage of altering those phenomenon of human activity just as we take advantage of altering the course of events of physical phenomenon. We are not testing first principles but the interaction between emergent phenomenon caused by the use of those principles in real time. The laws of the physical universe and of man, appear to be trivial, but the emergent phenomenon of those simple rules appears to be infinite and unpredictable, even if they are explainable. The physical universe and man, may in fact, follow predictable regular rules. Those rules are only interesting and useful in so far as we can learn how to bend them, and break them, for our use. Property rights for example, bend and break human behavior. Credit and interest for example let us bend and break human behavior. Monogamous marriage lets us bend and break human behavior. The extension of property rights and the prohibition on inbreeding bent and broke the human behavior that made high velocity economies possible. First principles of human behavior may exist but novel means of manipulating it for the production of prosperity are always available to us. THE PURPOSE OF TRUTH IS TESTIMONY – OUR INFORMATION SYSTEM Just as we may not interfere with the monetary system because of the cumulative effect of ‘lies’ created by informational distortion, we may not interfere with the ‘truthful’ information system created by verbal error, bias, distortion and deception, because of the cumulative effect of ‘lies’ created by error, bias, and deception. There is no reason we must hide our group evolutionary strategies, other than for the purposes of parasitism – lying. And if we wish to understand the law of human cooperation, it is that cooperation is only rational in the absence of parasitism, and that only truthful, fully informed, productive, warrantied, voluntary exchange free of negative externality constitutes ‘true’ information. And that all else is, just as monetary information is, THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER SOMETHING IS EMPIRICAL OR RATIONAL, BUT WHETHER IT IS TRUE, TRUTHFULLY STATED, AND WARRANTED. And there is but one universal moral principle: (a) truthfully stated (b) fully informed (c) productive (d) warrantied (e) voluntary exchange (f) free of negative externality And there is but one universal moral warrant: that any statement is: (a) internally consistent (logically tested) (b) externally correspondent (evidentially tested as meaningfully predictive and/or explicative) (c) falsifiable and falsified (tested for parsimony) (d) existentially possible (operationally defined) (e) moral(independent of immoral transfer) As such, since German Rationalism, and Jewish Cosmopolitan Rationalism is not warranted, truthful speech, and cannot constitute a moral, voluntary exchange, and is equal in immorality to economic disinformation created by distortion of the money supply. It’s not that Keynesian economics is unscientific it’s that it’s immoral. It’s not so much that German Rationalism and Jewish Cosmopolitan rationalism are not simply a backwards-expression of intuitionism and operationalism under empiricism, despite it’s inability to produce insights and only explain them. It’s instead, that the rationalist position is an attempt to intellectual outlaw investigation into emergent economic phenomenon – which is the purpose of scientific investigation, just as much as experimental psychology is the discipline that investigates first principles – and which has discovered the reason for our long list of cognitive biases that produce non-rational actions not anticipated by the classical model. There is no need for German and Jewish dishonest Rationalism, any more than there is a need for Keynesian dishonest economics. Liberty is possible under science, because science is the language of morality – of truthful speech free of involuntary transfer, by fraud. Liberty is a synonym for objective morality. Our solution is neither British Keynesian immorality nor German and Jewish immorality, nor anglo-american pseudoscientific immorality (neo-puritanism), but truth speaking, and moral, voluntary exchange across peoples with different evolutionary strategies. Truth, Science, and Morality are synonyms. And we would all be better off without all the immorality, pseudoscience, rationalism, and lying. Voluntary exchange is enough. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    THE REFORMATION OF WESTERN THOUGHT

    Science as we understand it is an attempt to create a discipline of truthful speech. Science as we understand it does not ‘recognize’ this attribute of science. Science as we understand it does not include those properties we call costs. Science as we understand it does not include those properties we call moral. Science as we understand it can be extended to include those properties we call costs and morality. Science as we understand it can then be restated as the discipline of constructing moral truthful speech. Science then is identical to epistemology in philosophy, and philosophy en toto as a discipline is begun, as its first purpose, with ethics (morality), not metaphysics. Law can now be scientifically constructed. Truth, science, law, morality are now identical. All else currently masquerading as philosophy, is no longer categorizable as philosophy, but as theology, psychology, or deception. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine.

    TRANSLATING KANTIAN RATIONALISM INTO SCIENTIFIC AND TESTIMONIAL SPEECH

    Lets translate Kantian Rationalism into scientific and testimonial speech. I’m going to teach epistemology by using economics in order to repair much of the damage that has been done to epistemology by the Platonists(mathematics), and the Rationalists (Kant etc), and the Analytic Philosophers (Just about all of the 20th century). *Reality consists of a limited number of actionable dimensions and by using economics we are able to include all of them, and therefore avoid the errors that the platonists, rationalists, and analytics have introduced into philosophy. “DEFINITIONS AND SERIES” 1) Empirical: Based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic. “From Observation”. 2) A Priori: “independent of observation.” There are three dimensions to claims of a priori truth claim: i) Aprioricity vs A posteriori, ii) Analyticity vs Syntheticity, and iii) Necessity vs Contingency Therefore we can produce at least the following spectrum of a priori claims. (a) Analytic A Priori: tautological: 2+2=4 and all deductions thereof. (b) Synthetic A Priori : Increasing money increases inflation. (c) Necessary Synthetic A Priori: Childless women will have no grandchildren. (d) Contingent Synthetic A Priori: “all other things being equal, as a general trend, increasing demand will increase supply, although we cannot know the composition of that supply in advance, we can identify it from recorded evidence.” This produces a an ordered spectrum of declining precision: (a) Identity(categorical consistency) – Analytic A Priori (b) Logical:(internal consistency) – Nec. Synthetic a priori (c) Empirical: (external consistency) – Gen. Synth. a priori (d) Existential: (operational consistency) – Cont. Synth. a priori Which corresponds to the testable dimensions of numbers. (a) identity (numbers) (b) logical (sets) (c) empirical (ratios) (d) existential (constructible) (e) time is unaccounted for in the a priori model. Which corresponds to dimensions of physical reality (a) point (b) line (c) shape (d) object (e) time (change) Which corresponds to a subset of the dimensions of actionable reality , the full set of which we express in fully express in Testimonialism as: (a) Identity(categorical consistency)(point) (b) Logical:(internal consistency)(line) (c) Empirical: (external consistency)(shape) (d) Existential: (operational consistency)(object) (e) Volitional: (rational choice of rational actor)(change) (f) Reciprocal: ( rational exchange between rational actors)(changes) (g) Limited: (Limits: At what points does the description fail?) (h) Fully Accounted: (Have all costs and consequences been accounted for – defense against cherry picking and special pleading.) Which together account for the totality of actionable reality (by man) that we currently know of (and its quite hard to imagine anything else is possible). DEDUCTIBILITY FROM A-PRIORI PROPOSITIONS Ergo, while one can claim the tautological truth (the Analytic A Priori), and one can claim the ideal(logical) truth (the Necessary Synthetic A Priori), one cannot ever know the non-tautological(identity, The Synthetic A Priori), non-ideal(Contingent Synthetic A Priori ) truth, because we rarely possess sufficient information to do so. What does this mean? It means that we can deduce from Analytic A Priori and Necessary Synthetic A Priori, but we cannot deduce from General Synthetic A Priori, or Contingent Synthetic A Priori Statements because we cannot know if such deductions are true (for specific cases). So the problem with making a priori claims in economics is that you can say statements about statements but not about consequences in reality. You can only say ‘all other things being equal’, we should observe this effect. You cannot say, “we will always observe this effect’. Why? Because we don’t always observe such effects, and economics is rife with examples, the most commonly cited being unemployment does not necessarily increase, and prices are sticky – and for good reason. (NOTE: Now that’s sufficiently complicated that I almost confused myself, and I might need a day away from it to make sure I didn’t screw up what someone might read into those last two paragraphs, but otherwise it’s correct.) The innovation that menger brought to the table was to bring the principle of relative change from calculus to economics. The principle contribution of hayek was to transform transform the use of materials to the use of information as the model for all social phenomenon. The principle contribution of Popper was to bring the information model to philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of science and to model scientific investigation on a market. This followed the transition in physics from the use of electromagnetic fields to that of information. Which then brought physics and mathematics into full correspondence. What Hayek and popper and the classicals and the keynesians all missed and brouwer in math, bridgman in physics, and mises in economics, and the entire analytic and continental movements missed was that man cannot make truth claims. For example, we did not think the ideas of time(velocity of change), length(distance), and space(volume) varied. Einstein’s discovery was the same as mises’, brouwer’s and bridgman’s: that all our pretense of axioms are false. If our idea of length and time can be false, every other idea that is obvious to our senses and reason can be false. The difference between economics and physics is in : (a) volition vs determinism (b) reciprocity vs transformation (c) sympathetic testing of rational choice vs entropy. THE SCIENTIFIC (UNIVERSAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL) METHODDEFLATION” (0) The purpose of the scientific method is to eliminate ignorance, error, bias, wishful thinking, suggestion, obscurantism, fictionalism, and deceit from our statements about reality. “DIMENSION” (1) We can make: (a) statements about experiences(metaphysical), or (b) statements about statements(ideal), or (c) statements about existential properties(existential/real), or (d) statements about existential cause and effect(change). (e) statements about volition “CLOSURE” (2) No test of any dimension can be completed without appeal to the subsequent dimension. (ie: godel. this is profoundly important. no dimension can provide a self-test.) Ergo, all speech is deflationary. “CRITICAL RATIONALISM” (3) All descriptive propositions of existential cause and effect (change) are contingent. “CRITICAL PREFERENCE” (4) The only method of decidability between two or more non-false cause and effect propositions(change) is cost. This is a clarification of Occam’s razor. And appears to be true, for the simple reason that nature cannot but choose the least cost method, and man generally chooses the least cost method – even if we cannot know the full causal density of his considerations. DUE DILIGENCE AGAINST IGNORANCE, ERROR, BIAS, DECEIT (5) The only method of making a truth claim is to perform due diligence in each dimension of reality (a ‘premise’ of the consequential dimension) applicable to the cause and effect phenomenon. (ie:physical world can’t engage in rational choice, or voluntary exchanges) Again, those dimensions are: (a) Identity(categorical consistency)(point) (b) Logical:(internal consistency)(line) (c) Empirical: (external consistency)(shape) (d) Existential: (operational consistency)(object) (e) Volitional: (rational choice of rational actor)(change) (f) Reciprocal: ( rational exchange between rational actors)(changes) (g) Limited: (Limits: At what points does the description fail?) (h) Fully Accounted: (Have all costs and consequences been accounted for – defense against cherry picking and special pleading.) “DARWINIAN SURVIVAL OF IDEAS” (6) All propositions (facts, propositions, theories) must survive the markets for criticism at the observer-mental-testing, observer-action testing, market application testing, and market survival testing. In other words, the universal epistemological method follows this lifecycle: (a) observation (b) *Free association* (F -> observation) (c) test of reasonability (F -> free association ) (d) *Hypothesis* (e) Perform Due Diligence (a-h) above. (F -> free association ) (f) *Theory* (g) Publish to the market for application (h) Survival in the market for application(F ->observation – of failures ) (i) *Law* (j) Survival in the market for refutation (F-> observation – of failures) (k) *Habituation into metaphysical assumptions* “SPECIAL CASES” 7) This universal epistemological process is universal despite the fact that various results can be identified with it. Because just as we find prime numbers largely by trial and error we find special cases of statements by trial and error. But when we find these statements we have to ask ourselves what is it we are finding? (a) Sensations: statements about experiences(metaphysical), or (b) Logic(analytic): statements about statements(ideal), or (c) Fact: statements about existential properties(existential/real), or (d) Theory(Synthetic): statements about existential cause and effect(change). (e) Morality: statements about volition (f) Testimony: statements about the fully accounted change in state of a given instance of the statement we are making (I have a credit card report that shows John Doe, on 1/1/2018 at 4:06:32 exchanged $2.00 for a hershey’s candy bar at Don’s newspaper stand then existing on 225th and Main in Cityname.”) EXAMPLES The most common special cases that we find are those that are impossible to contradict at the same dimension. (a,b,c,d,e) above. (a) Sense(Metaphysics): we cannot sense a ball is green and red all over at the same time. (b) Logic: If I issue credit on fractional reserves, I will increase the supply of money. (c) Fact: The differences between commodity money and note money include but are not limited to: liquidity, demand, exchange fee or interest gain, portability(weight/volume), reserve risk, vendor risk. (d) Theory: All other things being equal, if we increase the supply of money, prices will eventually increase accordingly and lower the purchasing power of payments against debts. (e) Morality: All other things being equal, when we force majoritarian decisions on the polity by using representative democracy, we create a monopoly out of the market for the commons, and eliminate the possibility of cooperating on means even if we pursue different ends. “ECONOMIC LEVERS” Polities can generally use this series of levers to affect the economy. -Near Term- (a) Monetary Policy (b) Fiscal Policy (Spending) -Medium Term- (c) Trade Policy (import export policies, foreign trade policies) (d) Regulatory/Legislative Policy (also includes price controls etc) (e) Immigration-Deporation policy / Expand military, WPA etc. -Long Term- (f) Human Capital Policy (Education policy) (g) Institutional Policy (laws, regulations, bureaucracies, institutions, banks) (h) Strategic (military) Policy “SCHOOLS OF ECONOMICS” The schools of economics reflect the culture and class of their origins. These groups do not acknowledge that their strategies and biases are as I”ve stated them here but their research evidence states the contrary. So I have tried to provide a general Spectrum of the institutions by what I understand is their culture/class bias. a) “Austrian / Rothbardian” (“Jewish”, Separatist) : Rule of Credit, Parasitic Optimum, Separatist / Anarchism. +Financial Class Bias. Anti-Commons Bias. (As far as I know, no university teaches the Jewish Austrian method.) b) “Mason-ism” (“Anglo Libertarian”, Right ) : Optimum Rule of Law, Nash Optimum, Minimal State / Christian Monarchy +Entrepreneurial Class Bias. (the only University I know of using this program is George Mason.) The “Mason-Libertarian” school places greater emphasis on maximizing the voluntary cooperation of individuals and organizations through reduction of impediments to ethical and moral cooperation. c) “Classical” (“Chicago”, Anglo, Center Right), Rule of Law, Insured Nash Optimum, Parliamentary State / Classical Liberalism. +Middle classes bias. (I would argue ‘not biased’) All other things being equal, the Chicago school places greater emphasis on policy that insures against error and failure by seeking formulas and rules that investors, businesses, and consumers can predict, thereby preserving rule of law, and maintaining the prohibition on discretionary rule. d) “Mainstream” (“Saltwater”, Center Left) : Mixed Discretionary Rule, Pareto Optimum, Social Democracy +Working Class Bias, Consumer Bias, Female bias(anti-male bias). Minority(anti-white) bias. Underclass Bias (anti-entreprenurial bias). All other things being equal the mainstream seeks to optimize consumption at all times, using every lever available, and favors abandoning rule of law, and adopting rule that is increasingly empirical, reactive, and discretionary. e) “Left Mainstream” (“Saltwater”, “Jewish left”) : Authoritarian Rule, Anti-Aristocracy(War), Extractive Maximum (Predatory), Socialism/Communism +Underclass (outsider) Bias. This is the Krugman/Stiglitz/Delong club of leftist economists maximizing both consumption and financial extraction as a means of undermining western aristocratic civilization and western norms and traditions and rule of law. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS –“…performative…” You keep using terms that I don’t think you understand, which is why Kant invented those terms: to conflate the empirical and the rational. He was afraid of the anglo empirical revolution. For good reason. —“…morality…”— Correct. Morality (reciprocity) requires inter-agent action. So does all economic activity. Economic activity can consist of moral (reciprocal) and immoral (unequal, irreciprocal) actions. We can make a claim that statements about irreciprocal (involuntary) actions in economics are immoral or we can claim that they are false. Whether you understand it or not, Mises is saying that its false not immoral, when he says ‘it’s not economics’. —“That you can verify something in reality doesn’t mean you need to empirically test it.”— We cannot solve the problem of ‘all other things being equal’ in order to understand why predicted phenomenon either vary widely, or do not exist. The neutrality of money does not appear to exist, because relative changes can propagate into various niches that absorb those changes, just like pennies being lost in landfills (so to speak). —“I can observe that two plus two equals four but I don’t need to design an empirical test to prove it.”— Yes but then it’s a tautology, whereas the nearly all economic phenomenon are only general rules. —“Likewise, I can observe that minimum wages increase unemployment all other things being equal, but I don’t need to conduct an empirical test to prove it.”— That’s just the thing, we aren’t trying to prove that it should increase unemployment, only that it turns out it that a lot of the time it doesn’t. Or rather, that the consequences of it are externalized and invisible. So where does it go? Well first it increases prices to consumers in the case of minimum wage workers it maintains employment but it prevents rotation of new workers into the economy. And the question is, is that a net gain or a net loss for everyone? Well, it’s immoral to both conduct the test, and the consequences are immoral. But does that mean the those consequences are not empirically measurable and therefore whether the policy is net beneficial? That is what economists measure. Secondly, if we think some good is achieved through raising the minimum wage, how can we accommodate the externality of lower rotation through the job pool? For example what if raising the minimum wage prevents least common denominator service economies? (Racing to the bottom). Is that something people prefer? In other words, would you rather have better service and higher unemployment (and greater subsidies for non-performers?) The underlying question is this: if prices are increasing profits can we capture more of that increase for hourly employees than we do for management, owners, and investors (or creditors)? So there is no difference between increasing the supply of money in order to temporarily increase consumer purchasing power at the expense of debt-holders, and increasing the minimum wage in order to capture a rise in prices for laborers at the expense of owners and investors. Or stated even more simply: given that economies are always changing velocities, can we redirect changes in state between participants without ‘killing the goose’ (destroying the system of production). Well the answer is a moral one, not a logical or empirical one. And the reason to claim otherwise is to use the false pretense of ‘unscientific’ or ‘logical positivism’ or ‘a priori’ or ‘logical contradiction’ to create a straw man as a means of preventing investigation into the science of economic immorality: economic manipulation by the forcible involuntary transfer of property between individuals. (Which is exactly what mises and rothbard were doing: shaming via straw man using obscurantism by overloading even well intended people with half truths that when fully expressed are false.) That’s the question people ask with these issues. No one questions if it will increase unemployment. They question the limit before it increases negative unemployment. The same as taxation. No one questions that taxation will produce declining revenues. But empirically, what is the maximum taxation that they govt can achieve before that happens – and what are the consequences. CLOSING Now you probably have no idea how profound this bit of text is. And I suspect you could spend a few months integrating it into your thought process. But that’s in large part, the state of the art in epistemology. THUS ENDETH THE LESSON. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

    WHICH IS MORE LIKELY THE CASE: A PURPOSEFUL DECEPTION OR THE POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-SCIENTIFIC RATIONALISM?

    That people “do things for reasons” tells us precisely nothing about the emergent effects of economic phenomenon, nor how to manipulate the economic information system such that we shift production and consumption forward. That people do things for reasons tells us precisely nothing about the temporal relations between cause and effect, and whether we can manipulate conditions to mitigate effects or change time. That people do things for reasons tells us precisely nothing about how to deduce emergent phenomenon. Scientists were borne out and praxeology abandoned: praxeology was unfruitful as a means of exploration. And it was unfruitful because the information necessary to perform a deduction (which what a deduction requires) does not exist in the axioms. THIS IS NON ESCAPABLE DEFECT OF AXIOMATIC PRAXEOLOGY – which is why Mises and Rothbard both had to admit that economics was both rational and empirical. One cannot deduce true conclusions from false premises. And incomplete premises provide insufficient information for the construction of deductive truths. So what is more likely? That instrumentalism empiricism, operational definitions and intuitionistic testing are necessary in economics just as they are in all fields? Or that economics is somehow “unique”, and that rationalism is just another authoritarian program with a deceptive hidden agenda masked by obscurantist language? Even if both propositions were demonstrably equally fruitful, which one is warrantable? In other words, if you will be put to death for being wrong, in a choice between a rationally deduced justification and a ratio empirically criticized definition, which do you choose to bet your life upon? It is one thing to make a statement of faith, another to review the history of rationalist thought, and particularly of cosmopolitan rationalism, and concluding that it has been and remains a failed enterprise. Mises only wants to ban government interference in the economy so that he can persist in non-contribution to the commons, and systemic parasitism. All his work is a justification of that separatist ambition. Mises suggests we create a model out of economic laws, but admits that we must use empirical evidence to identify those laws. So just as we create a model of physical reality without nowing first principles, we create a model of cooperative economic reality knowing first principles. But just as we may never deduce the full compliment of permutations and emergent phenomenon from simple physical rules (see Fractal logic) we may never deduce the full compliment of permutations and emergent phenomenon from simple behavioral rules. This is the nature of complexity. As such, while we can explain emergent phenomenon we cannot deduce it. And without instrumentation we cannot observe it. I think the entire intellectual world has explained sufficiently that the promise of praxeology is nonsense. I think that we now understand the anglo, german and cosmopolitan errors. I think it is obvious that praxeology is a defense of cosmopolitan separatism – an attempt to prohibit the production of an economic commons that is inescapable by free riders. I think the whole intellectual world has demonstrated convincingly that economics is practiced as a science, and must be practiced as a science, and that all insights of the German Austrians were added to mainstream economics, and the jewish Austrian movement was abandoned as unscientific (untrue). It is only recently that we know the motivations for creating an untrue proposition – or at least an unproductive pseudoscientific resistance movement. Just as marx, cantor, and freud were cosmopolitan pseudoscientific reactionaries, mises and rothbard were cosmopolitan pseudoscientific reactionaries. I am trying only to demonstrate the libertine movement, like all three cosmopolitan movements, is an obscurantist and dishonest one, so that in the future others can outlaw all obscurantists attacks on high trust civilization by mystical, rationalist and pseudoscientific means. I originally meant only to criminalize Postmodernism, until I understood that socialism, postmodernism, libertinism, and neo-conservatism had the same objective – the destruction of the western high trust ethic, and the western competitive advantage of creating commons, by preventing the construction of commons, licensing parasitism on any commons, and forcing the people to pay the costs of adventurism that is against their self interest but within their moral dispositions. As such, all libertine arguments, like all cosmopolitan arguments, are either lies by their originators, or vectors for lies by unwitting fools. As such it is necessary to construct an honest, truthful, scientific institutional model for the construction of a condition of liberty by the only means possible: expansion of property rights to prohibit all such forms of fraud and theft by obscurantist deception. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine  

    THE ANTI-ROTHBARDIAN CANON

    (intellectual arms dealing) (retaking the brand of liberty from the lunatic fringe) [R]othbardians are relying upon and spreading numerous fallacies: (a) the fallacy of the NAP/IVP as the moral and legal basis for an anarchic polity, (b) the fallacy of aggression rather than the necessity of trust, (c) and the fallacies of the origin of property rights as either intrinsic or augmentative, (d) and the fallacy that economics is aprioristic rather than empirical and operational. And because of these fallacies, all Rothbardians – and in practice, all anarcho-libertarians who subscribe to these fallacies – expend politically wasted effort themselves, distract from more productive efforts of others, perpetuate ideas that have been demonstrated to fail in the market for political preference, materially harmed the brand of liberty, and hindered our possibility of obtaining liberty by confusion, misdirection and delay. Rothbardian ethics are objectively immoral under rational analysis, and the market has deemed them immoral by experience, consideration and intuition. All forward motion on liberty has been toward classical liberalism and classical liberal ethics, and decidedly against rothbardian ethics – contrary to the claims of rothbardians. Since libertarian leaders have worked for and achieved a cult language and cult status that is insulated from criticism and innovation by faith in these principles; then the only alternative is to make rothbardian and misesian arguments intellectually embarrassing, and argumentatively impossible to use in public discourse, by arming opponents with the means to defeat them. At the very least this will limit the damage that they can do. But it will also cleanse the liberty movement, and the brand name ‘libertarian’ of its acquired continental and cosmopolitan absurdity, and allow classical liberals, aristocratic egalitarians, and private government advocates, all of whom advocate for high trust societies, to return the discourse on liberty to rational, empirical, and historical grounds. CONTRARY TO ROTHBARDIAN AND MISESIAN COSMOPOLITAN FALLACIES:FREE RIDING -free riding vs natural rights- 1) Upon agreeing to cooperate, one takes upon the moral hazard of free riding. Free riding is an logical antagonist to cooperation. If free riding is present, then it is not logical to cooperate. Property emerged prior to economic production as a prohibition on free riding prior to the division of labor and most likely as monogamy. The property rights constitute a precise, positive legal articulation of the general negative necessity of preventing free riding such that cooperation is a rational choice. MINIMUM RIGHTS – minimum necessary set of property rights- 2) The minimum necessary prohibitions on free riding include both the criminal and the ethical, with the option for negotiation on the moral. Otherwise transaction costs are too high for the rational choice of an anarchic polity over an authoritarian one. No ingroup polity of any kind exists without inclusively criminal, ethical, and moral prohibitions. It is possible to construct a federation of polities, as the medieval monarchies demonstrated, wherein cooperation between factions is limited to low trust – enforcement of merely criminal prohibitions – but it is not possible to form a voluntary polity without prohibition of at least criminal and ethical, if not some modicum of moral prohibitions. People demonstrate that they will demand an authority to suppress immoral action, or to mandate universal moral behavior, if the common law does not provide a means of preventing immoral behavior. (Where immoral behavior constitutes an involuntary transfer of costs by moral hazard, most commonly in the form of free riding.) In other words, the jewish quarter and the transient gypsies can only survive if they constitute small minorities at the will of an omnipotent host ruler – which we saw under both byzantine, muslim and aristocratic european societies. That is not liberty. That is merely a form of tolerance used to reduce costs. INSUFFICIENCY OF NAP – the NAP/ISV is insufficient in scope for the formation of a voluntary polity – 3) The NAP under ISV only prohibits criminal, but not unethical or immoral or conspiratorial, or conquest behaviors. For this reason it is insufficient basis for the discipline of cooperation: ethics and morality, and as basis for the institution of law: the definition of property rights. Instead, property rights must address all ethical and moral conflicts that are necessary to eliminate market demand for authoritarian intervention. And since all objective moral arguments and corresponding property definitions, consist of involuntary transfers that violate the prohibition on free riding, we can construct no libertarian argument against it. Unless the scope of prohibitions on free riding is sufficient, transaction costs render demand for the state preferable to demand for liberty. IGNORING TRUST -the degree of trust determines economic velocity: wealth- 4) Secure, and extensive Property rights, that suppress free riding, such that all are required to contribute to production, rather than survive off of parasitism, create trust: the ability to take risks, and to increase the velocity of production and trade, by reducing transaction costs. The level of trust corresponds directly to the degree of suppression of free riding created by the scope of prohibition of property rights, enforceable under law. The economic velocity of an economy corresponds directly to the degree of trust formed in a polity by the legal enforcement of property rights. FAILED CONSTRUCTIVISM -Mises’ legacy is that he failed to produce a constructivist argument- 4) During the late nineteenth century a movement to prevent a newly emergent form of logical mysticism (platonism) emerged under various names: intuitionistic and constructivist mathematics, operationalism in science, various linguistic movements in logic, and misesian praxeology in economics. All of these movements correctly intuited some problem with the emerging platonic concept of truth, but failed to accomplish it. This is because, constructive proof, correspondent proof (testing) and correspondent hardening (falsification) were not understood as ethical prohibitions on truth claims – and that truth was performative. That the act of testimony required demonstration of construction (internal consistency) demonstrating knowledge of construction, in addition to correspondence (external correspondence which demonstrates knowledge of use), and attempted falsification (demonstrating knowledge of durability). Mises intuited correctly, like intellectuals in other fields, that something was erroneous with the work of positivist (correlative, but not causal) economists. But he failed to grasp that praxeology was a problem of empirical observation, reduction to operations, testing those operations by sympathetic experience, before one could make a truth claim about any economic phenomenon. Mises simply failed. He failed worse than the advocates of operationalism and intuitionism. Who only failed to overcome objections. But his failure was compounded by the fact that had he correctly identified the problem of performative truth – that the constraint upon economic statements was one of testimony (truth telling), rather than deduction from first principles, it is possible that the leaders of other fields would have understood their predicament, and correctly distinguished between performative truth, constructive truth, correspondent truth, and ultimate truth. ETHICAL AND EMPIRICAL NOT LOGICAL -praxeology is both an empirical, and an ethical constraint- 5) As such, praxeology, whether we constaint it to action (rational action), cooperation (ethics), or economics (the voluntary organization of production) is a scientific process like all other epistemic processes, where we make observations, construct a theory, test it for proof of correspondence, falsify it for proof of durability, test our knowledge of construction for proof construction, and testify that we have proofs of correspondence, falsification, construction, and therefore possess the ethical right to make a truth claim. Once we have made such a claim we have a theory. If we, as all specialists, cannot find a means of falsifying it, then we have a law. All empirical concepts must follow this process. All technological innovation must follow this process. All acts of production must follow this process. All pursuit of knowledge must follow this process. (Note: I am not sure if falsification is a test of parsimony or not. I think that may be the correct terminology – or something close.) CONFLATION OF THEORETICAL AND SCIENTIFIC -Conflation of Theoretically Descriptive Science with Axiomatically Prescriptive Logic- 6) The conflation of theoretical systems which are limited to their correspondence to reality, and axiomatic systems which are limited only to their statements. Theoretical systems consist of descriptive statements constrained by reality, and axiomatic systems consist of *prescriptive* statements, not constrained by reality. Mises claim that economics is both aprioristic, axiomatic and scientific is by definition a pseudoscientific statement, since the definition of a science is that which adheres to the scientific method. Models may be constructed by axiomatic declarations, but any correspondence with reality requires that we accept that those axiomatic declarations, constitute analogies to theoretical descriptions whose basis is always empirical. FALLACY OF A PRIORISM VS EMPIRICISM -Analysis of human behavior is an empirical pursuit- 7) Praxeology (the study of action) , The Logic of Cooperation (the study of ethics), and Economics (the study of the voluntary organization of production) meet the criteria for empirical sciences, under which, through observation, we can reduce to hypothesis, theory and law. And with these laws we can construct axioms, for use in models, which function as logical instruments that allow us to contemplate what our limited cognitive abilities cannot contemplate without the use of various logical instruments: language, narrative, Operationalism, logic, numbers, mathematics. We can then test the truth of these axioms operationally and attempt to deduce whether it is possible for rational actors to perform according to the hypothesis, theory and law. If we cannot operationally describe those actions, and validate them through sympathetic experience as being rational, then they are not true. (This is the technique used in intuitionist mathematics.) -constancy of relations vs arbitrary precision- While cooperative relations are inconstant, and arguably each action is unique, patterns of relations are not inconstant and unique, and because of chaotic distribution of information, information, incentives and actions (changes in state) organically distribute (evolve) at different rates. Therefore we can predict trends of patterns, but not individual actions, any more than we can predict the position of any given physical entity at the subatomic level. That we cannot predict anything other than as a probability over a given period of time, does not render something unobservable, or unscientific. We need only be able to demonstrate that in fact, regularity exists at some given level of precision over some period of time. That is what determines whether a deductive statement is expressible as an hypothesis, theory or law: whether we can determine some regularity at some **scale** – some level of precision. Infinite precision is not possible, but the standard of precision is determined by the maximum utility we can obtain at the minimum level of regularity we can observe and describe. This constitutes “the problem of arbitrary precision”: General rules (theories) require us to adopt the available level of precision. Pure mathematics uses completely arbitrary precision, which is why it scales infinitely. But once we apply any general mathematical rule, to any particular description of reality, we include the necessary level of precision in the context. Machining valve, sawing a 2×4, navigating a ship, navigating an interplanetary satellite, and measuring the distance to the farthest observable object require different levels of precision, and we can only achieve certain levels of precision. That does not mean we cannot perform those operations using the same mathematics. It merely means we must apply contextual precision. -the scope of newton’s laws- Newton’s laws for example, and geometry for that matter, remain constant at human scale. But at very large and very small scale, due to the problems of velocity and immeasurability these rules fail. There are no universal statements expressible as operations that are not reductio fallacies. All hypotheses, theories and laws are subject to increases in precision or loss of utility by replacement with other hypotheses theories and laws. -the unpredictability of gasses- We cannot predict the course of any particular molecule when releasing a gas, but that does not mean that we cannot predict the overall distribution of molecules upon their release, and the rate of its dispersion. -the neutrality of money- We argue that money is neutral, but only over long and unpredictable periods of time. Is that an empirical question, or a logical one? We can deduce it, and it appears logical, but is our evidence sufficient to consider it a Law, Theory or Hypothesis. At present it is merely an hypothesis. But it is certainly not a law. -the minimum wage- We argue that minimum wage increases unemployment. Is that a logical or empirical question but it does not increase unemployment for all of those employed, and it occurs over unpredictable periods of time. -emergent phenomenon: the stickiness of prices- We did not deduce that prices would be as sticky as they are. We discovered it empirically – by observation. Is the stickiness of prices sufficient to meet the standard of hypothesis, theory or law? At present it is a theory that is widely accepted. -the non-deducibility of emergent phenomenon- We cannot deduce nor have we deduced emergent economic phenomenon. We can validate economic propositions deductively by reducing them to a series of actions, each of which is subject to sympathetic experience, and as such open to a subjective test of rationality. But that too is an empirical test. We observe and sense our reactions. ARGUMENTATION (I don’t state this well enough yet) -The fallacy of argumentation ethics- 8) Argumentation Ethics are fallacious because the choice of the strong is always between the use of violence to obtain what one desires, or the value of voluntary exchange, or boycott of worthless interactions. Human choice is always ternary: violence, cooperation or boycott, and never, under any condition, reduced to the binary choice of cooperation or boycott – argumentative contradiction is a fallacy since and agreement to temporarily cooperate on a given scope is merely utilitarian, and conveys nothing beyond the matter in question. Whereas, a contract for cooperation consists of a gamble that long term cooperation will be more beneficial, even if it results in various profits and losses. Numerous authors have stated similar arguments in non operational means. But Operationalism tells us that argumentation is empty – because we never surrender our violence, and as such never enter into a contradiction, merely demonstrate a preference. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev Ukraine.

    A LIST OF HANS HERMANN HOPPE’S ERRORS

    [I] consider my work as a restatement of Hoppe’s aprioristic justificationary rationalism in ratio-scientific terms. Hoppe’s errors are natural for a German philosopher who was trained by Marxists. And while the errors are substantial by today’s standards, they are limited to errors in construction (justification), with his conclusions from his justifications surviving. This is important. From Hoppe’s earliest work onward, his deductions from incentives are correct. – We justify moral actions within a normative system of evolved rules, and we criticize truth propositions to test whether the theories survive. We do not find truth in justification – we find permission. We find truth in survival against all known criticism. Justification translates to “I can get away with saying this so you cannot say I violated the rules of cooperation: morality or law” while truth propositions under ratio-scientific criticism translate to “I have done due diligence to determine if this argument survives all known attempts at failure, regardless of preference, morality or law.”  Hoppe confuses legal justification (excuse making), with truth (survival from all competition). As Mises discovered but failed to understand, truth propositions including human choice require the possibility of constructing a sequence of rational choices  AND the survival from categorical, logical, empirical falsification. Truth propositions survive competition. – Possession demonstrably (empirically) exists prior to cooperation, and property exist after an agreement to cooperate.  Scarcity exists prior to cooperation. But scarcity is imperceptible. Cost is perceptible. The origin of demonstrable property is in the cost to acquire. Scarcity explains why things are costly, but not the origination of possession nor the origination of property. – Different sets of Property rights evolve in communities due to the disproportionate returns on cooperation at the given level of division of ability, knowledge and labor – and the necessity of preserving those returns by prohibiting parasitism. Property rights do not originate in scarcity of goods, they originate in the scarcity and disproportionate return on cooperation. We pay for cooperation by forgoing opportunities to use or consume that which others have already invested in using and consuming. Man like other animals retaliates against the imposition of costs upon that which he has himself born costs with the intent to inventory. The universal demonstration of altruistic punishment (disproportionately costly punishment of free riders, parasites, predators) demonstrates the evolutionary necessity and value of cooperation as the most costly and scarce good. (thus upending libertarianism’s attempt to suggest cooperation can be obtained for free, or that it is the natural bias of man or animal. instead, man and animal are rational. we cooperate when possible, parasite when possible and prey when possible, depending upon costs.) – Argumentationand non-contradiction originate in legal justification post-cooperation, not in constraints prior to cooperation. The first question of cooperation is ‘why don’t I kill you and take your stuff’, and only once we enter into an agreement do we justify our words and deeds within that agreement – thereby relying upon internal consistency (non-contradiction). Prior to that factm no cooperation and nor moral constraint exists – it is only desired.  Moreover, the logic of cooperation is not binary.  We live in an amoral world of  violence, theft, conspiracy and deception,  and while we  can construct cooperation, we construct cooperation at will given the costs and returns. And our choices at any time are to: (a) preserve the options of violence, theft, deception and conspiracy until opportunity avails to use it, (b) agree not to aggress but not to cooperate either (c) cooperate when useful preserving future opportunity for cooperation (d) cooperate whenever possible, expecting the same, (e) cease any level of cooperation and retreat to a prior level. So, contradiction is a test for a judge in matters of dispute resolution. It is not a necessary property of cooperation. We can test violations of reciprocity (cooperation) during disputes but no such dependence upon internal consistency exists prior to establishing a agreement (contract) for cooperation. – The minimum scope of property necessary to construct a reciprocal exchange, in order to provide minimum incentives for the rational formation of a voluntary polity is property-en-toto, or what we call “demonstrated-property” (demonstrated defense of that which we have paid costs to acquire), and the minimum scope of property is not IVP: intersubjectively verifiable property – (property that is epistemologically easy to test if we transfer). Hoppe and Rothbard misapply separatist ethics between polities (between states) as sufficient for the formation of a polity. (Ghetto Ethics.)  Arguably Hoppe suggests that IVP is merely a minimum criteria and that all other properties must be arbitrarily constructed upon it.  However, this means that IVP is an insufficient criteria for a basis for law.  Whereas Property in Toto (demonstrated property) is a sufficient criteria for the basis for law. In other words, physical property is insufficient for the formation of a polity, it is merely sufficient for cooperation between states (organized polities). – The formation of a voluntary (anarchic) polity requires that local transaction costsare low enough to limit demand for authority to either prevent retaliation for violations of property in toto, and to provide sufficient incentives to join such a polity rather than say, a democratic humanist polity. The reason is we must choose between high local transaction costs with low political costs that prohibit economic velocity, and low local transaction costs that encourage economic velocity with high political costs. Humans rationally choose government over anarchy unless anarchy provides the lower transaction costs. This means that anarchy is only possible under high trust. High trust is only possible under property en toto with it’s total prohibition on deception (cheating) rather than intersubjectively verifiable property with its tolerance for deception and cheating.  A rational anarchic polity can only form under property en toto, not IVP. – Those arguably voluntary anarchic polities that have existed, on the few occasions that they have existed, because larger states have used squatters and settlers and given away territorial rights  in borderlands in order to hold it from competitors cheaply, without having to invest heavily, but still giving them an excuse to conduct war if attempts taken against it. If those have evolved for other reasons, they  have been the target of extermination by neighbors. Because the only reason to seek a low trust polity is some variation of parasitism: gypsies on the low end, pirates in the center, and financial predators (moral hazards) on the high end. – The formation of a voluntary polity (anarchic) will only be possible under western aristocratic martial egalitarianism (a militia) and the independent common law, prohibiting all parasitism against demonstrated property (what we bore costs for and defend), whether that parasitism is by violence, theft, extortion (blackmail, racketeering), fraud, (fraud by obscurantism, fraud by moralizing, fraud by omission), externality, (free riding, privatization of commons, socialization of losses), or conspiracy (statism, conversion, immigration, conquest, war and genocide). – Mises was, like many of his contemporaries, trying to solve the problem of his era, and incorrectly cast operational testing by subjective analysis of rational incentives (praxeology) as a positive means of exploration sufficient for the investigation of cooperative and economic phenomenon, instead of a test of existential possibility of claims. Economics is empirical as any other of the science and only differs in that we know the first principles of cooperation (rational incentives on the positive side and non-imposition of costs – parasitism- on the negative side.) Whereas the first principles of the physical universe are as yet unknown to us. And where the first principles of declarative systems (logics) are matters of our discretion. (This is a rather difficult subject for all but those of us who specialize in epistemology.) I could go on a bit, but Hoppe’s insights have been in the perverse incentives of bureaucracies – even under democracy, and the exposition of all moral and legal argument as reducible to property rights. All his justificationary argument is pure Kantian,Cosmopolitan and Marxist nonsense. We do not justify truth propositions. Truth propositions survive attempts to refute them. I love the man, honestly. But he was a product of his time and place just as I am a product of mine. Science wins. Rationalism loses. Not only because science is necessary for the provision of truth, but because PHILOSOPHY HAS LARGELY BEEN USED TO LIE. Rothbardian libertarianism is just the extremism of the Marxist prohibition on Private Property inverted into an the extremism of a Marxist prohibition on Common Property – despite the fact that property rights can only exist as a commons, and no polity can survive competition for people and trade, and against competitors without providing commons as the multipliers necessary to do so. I hope this is of some value to you. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine (Tallinn, Estonia)

    LIBERTARIANS ARE JUST COMMON PROPERTY MARXISTS.

    Libertarians get it wrong every day, multiple times a day. If you’re objective is an anarchic polity, you must eliminate demand for the state – wishing it away is not only ineffective but childish. The judicial state as we understand it, evolved everywhere, to suppress retaliation cycles between individuals, families, clans, and tribes by standardizing punishments, and prohibiting further cycles of retaliation. The universality of this historical fact contradicts all libertarian dogma both about the nature of man, the state of man, and the process of resolving disputes. To eliminate demand for the state, one must eliminate demand for aggression (suppress opportunity) AND, eliminate demand for retaliation (provide a means of resolution of differences) and eliminate retaliation cycles from forming (insure against retaliation). People are never happy with the outcome of court cases, they merely fear retaliation by the insurers. Whenever we have used competing insurers, they have devolved into feuding insurers. Feuding insurers are more dangerous than individual, family and clan feuds because they profit from it. Organizations seek dominance (a monopoly) and this is where states of all sizes originate: as monopoly insurers of last resort sufficient to hold other insurers (states) at bay. This is the historical narrative and counters the private-property-marxist dogma (socialism), and the common-property-marxist dogma (libertarianism). (I hope you saw what I said just then. Because that is the uncomfortable truth.) Libertarians opine (give opinions) on what constitutes aggression, and despite *decades* of hot air failing to define it, they never seem to determine that it is not the actor who determines but the victim who will sense a violation of his investments and retaliate and therefore determine the scope of property. And it is the community of insurers (the polity) that prevent retaliation cycles (feuds). And it is a monopoly insurer (the state however organized) that prevents it. The state overreach arises from discretionary regulatory power (legislation), discretionary tax power, and discretionary rent seeking power, rather than from it’s function as a monopoly insurer. So, the problems of the state originate in discretion and in full time employment of services organizations, rather than direct economic democracy, and subcontracted employment. As far as I know rule of law eliminates regulatory discretion. As far as I know direct democracy eliminates discretionary taxation. As far as I know subcontractors delivering services are superior to bureaucrats. As far as I know a judiciary can function independently. And all that is necessary is a monarchy as a judge of last resort, and a military as an insurer of last resort. In other words, the ancient monarchies ran the best ‘companies’: private estates. As far as I know there is no model superior to rule of natural common law, an independent judiciary, a hereditary monarch as judge of last resort, a set of houses for each class with differing interests used as a market for the production of commons, and direct economic democracy such that individuals who are enfranchised and contributing to the taxes make choices as to their allocations. Conversely, Libertarianism (jewish diasporic separatism) is another product of marxism and marxist history. And it does nothing but license immorality while prohibiting retaliatory violence against it. There is only one source of liberty: an armed militia, an independent judiciary, a monarch as judge of last resort, and the natural, common, judge discovered law, as the sacred political religion of all of them. Curt Doolittle The Philosophy of Aristocracy The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine (Tallinn, Estonia)

    THE ONLY MEANS OF ELIMINATING THE STATE AND CONSTRUCTING LIBERTY

    [T]he only way to eliminate the state, is to eliminate demand for the state. To eliminate demand for the state, we must construct institutions that provide the services of the state, without the free riding endemic to the state. The state provides just these services: …1) an allocation of property and property rights, and means of transfer. …2) a means of resolving all differences that lead to conflict. …3) a means of constructing and protecting commons from free riding. …4) a means of exclusion of competing allocations, means of resolution, means of construction. The only means of providing these services without the state, is to construct institutions that do not require a state. …1) the law of non-parasitism positively expressed as Property-en-Toto, the common organic law, an independent professional judiciary RATHER THAN an independent professional bureaucracy. ie: the fourth wave. …2) a market for commons consisting of houses of common interest in the commons, in which non-monopoly contracts are negotiated for the construction of commons. …3) a universal (or near universal ) militia, caretaking, emergency and rescue, in order to participate in the market for commons – participation must be earned, even if protection from parasitism need not be. A bureaucratic state then, is an evidence of the failure to construct institutions necessary for the provision of services that allow groups to compete against other groups. [F]ukuyama has not identified the alternative to social democracy, nor has he identified the transitory nature of monopoly institutions, as necessary for the construction of a commons prior to the development of a competing market for the provision of those commons. He failed to grasp the difference between research and development of expensive common institutions, and the conversion of those monopoly institutions to non-monopoly institutions that exclude conflicting institutions, while competing on the efficient provision of services. The end of history is quite different from that which Fukuyama imagines, and what the academy (as a profiteering church) advocates and desires. There is an alternative to monopoly government, if not an alternative to a monopoly of property rights articulated as property-en-toto. He is a product of the academy and history despite his honest intellectual interests – because he is not a product of economics and law: political economy. He is forgivable as are most students of history, of looking backward at patterns, without understanding the causal properties of human cooperation and the necessity of increasingly complex means of calculation. [A]s advocates for liberty, it is our function, our mission, to provide these superior solutions to the problem of cooperation at scale that we call “government” by the invention of, advocacy of, demand for, and rebellion in pursuit of, formal institutions that prohibit tyranny, and preserve our unique western rate of innovation, by prohibiting all parasitism (rent seeking) in all walks of life, at all times. …1) The universal requirement for productivity and it’s obverse, the prohibition on parasitism. …2) The institutionalization of that rule as property rights encompassing property-en-toto. …3) The common organic law, the independent professional judiciary, universal standing, the jury, truth telling, restitution, multiples of restitution, punishment and ostracization (imprisonment). …4) The nuclear family (and perhaps not the absolute nuclear) as the first commons in which gender competition is resolved outside of the production of commons. …5) An hereditary monarch (a head of state) with veto power, but without positive power. …6) A set of houses representing the classes, populated by random selection, who act as a jury, in the selection of contracts proposed for the annum and specific prohibition from the construction of law….7) The inclusion of the informational commons in property rights and therefore (a) the requirement for truthful (‘scientific and Propertarian’) speech in matters of the commons.(b) the requirement for operational language, (c) the prohibition on pooling and laundering (d) the prohibition on intertemporal and transferred commitment, and (e) the liability of jurors (representatives and voters) for their actions on behalf of others. The only defense is requirement for production, the common law, the jury, the truth, universal standing, universal liability, and competitive markets. This produces the least opportunity for rent seeking and privatization and forces all into the market for the production of goods and services in order to survive and reproduce. Insurance of one another against error and failure, and a limit of one child to those who are unproductive solves the problem of charity without the problem of eugenic immorality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine    
  • RUSSIA’S SERIOUS PROBLEMS (please ignore the bullshit about expanding immigratio

    RUSSIA’S SERIOUS PROBLEMS

    (please ignore the bullshit about expanding immigration, russia is already having the same problems we are, they’re just earlier in the cycle.)

    via: The Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale

    The perfect demographic storm of comparatively high mortality, low fertility and emigration of well-educated professionals is increasingly burdening Russian society and its deteriorating economy. In addition to a shrinking labor force, mounting costs for its aging population and troubling premature deaths, especially among men, Russia is facing difficulties in filling critical jobs with largely unskilled non-Russian migrants, many working illegally in the country.

    Throughout most of the second half of the 20th century, Russia’s population increased. Whereas the Russian population was slightly more than 100 million in 1950, it peaked at nearly 149 million by the early 1990s. Since then, the population has declined, and official reports put it at around 144 million.

    The shrinking population is the result of deaths outnumbering births for nearly two decades without sufficient immigration to compensate for the deficit. The increasing number of deaths reflects the persistence of comparatively high mortality. The decreasing number of births is due to the prevailing low fertility, which plummeted to 1.2 births per woman in the late 1990s and now hovers at 1.7 births per woman. That rate is still about 20 percent below 2.1 births per woman, the level necessary to ensure population replacement.

    High rates of smoking, alcohol consumption, drug use, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, obesity, heart disease, violence, suicide and environmental pollution contribute to Russians’ poor health. Russia’s current male life expectancy at birth of 64 years is 15 years lower than male life expectancies in Germany, Italy and Sweden.

    Russia also stands out for the gap between male and female life expectancies at birth; at almost 13 years, it is one of the widest sex differentials. Moreover, the life expectancy at birth of 74 years for Russian females compares unfavorably with other developed countries, such as 80 years for Polish females.

    Policies to address the health crisis are woefully inadequate. Russia’s periodic crackdown on alcohol consumption has had limited effect. About 700,000 Russians were estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS in 2013, a 5 percent increase over the previous year. With official policy forbidding opioid substitution and therapy services for drug users, HIV prevalence among Russians who inject drugs is between 18 and 31 percent.

    In most European countries, where coverage of needle programs and opioid substitution therapy is high, HIV/AIDS prevalence among drug users is lower, under 17 percent. To curb smoking, estimated at 40 percent of the adult population, Russia now bans smoking in public places. In terms of health expenditure per capita, Russia ranks near the bottom among OECD countries – spending $1,474 in 2012, compared with the OECD average of $3,484.

    Notwithstanding a recent fertility uptick, low fertility persists due to inadequate reproductive health services, lack of modern and low-cost contraceptives, widespread and unsafe abortions, infertility, fewer women of childbearing age, changing attitudes toward marriage and voluntary childlessness. In addition, Russia’s abortion rate, estimated at two abortions for every birth, has traditionally been the highest in the world.

    Another factor mitigating against higher fertility is Russia’s high divorce rate. In 2012, for every two marriages, there was one divorce. To counter these trends, the government has sought to promote childbearing through various measures. For example, Russian families are entitled to a certificate for 429,408 rubles, $12,500, after the birth or adoption of a second child.

    In 2013 the government was deliberating on whether to boost the divorce tax as a means of discouraging divorce and promoting family values. The protection of children and traditional family values was also the stated purpose for the enactment of a lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender propaganda law to prevent distribution of “non-traditional sexual relationships” ideas among minors. The government is also considering reinstatement of a tax on childlessness, estimated at 10 percent of women in their late 40s.

    Despite being home to the world’s second largest immigrant population, 11 million migrants or 8 percent of the total population, this inflow has not compensated for Russia’s population losses. These migrants, mostly from the impoverished former Soviet republics are often poorly educated and thus tend to have low paying jobs, which ethnic Russians are loathe to accept. Many migrants are from the former Central Asian Republics and the Caucasus, especially Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, and thus differ in religion, ethnicity and language from the ethnic Russian population.

    Scenarios: Russia’s future depends on fertility and, for now, a population increase seems unlikely (Source: UN Population Division)Enlarge Image

    Furthermore, over a third of these migrants, or some 4 million, reside unlawfully in the country and live under constant threat of harassment and deportation. The issue of illegal immigration has become so politicized that it has inflamed xenophobia and Russian ultra-nationalism, spawning numerous anti-immigration groups.

    More recently, some 800,000 people, many ethnically Russian, were uprooted by the ongoing conflict in the Ukraine and have poured across the border into Russia, with various forms of status. In some cases, they receive government subsidies, as well as being relocated to other regions across Russia. Additional arrivals from Ukraine are likely, given continuing instability in the area.

    Russia’s immigration policy has focused on attracting highly skilled workers from abroad, but has fallen short of its goals. Migrant labor is considered essential to counter the steep decline in Russia’s working-age population, expected to decline by 25 percent by mid-century.

    Russia’s aging population has placed strains on the economy that will impact numerous sectors including agriculture, manufacturing, the armed forces and retirement schemes. In the next decade, Russia’s labor force is expected to shrink by more than 12 million, or around 15 percent.

    The contraction of Russia’s labor force is exacerbated by low retirement ages: 60 for men and 55 for women. In certain situations, for example, hazardous occupations or unemployment, retirement ages are lower. Nevertheless, Russia’s older population does not fare well. According to a 2014 global survey of the social and economic well-being of older people, Russia ranked 65 among 96 countries.

    The future size of Russia may follow a number of scenarios, largely determined by fertility (Figure 1). For example, if fertility remained essentially constant, not an unreasonable assumption, the Russian population would fall to around 111 million by mid-century and 67 million by 2100. Such an outcome would mean that the Russian population would be less than half of its current size by the close of the 21st century.


    Source date (UTC): 2018-04-27 11:20:00 UTC

  • A Brief Introduction to Propertarianism

    A Brief Introduction to Propertarianism

    (Propertarianism’s Core Concepts for Libertarians.) by Eli Harman Download PDF: PropertarianCoreConcepts  (english) Download PDF:  1الفلسفة-التملكية-مفاهيم-أساسية  (Arabic) Translation by Ahmed Reda

    What is Propertarianism?

    Propertarianism is a scientific, rational, empirical, approach to understanding and analyzing human behavior, incentives, norms, institutions, cooperation and conflict originated by Curt Doolittle and developed by him in cooperation with others.

    What is Science?

    Science, or the “scientific method” is an empirical method for gaining understanding of reality and access to truth. Many people, including many so-called “scientists” do not understand the scientific method, why it works, or why it is valuable. You can be sure you are dealing with a pseudo-scientist whenever you hear phrases like “settled science”, “scientifically proven”, or “the scientific consensus”. The errors of these pseudo-scientists are rooted in “justificationism” the philosophical belief that science is about acquiring factual support or supporting evidence to “justify” theories. In this view, truth is “justified true belief”. Not only must belief be true to qualify as knowledge, but it must also be “justified.” One must have a good reason for believing it. In contrast, critical rationalism, an epistemology (philosophy of truth and knowledge) developed by Karl Popper and others, advances a standard of “true belief.” Knowledge, as “true belief,” does not need to be justified, because it cannot be justified. It only needs to be true. And the method of arriving at true belief is not justification, but falsification, “conjecture and refutation.” We advance towards the truth by identifying and discarding error, by process of elimination. We acquire facts by observation and measurement. In order to understand facts, how they relate to each other and the world, and to predict the future, we need theories. Theories are causal models developed through conjecture and refutation to explain the relationships of facts to one another and to the wider world. For any given set of facts, there may be many internally and externally consistent theories to explain them. Ancient astronomers, observing the apparent motions of celestial bodies from the vantage point of Earth, developed a geocentric model of the solar system (informed by their own biases and perception, of the Earth they inhabited as a fixed frame of reference). As the precision of the observations increased, the complexity of the model had to increase, for example to explain observed phenomena like retrograde motion by adding epicycles. Eventually, enough facts were amassed through observation to falsify, or disprove, the geocentric model, and a new model had to be adopted, heliocentrism. As it turned out, heliocentrism also explained the facts a lot more simply and elegantly. This is called parsimony. A simpler model is generally preferable to a more complex model, if they both account for the available facts. This is the essence of Ockham’s razor “entities are not to be needlessly multiplied”. A simpler model is easier to test or to falsify, but if it fails it can be salvaged with tweaks or ad hoc rationalizations that make it more complex, but save it from falsification. This is often an indication that something is wrong with the model. However, it’s important to note that until geocentrism was conclusively falsified, both geocentrism and heliocentrism were able to explain the available evidence. If we have multiple theories to explain the facts, we are looking for more evidence to start dis-confirming, refuting, or falsifying some of them. Hopefully, what’s left is the truth. If we falsify all of the theories we have, we have to come up with more through conjecture. Any source of conjectures is potentially valid, educated guesses, wild guesses, visions, dreams, drug induced hallucinations, “divine revelation,” you name it. But it has to be testable, it has to be falsifiable (capable of being falsified by some fact, observation, or measurement), and it has to survive falsification attempts in order to survive and be adopted as a theory. If we adopt a theory, that doesn’t mean it’s true. No matter how many subsequent observations, measurements, or facts agree with the theory, it will never be “proven” or “justified.” We can’t be sure that the next observation we make, the next measurement we take, or the next fact that we learn won’t falsify the entire theory. This is known as the problem of induction and has been discussed since at least David Hume. A theory that stands for a long time and survives many falsification attempts is not proven, it is simply not falsified, yet. This is because the truth of a theory depends on ALL of the facts, not just those that we know, but those that we don’t know, and even those that we don’t know we don’t know. On the other hand, a theory can be conclusively disproven or falsified by one or a few facts actually in our possession, or our personal, first-hand knowledge. Our theories are never proven, but the more they are disproved, hopefully, the better the remaining ones become, on average. This is how we acquire knowledge and understanding. It’s an evolutionary process that tends to improve our knowledge and understanding over time, but we can never actually be sure that we’ve finally got it.

    Testimonialism

    Testimonialism is limiting your speech and communication to testimony of that which is your personal, first-hand, knowledge; free of assumption, bias, error, misunderstanding, leaps to conclusions, etc… For example, I took a phone call at my office one time from someone who wanted me to relay a message to a coworker. I realized I had no knowledge of the message’s content so instead of simply relaying the content without context I decided to report that it had been relayed to me. Then I realized the source, too, was not personally known to me. It could have been anybody on the phone, for all I knew. So the email I eventually sent my coworker read “I received a message from someone identifying themselves as so-and-so who wanted me to tell you such and such.” As it turned out, the message was accurate and the source was who they said they were. But if you limit yourself to testimony it’s easy to speak truthfully, to place your statements in the proper context and communicate your confidence in them along with the content. Whereas, if you do NOT practice testimonialism it’s easy to pass on error, deception, bias, or imaginary content without caveat or without realizing it. A good heuristic for practicing testimonialism is to use E-Prime, which is basically English purged of the verb “to be.” Instead of talking of how things ARE, speak of how they seem, how they appear, or how you perceive them. This is more accurate testimony. Existential claims about things’ ultimate nature are usually extrapolations, assumptions, or errors… That’s theory, not fact, and we have a whole discipline of science constructed around being careful with how we construct and state theories. There is an old joke; An astronomer, a physicist and a mathematician are on a train in Scotland. The astronomer looks out of the window, sees a black sheep standing in a field, and remarks, “How odd. All the sheep in Scotland are black!” “No, no, no!” says the physicist. “Only some Scottish sheep are black.” The mathematician rolls his eyes at his companions’ muddled thinking and says, “In Scotland, there is at least one sheep, at least one side of which appears to be black from here, some of the time.” (I think the joke has the mathematician as the voice of wisdom because of the statistical problems with generalizing from a single example. But more typically, mathematicians are rationalists, concerned with internal consistency, while scientists are empiricists, who deal in external correspondence with reality.) Testimonialism is important because there can be many aspects of the truth and each of us may perceive them differently, or may perceive different aspects of the same question, from different perspectives. If we make leaps or assumptions and assume our perception IS reality then anyone with a different perception is wrong and we have to fight about it. But if we simply report accurate testimony of our perceptions we can compare it to the testimony of others without having to assume they are wrong. Even if they differ we don’t have to assume one or more are false but can use both to help build a more accurate or complete picture or model of reality.

    Operationalism

    Operationalism means speaking in operations or actions, like a recipe or a computer program. Science is operational because a proper, non-pseudoscientific, science paper is basically like a recipe. “Set up this experiment in this way and conduct it just so and you should observe these results.” If someone follows the recipe and observes different results, the conclusion will have to be revisited. People frequently do NOT speak operationally. They speak in metaphors, analogies, meanings, or existence claims, instead of actions and operations. When you do not speak operationally it is easy to engage in error, bias, wishful thinking, suggestion, conflation, fraud, or deception. Consider the phrase “I love you.” There is a lot of moral and emotional content in that short but highly meaningful utterance and I’d wager most people who use it, most times, aren’t thinking about all of that or its many weighty and subtle implications. “I love you” is frequently not an honest statement, either for reasons of willful duplicity or out of simple ignorance. But if we break it down in operational terms we can gain a more precise understanding of its meaning and benefit from employing it more correctly and conscientiously. I think that “love” (noun) refers to the condition in which one’s happiness depends on another’s. Therefore “to love” (verb) must mean to act in a manner consistent with this condition prevailing. So we can put “I love you” in operational terms and say that it means “I promise that if you test the hypothesis that my happiness depends on your own against my actions, you will not find it untrue”.

    Propertarianism Grew Out of Libertarianism.

    Curt Doolittle and many of his students are former libertarians or students of the libertarian project, which is itself descended from and something of a reboot of enlightenment classical liberalism. Classical liberalism evolved into progressive liberalism and eventually postmodern liberalism, as classical liberalism’s concerns with individual liberty and individual rights evolved into preoccupation with individual self-expression and the immediate satisfaction of individual desires. Somewhat dismayed with this development, libertarians sought to restore enlightenment classical liberalism and place it on a firmer moral and theoretical foundation. The culmination of this project is arguably Anarcho-capitalism, the analysis and advocacy of a totally stateless, private, free-market, social, political, and economic order. The problem is the moral and theoretical arguments made by libertarians are not scientific. They are rationalist, justificationist, pseudo-scientific, and moralistic. Libertarians frequently start out from what they consider irrefutable moral or praxeological axioms and then attempt to reason out comprehensive systems of moral imperatives or theoretical understanding through deductive logic; which they then regard as apodictically true, or irrefutable. Unfortunately, this methodology leads to building intricate castles in the sky based on magnification of subtle errors in assumptions or reasoning. Where these impressive, but often useless, and sometimes harmful, edifices of intellectual effort disagree with observable reality, libertarians hand wave the discrepancies away because logically, their conclusions MUST be true. Libertarian moral and descriptive theories are usually internally consistent, but not externally correspondent with observable reality. They are not scientific. They are not empirical. Like Marxism, they are rationalism and moralism. To correct these errors, Propertarianism seeks to reconcile what is salvageable from the libertarian project, from classical liberalism, and from pre-enlightenment Aristocracy, by subjecting it to the scientific method, falsifying what is false, retaining and incorporating what survives into a new body of theory, knowledge, understanding and practice necessary and sufficient for the restoration of Western Civilization (and others.) Propertarianism is not a political program in its own right. It is a methodology for understanding, analyzing and discussing political institutions, recommendations, and proposals, as well as other aspects of human behavior, laundered of error, bias, wishful thinking, and imaginary content (just as science, more generally, is a methodology for understanding anything, laundered of error, bias, wishful thinking, and imaginary content). Propertarian methods can be used to analyze, construct, or discuss proposals, recommendations, and institutions informed by libertarian, conservative, progressive, aristocratic, populist or any other preferences or values. Propertarianism is a descriptive approach. It is not a prescriptive approach. Propertarianism can tell you what is truthful, and what is possible, and what is untruthful and what is impossible, but people are still always going to differ on what is GOOD or what is DESIRABLE. The aim of Propertarianism, is that people may, by discussing and negotiating truthfully, cooperatively arrive at productive solutions that accommodate their respective preferences and values, through reciprocal exchange. The alternatives are conflict, compulsion, fraud, parasitism and theft.

    Preferences and Values

    Facts are objective. They are gathered from observation and measurement of objective reality. Theories explaining facts are objective, though they may be true or false. But preferences and values are subjective. They are internal and particular to specific actors, agents, and entities. Moral theories are generally moralisms. They aim to universalize the particular, subjective, preferences and values of some groups or individuals to others, so that they may assert that their preferences and values are binding and obligatory upon others and obtain what they want at a discount, by not accommodating the preferences and values of those others, but demanding that those others accommodate theirs. This is what progressives are generally doing when they demand handouts, benefits, or respect; what libertarians are doing when they demand liberty and property rights; and what conservatives are doing when they demand moral or traditional behavior. This is contentious because it is not reciprocal. When you demand what you want from others, you are seeking to impose a cost, if only an opportunity cost, or extract a benefit. But if you do so without offering them something they want in return, you are demanding that they do so at a loss. People seek to avoid losses and so they will resist you. Propertarianism eschews moralizing, and instead focuses on stating facts, values and preferences truthfully, as facts, values, and preferences, so that people may negotiate exchanges to accommodate their differing values and preferences, based on agreed upon facts. That is reciprocal. Moralisms are not reciprocal. Moralisms aim to influence the behavior of others by justifying behavior that is in the moralizer’s interests and delegitimizing behavior that is contrary to the moralizer’s interests in order to induce others to serve the moralizer’s interests, even at the expense of their own, without compensation, or at a large discount relative to productive exchanges negotiated honestly.

    Reciprocity and Cooperation.

    All cooperation is based on reciprocity. You must give in order to receive. Exchange or trade is how cooperation is brokered, with each party giving, in their own estimation, in light of their own preferences and values, less than they receive, so that the result is mutual benefit. The law of reciprocity is the foundation of cooperation. When reciprocity is violated, cooperation breaks down. For example, libertarians often defend “price gouging” on the grounds that it’s a natural consequence of supply and demand, helps to prevent or alleviate shortages, and prices are still the most efficient way of rationing scarce resources, even under extreme or unusual circumstances. This is largely correct. However, it ignores that “price gouging” is a violation of reciprocity. Under normal circumstances people don’t mind interacting with profit maximizing actors because competitive profits in equilibrated markets, or producer surpluses, are roughly proportional to consumer surpluses, or the benefit derived by the consumer from the transaction. Furthermore, people have options, they can choose not to transact or to transact with other suppliers. Mutual benefit, or reciprocity, are in full effect. But when people suffer misfortune, they start to resent others profiting from their misfortune (even if that alleviates it somewhat) rather than sharing in it. Abiding by market rules is actually a form of altruism, whereby participants forego certain benefits (like the proceeds of theft, fraud, defection, or nonperformance) for the benefit of other individuals in order to obtain some longer term rewards (the benefits of ongoing, productive, cooperation and exchange.) When price gougers ask consumers to continue respecting their property rights and to pay higher prices to ration their consumption, insure availability for others, and incentivize the flow of resources to where they are most needed, they are asking consumers to behave MORE altruistically then normal, to bear larger costs, and forego larger benefits, for the sake of others, while they themselves only PROFIT more than normal. In other words, price gougers behave less altruistically than normal while they demand their customers behave more altruistically. This is the violation of reciprocity that people intuit that leads to anger, retaliation, violence, looting, and vigilantism rather than paying elevated prices. Some other solution to local shortages after catastrophes or emergencies will have to be found. Either regulate “price gouging” to keep it moderate and supplement it with non-price rationing, and/or tax the proceeds of “price gouging” and redistribute them to everyone affected, or publicly provide critical supplies so people have a ready alternative to paying elevated prices. But just leaving things to “the market” in this case, doesn’t end best.

    The Ternary Logic of Cooperation.

    People can interact in 3 different ways:

    1. Cooperation. (Altruism, exchange, trade.)
    2. Noncooperation (Disassociation, boycott)
    3. Conflict (War, fraud, parasitism, theft, crime.)

    People will generally follow their incentives and choose the mode of interaction that is most profitable for them. If you wish to cooperate with others, you must create incentives favoring cooperation. You must have something to offer them so that cooperation is preferable to noncooperation. And you must have something to threaten them with so that cooperation is preferable to conflict. (The carrot and the stick.) But there is no categorical imperative to cooperate instead of not cooperate, or even instead of conflicting. Sometimes, with some people, we might prefer to conflict. If what someone demands in exchange for their cooperation is not worth what they’re willing to provide, and they’re not willing to leave you alone, conflict is the only solution. People follow their incentives.

    What Makes Propertarianism Propertarian?

    One of the central insights of propertarianism is that all rights are property rights, and that human cooperation, actions, and conflicts can be modeled as property transaction, or conflicts over property, or as attempts to preserve, increase, transfer, redistribute, loot, seize, destroy, defend or avoid losing inventories of property. The libertarian “life, liberty, and property” are obviously property rights, pertaining to and deriving from “self-ownership” and ownership of personal, private, property. The leftists’ assertions that “workers own the means of production” or “workers are entitled to the surplus value their labor creates” or “healthcare is a human right” are simply rival property claims that often conflict with the libertarian ones. Conservative concerns for protecting norms, security, order, culture, nation, and ethnicity are less obvious because these are forms of shared, common, often intangible, property, but they are still things over which people demonstrate a sense of ownership and which they will defend by retaliating against violations of or attacks against.

    What is Property?

    Property is that which individuals and groups demonstrate a willingness and ability to defend. Territoriality is common behavior among animals and the behavior takes a prototypical form. First, there will be a claim. A wolf will go out and piss on the boundaries of the territory he claims. This is a promise, that if another member of his species enters his territory and attempts to make use of it, there will be a conflict. If this occurs, the claim is defended, and the conflict is settled with a fight. The original claim will be upheld, or it will be overturned and the rival claim sustained in its stead. The only difference with human property is our territoriality can take much more varied and sophisticated forms and be given all sorts of different expressions. We’re not limited to pissing on territory. So property could be physical, private, property, or it could be the market value of the same. It could be physical, common, property, like a park. It could be common, intangible, property: like public order and decency, the integrity of our language or culture, truth in the “marketplace of ideas,” the ancestral gene pool, or something else. It could be private but intangible: reputation, intellectual property, honor, etc… Libertarians have a theory of legitimate private property originating in original appropriation and subsequent exchange. This is sometimes called “Intersubjectively Verifiable Property” (IVP) which means “property people can agree who owns” and it basically limits the scope of “legitimate” property to personal, private, property. But people will intuit assaults on or theft of common and intangible property as a loss and they will retaliate against it. So if the purpose of property rights, norms, and regimes, is to minimize conflicts by codifying who owns what, and consequently, who may do what, where, and why, then libertarian IVP fails as a property regime and a property norm, because there are whole categories of conflict it does not address nor prevent because it does not codify property rights in things that people value (with good reason) and conflict over, but actually licenses parasitism, theft, destruction, and freeriding in these domains by prohibiting retaliation against it.

    Property in Toto.

    Propertarians speak of “Property in Toto” or property in all of its forms, to include everything over which people lay claim, everything over which people demonstrate ownership, everything people defend and everything over which people conflict. If someone wants to fight you because you are insulting his woman’s honor, it’s pointless to maintain that he has no “right” to fight you because you have a “right” to say whatever you want to about her. He’s going to want to fight you, and he probably will, all your protests or arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. “Rights” arguments are generally a means of trying to get your way or justify and license your own behavior without paying its full costs (one cost of insulting someone’s woman is the cost of defending yourself from retaliation in defense of her honor.) The fact that someone wants to fight you to defend his woman’s honor demonstrates that he considers this his property. Your critiques of its legitimacy as property are irrelevant. Your antagonist regards it as property and is willing to defend it. His violence is demonstration of his sincerity and conviction. It’s time to shut up and put up. You have violated his property and you can either apologize and attempt to make amends, or you can defend yourself from his retaliation and attempt to assert, sustain and defend a rival or contradictory property claim. Likewise, it will do you no good to argue that people “shouldn’t” defend the market value of their property by getting together and forming homeowner’s associations, or zoning boards, to regulate and retaliate against activities that diminish the value of nearby properties. If someone starts doing something nearby that’s noisy, smelly, ugly, or that imposes some other cost on you and your property, it’s going to decrease the value of the property because other people are going to reckon it as a cost as well and they’re going to be willing to pay less for your property at sale. So if people can preserve the value of their property by preventing or punishing such activities in populated areas, they will. Libertarians see this as a conflict between rights over physical property (to do what you want with it) and some kind of intangible property (value) which they regard as illegitimate. But there is no reason the physical property is more legitimate. People value things subjectively and there is a great deal of inter-subjective agreement on the things people value and don’t value. It’s not totally arbitrary. This case does present us with a trade-off between different values. But that’s nothing unusual. Life is full of trade-offs, and it’s probably economically efficient to inconvenience people to do cost-imposing things in underpopulated areas where there is nobody to complain. The value of a populated area is chiefly its value for living and working in ways that don’t impinge on others. And if others impinge on you, that reduces the value of living in a populated area. So if you want to obtain the most value from living in such an area, you must give up the value of being able to do just whatever you want, whenever you want, wherever you want. You can smelt copper or slaughter hogs pretty much anywhere, and the cost of being far away from other things are small compared to the costs you would impose on them by being close. These are just a few examples of property in toto, property in all its forms. But they are not the only examples. This is a factual, descriptive, conception of property, not a moral one.

    Rights

    In practice, you have the property and property rights that the people around you are willing to concede that you have, and willing to help you defend and uphold. One man cannot stand alone against the world. But enough in confederation can hold hostile hordes at bay indefinitely. Property and property rights are obtained in exchange. You recognize and uphold mine and I’ll do the same for yours. The necessary standard to make property rights durable is mutual insurance, not just “respect mine and I’ll respect yours” but “DEFEND mine and I’ll DEFEND yours.” Practically speaking, you can’t have any rights without positive duties and obligations. Libertarians go wrong when they make a distinction between “positive” and “negative” rights. All rights are positive rights because NO rights can be enjoyed without enforcement and defense; and enforcement and defense must be proactive and have positive costs (although the benefits may be greater.) Any claims by libertarians that rights are “natural,” “God-given”, “innate,” “inalienable,” “selfevident,” or anything of the sort are moralistic attempts to obtain rights at a discount, without paying the full cost of asserting, maintaining, and defending them, by convincing others to PROVIDE them at their expense. But there can be no such thing, in practice, as a right not to contribute to the maintenance and defense of rights that one demands. Rights, in practice, have to be maintained and defended. Non-contribution to the maintenance and defense of rights is not conducive to their maintenance and defense. Demands for rights while refusing to enter into reciprocal duties and obligations to defend rights is a violation of reciprocity and an act of parasitism, not conducive to long term cooperation. Without cooperation, no rights can successfully be maintained and defended.

    Non-Aggression vs. Non-Parasitism

    Besides the different conceptions of property and rights, the main point of departure of propertarianism from libertarianism is rejection of the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP.) The NAP is in some sense question begging, because it depends critically on a theory of property. Without a theory of property you can’t tell what is aggression and what isn’t, what is defense, retaliation, etc… So libertarians and communists, for example, could conflict bitterly without ever engaging in aggression (against their own respective theories of property) but only to defend, on the one hand, property homesteaded by original appropriation or acquired by subsequent exchange, and, on the other hand, the surplus value created by labor and various equal or universal entitlements… But there is also no reason to extend enemies the benefit of non-aggression if they will not extend the same to you. That’s non-reciprocal. That’s a cost without benefit. You have to forego the benefits of aggression against your enemies, either preempting their aggression or actually plundering, looting, enslaving, or killing them, and you don’t get anything in return for your generosity or forbearance. They certainly won’t avoid doing any of that to you if they have the opportunity. Libertarians maintain that voluntary transactions and exchanges are always mutually beneficial (or if not, they’re simply, one-off errors and not systematically non-beneficial, or non-mutual.) So “voluntary” is the only requirement transactions have to meet in order to be productive, according to libertarians. This is consistent with the Non-Aggression Principle. But fraud by asymmetry of information is certainly possible, even if someone makes no explicit representation of the suitability of their product or service for a particular purpose, it’s possible to offer one that SEEMS so suitable, and only the individual or firm offering it knows better or knows different (until the fraud is discovered.) Libertarianism would license such fraud by prohibiting retaliation against it (because it does not rise to the level of aggression or explicit fraud.) But there might be good reason to prohibit and suppress parasitism and fraud, in all of their forms, even at the cost of committing aggression, to limit people to genuinely productive behavior. So to the condition of “voluntary” we must add “fully informed” and “warrantied.” Finally, transactions and exchanges have costs and benefits not only to those directly party to them (who are in charge of making the decision to transact or exchange) but also to others, not party. If the interests of those others are to be accounted for when the decision is made to transact or not to transact, they must have redress, if the decision imposes a cost on them, or deprives them of some benefit. So we must add another condition to our “non-parasitism principle”“Nothing but voluntary, fully informed, warrantied, transactions, free from negative externality… else we fight.” If you will permit me to speak metaphorically, the cold hand of Darwin will punish us just as surely for not engaging in aggression judiciously as for engaging in aggression injudiciously. Libertarians are content to leave the benefits of judicious aggression on the table for the sake of principle. But a principle of leaving benefits on the table is not an evolutionarily competitive one and that’s why libertarianism has never gone anywhere and never will.

    Warranty

    In high trust markets, warranty is typically offered by producers to vendors, and by vendors to consumers. This is a promise that the product or service will meet some expectation and compensation if it doesn’t. Basically, the producer assumes full responsibility to the vendor, and the vendor to the consumer, that the product or service will fulfill its stated purpose or function to a specified degree. Warranty is productive because producers have more information about the product or service and more control over quality than vendors and vendors more than consumers. So warranty incentivizes the achievement of the best outcomes at lowest cost by making the cost of failure incident explicitly upon those able to deliver success. The alternative, caveat emptor, “buyer beware” is tremendously costly and inefficient in comparison, and leads to wasteful duplication of effort, as every consumer has to do extensive and costly research before every transaction. This is the standard that prevails in low trust markets, where haggling is the norm, all sales are final, return policies are non-existent (and probably cannot exist, because they would be abused) people rely on relatives and extended family for most needs, crime, violence, fraud, corruption and nepotism are rife, etc… All this leads to very high transaction costs and standards of living suffer because many trades that might otherwise occur do not.

    Negative Externality

    A negative externality is an imposed cost. Anything you do which imposes a cost on others, whether noise, odor, unsightly or distracting imagery, risk, or what have you, is a negative externality. Profiting personally from imposing negative externalities on others is parasitic. You are accumulating property in Toto by diminishing the inventories of property held by others. Those others might rather you did something productive, which benefited you and others but did not impose a cost on them, or at least compensated them for their loss (which creates productive incentives and makes losses calculable.) But if you don’t do something productive, and if you don’t compensate people for the losses you cause, they will retaliate against you, or they will demand the government retaliate against you on their behalf. To use just one example; there was a bit of a flap a few years ago about an app someone had created to enable people to auction “their” public parking spaces in San Francisco. Some libertarians were defending the creator and users of the app by saying they were creating and selling information about the location of available parking spaces and/or that the spaces were public and therefore unowned. Building parking places and auctioning off their use is a productive activity that increases the supply of parking spaces to meet demand. Profit is, in this case, both the signal that guides production and the incentive to be productive. But looking for common parking spaces to park in and then demanding payment to move is not a productive behavior, it is theft of commons and free-riding. The profit one may earn doing this is neither an incentive to increase the supply of parking spaces nor a reward for doing so, it is simply taking of what is already there from those who are already using it. That behavior reduces the availability of parking spaces for those using them according to generally accepted rules and offers to selectively stop reducing the availability, for a fee. If the whole reason you are in a parking spot, or still in a parking spot, is so that you can charge someone to move, then you are not simply offering to find and sell information on parking spot availability, you are the cause of it, but you can only create availability by first creating unavailability, imposing a negative externality. People who impose a cost and then offer to stop imposing it, for compensation, are rightly regarded as knaves. Another example: if you run a crack house in a nice neighborhood you are profiting from imposing negative externalities on your neighbors. There is noise, odor, strange, unsightly, untrustworthy, people coming and going, petty crime, risk, intoxicated people stumbling about, a degradation in safety, security, order, and public decency. A libertarian might maintain that it is your “right” to run a crack house, because it is your house. And besides, the costs are largely imposed by the customers you’re not responsible for their actions. If you have a problem with them, take it up with them. But of course the things are causally related. No crack house, no customers… And so it is totally rational for neighbors to retaliate against the crack house for the costs imposed by its customers by kicking in its doors and shutting it down, or as the case may be, delegating that prerogative to the government to exercise on their behalf. If you do not address externalities, imposed costs, and parasitism by some means, either by law, or by informal retaliation, then people are going to demand authority to address the issues for them. Libertarians really shoot themselves in the foot, even on their own terms, by defending property norms or non-aggression principles that license parasitism or negative externalities (by prohibiting retaliation against them) because that will only increase the demand for either informal retaliation or authority. Libertarianism, as typically articulated, increases the demand for authority. Another instance where this is the case is open borders and mass migration, which many, but not all, libertarians support. People will experience the erosion of their culture and language and the diminishment of their ethnic group (relative to others) as well as political externalities arising from demographic subjugation and displacement by alien ethnic groups under democracy, the loss of social trust and intensification of ethnic rivalries from diversity, and other consequences of open borders or mass migration as costs or losses of property. This will increase demand for authority in the form of militarized police to deal with crime, terrorism, ethnic strife and disorder and eventually to enact border and immigration controls. If liberty is your goal, which is freedom from arbitrary authority, don’t propose policy changes which will increase demand for arbitrary authority. This is an example of a proposal failing a test of existential possibility (more on that later.)

    Collectivism

    In order to have any property, and in order to have any rights, individuals team up into groups capable of asserting and defending their rights and their property claims together against all challengers. Naive collectivism holds that the group is primary and individual are secondary; that group interests and rights are primary and individual interests and rights are secondary. But this fails methodological individualism. Factually speaking, only individuals have interests because only individuals hold preferences and values (although they may share these in a group.) Individuals form cooperative groups because it is in their individual interests to do so. Individual vs. collective is a trade-off. Sometimes, what’s good for the individual is not good for the collective, (other individuals) and they may profitably restrain or impose upon the individual. But it is in the interest of the individual to be part of a good collective. So as long as the benefits of being in a collective outweigh the costs (including opportunity costs) then the individual will remain in the collective. The same is true in the other direction. So long as the benefits of retaining an individual in a collective exceed the costs of doing the same, then the collective will do so. The smaller and more numerous and more varied the collectives, the more closely they can match every individual’s preferences and values. But the smaller the collectives, the less able they are to assert and defend the rights and interests of their individual members against others. Here, as elsewhere, we are faced with a trade-off.

    Individualism

    Naive individualism or atomistic individualism holds that the individual is SO primary that it is never in his interests to form or to enter into any durable collective or group. Only ad hoc or temporary cooperation is worthwhile, beneficial, or permitted. But this too, fails methodological individualism. Empirically, as a matter of fact, individuals DO form collectives and groups. And many of these collectives and groups prove durable. Productive collectives, those that serve the interests of individual members, are competitive relative to atomistic individuals who won’t enter into collective. History furnishes no example of a society of atomistic individuals remaining atomistic individuals in competition or conflict with individuals who have group identity and solidarity. If it were desirable or possible, there should be some. In truth though, all three of the principal western political orientations are profoundly and fundamentally individualistic. Leftism is individualism for those with instantaneous time horizons. Food and shelter and medicine and college and debt forgiveness and status and orgasms for ME, right now, regardless of the costs to others or to society or to my future self. Libertarianism is individualism for those with intermediate time horizons, who recognize some of the incentives and conditions necessary for engaging in production and exchange: so all of that through and because of property rights and markets over so many years as may be necessary to organize their production, without regard to the costs to tradition, culture, extended family, (ethnicity) commons or future generations. Rightism is individualism for people with very long time horizons, who recognize (or intuit) the full spectrum of conditions and incentives necessary to engage in production and exchange not just NOW, but for generations to come. So all of that for ME AND MINE, securely, now and for the future, for generations to come, by drawing on the hard won, evolutionary-gleaned wisdom of the past, and maintaining the various commons (things like public decency, good order, and common defense) that give us our competitive advantages over others who do not share our values or have our best interests at heart. This is what Curt calls the…

    “Intertemporal Division of Perception and Cognition.”

    Different people are specialized for perceiving and addressing different concerns on different timescales. A mother with a crying baby is going to be focused on the immediate desires and needs of that baby, and that is a good focus, for that particular problem. But for other problems, longer term views, taking account of remoter causes and consequences, may be more useful. If your problem is a crying baby that needs to be fed, it makes sense to treat it like a crying baby that needs to fed, because you want it to grow. That’s a good solution. But if your problem is NOT a crying baby that needs to be fed, you probably don’t want it treated like one, because you don’t want it to grow. That’s no solution.

    Propertarian Tests

    Propertarianism recommends the use of various tests to filter out bad statements, claims, proposals, etc… These tests are Identity (non-conflation) Internal Consistency (rational, noncontradiction) External Correspondence (empirical, “reality check”) Existential Possibility (selfsustaining vs, self-defeating) Morality (Non-Parasitism, reciprocity) Full Accounting (not fraud by omission) Parsimony (simplicity). If you can warranty that your statements and proposals pass these tests then your statements and proposals are as truthful as statements and proposals can be. They may not be TRUE, but at least you aren’t engaging in willful or negligent fraud, only honest error.

    Identity and non-conflation.

    A is A. A is not not A. Not A is not A. “Social justice” is not justice. If it were justice you wouldn’t need to qualify it. This is just a verbal conflation or sleight of hand to give injustice the imprimatur of justice. Justice can be defined objectively as the clear, impartial, consistent, administration of rules. Every civilized society administers the death penalty for stepping in front of a moving bus. Is this just? Yes, the rule is clear, impartial, and (pretty) consistently administered. It may be severe and even disproportional, but just pay attention not to violate it and you will be fine. However “social justice” (besides failing reciprocity, full accounting, internal consistency, external correspondence, existential possibility, and parsimony) is not justice. It is arbitrary, unclear, ever changing, and obscure, quite the opposite of Justice… “Domestic Terrorism” is not “terrorism.” It’s just an attempt to rhetorically conflate resistance or rebellion against unaccountable or unpopular rule (something towards which many people are favorably disposed) with hostile aggression by foreign, non-state, actors (something people are much more usually against). White identity is not the same as white nationalism which is not the same as white supremacy. If you look in the AP style guide (used by mainstream journalists) under the entry for “alt-right” it’s clear that they understand the distinction, but they advise to conflate them anyway. At this point, the advocates of “social justice” have succeeded in mostly conflating colorblind egalitarianism as “white supremacy”. If you’re not anti-white, you’re “white supremacist” Why conflate everything which is not one extreme as the other extreme? Well, they want you to support “THEIR” extreme. That’s easier if they can conflate everything else away into a false dichotomy and then load the other side of that dichotomy with all the moral and emotional baggage of the worst that it encompasses. An “earnings gap” is not the same as a “wage gap” and once you control for the relevant variables, including career field, time away from work, risk, hours worked, lower frequency of female outliers, etc… There is no evidence of a substantial “wage gap” between men and women, there is a minuscule one, at most (single digit percentages). But we constantly hear from lying, rent-seeking, feminists, attempting to justify demands for more, about their “77 cents on the dollar”. You never have to look far to find examples of conflation employed for duplicitous or self-serving ends. In contrast, Propertarianism aims for deflation, to clarify and enlighten for productive ends rather than to confuse and obscure for parasitic ends.

    Existential Possibility

    With a test of existential possibility, we are looking for any reason why an idea might be impossible in practice. For example, communism is impossible because of well-known incentive and calculation problems (hence the common excuse that “it wasn’t real communism” in defense of trying again). Equality is impossible because even if we succeed, somehow, in equalizing material conditions, people have differing preferences and values and hence, would reckon those conditions differently. We would have succeeded only in creating inequality of a different sort. That being said, people tend to perceive inequality negatively and so there might be some targeted measures to reduce inequality that are worthwhile, to increase social harmony and stability, or for some other reason. But we’re just going to have to insist people give up equality, per se, as an objective. Another thing we could look at would be the evolutionary stability or instability of a strategy. Non-reciprocal altruism is evolutionarily unstable because if we are not enforcing reciprocity and reciprocity is not somehow self-enforcing (like it is between kin, who share genes, and therefore help other instances of their own genes by helping each other) then there is no reason to reciprocate and people will not. Their incentive is to parasitize and freeride off of us, abusing our generosity without returning the favor, until we are consumed. And then we won’t be able to continue engaging in non-reciprocal altruism.

    Eugenia and Dysgenia

    Eugenia and dysgenia are a special case of the existential possibility test, pertaining to the quality of genes passed on and how this is altered or influenced by proposed changes. I would suggest that every policy, norm, tradition, practice, etc… Is either eugenic or dysgenic, and not just in terms of someone’s opinion. We might say a policy is objectively eugenic if it selects for the genes or other traits that are necessary for its own maintenance, and objectively dysgenic if it selects against them. For example, we might say that a policy of feeding the poor, without imposing limits on their reproduction, is objectively dysgenic, because somebody has to feed them, and such a policy penalizes those who are able to do so in order to subsidize the relative increase of those who are unable, so it must sooner or later reach a tipping point and break down catastrophically. On the other hand, the old western practice (around the north sea) of a man not marrying until he had his own home (the English word “husband” literally means homeowner, “house bond”) is objectively eugenic. Establishing a minimum bar for reproduction is only going to cause the population to improve and more and more people in each succeeding generation to meet the old standard. A classification of “eugenic” or “dysgenic” is therefore a useful metric for evaluating any policy or practice. And to suppose that “eugenic” is the thing which is bad, or something to be ashamed of, is exactly backwards.

    Morality

    Objective morality is reciprocity and non-parasitism. These are prerequisites for cooperation. It is never in one’s interests, long term, to continue cooperating with non-reciprocal parasites. People follow their incentives. Even if one wanted to continue cooperating with non-reciprocal parasites, there would eventually come a time when you could no longer afford to continue cooperating on those terms. Therefore, cooperation with non-reciprocal parasites is not existentially possible and it’s hard to see why anyone would consider it desirable, since cooperation with reciprocal, productive, friends and allies is much more profitable. Morality is not mandatory. Morality is only mandatory for cooperation, and cooperation is not mandatory. Well, some cooperation is probably mandatory, since some cooperation is better than none. A better strategy is always more evolutionarily stable, but no particular cooperation is usually mandatory. You usually have some choice about which cooperation to pursue.

    Full Accounting

    Full accounting is making a complete and accurate accounting of costs AND benefits. Quite often you will see someone arguing the benefits of proposals they favor without mentioning the costs. Or they will argue the costs of what they oppose without acknowledging the benefits. Scott Adams calls this a “half-pinion.” It’s also possible to mention costs and benefits, but inaccurately or incompletely.

    Propertarian Enemies

    Not everyone is committed or even open to truth and non-parasitism. Some are dedicated to deception, parasitism, and fraud. Here are a few of the top culprits and their methods:

    Feminine Coercion

    Feminine rhetorical devices and feminine rhetorical strategies, such as nagging, scolding, shaming, rallying, emotional appeals, popular appeals, insults, ridicule, gossip, moralisms , and so on and so forth, have no special utility for discovering or propagating truth. But they have great utility for spreading and propagating self-serving lies, because they have no built-in error testing or correction. So when nagging, scolding, shaming, rallying, emotional appeals, popular appeals, insults, ridicule, gossip, moralisms, etc, are used by women, and by other effeminate creatures; we classify them, not as good faith participants in debate, but as lying, totalitarian, parasites. Their aim in employing nagging, scolding, shaming, rallying, emotional appeals, popular appeals, insults, ridicule, gossip, moralisms, etc., is not the mutual discovery of truth, but simply to GET THEIR WAY. The manner in which they accomplish this is by imposing costs, social costs, psychic costs, energy costs, time costs, until you simply relent and give them what they want. The reason they employ these means is to avoid the high cost of offering VALUE in exchange for what they DESIRE. That is why we call nagging, scolding, shaming, rallying, emotional appeals, popular appeals, insults, ridicule, gossip, moralisms, etc… The feminine means of COERCION, for they are analogous to the masculine means of coercion (namely violence.) But the masculine (violent) means of coercion are not inherently duplicitous or parasitic. They require strength to employ, and the strong are always able, and often willing, to offer something of value in exchange instead. Violent means MAY be used for parasitic ends and MAY be directed by lies or aim at sustaining lies. BUT the greatest strength REQUIRES truth and cooperation. Lies and parasitism sap strength, while cooperation builds strength, and truth is a logical requirement of cooperation (it is not in the interests of others to cooperate with self-serving deceivers.) No individual or group who spurns truth and cooperation can ever be truly strong in comparison to ones who embrace them. In contrast, the feminine means of coercion are the implements and the refuge of the weak. The weak are intrinsically less able, and less willing, to offer value in exchange, and weakness has no lower limit. Parasitic lies make people weaker, which only makes them likely and liable to employ even more parasitic lies. The proliferation of the feminine means of coercion, and the concomitant proliferation of parasitism and lies, are attributable mainly to one factor; women and other effeminate creatures are less subject than they once were, to violent retaliation and suppression using the masculine means of coercion.

    Postmodern Deception

    Postmodern deception makes use of a variety of related means to advance and sustain falsehood by raising the cost of refutation without addressing the points of contention. This can include the feminine means of coercion (rallying, shaming, scolding) to raise the social  cost of disagreement, or it can include obscurantism, pseudoscience and fallacy to raise the cognitive and time cost of refutation (Pilpul). Another common technique is framing (conflation and incomplete accounting) to advance a false narrative or picture, loading ( adding moral or emotional – imaginary – content) and overloading (repetition) to overwhelm the rational faculties and suggest the desired conclusion by elicited emotional response. This is a staple technique of media and political figures. One of the most destructive techniques of postmodern deception is the heaping of undue praise. Whether the undue praise is heaped upon the “noble savage” (who is often anything but noble) or upon the perverted sexual deviant, or the morbidly obese feminist, it is always and only a way of robbing praise from those to whom it is due. It is a way to attack and critique and undermine and tear down the worthy and the exemplary without seeming to be doing anything of the sort. After all, there is no insult at all, they are only paying a compliment! A compliment to the wrong recipient is always an implied insult to the correct one. To make the worse seem better makes the better seem worse. The techniques of postmodern deception, taken together, allow their practitioners to “hack” the “marketplace of ideas” so that the good ideas don’t win. The good ideas, the nuggets of truth and wisdom, are surrounded by so much bullshit that hardly anyone can find them. And the bad ideas are protected by feminine coercion so that people fear to challenge them; all as they are blasted out on all channels, and all frequencies, all the time. The root problem is that people can bullshit faster than anyone can shovel. Lying can be very cheap and easy. Truthfulness is expensive, demanding, and difficult. So the only way for truth to prevail is for the truthful to take their shovels, not to the bullshit, but to the bullshitters. Make it costly to lie and people will stop. Make it cheap, and even if you don’t fall for the lies, the liars can just go lie at someone who will and come back with enough strength and numbers to beat you. “Free Speech” was a noble idea. But it failed. Free TRUTHFUL speech only.

    Socialism

    Socialism is usually sold in moralistic, rationalistic, idealistic terms. In these terms, it is always a lie. You are not entitled to anything because no one is entitled to anything. Furthermore, while you can organize to claim and defend entitlements over the objections of others, at whose expense they are coming, the socialist means of doing so have well known problems. However, some socialist concerns can be addressed by productive, mutually beneficial, trades. And some socialist policies can be constructed as mutually beneficial exchanges, and some socialist preferences can be accommodated by cooperation (not conflict) between classes. By these means, the most pernicious forms of socialism can be robbed of much potential support. People are not going to support a system that does not seem to work for them. And if some people are being “left behind” because they cannot meaningfully participate in production (or for whatever reason) then they are likely and liable to revolt, riot or loot, rather than die quietly or languish in poverty amidst splendor. But if you pay them to behave, and pay them not to reproduce, that can be a productive exchange. The productive classes can say: “Look, we’ll subsidize your lifestyle as long as you don’t get in the way, you don’t disrupt the peace, order and stability we need to produce, and you don’t pass your inability to produce on to the next generation, so that this subsidy is really and truly a solution to the problem.” That is a win win. Another option is to pay the lower classes for military service. Don’t impede the production of the middle classes or the rule of the upper, but fight to defend them, and you may share in a portion of the benefits.

    Feminism

    Much could be, and has been, said about feminism, enough to fill volumes. I have already addressed the issue of feminine coercion above. What has to be understood is that feminism originates primarily with inferior women, women who cannot obtain what they want from men in exchange because they have little of value to exchange (whether because they are fat, old, infertile, ugly, lazy, obnoxious, or what have you.) Their aim is twofold: First, to obtain what they want from men at a discount using the feminine means of coercion (nagging scolding, shaming, rallying, gossip, etc…) Second, to sabotage their competition, women of value to men, by filling their heads with destructive nonsense, and induce them to throw away their value in exchange for nothing. Seen in this light, much that is incomprehensible about feminism makes sense. Do they really think they can “redefine” men’s “standards of beauty”? Maybe, maybe not. One thing they DEFINITELY can do is persuade other women to take less care of their own, and that makes them look better in comparison. A lot of people think that feminism started out alright but it has “gone too far.” Well it started out using feminine coercion to obtain the franchise. Feminine coercion is dishonest and parasitic. But it’s also trivially easy to show that women’s suffrage is a long term existential impossibility. That argument depends on only a few, fairly obvious, points.

    1. 1) Voting either directs violence, or is a substitute for it.
    2. 2) The preponderance of actual violence is supplied by men, and the preponderance of potential violence is *not supplied* by men.
    3. 3) Men and women vote differently, on average.

    All three of these points are, I think, incontrovertible. There is certainly much more which could be said on the matter. But this is all that actually needs to be said, to show that women’s suffrage is unstable, and necessarily ends in violence. The more women vote to advance their interests, or impose their priorities, as they see them, at the expense of men’s, the more tension will build, and it can only build until it breaks, because it is men who are asked to supply the actual violence which carries the outcomes of elections into effect, or to refrain from potential violence to prevent the outcomes of elections from being carried into effect. But we don’t actually HAVE to do either. We can do the opposite. Women obtained the vote on the back of the lie that their former exclusion had been arbitrary and baseless, and therefore unnecessary and unjust, and that is the lie it is now necessary to debunk. But that lie stems from an ignorance (perhaps deliberate) of context. In fact, women had been excluded from politics because political institutions had been created by men, as a compromise and an alternative to warfare, which is a male domain. Voting and politics can be an economical alternative to warfare, as long as the winners do not seek either to take, or to impose enough to make warfare preferable for the losers. It can be a win-win, the winners win more, and the losers lose less, than they can by warfare, because they do not have to try the matter by a contest of arms, and politics, therefore, can be stable and productive, so long as it remains within those bounds. Women do not participate in warfare (and it is best that they do not) so it was never necessary to cut them in on the spoils of politics, and doing so is to grant them a great and unearned boon; a benefit that they could not obtain by other means. It was a pure indulgence, and an expense with no countervailing benefits. Women’s violence did not need to be bought off because they don’t threaten violence. Because they are ignorant of the context, and of the domain, having never, historically, participated, and because they do not understand that warfare is the alternative, and politics only a means of avoiding warfare, and can always return to warfare, women recognize no limits. They always demand more. They always seek to impose more. Further, women bring no spoils to the table, they only make off with them. They contribute nothing, they risk nothing, and they threaten nothing. Therefore it is only right and proper that in this arena, they get nothing. Past generations of men thought they could afford to indulge women in this way, but the expense has only ever grown, and only ever will. Now, we can no longer afford it, even if we wanted to. The price would be our civilization and our future, and that is too high a price to bear. The further the results of elections continue to diverge from the likely results of war -and women make those results diverge -for they participate in elections but not in warfare -the greater the incentive for those with the means (men) to stop playing democracy and start playing war. That’s a game we can win, and if all we need to do to win is switch games, then sooner or later we will switch games. It is a foregone conclusion. That is why, and that is how, women’s suffrage shall end. It is inherently unstable, and fleeting. But men must know why they must fight. When men vote, we’re saving each other money, saving each other’s lives, by not fighting about shit. When women vote, they’re getting something for nothing. Soon we will have nothing left to give, but plenty to take, our own way.

    Democracy

    Ending democracy, egalitarian, majority rule, is always advisable and a step in the right direction. Democracies have mal incentives (Hoppe.) But even more damaging in the long term, democracies breed dysgenic people because democracies are vote farms and (if all votes count the same) the most economical way to farm votes is to breed dependent parasites. Lysander Spooner said “a ballot either signifies a bullet, or it signifies nothing.”, but a bullet is more honest. All states require the voluntary consent and support of enough individuals and groups to compel the submission of the remainder. And the coalition that performs this function always arises by negotiation and exchange (you want this benefit, or that, to participate in our coalition? Well, we want these concessions in return.) Democracies actually set a fairly low bar for popular support at 51%. And a democracy will never be ruled by a coalition much larger than 51%. If you’re getting more than 51% of the vote, you’re leaving rents on the table. You could take more, or give less, and still win the election. Additionally, if your aim is to maximize the profitability of an electoral victory, in terms of rents extracted, you will build your coalition of the cheapest votes, the most worthless and parasitic individuals. A rich man’s vote is expensive, you have to not take most of his stuff. But if you do, you can buy many votes. As the 51% feed on the productive, their numbers will grow. That’s what happens when you feed parasites. As we said, you don’t want to win more than 51% of the vote, so the ruling coalition in a democracy is always in the position of being able to give its most productive members the boot and throw them to the wolves, to begin consuming them in turn. This is why democracies always become weaker and more parasitic, why “Cthulhu only swims left” and we can observe, in every democratic polity, a persistent “ratchet effect.” In contrast, a wise authoritarian will begin building his coalition of supporters with the best. And while he need not attract 51% support to maintain his rule, there is no reason to stop there. Support is generally less costly and more profitable than submission. So a sensible authoritarian will continue bargaining for support until there is no one left in need of compulsion except those who have nothing to offer which is worth what they demand in exchange for peaceful cooperation, whose demands are too costly or unreasonable to merit entertaining; in short, people who probably should be coerced. So I do expect authoritarian regimes, on the whole, to be more honest, productive, and less parasitic than democratic ones. This expectation is borne out by an examination of historical monarchies, especially European ones.

    Houses of Government and Government by Exchange

    A better solution to representative government than Democracy (majority rule) is a government of houses representing different classes. Traditionally, western nations were thought to be composed of three “estates of the realm:” those who fight, those who work, and those who pray; aristocracy, commoners, and clergy. Variations on this are possible. The English lumped the aristocracy and clergy together into the nobility. That’s why Parliament only has two houses. And India (which derives from the same proto-Indo-European root culture) has a fourth class, the untouchables. But three is the standard. Democracy can only select whose interests are to prevail and whose are to be subordinated or sacrificed. Democracy, monopoly, majoritarian government, can never ever, NEVER EVER reconcile conflicting interests. Where interests are aligned and homogeneous, democracy can work fine. That’s why it works fine for a corporation, because shareholder interests are more or less perfectly aligned, towards maximization of profit. There is no way for some to profit at the expense of others. And for the same reason, Democracy generally works fine in very homogeneous nations. As soon as interests differ and clash, you’re going to need houses of government, sharing power, in order to negotiate exchanges between classes, or classes and individuals will clash. If members of one class wants something from another, they can propose an exchange, offering something in return to make it worth their while. If they offer nothing, or don’t offer enough, their proposal will be vetoed. If cooperation and exchange break down, then things revert to warfare, or conflict, as above in the case of women voters. Only, in this case, this is understood by all parties instead of being concealed behind parasitic, moralistic, appeals to the divine right of majorities.

    Common Law

    Common law is judge and jury discovered law; evolutionary law. Basically, the common law is “don’t do anything twelve random people and a learned jurist would agree to retaliate against you for doing.” If someone perceives a behavior as imposing a cost or as a theft or destruction of property (according to the propertarian conception of property) then they can take their case before a court. If the court agrees with their evaluation, then the law is updated to define that behavior as criminal. Common law can rapidly and accurately adjust to innovations in property norms, parasitism and criminality. Of course, people can and do differ on what they think impositions, property, or legitimate and proper grounds for retaliation. When such differences are discovered, they are settled over a longer period of time by debate, discussion, moral suasion, migration, self-segregation, or failing that, conflict. If my friends and I think a law is good, and you and your friends think a law is bad, and we disagree too strongly to “agree to disagree” then we are at war. Whoever is more right, all other things being equal, is more likely to “win” (defining victory to include memetic, genetic, economic, social, cultural, political, and military outcomes.) This is the principle of discovered law, evolved law, the common law. Legislation, on the other hand, has no such corrective tendency, until it culminates in total catastrophe, and is much less adaptable and slower reacting.

    The Market for Violence and Negative Subjective Evaluations

    It’s an article of faith among many libertarians that violence, and particularly aggressive violence, is necessarily negative sum. Prices contain information and markets broker them (in a subjective utility maximizing way.) Violence only short circuits that, disrupts markets, destroy price signals, and makes everyone worse off. But this is not correct. In the first place, market transactions aren’t necessarily positive sum. If they are fraudulent or create negative externalities for those not party, they can be negative sum. In the second place, violence is itself a signal, and transmits information. A threat expresses a subjective evaluation just as an offer does in the marketplace. “Hey, don’t do that or we’re going to fight.” And the initiation of hostilities demonstrates the authenticity of that information just as a payment does in the marketplace. One undertakes real cost, and real risk, in resorting to violence. (In contrast, whining, and playing the victim DO NOT demonstrate the authenticity of grievances in the way that resorting to violence does, and so are liable and likely to prove negative sum, if indulged, just as theft is liable and likely to prove negative sum, in the marketplace, because it does not make a sufficient demonstration and exchange of value). Markets and prices on the one hand, and violence and threats on the other, are both necessary components to a stable, functional, and efficient society and economy. To suppress either wholly in favor of the other, would be to forego the benefits they offer, and to pervert incentives towards destructive outcomes. No society which does either will be able to compete, long term, against one which makes a more sensible trade-off between them, making best use of information supplied by both exchange and conflict. Violence is the means of expressing the subjective evaluations not captured by price signals, which are as vast and varied as those which are. A prosperous and functional society needs a price system, but a price system without a threats and violence system is as dysfunctional as a threats and violence system without a price system.

    Borders

    Borders are analogous to property lines. Both are arbitrary social constructs which exist only by convention. Both nevertheless exist because Darwin rewards people who practice their use. Property lines exist when individuals claim territory and succeed in defending it. Borders exist when groups claim territory and succeed in defending it. If property lines are the boundaries between property holdings, borders can be thought of as the boundaries between property regimes. In practice, you have the property and property rights that the people around you are willing to concede that you have. One man cannot stand alone against the world, but a few in confederation can hold the looters, parasites, and destroyers at bay indefinitely; provided no one lets them into their midst. So one reasonable condition people may demand for recognizing and upholding your private property (in addition to you recognizing and upholding their own) is help in upholding shared borders. You don’t have to assent to that condition, but if not, you might find your position very lonely.

    Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism

    Altruism is rarely found in nature except for kinship altruism, because kinship makes reciprocity evolutionarily self-enforcing. A gene coding for altruistic behavior towards kin will help out instances of itself and therefore help itself to propagate and persist (while those other instances of it, in turn, will help it). Kinship also makes defection evolutionarily unstable because it is selfpunishing, or self-limiting. Genes which code for defection behaviors towards kin will harm other instances of themselves and therefore suffer a competitive disadvantage relative to others. Accordingly, we will expect to see greater altruism towards kin and greater trust between kin (because trust is a form of altruism, it entails taking risks and bearing costs for others in the hope of reciprocation) than we do towards or between non-kin or more distant kin. This does seem to be what we observe EVEN in highly ethnocentric (clannish, tribal) low-trust, conflict riven, societies. Western nations are less ethnocentric, less clannish, less tribal, and they are higher trust, more productive, more peaceful, more stable, than some others, but this does not imply that perfect (abstract) universalism and individualism would be higher trust or more productive, or more peaceful still… Western societies are higher trust than tribal societies. But this is not because kinship is not a factor, rather, because of normative out breeding, you simply have larger kinship groups, this permitted the universalization of kinship altruism and kinship trust within homogeneous, outbred nations. Everyone is at least distantly related to one another, and very few people are radically more or less related to you than others. So close kin will always be more cooperative, more altruistic, and enjoy higher trust than distant kin or non-kin, but what you see in western nations is high trust because in-groups are larger. Tribal societies probably have higher trust in-group, but they have very small in-groups, and lots of them, so they conflict. Reciprocity can be enforced technologically (through proactive monitoring and enforcement) at greater distances in terms of relatedness, but at some cost. The cost of cooperative behavior is inversely proportional to relatedness. That makes the demarcation of in-group/out-group boundaries along racial, ethnic, or national (kinship) lines rational, productive and stable, in order to capitalize on high in-group trust and economize on low in-group transaction costs. As much as some people like to claim this is a dated atavism, it is simply not so. None of the evidence is consistent with that hypothesis.

    Hierarchy

    I would serve the lord who would serve me. A hierarchy based on reciprocal duties, loyalties, and obligations, and where the sovereign understands his power depends on maintaining the loyalty of his subjects by discharging his duties and obligations faithfully so they will discharge their duties and obligations willingly, can be a productive hierarchy. Hierarchy can be productive because it can provide economies of scale in the provisions of certain commons and public goods (principally defense). Hierarchy can also provide decision in undecidable cases (where there are no objective or agreed upon intersubjective criteria for decision) and then people can get over it and move on to capture gains from cooperation in more decidable cases instead of getting bogged down. Sometimes it’s more important to be on the same page than the best page, or there is no best page. But even if the hierarchical solution is not best, for you, it may nevertheless be less costly than a prolonged and possibly pointless conflict or indecision. As long as hierarchy is productive, it will persist and grow. When it ceases to be productive, but becomes parasitic, subordinating the interests of some, systematically, for the benefit of others, sooner or later, it will probably crumble and split, or fall.

    Incremental Suppression

    Incremental Suppression is a marginal approach to enforcement, a bologna slice strategy. If you are powerful, you identify the most egregious instances of violation and go after those first, working your way down the list until it’s no longer worth the cost. If you are not powerful, you identify the violators within your reach and begin suppressing them, working your way outward as your power grows and your enemies’ diminish. Conclusion. Western civilization CAN be reclaimed and restored, through truth, science, violence, hierarchy, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and law, by incrementally suppressing all forms of parasitism, fraud, deception, and freeriding, including democracy, feminism, socialism, postmodernism, pilpul, feminine coercion, and more (which we have not yet addressed) by building and maintaining commons and accumulating and defending other property to serve and protect the long term interests of our in-groups, cooperating through trade, and negotiating honestly, and by disassociating or bitterly conflicting with those who will not. “Truth is enough.” ~ Curt Doolittle Truth and Violence To Enforce It

  • A Brief Introduction to Propertarianism

    A Brief Introduction to Propertarianism

    (Propertarianism’s Core Concepts for Libertarians.) by Eli Harman Download PDF: PropertarianCoreConcepts  (english) Download PDF:  1الفلسفة-التملكية-مفاهيم-أساسية  (Arabic) Translation by Ahmed Reda

    What is Propertarianism?

    Propertarianism is a scientific, rational, empirical, approach to understanding and analyzing human behavior, incentives, norms, institutions, cooperation and conflict originated by Curt Doolittle and developed by him in cooperation with others.

    What is Science?

    Science, or the “scientific method” is an empirical method for gaining understanding of reality and access to truth. Many people, including many so-called “scientists” do not understand the scientific method, why it works, or why it is valuable. You can be sure you are dealing with a pseudo-scientist whenever you hear phrases like “settled science”, “scientifically proven”, or “the scientific consensus”. The errors of these pseudo-scientists are rooted in “justificationism” the philosophical belief that science is about acquiring factual support or supporting evidence to “justify” theories. In this view, truth is “justified true belief”. Not only must belief be true to qualify as knowledge, but it must also be “justified.” One must have a good reason for believing it. In contrast, critical rationalism, an epistemology (philosophy of truth and knowledge) developed by Karl Popper and others, advances a standard of “true belief.” Knowledge, as “true belief,” does not need to be justified, because it cannot be justified. It only needs to be true. And the method of arriving at true belief is not justification, but falsification, “conjecture and refutation.” We advance towards the truth by identifying and discarding error, by process of elimination. We acquire facts by observation and measurement. In order to understand facts, how they relate to each other and the world, and to predict the future, we need theories. Theories are causal models developed through conjecture and refutation to explain the relationships of facts to one another and to the wider world. For any given set of facts, there may be many internally and externally consistent theories to explain them. Ancient astronomers, observing the apparent motions of celestial bodies from the vantage point of Earth, developed a geocentric model of the solar system (informed by their own biases and perception, of the Earth they inhabited as a fixed frame of reference). As the precision of the observations increased, the complexity of the model had to increase, for example to explain observed phenomena like retrograde motion by adding epicycles. Eventually, enough facts were amassed through observation to falsify, or disprove, the geocentric model, and a new model had to be adopted, heliocentrism. As it turned out, heliocentrism also explained the facts a lot more simply and elegantly. This is called parsimony. A simpler model is generally preferable to a more complex model, if they both account for the available facts. This is the essence of Ockham’s razor “entities are not to be needlessly multiplied”. A simpler model is easier to test or to falsify, but if it fails it can be salvaged with tweaks or ad hoc rationalizations that make it more complex, but save it from falsification. This is often an indication that something is wrong with the model. However, it’s important to note that until geocentrism was conclusively falsified, both geocentrism and heliocentrism were able to explain the available evidence. If we have multiple theories to explain the facts, we are looking for more evidence to start dis-confirming, refuting, or falsifying some of them. Hopefully, what’s left is the truth. If we falsify all of the theories we have, we have to come up with more through conjecture. Any source of conjectures is potentially valid, educated guesses, wild guesses, visions, dreams, drug induced hallucinations, “divine revelation,” you name it. But it has to be testable, it has to be falsifiable (capable of being falsified by some fact, observation, or measurement), and it has to survive falsification attempts in order to survive and be adopted as a theory. If we adopt a theory, that doesn’t mean it’s true. No matter how many subsequent observations, measurements, or facts agree with the theory, it will never be “proven” or “justified.” We can’t be sure that the next observation we make, the next measurement we take, or the next fact that we learn won’t falsify the entire theory. This is known as the problem of induction and has been discussed since at least David Hume. A theory that stands for a long time and survives many falsification attempts is not proven, it is simply not falsified, yet. This is because the truth of a theory depends on ALL of the facts, not just those that we know, but those that we don’t know, and even those that we don’t know we don’t know. On the other hand, a theory can be conclusively disproven or falsified by one or a few facts actually in our possession, or our personal, first-hand knowledge. Our theories are never proven, but the more they are disproved, hopefully, the better the remaining ones become, on average. This is how we acquire knowledge and understanding. It’s an evolutionary process that tends to improve our knowledge and understanding over time, but we can never actually be sure that we’ve finally got it.

    Testimonialism

    Testimonialism is limiting your speech and communication to testimony of that which is your personal, first-hand, knowledge; free of assumption, bias, error, misunderstanding, leaps to conclusions, etc… For example, I took a phone call at my office one time from someone who wanted me to relay a message to a coworker. I realized I had no knowledge of the message’s content so instead of simply relaying the content without context I decided to report that it had been relayed to me. Then I realized the source, too, was not personally known to me. It could have been anybody on the phone, for all I knew. So the email I eventually sent my coworker read “I received a message from someone identifying themselves as so-and-so who wanted me to tell you such and such.” As it turned out, the message was accurate and the source was who they said they were. But if you limit yourself to testimony it’s easy to speak truthfully, to place your statements in the proper context and communicate your confidence in them along with the content. Whereas, if you do NOT practice testimonialism it’s easy to pass on error, deception, bias, or imaginary content without caveat or without realizing it. A good heuristic for practicing testimonialism is to use E-Prime, which is basically English purged of the verb “to be.” Instead of talking of how things ARE, speak of how they seem, how they appear, or how you perceive them. This is more accurate testimony. Existential claims about things’ ultimate nature are usually extrapolations, assumptions, or errors… That’s theory, not fact, and we have a whole discipline of science constructed around being careful with how we construct and state theories. There is an old joke; An astronomer, a physicist and a mathematician are on a train in Scotland. The astronomer looks out of the window, sees a black sheep standing in a field, and remarks, “How odd. All the sheep in Scotland are black!” “No, no, no!” says the physicist. “Only some Scottish sheep are black.” The mathematician rolls his eyes at his companions’ muddled thinking and says, “In Scotland, there is at least one sheep, at least one side of which appears to be black from here, some of the time.” (I think the joke has the mathematician as the voice of wisdom because of the statistical problems with generalizing from a single example. But more typically, mathematicians are rationalists, concerned with internal consistency, while scientists are empiricists, who deal in external correspondence with reality.) Testimonialism is important because there can be many aspects of the truth and each of us may perceive them differently, or may perceive different aspects of the same question, from different perspectives. If we make leaps or assumptions and assume our perception IS reality then anyone with a different perception is wrong and we have to fight about it. But if we simply report accurate testimony of our perceptions we can compare it to the testimony of others without having to assume they are wrong. Even if they differ we don’t have to assume one or more are false but can use both to help build a more accurate or complete picture or model of reality.

    Operationalism

    Operationalism means speaking in operations or actions, like a recipe or a computer program. Science is operational because a proper, non-pseudoscientific, science paper is basically like a recipe. “Set up this experiment in this way and conduct it just so and you should observe these results.” If someone follows the recipe and observes different results, the conclusion will have to be revisited. People frequently do NOT speak operationally. They speak in metaphors, analogies, meanings, or existence claims, instead of actions and operations. When you do not speak operationally it is easy to engage in error, bias, wishful thinking, suggestion, conflation, fraud, or deception. Consider the phrase “I love you.” There is a lot of moral and emotional content in that short but highly meaningful utterance and I’d wager most people who use it, most times, aren’t thinking about all of that or its many weighty and subtle implications. “I love you” is frequently not an honest statement, either for reasons of willful duplicity or out of simple ignorance. But if we break it down in operational terms we can gain a more precise understanding of its meaning and benefit from employing it more correctly and conscientiously. I think that “love” (noun) refers to the condition in which one’s happiness depends on another’s. Therefore “to love” (verb) must mean to act in a manner consistent with this condition prevailing. So we can put “I love you” in operational terms and say that it means “I promise that if you test the hypothesis that my happiness depends on your own against my actions, you will not find it untrue”.

    Propertarianism Grew Out of Libertarianism.

    Curt Doolittle and many of his students are former libertarians or students of the libertarian project, which is itself descended from and something of a reboot of enlightenment classical liberalism. Classical liberalism evolved into progressive liberalism and eventually postmodern liberalism, as classical liberalism’s concerns with individual liberty and individual rights evolved into preoccupation with individual self-expression and the immediate satisfaction of individual desires. Somewhat dismayed with this development, libertarians sought to restore enlightenment classical liberalism and place it on a firmer moral and theoretical foundation. The culmination of this project is arguably Anarcho-capitalism, the analysis and advocacy of a totally stateless, private, free-market, social, political, and economic order. The problem is the moral and theoretical arguments made by libertarians are not scientific. They are rationalist, justificationist, pseudo-scientific, and moralistic. Libertarians frequently start out from what they consider irrefutable moral or praxeological axioms and then attempt to reason out comprehensive systems of moral imperatives or theoretical understanding through deductive logic; which they then regard as apodictically true, or irrefutable. Unfortunately, this methodology leads to building intricate castles in the sky based on magnification of subtle errors in assumptions or reasoning. Where these impressive, but often useless, and sometimes harmful, edifices of intellectual effort disagree with observable reality, libertarians hand wave the discrepancies away because logically, their conclusions MUST be true. Libertarian moral and descriptive theories are usually internally consistent, but not externally correspondent with observable reality. They are not scientific. They are not empirical. Like Marxism, they are rationalism and moralism. To correct these errors, Propertarianism seeks to reconcile what is salvageable from the libertarian project, from classical liberalism, and from pre-enlightenment Aristocracy, by subjecting it to the scientific method, falsifying what is false, retaining and incorporating what survives into a new body of theory, knowledge, understanding and practice necessary and sufficient for the restoration of Western Civilization (and others.) Propertarianism is not a political program in its own right. It is a methodology for understanding, analyzing and discussing political institutions, recommendations, and proposals, as well as other aspects of human behavior, laundered of error, bias, wishful thinking, and imaginary content (just as science, more generally, is a methodology for understanding anything, laundered of error, bias, wishful thinking, and imaginary content). Propertarian methods can be used to analyze, construct, or discuss proposals, recommendations, and institutions informed by libertarian, conservative, progressive, aristocratic, populist or any other preferences or values. Propertarianism is a descriptive approach. It is not a prescriptive approach. Propertarianism can tell you what is truthful, and what is possible, and what is untruthful and what is impossible, but people are still always going to differ on what is GOOD or what is DESIRABLE. The aim of Propertarianism, is that people may, by discussing and negotiating truthfully, cooperatively arrive at productive solutions that accommodate their respective preferences and values, through reciprocal exchange. The alternatives are conflict, compulsion, fraud, parasitism and theft.

    Preferences and Values

    Facts are objective. They are gathered from observation and measurement of objective reality. Theories explaining facts are objective, though they may be true or false. But preferences and values are subjective. They are internal and particular to specific actors, agents, and entities. Moral theories are generally moralisms. They aim to universalize the particular, subjective, preferences and values of some groups or individuals to others, so that they may assert that their preferences and values are binding and obligatory upon others and obtain what they want at a discount, by not accommodating the preferences and values of those others, but demanding that those others accommodate theirs. This is what progressives are generally doing when they demand handouts, benefits, or respect; what libertarians are doing when they demand liberty and property rights; and what conservatives are doing when they demand moral or traditional behavior. This is contentious because it is not reciprocal. When you demand what you want from others, you are seeking to impose a cost, if only an opportunity cost, or extract a benefit. But if you do so without offering them something they want in return, you are demanding that they do so at a loss. People seek to avoid losses and so they will resist you. Propertarianism eschews moralizing, and instead focuses on stating facts, values and preferences truthfully, as facts, values, and preferences, so that people may negotiate exchanges to accommodate their differing values and preferences, based on agreed upon facts. That is reciprocal. Moralisms are not reciprocal. Moralisms aim to influence the behavior of others by justifying behavior that is in the moralizer’s interests and delegitimizing behavior that is contrary to the moralizer’s interests in order to induce others to serve the moralizer’s interests, even at the expense of their own, without compensation, or at a large discount relative to productive exchanges negotiated honestly.

    Reciprocity and Cooperation.

    All cooperation is based on reciprocity. You must give in order to receive. Exchange or trade is how cooperation is brokered, with each party giving, in their own estimation, in light of their own preferences and values, less than they receive, so that the result is mutual benefit. The law of reciprocity is the foundation of cooperation. When reciprocity is violated, cooperation breaks down. For example, libertarians often defend “price gouging” on the grounds that it’s a natural consequence of supply and demand, helps to prevent or alleviate shortages, and prices are still the most efficient way of rationing scarce resources, even under extreme or unusual circumstances. This is largely correct. However, it ignores that “price gouging” is a violation of reciprocity. Under normal circumstances people don’t mind interacting with profit maximizing actors because competitive profits in equilibrated markets, or producer surpluses, are roughly proportional to consumer surpluses, or the benefit derived by the consumer from the transaction. Furthermore, people have options, they can choose not to transact or to transact with other suppliers. Mutual benefit, or reciprocity, are in full effect. But when people suffer misfortune, they start to resent others profiting from their misfortune (even if that alleviates it somewhat) rather than sharing in it. Abiding by market rules is actually a form of altruism, whereby participants forego certain benefits (like the proceeds of theft, fraud, defection, or nonperformance) for the benefit of other individuals in order to obtain some longer term rewards (the benefits of ongoing, productive, cooperation and exchange.) When price gougers ask consumers to continue respecting their property rights and to pay higher prices to ration their consumption, insure availability for others, and incentivize the flow of resources to where they are most needed, they are asking consumers to behave MORE altruistically then normal, to bear larger costs, and forego larger benefits, for the sake of others, while they themselves only PROFIT more than normal. In other words, price gougers behave less altruistically than normal while they demand their customers behave more altruistically. This is the violation of reciprocity that people intuit that leads to anger, retaliation, violence, looting, and vigilantism rather than paying elevated prices. Some other solution to local shortages after catastrophes or emergencies will have to be found. Either regulate “price gouging” to keep it moderate and supplement it with non-price rationing, and/or tax the proceeds of “price gouging” and redistribute them to everyone affected, or publicly provide critical supplies so people have a ready alternative to paying elevated prices. But just leaving things to “the market” in this case, doesn’t end best.

    The Ternary Logic of Cooperation.

    People can interact in 3 different ways:

    1. Cooperation. (Altruism, exchange, trade.)
    2. Noncooperation (Disassociation, boycott)
    3. Conflict (War, fraud, parasitism, theft, crime.)

    People will generally follow their incentives and choose the mode of interaction that is most profitable for them. If you wish to cooperate with others, you must create incentives favoring cooperation. You must have something to offer them so that cooperation is preferable to noncooperation. And you must have something to threaten them with so that cooperation is preferable to conflict. (The carrot and the stick.) But there is no categorical imperative to cooperate instead of not cooperate, or even instead of conflicting. Sometimes, with some people, we might prefer to conflict. If what someone demands in exchange for their cooperation is not worth what they’re willing to provide, and they’re not willing to leave you alone, conflict is the only solution. People follow their incentives.

    What Makes Propertarianism Propertarian?

    One of the central insights of propertarianism is that all rights are property rights, and that human cooperation, actions, and conflicts can be modeled as property transaction, or conflicts over property, or as attempts to preserve, increase, transfer, redistribute, loot, seize, destroy, defend or avoid losing inventories of property. The libertarian “life, liberty, and property” are obviously property rights, pertaining to and deriving from “self-ownership” and ownership of personal, private, property. The leftists’ assertions that “workers own the means of production” or “workers are entitled to the surplus value their labor creates” or “healthcare is a human right” are simply rival property claims that often conflict with the libertarian ones. Conservative concerns for protecting norms, security, order, culture, nation, and ethnicity are less obvious because these are forms of shared, common, often intangible, property, but they are still things over which people demonstrate a sense of ownership and which they will defend by retaliating against violations of or attacks against.

    What is Property?

    Property is that which individuals and groups demonstrate a willingness and ability to defend. Territoriality is common behavior among animals and the behavior takes a prototypical form. First, there will be a claim. A wolf will go out and piss on the boundaries of the territory he claims. This is a promise, that if another member of his species enters his territory and attempts to make use of it, there will be a conflict. If this occurs, the claim is defended, and the conflict is settled with a fight. The original claim will be upheld, or it will be overturned and the rival claim sustained in its stead. The only difference with human property is our territoriality can take much more varied and sophisticated forms and be given all sorts of different expressions. We’re not limited to pissing on territory. So property could be physical, private, property, or it could be the market value of the same. It could be physical, common, property, like a park. It could be common, intangible, property: like public order and decency, the integrity of our language or culture, truth in the “marketplace of ideas,” the ancestral gene pool, or something else. It could be private but intangible: reputation, intellectual property, honor, etc… Libertarians have a theory of legitimate private property originating in original appropriation and subsequent exchange. This is sometimes called “Intersubjectively Verifiable Property” (IVP) which means “property people can agree who owns” and it basically limits the scope of “legitimate” property to personal, private, property. But people will intuit assaults on or theft of common and intangible property as a loss and they will retaliate against it. So if the purpose of property rights, norms, and regimes, is to minimize conflicts by codifying who owns what, and consequently, who may do what, where, and why, then libertarian IVP fails as a property regime and a property norm, because there are whole categories of conflict it does not address nor prevent because it does not codify property rights in things that people value (with good reason) and conflict over, but actually licenses parasitism, theft, destruction, and freeriding in these domains by prohibiting retaliation against it.

    Property in Toto.

    Propertarians speak of “Property in Toto” or property in all of its forms, to include everything over which people lay claim, everything over which people demonstrate ownership, everything people defend and everything over which people conflict. If someone wants to fight you because you are insulting his woman’s honor, it’s pointless to maintain that he has no “right” to fight you because you have a “right” to say whatever you want to about her. He’s going to want to fight you, and he probably will, all your protests or arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. “Rights” arguments are generally a means of trying to get your way or justify and license your own behavior without paying its full costs (one cost of insulting someone’s woman is the cost of defending yourself from retaliation in defense of her honor.) The fact that someone wants to fight you to defend his woman’s honor demonstrates that he considers this his property. Your critiques of its legitimacy as property are irrelevant. Your antagonist regards it as property and is willing to defend it. His violence is demonstration of his sincerity and conviction. It’s time to shut up and put up. You have violated his property and you can either apologize and attempt to make amends, or you can defend yourself from his retaliation and attempt to assert, sustain and defend a rival or contradictory property claim. Likewise, it will do you no good to argue that people “shouldn’t” defend the market value of their property by getting together and forming homeowner’s associations, or zoning boards, to regulate and retaliate against activities that diminish the value of nearby properties. If someone starts doing something nearby that’s noisy, smelly, ugly, or that imposes some other cost on you and your property, it’s going to decrease the value of the property because other people are going to reckon it as a cost as well and they’re going to be willing to pay less for your property at sale. So if people can preserve the value of their property by preventing or punishing such activities in populated areas, they will. Libertarians see this as a conflict between rights over physical property (to do what you want with it) and some kind of intangible property (value) which they regard as illegitimate. But there is no reason the physical property is more legitimate. People value things subjectively and there is a great deal of inter-subjective agreement on the things people value and don’t value. It’s not totally arbitrary. This case does present us with a trade-off between different values. But that’s nothing unusual. Life is full of trade-offs, and it’s probably economically efficient to inconvenience people to do cost-imposing things in underpopulated areas where there is nobody to complain. The value of a populated area is chiefly its value for living and working in ways that don’t impinge on others. And if others impinge on you, that reduces the value of living in a populated area. So if you want to obtain the most value from living in such an area, you must give up the value of being able to do just whatever you want, whenever you want, wherever you want. You can smelt copper or slaughter hogs pretty much anywhere, and the cost of being far away from other things are small compared to the costs you would impose on them by being close. These are just a few examples of property in toto, property in all its forms. But they are not the only examples. This is a factual, descriptive, conception of property, not a moral one.

    Rights

    In practice, you have the property and property rights that the people around you are willing to concede that you have, and willing to help you defend and uphold. One man cannot stand alone against the world. But enough in confederation can hold hostile hordes at bay indefinitely. Property and property rights are obtained in exchange. You recognize and uphold mine and I’ll do the same for yours. The necessary standard to make property rights durable is mutual insurance, not just “respect mine and I’ll respect yours” but “DEFEND mine and I’ll DEFEND yours.” Practically speaking, you can’t have any rights without positive duties and obligations. Libertarians go wrong when they make a distinction between “positive” and “negative” rights. All rights are positive rights because NO rights can be enjoyed without enforcement and defense; and enforcement and defense must be proactive and have positive costs (although the benefits may be greater.) Any claims by libertarians that rights are “natural,” “God-given”, “innate,” “inalienable,” “selfevident,” or anything of the sort are moralistic attempts to obtain rights at a discount, without paying the full cost of asserting, maintaining, and defending them, by convincing others to PROVIDE them at their expense. But there can be no such thing, in practice, as a right not to contribute to the maintenance and defense of rights that one demands. Rights, in practice, have to be maintained and defended. Non-contribution to the maintenance and defense of rights is not conducive to their maintenance and defense. Demands for rights while refusing to enter into reciprocal duties and obligations to defend rights is a violation of reciprocity and an act of parasitism, not conducive to long term cooperation. Without cooperation, no rights can successfully be maintained and defended.

    Non-Aggression vs. Non-Parasitism

    Besides the different conceptions of property and rights, the main point of departure of propertarianism from libertarianism is rejection of the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP.) The NAP is in some sense question begging, because it depends critically on a theory of property. Without a theory of property you can’t tell what is aggression and what isn’t, what is defense, retaliation, etc… So libertarians and communists, for example, could conflict bitterly without ever engaging in aggression (against their own respective theories of property) but only to defend, on the one hand, property homesteaded by original appropriation or acquired by subsequent exchange, and, on the other hand, the surplus value created by labor and various equal or universal entitlements… But there is also no reason to extend enemies the benefit of non-aggression if they will not extend the same to you. That’s non-reciprocal. That’s a cost without benefit. You have to forego the benefits of aggression against your enemies, either preempting their aggression or actually plundering, looting, enslaving, or killing them, and you don’t get anything in return for your generosity or forbearance. They certainly won’t avoid doing any of that to you if they have the opportunity. Libertarians maintain that voluntary transactions and exchanges are always mutually beneficial (or if not, they’re simply, one-off errors and not systematically non-beneficial, or non-mutual.) So “voluntary” is the only requirement transactions have to meet in order to be productive, according to libertarians. This is consistent with the Non-Aggression Principle. But fraud by asymmetry of information is certainly possible, even if someone makes no explicit representation of the suitability of their product or service for a particular purpose, it’s possible to offer one that SEEMS so suitable, and only the individual or firm offering it knows better or knows different (until the fraud is discovered.) Libertarianism would license such fraud by prohibiting retaliation against it (because it does not rise to the level of aggression or explicit fraud.) But there might be good reason to prohibit and suppress parasitism and fraud, in all of their forms, even at the cost of committing aggression, to limit people to genuinely productive behavior. So to the condition of “voluntary” we must add “fully informed” and “warrantied.” Finally, transactions and exchanges have costs and benefits not only to those directly party to them (who are in charge of making the decision to transact or exchange) but also to others, not party. If the interests of those others are to be accounted for when the decision is made to transact or not to transact, they must have redress, if the decision imposes a cost on them, or deprives them of some benefit. So we must add another condition to our “non-parasitism principle”“Nothing but voluntary, fully informed, warrantied, transactions, free from negative externality… else we fight.” If you will permit me to speak metaphorically, the cold hand of Darwin will punish us just as surely for not engaging in aggression judiciously as for engaging in aggression injudiciously. Libertarians are content to leave the benefits of judicious aggression on the table for the sake of principle. But a principle of leaving benefits on the table is not an evolutionarily competitive one and that’s why libertarianism has never gone anywhere and never will.

    Warranty

    In high trust markets, warranty is typically offered by producers to vendors, and by vendors to consumers. This is a promise that the product or service will meet some expectation and compensation if it doesn’t. Basically, the producer assumes full responsibility to the vendor, and the vendor to the consumer, that the product or service will fulfill its stated purpose or function to a specified degree. Warranty is productive because producers have more information about the product or service and more control over quality than vendors and vendors more than consumers. So warranty incentivizes the achievement of the best outcomes at lowest cost by making the cost of failure incident explicitly upon those able to deliver success. The alternative, caveat emptor, “buyer beware” is tremendously costly and inefficient in comparison, and leads to wasteful duplication of effort, as every consumer has to do extensive and costly research before every transaction. This is the standard that prevails in low trust markets, where haggling is the norm, all sales are final, return policies are non-existent (and probably cannot exist, because they would be abused) people rely on relatives and extended family for most needs, crime, violence, fraud, corruption and nepotism are rife, etc… All this leads to very high transaction costs and standards of living suffer because many trades that might otherwise occur do not.

    Negative Externality

    A negative externality is an imposed cost. Anything you do which imposes a cost on others, whether noise, odor, unsightly or distracting imagery, risk, or what have you, is a negative externality. Profiting personally from imposing negative externalities on others is parasitic. You are accumulating property in Toto by diminishing the inventories of property held by others. Those others might rather you did something productive, which benefited you and others but did not impose a cost on them, or at least compensated them for their loss (which creates productive incentives and makes losses calculable.) But if you don’t do something productive, and if you don’t compensate people for the losses you cause, they will retaliate against you, or they will demand the government retaliate against you on their behalf. To use just one example; there was a bit of a flap a few years ago about an app someone had created to enable people to auction “their” public parking spaces in San Francisco. Some libertarians were defending the creator and users of the app by saying they were creating and selling information about the location of available parking spaces and/or that the spaces were public and therefore unowned. Building parking places and auctioning off their use is a productive activity that increases the supply of parking spaces to meet demand. Profit is, in this case, both the signal that guides production and the incentive to be productive. But looking for common parking spaces to park in and then demanding payment to move is not a productive behavior, it is theft of commons and free-riding. The profit one may earn doing this is neither an incentive to increase the supply of parking spaces nor a reward for doing so, it is simply taking of what is already there from those who are already using it. That behavior reduces the availability of parking spaces for those using them according to generally accepted rules and offers to selectively stop reducing the availability, for a fee. If the whole reason you are in a parking spot, or still in a parking spot, is so that you can charge someone to move, then you are not simply offering to find and sell information on parking spot availability, you are the cause of it, but you can only create availability by first creating unavailability, imposing a negative externality. People who impose a cost and then offer to stop imposing it, for compensation, are rightly regarded as knaves. Another example: if you run a crack house in a nice neighborhood you are profiting from imposing negative externalities on your neighbors. There is noise, odor, strange, unsightly, untrustworthy, people coming and going, petty crime, risk, intoxicated people stumbling about, a degradation in safety, security, order, and public decency. A libertarian might maintain that it is your “right” to run a crack house, because it is your house. And besides, the costs are largely imposed by the customers you’re not responsible for their actions. If you have a problem with them, take it up with them. But of course the things are causally related. No crack house, no customers… And so it is totally rational for neighbors to retaliate against the crack house for the costs imposed by its customers by kicking in its doors and shutting it down, or as the case may be, delegating that prerogative to the government to exercise on their behalf. If you do not address externalities, imposed costs, and parasitism by some means, either by law, or by informal retaliation, then people are going to demand authority to address the issues for them. Libertarians really shoot themselves in the foot, even on their own terms, by defending property norms or non-aggression principles that license parasitism or negative externalities (by prohibiting retaliation against them) because that will only increase the demand for either informal retaliation or authority. Libertarianism, as typically articulated, increases the demand for authority. Another instance where this is the case is open borders and mass migration, which many, but not all, libertarians support. People will experience the erosion of their culture and language and the diminishment of their ethnic group (relative to others) as well as political externalities arising from demographic subjugation and displacement by alien ethnic groups under democracy, the loss of social trust and intensification of ethnic rivalries from diversity, and other consequences of open borders or mass migration as costs or losses of property. This will increase demand for authority in the form of militarized police to deal with crime, terrorism, ethnic strife and disorder and eventually to enact border and immigration controls. If liberty is your goal, which is freedom from arbitrary authority, don’t propose policy changes which will increase demand for arbitrary authority. This is an example of a proposal failing a test of existential possibility (more on that later.)

    Collectivism

    In order to have any property, and in order to have any rights, individuals team up into groups capable of asserting and defending their rights and their property claims together against all challengers. Naive collectivism holds that the group is primary and individual are secondary; that group interests and rights are primary and individual interests and rights are secondary. But this fails methodological individualism. Factually speaking, only individuals have interests because only individuals hold preferences and values (although they may share these in a group.) Individuals form cooperative groups because it is in their individual interests to do so. Individual vs. collective is a trade-off. Sometimes, what’s good for the individual is not good for the collective, (other individuals) and they may profitably restrain or impose upon the individual. But it is in the interest of the individual to be part of a good collective. So as long as the benefits of being in a collective outweigh the costs (including opportunity costs) then the individual will remain in the collective. The same is true in the other direction. So long as the benefits of retaining an individual in a collective exceed the costs of doing the same, then the collective will do so. The smaller and more numerous and more varied the collectives, the more closely they can match every individual’s preferences and values. But the smaller the collectives, the less able they are to assert and defend the rights and interests of their individual members against others. Here, as elsewhere, we are faced with a trade-off.

    Individualism

    Naive individualism or atomistic individualism holds that the individual is SO primary that it is never in his interests to form or to enter into any durable collective or group. Only ad hoc or temporary cooperation is worthwhile, beneficial, or permitted. But this too, fails methodological individualism. Empirically, as a matter of fact, individuals DO form collectives and groups. And many of these collectives and groups prove durable. Productive collectives, those that serve the interests of individual members, are competitive relative to atomistic individuals who won’t enter into collective. History furnishes no example of a society of atomistic individuals remaining atomistic individuals in competition or conflict with individuals who have group identity and solidarity. If it were desirable or possible, there should be some. In truth though, all three of the principal western political orientations are profoundly and fundamentally individualistic. Leftism is individualism for those with instantaneous time horizons. Food and shelter and medicine and college and debt forgiveness and status and orgasms for ME, right now, regardless of the costs to others or to society or to my future self. Libertarianism is individualism for those with intermediate time horizons, who recognize some of the incentives and conditions necessary for engaging in production and exchange: so all of that through and because of property rights and markets over so many years as may be necessary to organize their production, without regard to the costs to tradition, culture, extended family, (ethnicity) commons or future generations. Rightism is individualism for people with very long time horizons, who recognize (or intuit) the full spectrum of conditions and incentives necessary to engage in production and exchange not just NOW, but for generations to come. So all of that for ME AND MINE, securely, now and for the future, for generations to come, by drawing on the hard won, evolutionary-gleaned wisdom of the past, and maintaining the various commons (things like public decency, good order, and common defense) that give us our competitive advantages over others who do not share our values or have our best interests at heart. This is what Curt calls the…

    “Intertemporal Division of Perception and Cognition.”

    Different people are specialized for perceiving and addressing different concerns on different timescales. A mother with a crying baby is going to be focused on the immediate desires and needs of that baby, and that is a good focus, for that particular problem. But for other problems, longer term views, taking account of remoter causes and consequences, may be more useful. If your problem is a crying baby that needs to be fed, it makes sense to treat it like a crying baby that needs to fed, because you want it to grow. That’s a good solution. But if your problem is NOT a crying baby that needs to be fed, you probably don’t want it treated like one, because you don’t want it to grow. That’s no solution.

    Propertarian Tests

    Propertarianism recommends the use of various tests to filter out bad statements, claims, proposals, etc… These tests are Identity (non-conflation) Internal Consistency (rational, noncontradiction) External Correspondence (empirical, “reality check”) Existential Possibility (selfsustaining vs, self-defeating) Morality (Non-Parasitism, reciprocity) Full Accounting (not fraud by omission) Parsimony (simplicity). If you can warranty that your statements and proposals pass these tests then your statements and proposals are as truthful as statements and proposals can be. They may not be TRUE, but at least you aren’t engaging in willful or negligent fraud, only honest error.

    Identity and non-conflation.

    A is A. A is not not A. Not A is not A. “Social justice” is not justice. If it were justice you wouldn’t need to qualify it. This is just a verbal conflation or sleight of hand to give injustice the imprimatur of justice. Justice can be defined objectively as the clear, impartial, consistent, administration of rules. Every civilized society administers the death penalty for stepping in front of a moving bus. Is this just? Yes, the rule is clear, impartial, and (pretty) consistently administered. It may be severe and even disproportional, but just pay attention not to violate it and you will be fine. However “social justice” (besides failing reciprocity, full accounting, internal consistency, external correspondence, existential possibility, and parsimony) is not justice. It is arbitrary, unclear, ever changing, and obscure, quite the opposite of Justice… “Domestic Terrorism” is not “terrorism.” It’s just an attempt to rhetorically conflate resistance or rebellion against unaccountable or unpopular rule (something towards which many people are favorably disposed) with hostile aggression by foreign, non-state, actors (something people are much more usually against). White identity is not the same as white nationalism which is not the same as white supremacy. If you look in the AP style guide (used by mainstream journalists) under the entry for “alt-right” it’s clear that they understand the distinction, but they advise to conflate them anyway. At this point, the advocates of “social justice” have succeeded in mostly conflating colorblind egalitarianism as “white supremacy”. If you’re not anti-white, you’re “white supremacist” Why conflate everything which is not one extreme as the other extreme? Well, they want you to support “THEIR” extreme. That’s easier if they can conflate everything else away into a false dichotomy and then load the other side of that dichotomy with all the moral and emotional baggage of the worst that it encompasses. An “earnings gap” is not the same as a “wage gap” and once you control for the relevant variables, including career field, time away from work, risk, hours worked, lower frequency of female outliers, etc… There is no evidence of a substantial “wage gap” between men and women, there is a minuscule one, at most (single digit percentages). But we constantly hear from lying, rent-seeking, feminists, attempting to justify demands for more, about their “77 cents on the dollar”. You never have to look far to find examples of conflation employed for duplicitous or self-serving ends. In contrast, Propertarianism aims for deflation, to clarify and enlighten for productive ends rather than to confuse and obscure for parasitic ends.

    Existential Possibility

    With a test of existential possibility, we are looking for any reason why an idea might be impossible in practice. For example, communism is impossible because of well-known incentive and calculation problems (hence the common excuse that “it wasn’t real communism” in defense of trying again). Equality is impossible because even if we succeed, somehow, in equalizing material conditions, people have differing preferences and values and hence, would reckon those conditions differently. We would have succeeded only in creating inequality of a different sort. That being said, people tend to perceive inequality negatively and so there might be some targeted measures to reduce inequality that are worthwhile, to increase social harmony and stability, or for some other reason. But we’re just going to have to insist people give up equality, per se, as an objective. Another thing we could look at would be the evolutionary stability or instability of a strategy. Non-reciprocal altruism is evolutionarily unstable because if we are not enforcing reciprocity and reciprocity is not somehow self-enforcing (like it is between kin, who share genes, and therefore help other instances of their own genes by helping each other) then there is no reason to reciprocate and people will not. Their incentive is to parasitize and freeride off of us, abusing our generosity without returning the favor, until we are consumed. And then we won’t be able to continue engaging in non-reciprocal altruism.

    Eugenia and Dysgenia

    Eugenia and dysgenia are a special case of the existential possibility test, pertaining to the quality of genes passed on and how this is altered or influenced by proposed changes. I would suggest that every policy, norm, tradition, practice, etc… Is either eugenic or dysgenic, and not just in terms of someone’s opinion. We might say a policy is objectively eugenic if it selects for the genes or other traits that are necessary for its own maintenance, and objectively dysgenic if it selects against them. For example, we might say that a policy of feeding the poor, without imposing limits on their reproduction, is objectively dysgenic, because somebody has to feed them, and such a policy penalizes those who are able to do so in order to subsidize the relative increase of those who are unable, so it must sooner or later reach a tipping point and break down catastrophically. On the other hand, the old western practice (around the north sea) of a man not marrying until he had his own home (the English word “husband” literally means homeowner, “house bond”) is objectively eugenic. Establishing a minimum bar for reproduction is only going to cause the population to improve and more and more people in each succeeding generation to meet the old standard. A classification of “eugenic” or “dysgenic” is therefore a useful metric for evaluating any policy or practice. And to suppose that “eugenic” is the thing which is bad, or something to be ashamed of, is exactly backwards.

    Morality

    Objective morality is reciprocity and non-parasitism. These are prerequisites for cooperation. It is never in one’s interests, long term, to continue cooperating with non-reciprocal parasites. People follow their incentives. Even if one wanted to continue cooperating with non-reciprocal parasites, there would eventually come a time when you could no longer afford to continue cooperating on those terms. Therefore, cooperation with non-reciprocal parasites is not existentially possible and it’s hard to see why anyone would consider it desirable, since cooperation with reciprocal, productive, friends and allies is much more profitable. Morality is not mandatory. Morality is only mandatory for cooperation, and cooperation is not mandatory. Well, some cooperation is probably mandatory, since some cooperation is better than none. A better strategy is always more evolutionarily stable, but no particular cooperation is usually mandatory. You usually have some choice about which cooperation to pursue.

    Full Accounting

    Full accounting is making a complete and accurate accounting of costs AND benefits. Quite often you will see someone arguing the benefits of proposals they favor without mentioning the costs. Or they will argue the costs of what they oppose without acknowledging the benefits. Scott Adams calls this a “half-pinion.” It’s also possible to mention costs and benefits, but inaccurately or incompletely.

    Propertarian Enemies

    Not everyone is committed or even open to truth and non-parasitism. Some are dedicated to deception, parasitism, and fraud. Here are a few of the top culprits and their methods:

    Feminine Coercion

    Feminine rhetorical devices and feminine rhetorical strategies, such as nagging, scolding, shaming, rallying, emotional appeals, popular appeals, insults, ridicule, gossip, moralisms , and so on and so forth, have no special utility for discovering or propagating truth. But they have great utility for spreading and propagating self-serving lies, because they have no built-in error testing or correction. So when nagging, scolding, shaming, rallying, emotional appeals, popular appeals, insults, ridicule, gossip, moralisms, etc, are used by women, and by other effeminate creatures; we classify them, not as good faith participants in debate, but as lying, totalitarian, parasites. Their aim in employing nagging, scolding, shaming, rallying, emotional appeals, popular appeals, insults, ridicule, gossip, moralisms, etc., is not the mutual discovery of truth, but simply to GET THEIR WAY. The manner in which they accomplish this is by imposing costs, social costs, psychic costs, energy costs, time costs, until you simply relent and give them what they want. The reason they employ these means is to avoid the high cost of offering VALUE in exchange for what they DESIRE. That is why we call nagging, scolding, shaming, rallying, emotional appeals, popular appeals, insults, ridicule, gossip, moralisms, etc… The feminine means of COERCION, for they are analogous to the masculine means of coercion (namely violence.) But the masculine (violent) means of coercion are not inherently duplicitous or parasitic. They require strength to employ, and the strong are always able, and often willing, to offer something of value in exchange instead. Violent means MAY be used for parasitic ends and MAY be directed by lies or aim at sustaining lies. BUT the greatest strength REQUIRES truth and cooperation. Lies and parasitism sap strength, while cooperation builds strength, and truth is a logical requirement of cooperation (it is not in the interests of others to cooperate with self-serving deceivers.) No individual or group who spurns truth and cooperation can ever be truly strong in comparison to ones who embrace them. In contrast, the feminine means of coercion are the implements and the refuge of the weak. The weak are intrinsically less able, and less willing, to offer value in exchange, and weakness has no lower limit. Parasitic lies make people weaker, which only makes them likely and liable to employ even more parasitic lies. The proliferation of the feminine means of coercion, and the concomitant proliferation of parasitism and lies, are attributable mainly to one factor; women and other effeminate creatures are less subject than they once were, to violent retaliation and suppression using the masculine means of coercion.

    Postmodern Deception

    Postmodern deception makes use of a variety of related means to advance and sustain falsehood by raising the cost of refutation without addressing the points of contention. This can include the feminine means of coercion (rallying, shaming, scolding) to raise the social  cost of disagreement, or it can include obscurantism, pseudoscience and fallacy to raise the cognitive and time cost of refutation (Pilpul). Another common technique is framing (conflation and incomplete accounting) to advance a false narrative or picture, loading ( adding moral or emotional – imaginary – content) and overloading (repetition) to overwhelm the rational faculties and suggest the desired conclusion by elicited emotional response. This is a staple technique of media and political figures. One of the most destructive techniques of postmodern deception is the heaping of undue praise. Whether the undue praise is heaped upon the “noble savage” (who is often anything but noble) or upon the perverted sexual deviant, or the morbidly obese feminist, it is always and only a way of robbing praise from those to whom it is due. It is a way to attack and critique and undermine and tear down the worthy and the exemplary without seeming to be doing anything of the sort. After all, there is no insult at all, they are only paying a compliment! A compliment to the wrong recipient is always an implied insult to the correct one. To make the worse seem better makes the better seem worse. The techniques of postmodern deception, taken together, allow their practitioners to “hack” the “marketplace of ideas” so that the good ideas don’t win. The good ideas, the nuggets of truth and wisdom, are surrounded by so much bullshit that hardly anyone can find them. And the bad ideas are protected by feminine coercion so that people fear to challenge them; all as they are blasted out on all channels, and all frequencies, all the time. The root problem is that people can bullshit faster than anyone can shovel. Lying can be very cheap and easy. Truthfulness is expensive, demanding, and difficult. So the only way for truth to prevail is for the truthful to take their shovels, not to the bullshit, but to the bullshitters. Make it costly to lie and people will stop. Make it cheap, and even if you don’t fall for the lies, the liars can just go lie at someone who will and come back with enough strength and numbers to beat you. “Free Speech” was a noble idea. But it failed. Free TRUTHFUL speech only.

    Socialism

    Socialism is usually sold in moralistic, rationalistic, idealistic terms. In these terms, it is always a lie. You are not entitled to anything because no one is entitled to anything. Furthermore, while you can organize to claim and defend entitlements over the objections of others, at whose expense they are coming, the socialist means of doing so have well known problems. However, some socialist concerns can be addressed by productive, mutually beneficial, trades. And some socialist policies can be constructed as mutually beneficial exchanges, and some socialist preferences can be accommodated by cooperation (not conflict) between classes. By these means, the most pernicious forms of socialism can be robbed of much potential support. People are not going to support a system that does not seem to work for them. And if some people are being “left behind” because they cannot meaningfully participate in production (or for whatever reason) then they are likely and liable to revolt, riot or loot, rather than die quietly or languish in poverty amidst splendor. But if you pay them to behave, and pay them not to reproduce, that can be a productive exchange. The productive classes can say: “Look, we’ll subsidize your lifestyle as long as you don’t get in the way, you don’t disrupt the peace, order and stability we need to produce, and you don’t pass your inability to produce on to the next generation, so that this subsidy is really and truly a solution to the problem.” That is a win win. Another option is to pay the lower classes for military service. Don’t impede the production of the middle classes or the rule of the upper, but fight to defend them, and you may share in a portion of the benefits.

    Feminism

    Much could be, and has been, said about feminism, enough to fill volumes. I have already addressed the issue of feminine coercion above. What has to be understood is that feminism originates primarily with inferior women, women who cannot obtain what they want from men in exchange because they have little of value to exchange (whether because they are fat, old, infertile, ugly, lazy, obnoxious, or what have you.) Their aim is twofold: First, to obtain what they want from men at a discount using the feminine means of coercion (nagging scolding, shaming, rallying, gossip, etc…) Second, to sabotage their competition, women of value to men, by filling their heads with destructive nonsense, and induce them to throw away their value in exchange for nothing. Seen in this light, much that is incomprehensible about feminism makes sense. Do they really think they can “redefine” men’s “standards of beauty”? Maybe, maybe not. One thing they DEFINITELY can do is persuade other women to take less care of their own, and that makes them look better in comparison. A lot of people think that feminism started out alright but it has “gone too far.” Well it started out using feminine coercion to obtain the franchise. Feminine coercion is dishonest and parasitic. But it’s also trivially easy to show that women’s suffrage is a long term existential impossibility. That argument depends on only a few, fairly obvious, points.

    1. 1) Voting either directs violence, or is a substitute for it.
    2. 2) The preponderance of actual violence is supplied by men, and the preponderance of potential violence is *not supplied* by men.
    3. 3) Men and women vote differently, on average.

    All three of these points are, I think, incontrovertible. There is certainly much more which could be said on the matter. But this is all that actually needs to be said, to show that women’s suffrage is unstable, and necessarily ends in violence. The more women vote to advance their interests, or impose their priorities, as they see them, at the expense of men’s, the more tension will build, and it can only build until it breaks, because it is men who are asked to supply the actual violence which carries the outcomes of elections into effect, or to refrain from potential violence to prevent the outcomes of elections from being carried into effect. But we don’t actually HAVE to do either. We can do the opposite. Women obtained the vote on the back of the lie that their former exclusion had been arbitrary and baseless, and therefore unnecessary and unjust, and that is the lie it is now necessary to debunk. But that lie stems from an ignorance (perhaps deliberate) of context. In fact, women had been excluded from politics because political institutions had been created by men, as a compromise and an alternative to warfare, which is a male domain. Voting and politics can be an economical alternative to warfare, as long as the winners do not seek either to take, or to impose enough to make warfare preferable for the losers. It can be a win-win, the winners win more, and the losers lose less, than they can by warfare, because they do not have to try the matter by a contest of arms, and politics, therefore, can be stable and productive, so long as it remains within those bounds. Women do not participate in warfare (and it is best that they do not) so it was never necessary to cut them in on the spoils of politics, and doing so is to grant them a great and unearned boon; a benefit that they could not obtain by other means. It was a pure indulgence, and an expense with no countervailing benefits. Women’s violence did not need to be bought off because they don’t threaten violence. Because they are ignorant of the context, and of the domain, having never, historically, participated, and because they do not understand that warfare is the alternative, and politics only a means of avoiding warfare, and can always return to warfare, women recognize no limits. They always demand more. They always seek to impose more. Further, women bring no spoils to the table, they only make off with them. They contribute nothing, they risk nothing, and they threaten nothing. Therefore it is only right and proper that in this arena, they get nothing. Past generations of men thought they could afford to indulge women in this way, but the expense has only ever grown, and only ever will. Now, we can no longer afford it, even if we wanted to. The price would be our civilization and our future, and that is too high a price to bear. The further the results of elections continue to diverge from the likely results of war -and women make those results diverge -for they participate in elections but not in warfare -the greater the incentive for those with the means (men) to stop playing democracy and start playing war. That’s a game we can win, and if all we need to do to win is switch games, then sooner or later we will switch games. It is a foregone conclusion. That is why, and that is how, women’s suffrage shall end. It is inherently unstable, and fleeting. But men must know why they must fight. When men vote, we’re saving each other money, saving each other’s lives, by not fighting about shit. When women vote, they’re getting something for nothing. Soon we will have nothing left to give, but plenty to take, our own way.

    Democracy

    Ending democracy, egalitarian, majority rule, is always advisable and a step in the right direction. Democracies have mal incentives (Hoppe.) But even more damaging in the long term, democracies breed dysgenic people because democracies are vote farms and (if all votes count the same) the most economical way to farm votes is to breed dependent parasites. Lysander Spooner said “a ballot either signifies a bullet, or it signifies nothing.”, but a bullet is more honest. All states require the voluntary consent and support of enough individuals and groups to compel the submission of the remainder. And the coalition that performs this function always arises by negotiation and exchange (you want this benefit, or that, to participate in our coalition? Well, we want these concessions in return.) Democracies actually set a fairly low bar for popular support at 51%. And a democracy will never be ruled by a coalition much larger than 51%. If you’re getting more than 51% of the vote, you’re leaving rents on the table. You could take more, or give less, and still win the election. Additionally, if your aim is to maximize the profitability of an electoral victory, in terms of rents extracted, you will build your coalition of the cheapest votes, the most worthless and parasitic individuals. A rich man’s vote is expensive, you have to not take most of his stuff. But if you do, you can buy many votes. As the 51% feed on the productive, their numbers will grow. That’s what happens when you feed parasites. As we said, you don’t want to win more than 51% of the vote, so the ruling coalition in a democracy is always in the position of being able to give its most productive members the boot and throw them to the wolves, to begin consuming them in turn. This is why democracies always become weaker and more parasitic, why “Cthulhu only swims left” and we can observe, in every democratic polity, a persistent “ratchet effect.” In contrast, a wise authoritarian will begin building his coalition of supporters with the best. And while he need not attract 51% support to maintain his rule, there is no reason to stop there. Support is generally less costly and more profitable than submission. So a sensible authoritarian will continue bargaining for support until there is no one left in need of compulsion except those who have nothing to offer which is worth what they demand in exchange for peaceful cooperation, whose demands are too costly or unreasonable to merit entertaining; in short, people who probably should be coerced. So I do expect authoritarian regimes, on the whole, to be more honest, productive, and less parasitic than democratic ones. This expectation is borne out by an examination of historical monarchies, especially European ones.

    Houses of Government and Government by Exchange

    A better solution to representative government than Democracy (majority rule) is a government of houses representing different classes. Traditionally, western nations were thought to be composed of three “estates of the realm:” those who fight, those who work, and those who pray; aristocracy, commoners, and clergy. Variations on this are possible. The English lumped the aristocracy and clergy together into the nobility. That’s why Parliament only has two houses. And India (which derives from the same proto-Indo-European root culture) has a fourth class, the untouchables. But three is the standard. Democracy can only select whose interests are to prevail and whose are to be subordinated or sacrificed. Democracy, monopoly, majoritarian government, can never ever, NEVER EVER reconcile conflicting interests. Where interests are aligned and homogeneous, democracy can work fine. That’s why it works fine for a corporation, because shareholder interests are more or less perfectly aligned, towards maximization of profit. There is no way for some to profit at the expense of others. And for the same reason, Democracy generally works fine in very homogeneous nations. As soon as interests differ and clash, you’re going to need houses of government, sharing power, in order to negotiate exchanges between classes, or classes and individuals will clash. If members of one class wants something from another, they can propose an exchange, offering something in return to make it worth their while. If they offer nothing, or don’t offer enough, their proposal will be vetoed. If cooperation and exchange break down, then things revert to warfare, or conflict, as above in the case of women voters. Only, in this case, this is understood by all parties instead of being concealed behind parasitic, moralistic, appeals to the divine right of majorities.

    Common Law

    Common law is judge and jury discovered law; evolutionary law. Basically, the common law is “don’t do anything twelve random people and a learned jurist would agree to retaliate against you for doing.” If someone perceives a behavior as imposing a cost or as a theft or destruction of property (according to the propertarian conception of property) then they can take their case before a court. If the court agrees with their evaluation, then the law is updated to define that behavior as criminal. Common law can rapidly and accurately adjust to innovations in property norms, parasitism and criminality. Of course, people can and do differ on what they think impositions, property, or legitimate and proper grounds for retaliation. When such differences are discovered, they are settled over a longer period of time by debate, discussion, moral suasion, migration, self-segregation, or failing that, conflict. If my friends and I think a law is good, and you and your friends think a law is bad, and we disagree too strongly to “agree to disagree” then we are at war. Whoever is more right, all other things being equal, is more likely to “win” (defining victory to include memetic, genetic, economic, social, cultural, political, and military outcomes.) This is the principle of discovered law, evolved law, the common law. Legislation, on the other hand, has no such corrective tendency, until it culminates in total catastrophe, and is much less adaptable and slower reacting.

    The Market for Violence and Negative Subjective Evaluations

    It’s an article of faith among many libertarians that violence, and particularly aggressive violence, is necessarily negative sum. Prices contain information and markets broker them (in a subjective utility maximizing way.) Violence only short circuits that, disrupts markets, destroy price signals, and makes everyone worse off. But this is not correct. In the first place, market transactions aren’t necessarily positive sum. If they are fraudulent or create negative externalities for those not party, they can be negative sum. In the second place, violence is itself a signal, and transmits information. A threat expresses a subjective evaluation just as an offer does in the marketplace. “Hey, don’t do that or we’re going to fight.” And the initiation of hostilities demonstrates the authenticity of that information just as a payment does in the marketplace. One undertakes real cost, and real risk, in resorting to violence. (In contrast, whining, and playing the victim DO NOT demonstrate the authenticity of grievances in the way that resorting to violence does, and so are liable and likely to prove negative sum, if indulged, just as theft is liable and likely to prove negative sum, in the marketplace, because it does not make a sufficient demonstration and exchange of value). Markets and prices on the one hand, and violence and threats on the other, are both necessary components to a stable, functional, and efficient society and economy. To suppress either wholly in favor of the other, would be to forego the benefits they offer, and to pervert incentives towards destructive outcomes. No society which does either will be able to compete, long term, against one which makes a more sensible trade-off between them, making best use of information supplied by both exchange and conflict. Violence is the means of expressing the subjective evaluations not captured by price signals, which are as vast and varied as those which are. A prosperous and functional society needs a price system, but a price system without a threats and violence system is as dysfunctional as a threats and violence system without a price system.

    Borders

    Borders are analogous to property lines. Both are arbitrary social constructs which exist only by convention. Both nevertheless exist because Darwin rewards people who practice their use. Property lines exist when individuals claim territory and succeed in defending it. Borders exist when groups claim territory and succeed in defending it. If property lines are the boundaries between property holdings, borders can be thought of as the boundaries between property regimes. In practice, you have the property and property rights that the people around you are willing to concede that you have. One man cannot stand alone against the world, but a few in confederation can hold the looters, parasites, and destroyers at bay indefinitely; provided no one lets them into their midst. So one reasonable condition people may demand for recognizing and upholding your private property (in addition to you recognizing and upholding their own) is help in upholding shared borders. You don’t have to assent to that condition, but if not, you might find your position very lonely.

    Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism

    Altruism is rarely found in nature except for kinship altruism, because kinship makes reciprocity evolutionarily self-enforcing. A gene coding for altruistic behavior towards kin will help out instances of itself and therefore help itself to propagate and persist (while those other instances of it, in turn, will help it). Kinship also makes defection evolutionarily unstable because it is selfpunishing, or self-limiting. Genes which code for defection behaviors towards kin will harm other instances of themselves and therefore suffer a competitive disadvantage relative to others. Accordingly, we will expect to see greater altruism towards kin and greater trust between kin (because trust is a form of altruism, it entails taking risks and bearing costs for others in the hope of reciprocation) than we do towards or between non-kin or more distant kin. This does seem to be what we observe EVEN in highly ethnocentric (clannish, tribal) low-trust, conflict riven, societies. Western nations are less ethnocentric, less clannish, less tribal, and they are higher trust, more productive, more peaceful, more stable, than some others, but this does not imply that perfect (abstract) universalism and individualism would be higher trust or more productive, or more peaceful still… Western societies are higher trust than tribal societies. But this is not because kinship is not a factor, rather, because of normative out breeding, you simply have larger kinship groups, this permitted the universalization of kinship altruism and kinship trust within homogeneous, outbred nations. Everyone is at least distantly related to one another, and very few people are radically more or less related to you than others. So close kin will always be more cooperative, more altruistic, and enjoy higher trust than distant kin or non-kin, but what you see in western nations is high trust because in-groups are larger. Tribal societies probably have higher trust in-group, but they have very small in-groups, and lots of them, so they conflict. Reciprocity can be enforced technologically (through proactive monitoring and enforcement) at greater distances in terms of relatedness, but at some cost. The cost of cooperative behavior is inversely proportional to relatedness. That makes the demarcation of in-group/out-group boundaries along racial, ethnic, or national (kinship) lines rational, productive and stable, in order to capitalize on high in-group trust and economize on low in-group transaction costs. As much as some people like to claim this is a dated atavism, it is simply not so. None of the evidence is consistent with that hypothesis.

    Hierarchy

    I would serve the lord who would serve me. A hierarchy based on reciprocal duties, loyalties, and obligations, and where the sovereign understands his power depends on maintaining the loyalty of his subjects by discharging his duties and obligations faithfully so they will discharge their duties and obligations willingly, can be a productive hierarchy. Hierarchy can be productive because it can provide economies of scale in the provisions of certain commons and public goods (principally defense). Hierarchy can also provide decision in undecidable cases (where there are no objective or agreed upon intersubjective criteria for decision) and then people can get over it and move on to capture gains from cooperation in more decidable cases instead of getting bogged down. Sometimes it’s more important to be on the same page than the best page, or there is no best page. But even if the hierarchical solution is not best, for you, it may nevertheless be less costly than a prolonged and possibly pointless conflict or indecision. As long as hierarchy is productive, it will persist and grow. When it ceases to be productive, but becomes parasitic, subordinating the interests of some, systematically, for the benefit of others, sooner or later, it will probably crumble and split, or fall.

    Incremental Suppression

    Incremental Suppression is a marginal approach to enforcement, a bologna slice strategy. If you are powerful, you identify the most egregious instances of violation and go after those first, working your way down the list until it’s no longer worth the cost. If you are not powerful, you identify the violators within your reach and begin suppressing them, working your way outward as your power grows and your enemies’ diminish. Conclusion. Western civilization CAN be reclaimed and restored, through truth, science, violence, hierarchy, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and law, by incrementally suppressing all forms of parasitism, fraud, deception, and freeriding, including democracy, feminism, socialism, postmodernism, pilpul, feminine coercion, and more (which we have not yet addressed) by building and maintaining commons and accumulating and defending other property to serve and protect the long term interests of our in-groups, cooperating through trade, and negotiating honestly, and by disassociating or bitterly conflicting with those who will not. “Truth is enough.” ~ Curt Doolittle Truth and Violence To Enforce It

  • PHILOSOPHY FOR GROWN UPS PART ONE AND PART TWO 1. The only truths we know for ce

    PHILOSOPHY FOR GROWN UPS PART ONE AND PART TWO

    1. The only truths we know for certain are falsehoods. Everything that is not false is a truth candidate. This is the inverse of the fallacy of justificationism and the central insight of the sciences: the means by which we invent or grasp an idea contribute nothing to whether or not it is true or false. Only exhaustive falsification and survival from criticism deliver confidence that actions produce anticipated outcomes due to our comprehension of cause, effect, and the operations that are possible. Otherwise we are forever justifying whatever it is we seek to justify by any set of excuses we can imagine. This is why astrology, numerology, theology, philosophy, and the pseudosciences are so common – justification means absolutely nothing.

    2. The only preference we know is the one we demonstrate. The only good we know is the one we mutually demonstrate by acting upon. People report very differently from what they demonstrate. The only morality we know that is we must avoid criminal(material), ethical(direct), and moral (indirect) imposition of costs upon one another. The only moral actions then are those that are not criminal, unethical, and immoral, and that means the only moral actions consiste of productive, fully informed, warrantied, voluntary exchange, free of imposition of costs upon the investments of others by externality. Ergo, all moral actions are those that are not immoral. There is no recipe for moral action other than that which is not immoral.

    3. People always and everywhere demonstrate that they are neither moral or immoral but amoral and rational, doing what they must in all circumstances that they exist in. it is just disproportionately advantageous to act morally for the simple reason that the returns of cooperation always and everywhere defeat the returns on individual action. This is why exhaustive forgiveness of ‘cheaters’ in all walks of life will generally reform them. Because it is in their self interest. This is why we demonstrate altruistic punishment also (high cost of punishing cheaters), because the returns on cooperation are so valuable that we evolved to pay the high cost of punishment in order to preserve the high value of cooperation.

    4. People notoriously think they are right and in the right, and acting morally, which is why we have courts of one kind or another among all peoples at all stages of development. And while rules of decidability in courts in matters of conflict vary from the poor and underdeveloped where interests in things, kin, and relationships are rare and collectively owned, to the wealthy and developed where things, interests, kin, relationships, and contracts are universally allocated to individuals and individually owned, the means of decidability in every single civilization is RECIPROCITY.

    5. There exist then only one negative moral rule and one universal test of morality: “Do not unto others as they would not have done unto them”. There is only one positive moral rule: the extension of trust to non kin that we extend to kin, until it is no longer empirically possible to trust. – this optimizes cooperation by continuously training malcontents that it is in their interest to cooperate, and ostracizes (punishes) those who do not.

    6. There are no conflicts that are not decidable by tests of reciprocity. None. This is why all international law is limited exclusively to the test of reciprocity. So logically(rational choice) and empirically (demonstrated action), and universally (all laws domestica and international at all scales) morality is anything that is not immoral unethical or criminal in that it imposes costs upon the efforts already expended to obtain a non-conflicting interest, in a good, relationship, or opportunity.

    As far as I know no argument can defeat this that is not in and of itself an attempt at reciprocity (theft, freeriding, parasitism, conspiracy).

    PHILOSOPHY FOR GROWNUPS PART TWO

    This is not so much a philosophy as the results of science that I can no longer deny, and so I live according to the science – in large part because it is advantageous.

    1. We are an expensive life form. Particularly our brains.

    2. We must acquire, and we acquire at cost to ourselves. we acquire experiences, things, kin, relations, interests, opportunities.

    3. All our emotions are nothing but reflections in state of that which we plan to, are in the process of, or have acquired an interest.

    4. Cooperation is logarithmically more productive than any action an individual can take, and therefore we must cooperate to survive -or at least not encourage retaliation against us. (Possibly as much as ten thousand times as productive.)

    5. People are purely rational, not moral or immoral but amoral: they cheat and try to acquire disproportionately from cooperation, they free ride, steal from, and prey upon others. This is why we demonstrate altruistic punishment of cheaters in all walks of life, even at high personal cost: to prevent defectors from cheating.

    6. The optimum algorithm (really) for developing cooperation is to exhaust every opportunity for cooperation even from cheaters. They almost always come around, because it is always an advantage to come around. This was the entire message of christianity which was lost in the dogma. But it’s just science.

    7. All our speech is merely a dance of negotiation so that we may create opportunities to acquire, do acquire, or preserve what we acquire. All of it is just signaling.

    8. We are entirely incognizant of these behaviors because it is evolutionarily disadvantageous for us to be intuitively honest, honest with ourselves, and honest with others. This is the same reason we have many cognitive, social, and probabilistic biases in our genes. To keep us going when evidence would overwhelm us.

    9. Most of the joy in life is playing this set of word games, cooperative games, and acquisition games with others so that we all acquire what we want as best we can without making others avoid us so that we can’t acquire what we want and need. This is why people commit suicide when they are lonely, and do not commit suicide when they are not.

    10. Therefor the only rule of cooperation, of morality, and of law, is reciprocity: productive, fully informed, warrantied, voluntary cooperation with each other, and the only immoral actions are those that violate that moral rule by free riding, parasitism, theft, or predation. And that is why reciprocity is the basis of all traditional laws (and why it is not the basis of legislation).

    This little list is the answer to nearly all of metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, sociology, ethics, and politics.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine


    Source date (UTC): 2018-03-20 13:02:00 UTC

  • going to criticize then compliment the ACLU. **CRITICISM – THE SINGULAR IMPORTAN

    https://www.quora.com/Is-the-ACLU-good-for-America/answer/Curt-Doolittle?share=2c3c4a0c&srid=u4QvI’m going to criticize then compliment the ACLU.

    **CRITICISM – THE SINGULAR IMPORTANCE OF NATURAL LAW (RECIPROCITY)**

    Unfortunately while the ACLU has defended those who need defending, they have also been instrumental in pursuing a set of cases with the objective of using the courts to circumvent the process by which our constitution was designed to be changed.

    And they have been the principle prosecutors of the intentional destruction of the limits to expression that prohibit that behavior that westerners had developed carefully over centuries: the treatment of all common spaces as sacred – as extensions of the interiors of their church.

    Now expressed in scientific rather than normative terms, this means that the west has aggressively prosecuted the underclass for at least one thousand years, by enforcing strict limits on “display, word, and deed” that would normalize behavior that would put the young, the foolish, and those of less able families at risk of imitating. The result was the west’s High Trust Society that no civilization has been in any way close to achieving.

    The original Mission of the ACLU was decidedly Communist and Socialist (see their platform changes over time) and this strategy a means by which to undermine Anglo (western) civilization by taking advantage of a very tolerant legal and cultural system – the first system of its kind, in a territory never ruled by the Aristocracy or Church.

    **HISTORICAL CONTEXT **

    Lost to common people’s history was that the founders were conducting an experiment in ‘the third way’ which was rule by the middle class (or at least upper middle class) and business people, in a world run traditionally by church, state, or a competition between the two. They ran this experiment by encoding individual sovereignty (Natural Law) and rule of law (as opposed to rule by human discretion) into the constitution with strict processes to follow – unfortunately they did not yet understand strict construction or their experiment would have been even more successful.

    So the ACLU’s mission has produced some goods, but equal if not offsetting bads, not the least of which was the destruction of rule of law by the natural law of reciprocity (natural law) by continuing the undermining of that constitution begun during the Civil War, the Reconstruction, under FDR, and under Johnson’s Great Society movement (trying to imitate the Soviets.)

    So the constitution failed to include such provisions for the defense of high trust norms, in no small part because the discussion at the time assumed that the church would play the civic and familial role and the domain of the government was largely defense and commerce.

    In addition, while all of us have universal standing in matters private, we do not have univeresal standing in matters public – we deliver our agency to proxies we call politicians. We do this because at the time of the constitution, (a) the population capable of such activity was limited, and (b) the time delay of communication was prohibitive.

    And the constitution did not provide a mechanism for suing the state, the bureaucracy, or members of the state, nor taking up matters of norms at the federal level, in part because such activities were not the purview of the federal government, even the state governments, but the church enforced by polity and local government.

    **WHAT WENT RIGHT**

    So, while the ACLU has undermined those high trust norms, and contributed significantly to the present and future conflict:

    (a) it is a civic organization not a state organization and therefore property constructed under natural, reciprocal, anglo saxon (meaning sovereign and contractualist), common law. In other words, it is constructed as the founders would have all civic institutions constructed – continuing long standing tradition.

    (b) it was able to fulfill some of the functions that the church was unable to post the industrial and second scientific revolutions (post 1870) by providing a civic institution that levied for the underclasses the way the church had done throughout western history.

    (c) by centralizing the government during the civil war, developing fiat money and the federal reserve, followed by the income tax, and vastly expanding the federal government influence, money that had (in europe) been in civic organizations and church assets was available for consumption by democratic politics and the court.

    In my reading of history the democratic socialist movement in general can be seen as the slow replacement of the prior theological church with secular (if frequently pseudoscientific) institutions and prose.

    **WHAT WENT WRONG**

    The principle problem with their movement was the search for monopoly power and single-house government, by underclass rule, rather than adding a house for the underclass through which their interests could be negotiated with the other classes now that the church no longer existed as a semi-governing body responsible for norm and family.

    In other words, MONOPOLY IS ALWAYS BAD and the world communist and socialist movements attempted (as did the church but the church also failed) attempted to achieve authoritarian monopoly, without understanding that the Tripartism of Church, Burger, and State functioned as a balance of power between the classes from the end of the empire to the first world war.

    The court is a poor proxy for markets, and had we created additional houses for the classes rather than (i) the anglo enlightenment fantasy of an aristocracy of all, or (ii) the French/Russian/Jewish fantasy of underclass authoritarianism. Or the (iii) German fantasy of an army of civic duty replacing the church with secular rationalist prose (The Germans had the least inaccurate vision of man.)

    **WE LEARN FROM RETROSPECT **

    Small things in large numbers have vast consequences and if I am right then we will have another civil war within our lifetimes.

    Hopefully our next constitutions will be written in strictly constructed law from the first law of reciprocity, but we will have many small states the normative, formal, economic, and military orgnaizations of which are custoimized for the reproductive interst of the polities.

    The only value of scale is debt and the war made possible by access to that debt.

    The continental government has outlived its usefulness as an institution that control the sale and distribution of a conquered continent to immigrants.

    The american economy is and always has been housing and the goods to fill those houses. And that’s all there is and ever was. It has nothing to do with anything else.Updated Mar 19, 2018, 8:59 PM


    Source date (UTC): 2018-03-19 20:59:00 UTC

  • I’m Going To Criticize Then Compliment The ACLU

    I’m going to criticize then compliment the ACLU. **CRITICISM – THE SINGULAR IMPORTANCE OF NATURAL LAW (RECIPROCITY)** Unfortunately while the ACLU has defended those who need defending, they have also been instrumental in pursuing a set of cases with the objective of using the courts to circumvent the process by which our constitution was designed to be changed. And they have been the principle prosecutors of the intentional destruction of the limits to expression that prohibit that behavior that westerners had developed carefully over centuries: the treatment of all common spaces as sacred – as extensions of the interiors of their church. Now expressed in scientific rather than normative terms, this means that the west has aggressively prosecuted the underclass for at least one thousand years, by enforcing strict limits on “display, word, and deed” that would normalize behavior that would put the young, the foolish, and those of less able families at risk of imitating. The result was the west’s High Trust Society that no civilization has been in any way close to achieving. The original Mission of the ACLU was decidedly Communist and Socialist (see their platform changes over time) and this strategy a means by which to undermine Anglo (western) civilization by taking advantage of a very tolerant legal and cultural system – the first system of its kind, in a territory never ruled by the Aristocracy or Church. **HISTORICAL CONTEXT ** Lost to common people’s history was that the founders were conducting an experiment in ‘the third way’ which was rule by the middle class (or at least upper middle class) and business people, in a world run traditionally by church, state, or a competition between the two. They ran this experiment by encoding individual sovereignty (Natural Law) and rule of law (as opposed to rule by human discretion) into the constitution with strict processes to follow – unfortunately they did not yet understand strict construction or their experiment would have been even more successful. So the ACLU’s mission has produced some goods, but equal if not offsetting bads, not the least of which was the destruction of rule of law by the natural law of reciprocity (natural law) by continuing the undermining of that constitution begun during the Civil War, the Reconstruction, under FDR, and under Johnson’s Great Society movement (trying to imitate the Soviets.) So the constitution failed to include such provisions for the defense of high trust norms, in no small part because the discussion at the time assumed that the church would play the civic and familial role and the domain of the government was largely defense and commerce. In addition, while all of us have universal standing in matters private, we do not have univeresal standing in matters public – we deliver our agency to proxies we call politicians. We do this because at the time of the constitution, (a) the population capable of such activity was limited, and (b) the time delay of communication was prohibitive. And the constitution did not provide a mechanism for suing the state, the bureaucracy, or members of the state, nor taking up matters of norms at the federal level, in part because such activities were not the purview of the federal government, even the state governments, but the church enforced by polity and local government. **WHAT WENT RIGHT** So, while the ACLU has undermined those high trust norms, and contributed significantly to the present and future conflict: (a) it is a civic organization not a state organization and therefore property constructed under natural, reciprocal, anglo saxon (meaning sovereign and contractualist), common law. In other words, it is constructed as the founders would have all civic institutions constructed – continuing long standing tradition. (b) it was able to fulfill some of the functions that the church was unable to post the industrial and second scientific revolutions (post 1870) by providing a civic institution that levied for the underclasses the way the church had done throughout western history. (c) by centralizing the government during the civil war, developing fiat money and the federal reserve, followed by the income tax, and vastly expanding the federal government influence, money that had (in europe) been in civic organizations and church assets was available for consumption by democratic politics and the court. In my reading of history the democratic socialist movement in general can be seen as the slow replacement of the prior theological church with secular (if frequently pseudoscientific) institutions and prose. **WHAT WENT WRONG** The principle problem with their movement was the search for monopoly power and single-house government, by underclass rule, rather than adding a house for the underclass through which their interests could be negotiated with the other classes now that the church no longer existed as a semi-governing body responsible for norm and family. In other words, MONOPOLY IS ALWAYS BAD and the world communist and socialist movements attempted (as did the church but the church also failed) attempted to achieve authoritarian monopoly, without understanding that the Tripartism of Church, Burger, and State functioned as a balance of power between the classes from the end of the empire to the first world war. The court is a poor proxy for markets, and had we created additional houses for the classes rather than (i) the anglo enlightenment fantasy of an aristocracy of all, or (ii) the French/Russian/Jewish fantasy of underclass authoritarianism. Or the (iii) German fantasy of an army of civic duty replacing the church with secular rationalist prose (The Germans had the least inaccurate vision of man.) **WE LEARN FROM RETROSPECT ** Small things in large numbers have vast consequences and if I am right then we will have another civil war within our lifetimes. Hopefully our next constitutions will be written in strictly constructed law from the first law of reciprocity, but we will have many small states the normative, formal, economic, and military orgnaizations of which are custoimized for the reproductive interst of the polities. The only value of scale is debt and the war made possible by access to that debt. The continental government has outlived its usefulness as an institution that control the sale and distribution of a conquered continent to immigrants. The american economy is and always has been housing and the goods to fill those houses. And that’s all there is and ever was. It has nothing to do with anything else.
  • I’m Going To Criticize Then Compliment The ACLU

    I’m going to criticize then compliment the ACLU. **CRITICISM – THE SINGULAR IMPORTANCE OF NATURAL LAW (RECIPROCITY)** Unfortunately while the ACLU has defended those who need defending, they have also been instrumental in pursuing a set of cases with the objective of using the courts to circumvent the process by which our constitution was designed to be changed. And they have been the principle prosecutors of the intentional destruction of the limits to expression that prohibit that behavior that westerners had developed carefully over centuries: the treatment of all common spaces as sacred – as extensions of the interiors of their church. Now expressed in scientific rather than normative terms, this means that the west has aggressively prosecuted the underclass for at least one thousand years, by enforcing strict limits on “display, word, and deed” that would normalize behavior that would put the young, the foolish, and those of less able families at risk of imitating. The result was the west’s High Trust Society that no civilization has been in any way close to achieving. The original Mission of the ACLU was decidedly Communist and Socialist (see their platform changes over time) and this strategy a means by which to undermine Anglo (western) civilization by taking advantage of a very tolerant legal and cultural system – the first system of its kind, in a territory never ruled by the Aristocracy or Church. **HISTORICAL CONTEXT ** Lost to common people’s history was that the founders were conducting an experiment in ‘the third way’ which was rule by the middle class (or at least upper middle class) and business people, in a world run traditionally by church, state, or a competition between the two. They ran this experiment by encoding individual sovereignty (Natural Law) and rule of law (as opposed to rule by human discretion) into the constitution with strict processes to follow – unfortunately they did not yet understand strict construction or their experiment would have been even more successful. So the ACLU’s mission has produced some goods, but equal if not offsetting bads, not the least of which was the destruction of rule of law by the natural law of reciprocity (natural law) by continuing the undermining of that constitution begun during the Civil War, the Reconstruction, under FDR, and under Johnson’s Great Society movement (trying to imitate the Soviets.) So the constitution failed to include such provisions for the defense of high trust norms, in no small part because the discussion at the time assumed that the church would play the civic and familial role and the domain of the government was largely defense and commerce. In addition, while all of us have universal standing in matters private, we do not have univeresal standing in matters public – we deliver our agency to proxies we call politicians. We do this because at the time of the constitution, (a) the population capable of such activity was limited, and (b) the time delay of communication was prohibitive. And the constitution did not provide a mechanism for suing the state, the bureaucracy, or members of the state, nor taking up matters of norms at the federal level, in part because such activities were not the purview of the federal government, even the state governments, but the church enforced by polity and local government. **WHAT WENT RIGHT** So, while the ACLU has undermined those high trust norms, and contributed significantly to the present and future conflict: (a) it is a civic organization not a state organization and therefore property constructed under natural, reciprocal, anglo saxon (meaning sovereign and contractualist), common law. In other words, it is constructed as the founders would have all civic institutions constructed – continuing long standing tradition. (b) it was able to fulfill some of the functions that the church was unable to post the industrial and second scientific revolutions (post 1870) by providing a civic institution that levied for the underclasses the way the church had done throughout western history. (c) by centralizing the government during the civil war, developing fiat money and the federal reserve, followed by the income tax, and vastly expanding the federal government influence, money that had (in europe) been in civic organizations and church assets was available for consumption by democratic politics and the court. In my reading of history the democratic socialist movement in general can be seen as the slow replacement of the prior theological church with secular (if frequently pseudoscientific) institutions and prose. **WHAT WENT WRONG** The principle problem with their movement was the search for monopoly power and single-house government, by underclass rule, rather than adding a house for the underclass through which their interests could be negotiated with the other classes now that the church no longer existed as a semi-governing body responsible for norm and family. In other words, MONOPOLY IS ALWAYS BAD and the world communist and socialist movements attempted (as did the church but the church also failed) attempted to achieve authoritarian monopoly, without understanding that the Tripartism of Church, Burger, and State functioned as a balance of power between the classes from the end of the empire to the first world war. The court is a poor proxy for markets, and had we created additional houses for the classes rather than (i) the anglo enlightenment fantasy of an aristocracy of all, or (ii) the French/Russian/Jewish fantasy of underclass authoritarianism. Or the (iii) German fantasy of an army of civic duty replacing the church with secular rationalist prose (The Germans had the least inaccurate vision of man.) **WE LEARN FROM RETROSPECT ** Small things in large numbers have vast consequences and if I am right then we will have another civil war within our lifetimes. Hopefully our next constitutions will be written in strictly constructed law from the first law of reciprocity, but we will have many small states the normative, formal, economic, and military orgnaizations of which are custoimized for the reproductive interst of the polities. The only value of scale is debt and the war made possible by access to that debt. The continental government has outlived its usefulness as an institution that control the sale and distribution of a conquered continent to immigrants. The american economy is and always has been housing and the goods to fill those houses. And that’s all there is and ever was. It has nothing to do with anything else.