Curt Doolittle

Form: Excerpt

  • Wisdom of Crowds: Stereotypes Are The Most Accurate Measure in Social Science

    (apologies to the author but I must keep these ‘finds’ in my database. The internet is not dependable enough.) By Lee Jussim [T]HE LONGSTANDING AND LOGICALLY INCOHERENT EMPHASIS ON STEREOTYPE INACCURACY Psychological perspectives once defined stereotypes as inaccurate, casting them as rigid (Lippmann, 1922/1991), rationalizations of prejudice (Jost & Banaji, 1994; La Piere, 1936), out of touch with reality (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), and exaggerations based on small “kernels of truth” (Allport, 1954/1979; Table 1). These common definitions are untenable. Almost any belief about almost any group has been considered a “stereotype” in empirical studies. It is, however, logically impossible for all group beliefs to be inaccurate. This would make it “inaccurate” to believe that two groups differ or that they do not differ. Alternatively, perhaps stereotypes are only inaccurate group beliefs, and so therefore accurate beliefs are not stereotypes. If this were true, one would first have to empirically establish that the belief is inaccurate—otherwise, it would not be a stereotype. The rarity of such demonstrations would mean that there are few known stereotypes. Increasing recognition of these logical problems has led many modern reviews to abandon “inaccuracy” as a core definitional component of stereotypes (see Jussim et al, 2016 for a review). Nonetheless, an emphasis on inaccuracy remains, which is broadly inconsistent with empirical research. My book, Social Perception and Social Reality: Why Accuracy Dominates Bias and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, (hence SPSR) reviewed 80 years of social psychological scholarship and showed that there was widespread emphasis on inaccuracy. Some social psychologists have argued that the “kernel of truth” notion means social psychology has long recognized stereotype accuracy, but I do not buy it. It creates the impression that, among an almost entirely rotten cob, there is a single decent kernel, the “kernel of truth.” And if you doubt that is what this means, consider a turnabout test (Duarte et al, 2015): How would you feel if someone described social psychology has having a “kernel of truth?” Would that be high praise? THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE This blog is not the place to review the overwhelming evidence of stereotype accuracy, though interested readers are directed to SPSR and our updated reviews that have appeared in Current Directions in Psychological Science (Jussim et al, 2015) and Todd Nelson’s Handbook of Stereotypes, Prejudice and Discrimination (Jussim et al, 2016).

    Summarizing those reviews: Over 50 studies have now been performed assessing the accuracy of demographic, national, political, and other stereotypes. Stereotype accuracy is one of the largest and most replicable effects in all of social psychology. Richard et al (2003) found that fewer than 5% of all effects in social psychology exceeded r’s of .50. In contrast, nearly all consensual stereotype accuracy correlations and about half of all personal stereotype accuracy correlations exceed .50.[1]

    The evidence from both experimental and naturalistic studies indicates that people apply their stereotypes when judging others approximately rationally. When individuating information is absent or ambiguous, stereotypes often influence person perception. When individuating information is clear and relevant, its effects are “massive” (Kunda & Thagard, 1996, yes, that is a direct quote, p. 292), and stereotype effects tend to be weak or nonexistent. This puts the lie to longstanding claims that “stereotypes lead people to ignore individual differences.” There are only a handful of studies that have examined whether the situations in which people rely on stereotypes when judging individuals increases or reduces person perception accuracy. Although those studies typically show that doing so increases person perception accuracy, there are too few to reach any general conclusion. Nonetheless, that body of research provides no support whatsoever for the common presumption that the ways and conditions under which people rely on stereotypes routinely reduces person perception accuracy. BIAN AND CIMPIAN’S “GENERIC” CRITIQUE Bian and Cimpian step into this now large literature and simply declare it to be wrong. They do not review the evidence. They do not suggest the evidence is flawed or misinterpreted. Bian & Cimpian simple ignore the data. That sounds like a strong charge, but, if you think it is too strong, I request that you re-read their critique. The easiest way to maintain any cherished belief is to just ignore contrary data – something that is distressingly common, not only in social psychology (Jussim et al, in press), but in medicine (Ioannidis, 2005), astronomy (Loeb, 2014), environmental engineering (Kolowich, 2016), and across the social sciences (Pinker, 2002). How, then, do Bian and Cimpian aspire to reach any conclusion about stereotype accuracy without grappling with the data? Their critique rests primarily on declaring (without empirical evidence) that most stereotypes are “generic” beliefs, which renders them inherently inaccurate, so no empirical evidence of stereotype inaccuracy is even necessary. This is the first failure of this critique. They report no data assessing the prevalence of stereotypes as generic beliefs. An empirical question (“what proportion of people’s stereotypes are generic beliefs?”) can never be resolved by declaration. That failing is sufficient to render their analysis irrelevant to understanding the state of the evidence regarding stereotype accuracy.. However, it also fails on other grounds, which are instructive to consider because they are symptomatic of a common error made by social psychologists. They fall victim to the processistic fallacy, which was addressed in SPSR. Thus, my response to these critiques begins by quoting that text (p. 394): To address accuracy, research must somehow assess how well people’s stereotypes (or the perceptions of individuals) correspond with reality. The evidence that social psychologists typically review when emphasizing stereotype inaccuracy does not do this. Instead, that evidence typically demonstrates some sort of cognitive process, which is then presumed – without testing for accuracy – to lead to inaccuracy… Social psychologists have many “basic phenomena” that are presumed (without evidence) to cause inaccuracy: categorization supposedly exaggerates real differences between groups, ingroup biases, illusory correlations, automatic activation of stereotypes, the ultimate attribution error, and many more. None, however, have ever been linked to the actual (in)accuracy of lay people’s stereotypes. Mistaking processes speculatively claimed to cause stereotype inaccuracy, for evidence of actual stereotype inaccuracy, is the prototypical example of the processistic fallacy. Their prototypical cases of supposedly inherently erroneous generic beliefs are those such as “mosquitos carry the West Nile virus” and “ducks lay eggs” (Leslie, Khemlani, & Glucksberg, 2011). They cite evidence that people judge such statements to be true. They argue that this renders people inaccurate because few mosquitos carry West Nile virus and not all ducks lay eggs. Ipso facto, according to their argument, stereotypes that are generic beliefs also cannot be accurate. Even if people’s beliefs about ducks’ egg laying were generic and wrong, we would still have no direct information about the accuracy of their beliefs about other people. So, how does this translate to stereotypes? Bian and Cimpian cite another paper by Leslie (in press) in support of the claim that “”more people hold the generic belief that Muslims are terrorists than hold the generic belief that Muslims are female.” What was Leslie’s (in press) “evidence”? Quotes from headline-seeking politicians and a rise in hate crimes post-9/11. In short, this is no evidence whatsoever that bears on the claim that “more people believe Muslims are terrorists than Muslims are female.” Of course, even if this were valid, how it would bear on stereotype accuracy is entirely unclear, because that would depend, not on researcher assumptions about what people mean when they agree with statements like, “Muslims are terrorists” but on evidence assessing what people actually mean. The stereotyping literature is so strongly riddled with invalid researcher presumptions about lay people’s beliefs, that, absent hard empirical evidence about what people actually believe, researcher assumptions that are not backed up by evidence do not warrant credibility. If, as seems to be widely assumed in discussions such as Bian and Cimpian’s, agreeing that “Muslims are terrorists” means “all Muslims are terrorists” then such stereotypes are clearly inaccurate (indeed, SPSR specifically points out that all or nearly all absolute stereotypes of the form ALL of THEM are X are inherently inaccurate, because human variability is typically sufficient to invalidate almost any such absolutist claim). However, the problem here is the presumption that agreeing that “Muslims are terrorists” is equivalent to the belief that “all Muslims are terrorists.” Maybe it is, but if so, that cannot be empirically supported just because researchers say so. I suspect many would agree that “Alaska is cold” (indeed, I would myself) – but doing so does not necessarily also entail the assumption that every day in every location in Alaska is always frigidly cold. Juneau routinely hits the 70 degree mark, which I do not consider particularly cold. Yet, I would still agree that “Alaska is cold.” Whether any particular generic beliefs is, in fact, absolutist requires evidence. In the absence of such evidence, researchers are welcome to present their predictions as speculations about stereotypes’ supposed absolute or inaccurate content, but they should not be presenting their own presumptions as facts. Bian and Cimpian acknowledge that statistical beliefs are far more capable of being accurate, but then go on to claim that most stereotypes are not statistical beliefs, or, at least, generically based stereotypes are more potent influences on social perceptions. They present no assessment, however, of the relative frequencies with which people’s beliefs about groups are generic versus statistical. Again, there is an assumption without evidence. But let’s consider the implications of their claim that most people’s stereotypes include little or no statistical understanding of the distributions of characteristics among groups. According to this view, laypeople would have little idea about racial/ethnic differences in high school or college graduate rates, or about the nonverbal skill differences between men and women, and are clueless about differences in the policy positions held by Democrats and Republicans. That leads to a very simple prediction – that people’s judgments of these distributions would be almost entirely unrelated to the actual distributions; correlations of stereotypes with criteria would be near zero and discrepancy scores would be high. One cannot have it both ways. If people are statistically clueless, then their beliefs should be unrelated to statistical distributions of characteristics among groups. If people’s beliefs do show strong relations to statistical realities, then they are not statistically clueless. We already know that the predictions generated from the “most stereotypes are generic and are therefore statistically clueless” are disconfirmed by the data summarized in SPSR, and in Jussim et al (2015, 2016). Bian and Cimpian have developed compelling descriptions of the processes that they believe should lead people to be inaccurate. In point of empirical fact, however, people have mostly been found to be fairly accurate. Disconfirmation of such predictions can occur for any of several reasons: The processes identified as “causing” inaccuracy do not occur with the frequency that those offering them assume (maybe most stereotypes are not generic). The processes are quite common and do cause inaccuracy, but are mitigated by other countervailing processes that increase accuracy (e.g., perhaps people often adjust their beliefs in response to corrective information). The processes are common, but, in real life, lead to much higher levels of accuracy than those emphasizing inaccuracy presume (see SPSR for more details). Regardless, making declarations about levels of stereotype inaccuracy on the basis of a speculative prediction that some process causes stereotype inaccuracy, rather than on the basis of evidence that directly bears on accuracy, is a classic demonstration of the processistic fallacy. THE BLACK HOLE AT THE BOTTOM OF MOST DECLARATIONS THAT “STEREOTYPES ARE INACCURATE” In science, the convention is to support empirical claims with evidence, typically via a citation. This should be an obvious point, but far too often, scientific articles have declared stereotypes to be inaccurate either without a single citation, or by citing an article that itself provides no empirical evidence of stereotype inaccuracy. My collaborators and I (e.g., Jussim et al, 2016) have taken to referring to this as “the black hole at the bottom of declarations of stereotype inaccuracy.” For example:

    “… stereotypes are maladaptive forms of categories because their content does not correspond to what is going on in the environment” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 467).

    There is no citation here. It is a declaration without any provided empirical support.

    Or consider this: “The term stereotype refers to those interpersonal beliefs and expectancies that are both widely shared and generally invalid (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981).” (Miller & Turnbull, 1986, p. 233).

    There is a citation here – to Ashmore and Del Boca (1981). Although Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) did review how prior researchers defined stereotypes, they did not review or provide empirical evidence that addressed the accuracy of stereotypes. Thus, the Miller and Turnbull (1986) quote also ends in an empirical black hole. Bian and Cimpian’s argument that “stereotypes are inaccurate” based on studies that did not assess stereotype accuracy is a modern and sophisticated version of this argument from a black hole. IS YOUR BELIEF IN STEREOTYPE INACCURACY FALSIFIABLE? That question is directed to all readers of this blog entry who still maintain the claim that “stereotypes are inaccurate.” Scientific beliefs should at least be capable of falsification and correction; otherwise, they are more like religion. Bian and Cimpian follow a long and venerable social psychological tradition of declaring stereotypes inaccurate without: 1. Grappling with the overwhelming evidence of stereotype accuracy; and 2. Without providing new evidence that directly assesses accuracy. This raises the question, if 50 high quality studies demonstrating stereotype accuracy across many groups, many beliefs, many labs, and many decades is not enough to get you to change your mind, what could? I can tell you what could change my belief that the evidence shows most stereotypes are usually at least fairly accurate. If most of the next 50 studies on the topic provide little or no evidence of inaccuracy, I would change my view. Indeed, in our most recent reviews (Jussim et al, 2015, 2016) we pointed out two areas in which the weight of the evidence shows inaccuracy. National character stereotypes are often inaccurate when compared against Big Five Personality measures (interestingly, however, they are often more accurate when other criterion measures are used); and political stereotypes (e.g., people’s beliefs about Democrats versus Republicans, or liberals versus conservatives) generally exaggerate real differences. Show me the data, and I will change my view. If no data could lead you to change your position, then your position is not scientific. It is completely appropriate for people’s morals to inform or even determine their political attitudes and policy positions. What is not appropriate, however, is for that to be the case, and then to pretend that one’s position is based on science. BOTTOM LINES Stereotype accuracy is one of the largest effects in all of social psychology. Given social psychology’s current crisis of replicability, and widespread concerns about questionable research practices (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons et al, 2011), one might expect that social psychologists would be shouting to the world that we have actually found a valid, independently replicable, powerful phenomena. But if one did think that, one could not possibly be more wrong. Testaments to the inaccuracy of stereotypes still dominate textbooks and broad reviews of the stereotyping literature that appear in scholarly books. The new generation of scholars is still being brought up to believe that “stereotypes are inaccurate,” a claim many will undoubtedly take for granted as true, and then promote in their own scholarship. Sometimes, these manifest as definitions of stereotypes as inaccurate; and even when stereotypes are not defined as inaccurate, they manifest as declarations that stereotypes are inaccurate, exaggerated, or overgeneralized. Social psychologists are unbelievably terrific at coming up with reasons why stereotypes “should” be inaccurate, typically presented as statements that they “are” inaccurate. Social psychologists are, however, often less good at correcting their cherished beliefs in the face of contrary data than many of us would have hoped (Jussim et al, in press). Self-correction is, supposedly, one of the hallmarks of true sciences. Failure to self-correct in the face of overwhelming data is, to me, a threat to the scientific integrity of our field. Perhaps, therefore, most of us can agree that, with respect to the longstanding claim that “stereotypes are inaccurate,” a little scientific self-correction is long overdue. References Allport, G. W. (1954/1979). The nature of prejudice (2nd edition). Cambridge, MA : Perseus Books. Ashmore, R. D., & Del Boca, F. K. (1981). Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior (pp.1-35). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54, 462-479. Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015). Political diversity will improve social psychological science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, 1-54. Ioannidis, J. P. (2012). Why science is not necessarily self-correcting. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 645-654. Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system‑justification and the production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1‑27. Jussim, L. (2012). Social perception and social reality: Why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfilling prophecy. New York: Oxford University Press. Jussim, L., Cain, T., Crawford, J., Harber, K., & Cohen, F. (2009). The unbearable accuracy of stereotypes. In T. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp.199-227). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Jussim, L., Crawford, J.T., Anglin, S. M., Chambers, J. R., Stevens, S. T., & Cohen, F. (2016). Stereotype accuracy: One of the largest and most replicable effects in all of social psychology. Pp. 31-63, in T. Nelson (ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (second edition). New York: Psychology Press. Jussim, L., Crawford, J. T., Anglin, S. M., Stevens, S. M., & Duarte, J. L. (In press). Interpretations and methods: Towards a more effectively self-correcting social psychology. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Jussim, L., Crawford, J. T., & Rubinstein, R. S. (2015). Stereotype (In)accuracy in perceptions of groups and individuals. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24, 490-497. Kolowich. S. (February 2, 2016). The water next time: Professor who helped expose crisis in Flynt says public science is broken. Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved on 2/3/16 from: http://chronicle.com/article/The-Water-Next-Time-Professor/235136/ Kunda, Z., & Thagard, P. (1996). Forming impressions from stereotypes, traits, and behaviors: A parallel-constraint-satisfaction theory. Psychological Review, 103, 284-308. LaPiere, R. T. (1936). Type-rationalizations of group antipathy. Social Forces, 15, 232-237. Leslie, S.J. (in press). The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice and Generalization. The Journal of Philosophy. Leslie, S., Khemlani, S., & Glucksberg, S. (2011). Do all ducks lay eggs? The generic overgeneralization effect. Journal of Memory and Language, 65, 15–31. Loeb, A. (2014). Benefits of diversity. Nature: Physics, 10, 616-617. Lippmann, W. (1922/1991). Public opinion. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Miller, D.T., & Turnbull, W. (1986). Expectancies and interpersonal processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 37, 233-256. Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science, 349, aac4716. doi: 10.1126/science.aac4716 Pinker, S. (2002). The blank slate. New York City: Penguin Books. Richard, F. D., Bond, C. F. Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, J. J. (2003). One hundred years of social psychology quantitatively described. Review of General Psychology, 7, 331-363. Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. Psychological Science, 22, 1359-1366. [1] Consensual stereotypes refer to beliefs shared by a group and are usually assessed by means. For example, you might be teaching a psychology of 30 students, and ask them to estimate the college graduation rates for five demographic groups. Consensual stereotype accuracy can be assessed by correlating the class mean on these estimates with, e.g., Census data on graduate rates for the different groups. Personal stereotype accuracy is assessed identically, but for each person, separately. So, one would assess Fred’s personal stereotype accuracy by correlating Fred’s estimates for each group with the Census data. See SPSR, Chapter 16, for a much more detailed description of different aspects of stereotype accuracy and how they can be assessed.

  • On Stereotypes – They’re True.

    By Eli Harman (IMPORTANT POST) [T]he following is my condensed restatement of Jason Cogwell’s theory of confirmation bias as a collective cognition strategy. There are a great many instances where making a generalization could be useful, helpful, or necessary. But most people aren’t in posession of enough information to make rigorous and defensible generalizations very often. what people are doing is constantly forming or hearing hypotheses. If a thought occurs to me, or if I hear an observation or speculation from someone else, and then soon after see some fact or situation that appears to correspond to that hypothesis, then that hypothesis will be “confirmed” (in my mind.) And each subsequent “confirmation” will tend to make it seem more compelling, to me. Epistemically, this one off correspondence (or even a pattern of correspondence) means nothing. It could be coincidence. It could be random chance. There could be something going on, but something *other* than I speculated, etc… But what it causes me to do is adopt the hypothesis as a predictive model for myself and restate it to others (until it is disconfirmed to my satisfaction.) If their experience does not confirm (disconfirms) my hypothesis then they will quickly forget about it. They’re hearing random hypotheses all the time and many of them don’t hold, and are therefore discarded. But, if THEIR experience “confirms” the hypothesis, in their own mind, then they will adopt it and restate it to still others. The implication should be obvious. Confirmation bias will cause all people, some of the time, to adopt false hypotheses and act as if they were true, just by random chance. Thinking those hypotheses true, they will then restate them to others. But false hypotheses will tend to fizzle out and die, as others will not adopt them consistently if they are not subsequently “confirmed” in their own experience. True hypotheses, on the other hand, those which correspond to reality, those with consistent predictive power, will tend to spread further and faster, until they attain the status of common knowledge, or widely known stereotype. What tends to produce accurate hypotheses and stereotypes is not the cognitive processes and strategies of any given individual (for these are indeed biased and flawed) but the iterated spread of ideas through a population over time. And research show that this is indeed effective. Commonly held stereotypes correspond to reality with a correlation of between .4 and .9, with an average correlation of about .8. http://quillette.com/…/rebellious-scientist-surprising-tru…/ In other words, stereotypes are an extremely accurate description of reality. And that description, of sometimes very subtle phenomena, is accurate not because anyone has the means to probe them adequately themselves, but because their inadequate means, taken together, amount to an extremely powerful engine of empirical research, of conjecture and refutation. Every individual is a laboratory for testing hypotheses. Confirmation bias causes individuals, taken in isolation, to believe wrong ideas are true. But it is tremendously valuable in sorting hypotheses, which to kill, and which to submit to others for further testing (for that’s really what people are doing when they “adopt a hypothesis as true.”) With time and repetition, the consensus tends to converge on the truth. Jason gave us a hypothetical example. Suppose there are two kinds of people, green people and blue people. Green people are 95% of the population and tell the truth 99% of the time. Blue people are 5% of the population and lie 5% of the time. How are people to discover that blue people are less trustworthy (five times less trustworthy?) Well, start out, at random, with the hypotheses “green people lie” and “blue people lie” by coin flip if necessary. The “green people lie” hypothesis will be confirmed very rarely and spread very slowly. The “blue people lie” hypothesis will be confirmed more often and spread more rapidly, and moreover, this effect will snowball and compound, despite the fact that blue people still tell the truth most of the time, and most green people interact with blue people very rarely (they’re only 5% of the population.) But there is a catch. What if they blue people lie much more than 5% of the time? It could be that almost all of them lie almost all of the time, but they tell very subtle lies like “there is no difference in the rate at which blue people and green people lie.” How would you catch them in such a lie? Who’s keeping statistics on such things? That’s a lie, incidentally, that would be “confirmed” the vast majority of the time, since the vast majority of the time, it is impossible to catch either the blue people or the green people in a lie. And if they repeat that lie enough, they can get it accepted as a consensus, and then proceed to invoke altrusitic punishment and social sanction against anyone who questions it… (“That’s preposterous! You should be ashamed to say such a thing! You’re a bad person for even thinking such a thing!”) Extra credit. Model this scenario and determine what kind of gap or delta can be created between the consensus “there is no difference in the rate of lying” and the reality of measurable differences in verifiable and actionable fraud and deception, and what it costs to maintain, in terms of repetition.

  • On Stereotypes – They’re True.

    By Eli Harman (IMPORTANT POST) [T]he following is my condensed restatement of Jason Cogwell’s theory of confirmation bias as a collective cognition strategy. There are a great many instances where making a generalization could be useful, helpful, or necessary. But most people aren’t in posession of enough information to make rigorous and defensible generalizations very often. what people are doing is constantly forming or hearing hypotheses. If a thought occurs to me, or if I hear an observation or speculation from someone else, and then soon after see some fact or situation that appears to correspond to that hypothesis, then that hypothesis will be “confirmed” (in my mind.) And each subsequent “confirmation” will tend to make it seem more compelling, to me. Epistemically, this one off correspondence (or even a pattern of correspondence) means nothing. It could be coincidence. It could be random chance. There could be something going on, but something *other* than I speculated, etc… But what it causes me to do is adopt the hypothesis as a predictive model for myself and restate it to others (until it is disconfirmed to my satisfaction.) If their experience does not confirm (disconfirms) my hypothesis then they will quickly forget about it. They’re hearing random hypotheses all the time and many of them don’t hold, and are therefore discarded. But, if THEIR experience “confirms” the hypothesis, in their own mind, then they will adopt it and restate it to still others. The implication should be obvious. Confirmation bias will cause all people, some of the time, to adopt false hypotheses and act as if they were true, just by random chance. Thinking those hypotheses true, they will then restate them to others. But false hypotheses will tend to fizzle out and die, as others will not adopt them consistently if they are not subsequently “confirmed” in their own experience. True hypotheses, on the other hand, those which correspond to reality, those with consistent predictive power, will tend to spread further and faster, until they attain the status of common knowledge, or widely known stereotype. What tends to produce accurate hypotheses and stereotypes is not the cognitive processes and strategies of any given individual (for these are indeed biased and flawed) but the iterated spread of ideas through a population over time. And research show that this is indeed effective. Commonly held stereotypes correspond to reality with a correlation of between .4 and .9, with an average correlation of about .8. http://quillette.com/…/rebellious-scientist-surprising-tru…/ In other words, stereotypes are an extremely accurate description of reality. And that description, of sometimes very subtle phenomena, is accurate not because anyone has the means to probe them adequately themselves, but because their inadequate means, taken together, amount to an extremely powerful engine of empirical research, of conjecture and refutation. Every individual is a laboratory for testing hypotheses. Confirmation bias causes individuals, taken in isolation, to believe wrong ideas are true. But it is tremendously valuable in sorting hypotheses, which to kill, and which to submit to others for further testing (for that’s really what people are doing when they “adopt a hypothesis as true.”) With time and repetition, the consensus tends to converge on the truth. Jason gave us a hypothetical example. Suppose there are two kinds of people, green people and blue people. Green people are 95% of the population and tell the truth 99% of the time. Blue people are 5% of the population and lie 5% of the time. How are people to discover that blue people are less trustworthy (five times less trustworthy?) Well, start out, at random, with the hypotheses “green people lie” and “blue people lie” by coin flip if necessary. The “green people lie” hypothesis will be confirmed very rarely and spread very slowly. The “blue people lie” hypothesis will be confirmed more often and spread more rapidly, and moreover, this effect will snowball and compound, despite the fact that blue people still tell the truth most of the time, and most green people interact with blue people very rarely (they’re only 5% of the population.) But there is a catch. What if they blue people lie much more than 5% of the time? It could be that almost all of them lie almost all of the time, but they tell very subtle lies like “there is no difference in the rate at which blue people and green people lie.” How would you catch them in such a lie? Who’s keeping statistics on such things? That’s a lie, incidentally, that would be “confirmed” the vast majority of the time, since the vast majority of the time, it is impossible to catch either the blue people or the green people in a lie. And if they repeat that lie enough, they can get it accepted as a consensus, and then proceed to invoke altrusitic punishment and social sanction against anyone who questions it… (“That’s preposterous! You should be ashamed to say such a thing! You’re a bad person for even thinking such a thing!”) Extra credit. Model this scenario and determine what kind of gap or delta can be created between the consensus “there is no difference in the rate of lying” and the reality of measurable differences in verifiable and actionable fraud and deception, and what it costs to maintain, in terms of repetition.

  • El espectro de la moralidad: De la certidumbre al descubrimiento

    [A]lgunos conflictos son objetivamente inmorales, ya que generan venganza. Algunos conflictos son condicionalmente inmorales porque violan los contratos normativos que consisten en el producto (resultado) de un conjunto de intercambios en lugar de acciones individuales. Algunos conflictos son morales tales como la competencia por las oportunidades producidas por el mercado. Algunos conflictos son inciertos ya que constituyen un proceso de descubrimiento. Traducido por Alberto R. Zambrano U. Texto original

  • El espectro de la moralidad: De la certidumbre al descubrimiento

    [A]lgunos conflictos son objetivamente inmorales, ya que generan venganza. Algunos conflictos son condicionalmente inmorales porque violan los contratos normativos que consisten en el producto (resultado) de un conjunto de intercambios en lugar de acciones individuales. Algunos conflictos son morales tales como la competencia por las oportunidades producidas por el mercado. Algunos conflictos son inciertos ya que constituyen un proceso de descubrimiento. Traducido por Alberto R. Zambrano U. Texto original

  • Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book 1, 2.1, 2.2-6, 2.7-24, 2.34-46, 2.47-54,

    Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book 1, 2.1, 2.2-6, 2.7-24, 2.34-46, 2.47-54, 2.59-65, 2.71-78, 3.20-24, 3.35-50, 3.52-68, 3.81-84, 4.3-4.41, 4.46-484, 4.90-101, 4.117-124, 5.6-11, 5.14-24, 5.25-26, 5.42-48, 5.76-83, 5.85-116, Books 6 and 7, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/777896

    Homer, Iliad, Books 1, 3, 7, 9, and 24, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/312311

    Virgil, Aeneid, Books 2 and 4, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9256287

    Thomas E. Ricks, Making the Corps, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/37024242

    E.B. Sledge, With the Old Breed, Chapters 1-4 and 10-15, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/124046079

    Modules 7-8

    John Keegan, The Face of Battle, Chapters 2-4, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2137107

    James Lacey and Williamson Murray, Moment of Battle, Choose your battles, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/808215944

    Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won, Chapters 4, 6, and 7, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/33948454

    Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture, Chapters 1, 6, 8, 10, and Afterword, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/45375193

    Reviel Netz, Barbed Wire, Part III, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/728243601

    John Hersey, Hiroshima, All, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/397886

    Keith Lowe, Savage Continent, Part I, Chapters 8-10, 18-20, and 22-24, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/796983759

    Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Concerning Violence, Colonial War and Mental disorders, and Conclusion, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63404320

    David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, Introduction, Chapters 1, 2, and 5, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/853286994

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-18 13:21:00 UTC

  • LIVING AMERICAN GENERATIONS ****The Depression Era**** “The Fearful Generation”

    http://socialmarketing.org/archives/generations-xy-z-and-the-others/THE LIVING AMERICAN GENERATIONS

    ****The Depression Era**** “The Fearful Generation”

    Born: 1912-1921

    Coming of Age: 1930-1939

    Age in 2004: 83 to 92

    Current Population: 11-12 million (and declining rapidly)

    Depression era individuals tend to be conservative, compulsive savers, maintain low debt and use more secure financial products like CDs versus stocks.

    These individuals tend to feel a responsibility to leave a legacy to their children. Tend to be patriotic, oriented toward work before pleasure, respect for authority, have a sense of moral obligation.

    ****World War II**** The Greatest Generation

    Born: 1922 to 1927

    Coming of Age: 1940-1945

    Age in 2004: 77-82

    Current Population: 11 million (in quickening decline)

    People in this cohort shared in a common goal of defeating the Axis

    powers. There was an accepted sense of “deferment” among this group, contrasted with the emphasis on “me” in more recent (i.e. Gen X) cohorts.

    ****Post-War Cohort**** The Privileged Generation

    Born: 1928-1945

    Coming of Age: 1946-1963

    Age in 2004: 59 to 76

    Current Population: 41 million (declining)

    This generation had significant opportunities in jobs and education as the War ended and apost-war economic boom struck America. However, the growth in Cold War tensions, the potential for nuclear war and other never before seen threats led to levels of discomfort and uncertainty throughout the generation. Members of this group value security, comfort, and familiar, known activities and environments.

    ****The Baby Boomers**** “The Fuck Ups”

    Born: 1946-1954

    Coming of Age: 1963-1972

    Age in 2004: 50-58

    Current Population: 33 million

    For a long time the Baby Boomers were defined as those born between 1945 and 1964. That would make the generation huge (71 million) and encompass people who were 20 years apart in age. It didn’t compute to have those born in 1964 compared with those born in 1946. Life experiences were completely different.

    Attitudes, behaviors and society were vastly different. In effect, all the

    elements that help to define a cohort were violated by the broad span of years originally included in the concept of the Baby Boomers. The first Boomer segment is bounded by the Kennedy and Martin Luther King assassinations, the Civil Rights movements and the Vietnam War. Boomers I were in or protested the War.

    Boomers 2 or the Jones Generation missed the whole thing.

    Boomers I had good economic opportunities and were largely optimistic about the potential for America and their own lives, the Vietnam War notwithstanding.

    *****Generation Jones***** The Tech Transition Generation

    Born: 1955-1965

    Coming of Age: 1973-1983

    Age in 2004: 39 to 49

    Current Population: 49 million

    This first post-Watergate generation lost much of its trust in government and optimistic views the Boomers I maintained. Economic struggles including the oil embargo of 1979 reinforced a sense of “I’m out for me” and narcissism and a focus on self-help and skepticism over media and institutions is representative of attitudes of this cohort. While Boomers I had Vietnam, Joneses had AIDS as part of their rites of passage. The youngest members of the Jones generation in fact did not have the benefits of the Boomers class as

    many of the best jobs, opportunities, housing etc. were taken by the larger and earlier group. Both Gen X and Boomer II s suffer from this long shadow cast by Boomers.

    ****Generation X**** The Uncertain Generation

    Born: 1966-1976

    Coming of Age: 1988-1994

    Age in 2004: 28 to 38

    Current Population: 41 million

    Sometimes referred to as the “lost” generation, this was the first

    generation of “latchkey” kids, exposed to lots of daycare and divorce. Known as the generation with the lowest voting participation rate of any generation, Gen Xers were quoted by Newsweek as “the generation that dropped out without ever turning on the news or tuning in to the social issues around them.”

    Gen X is often characterized by high levels of skepticism, “what’s in it for me” attitudes and a reputation for some of the worst music to ever gain popularity. Now, moving into adulthood William Morrow (Generations) cited the childhood divorce of many Gen Xers as “one of the most decisive experiences influencing how Gen Xers will shape their own families”.

    Gen Xers are arguably the best educated generation with 29% obtaining a bachelor’s degree or higher (6% higher than the previous cohort). And, with that education and a growing maturity they are starting to form families with a higher level of caution and pragmatism than their parents demonstrated. Concerns run high over avoiding broken homes, kids growing up without a parent around and financial planning.

    ****Generation Y, Millennials (“The Pet Generation”)****

    Born: 1977-1994

    Coming of Age: 1998-2006

    Age in 2004: 10 to 22

    Current Population: 71 million

    The largest cohort since the Baby Boomers, their high numbers reflect their births as that of their parent generation. The last of the Boomer Is and most of the Boomer II s. Gen Y kids are known as incredibly sophisticated, technology wise, immune to most traditional marketing and sales pitches…as they not only grew up with it all, they’ve seen it all and been exposed to it all since early childhood.

    Gen Y members are much more racially and ethnically diverse and they are much more segmented as an audience aided by the rapid expansion in Cable TV channels, satellite radio, the Internet, e-zines, etc.

    Gen Y are less brand loyal and the speed of the Internet has led the cohort to be similarly flexible and changing in its fashion, style consciousness and where and how it is communicated with.

    Gen Y kids often raised in dual income or single parent families have been more involved in family purchases…everything from groceries to new cars. One in nine Gen Yers has a credit card co-signed by a parent.

    ****Generation Z****

    Born: 1995-2012

    Coming of Age: 2013-2020

    Age in 2004: 0-9

    Current Population: 23 million and growing rapidly

    While we don’t know much about Gen Z yet…we know a lot about the environment they are growing up in. This highly diverse environment will make the grade schools of the next generation the most diverse ever. Higher levels of technology will make significant inroads in academics allowing for customized instruction, data mining of student histories to enable pinpoint diagnostics and remediation or accelerated achievement opportunities.

    Gen Z kids will grow up with a highly sophisticated media and computer environment and will be more Internet savvy and expert than their Gen Y forerunners. More to come on Gen Z…stay tuned.

    FROM

    Source date (UTC): 2016-07-14 10:20:00 UTC

  • Sobre el chismorreo y el rechazo

    Post original de Vivek Upadhyay Traducido al Castellano por Alberto R. Zambrano U. CHISMORREO El chismorreo es un medio libre de garantías y no correspondiente de mejorar el estatuí personal por medio del despliegue y la extrapolación de información seleccionada de la persona sobre la cual se chismea. Por medio del uso de declaraciones infladas, bromas, juicios impresionistas subidos de tono, etc., en un consenso compartido que con frecuencia posee un “sesgo de confirmación” a pesar de que los costos demostrables de este error, los chismosos buscan obtener algún estatus que no les corresponde y con frecuencia parasitario en relación al asunto sobre el cual se chismorrea, en parte para burlar los requerimientos altamente cognitivos de desarrollar críticas constructivas (en vez de críticas infladas y destructivas), lo cual implica valorar de manera vez los rumores de incentivos sujetos a haber dicho o hecho supuestamente imposición de costos hasta dar con la verdad o determinar si la verdad ha sido socavada. Los chismes también burlan la adecuada comparación de los antecedentes interpersonales que son transparentemente analizables, medibles, que tienen una fundamentación hecha con base a méritos, productivos, y que se les agrega valor con base a intentos (Esto comprende algunas pautas dentro de una línea de fondo que sirve para determinar si alguien es claramente una buena inversión para completar una tarde o una sucesión de tareas en relación con otros candidatos que puedan llevar a cabo la tarea designada). El chismorreo impone costos gratuitos (por lo menos) de dos maneras:

    1. Por medio de evitar conversaciones con sus interlocutores, por lo que contamina la información que se transmite a las personas con las que el chismoso se relaciona, dicha información cuando va a otros lugares  a otros lugares, se expande gradualmente fuera del alcance de sus interacciones y va disminuyendo la confianza interpersonal. Se forman interacciones sociales entre los interlocutores cuya velocidad económica interpersonal se hace susceptible.
    2. Por medio de reunir, avergonzar y eventualmente confrontar a la persona sobre la cual se chismea con una cantidad de informaciones exageradas y preguntas sesgadas a en vez de haber conseguido primero el contexto basado en incentivos sobre la persona de la cual se chismorreó y de la que aún no se sabe si esos chismes son ciertos.

    RECHAZO Rechazar es un comportamiento que impone un costo, que no logra dar una rendición de cuentas bien informada de por que una persona rechaza a alguien. Impone límites de conducta sobre el rechazado sobre los cuales éste debe operar para mantener relaciones interpersonales; estos límites no corresponden con los términos de la transacción sobre la cual el rechazado debe reforzar la interpretación cargada y no correspondiente de los eventos (aun cuando esté en consenso compartido uno con otro). Lo que alguien que rechaza administra es una prueba no explicada sin la garantía de que esa prueba valga la pena tomar: “Compórtate y habla como yo quiere o te privaré de afecto, instrucción, recursos, inversión u otras formas de capital”. No logra registrar los incentivos de cambios de comportamiento y discurso del que rechaza y por ello compromete las pruebas de realidad del rechazado a favor de sus medios intuitivos, de presionar al rechazado de apaciguar sus preferencias: Preferencias que son costosas de forma demostrable o intuitivas para el rechazado. Si alguien te rechaza, pregúntate el valor que ese alguien tiene en tu vida antes de considerar el contexto por el cual fuiste rechazado. ¿Provee quien me rechaza algo que no tenga un valor único que yo no pueda obtener en algún otro lado con un descuento (o precio comparable) entre ti y el interlocutor que no te rechaza? Confirmas que por medio de la conveniencia no intuitiva del rechazo ganas paz y  capital con el cual puedes amar y producir más para aquellos en los que confías, algo que no demuestran aquellos que te imponen esos costos al rechazarte. ¿Si? Entonces déjalos mientras compartes que estos nuevos hallazgos de valores deben continuamente incentivar el que no interactúes con ellos. Después de hacer claro esto, déjalos seguir adelante con sus proyectos. Déjalos sin ningún tipo de rencor. Asegúrate que si está en tus intereses volver a llegar a algún tipo de acuerdo con ellos, puedes hacerlo sin tener que imponer un ataque que imponga costos, es decir, una observación no basada en la crítica de las acciones, valores, creencias, virtudes o actitudes de alguien más. No inyectes costos gratuitos en tus intentos de restablecer conexiones en los cuales ambas partes pueden exclusivamente añadir valores a sus vidas, de acuerdo a los términos comunicativos y voluntarios que fueron fijados para hacer una transacción, de modo tal que eso no le imponga costos a tus amigos y familia, o elige simplemente no interactuar en una instancia particular.

  • Sobre el chismorreo y el rechazo

    Post original de Vivek Upadhyay Traducido al Castellano por Alberto R. Zambrano U. CHISMORREO El chismorreo es un medio libre de garantías y no correspondiente de mejorar el estatuí personal por medio del despliegue y la extrapolación de información seleccionada de la persona sobre la cual se chismea. Por medio del uso de declaraciones infladas, bromas, juicios impresionistas subidos de tono, etc., en un consenso compartido que con frecuencia posee un “sesgo de confirmación” a pesar de que los costos demostrables de este error, los chismosos buscan obtener algún estatus que no les corresponde y con frecuencia parasitario en relación al asunto sobre el cual se chismorrea, en parte para burlar los requerimientos altamente cognitivos de desarrollar críticas constructivas (en vez de críticas infladas y destructivas), lo cual implica valorar de manera vez los rumores de incentivos sujetos a haber dicho o hecho supuestamente imposición de costos hasta dar con la verdad o determinar si la verdad ha sido socavada. Los chismes también burlan la adecuada comparación de los antecedentes interpersonales que son transparentemente analizables, medibles, que tienen una fundamentación hecha con base a méritos, productivos, y que se les agrega valor con base a intentos (Esto comprende algunas pautas dentro de una línea de fondo que sirve para determinar si alguien es claramente una buena inversión para completar una tarde o una sucesión de tareas en relación con otros candidatos que puedan llevar a cabo la tarea designada). El chismorreo impone costos gratuitos (por lo menos) de dos maneras:

    1. Por medio de evitar conversaciones con sus interlocutores, por lo que contamina la información que se transmite a las personas con las que el chismoso se relaciona, dicha información cuando va a otros lugares  a otros lugares, se expande gradualmente fuera del alcance de sus interacciones y va disminuyendo la confianza interpersonal. Se forman interacciones sociales entre los interlocutores cuya velocidad económica interpersonal se hace susceptible.
    2. Por medio de reunir, avergonzar y eventualmente confrontar a la persona sobre la cual se chismea con una cantidad de informaciones exageradas y preguntas sesgadas a en vez de haber conseguido primero el contexto basado en incentivos sobre la persona de la cual se chismorreó y de la que aún no se sabe si esos chismes son ciertos.

    RECHAZO Rechazar es un comportamiento que impone un costo, que no logra dar una rendición de cuentas bien informada de por que una persona rechaza a alguien. Impone límites de conducta sobre el rechazado sobre los cuales éste debe operar para mantener relaciones interpersonales; estos límites no corresponden con los términos de la transacción sobre la cual el rechazado debe reforzar la interpretación cargada y no correspondiente de los eventos (aun cuando esté en consenso compartido uno con otro). Lo que alguien que rechaza administra es una prueba no explicada sin la garantía de que esa prueba valga la pena tomar: “Compórtate y habla como yo quiere o te privaré de afecto, instrucción, recursos, inversión u otras formas de capital”. No logra registrar los incentivos de cambios de comportamiento y discurso del que rechaza y por ello compromete las pruebas de realidad del rechazado a favor de sus medios intuitivos, de presionar al rechazado de apaciguar sus preferencias: Preferencias que son costosas de forma demostrable o intuitivas para el rechazado. Si alguien te rechaza, pregúntate el valor que ese alguien tiene en tu vida antes de considerar el contexto por el cual fuiste rechazado. ¿Provee quien me rechaza algo que no tenga un valor único que yo no pueda obtener en algún otro lado con un descuento (o precio comparable) entre ti y el interlocutor que no te rechaza? Confirmas que por medio de la conveniencia no intuitiva del rechazo ganas paz y  capital con el cual puedes amar y producir más para aquellos en los que confías, algo que no demuestran aquellos que te imponen esos costos al rechazarte. ¿Si? Entonces déjalos mientras compartes que estos nuevos hallazgos de valores deben continuamente incentivar el que no interactúes con ellos. Después de hacer claro esto, déjalos seguir adelante con sus proyectos. Déjalos sin ningún tipo de rencor. Asegúrate que si está en tus intereses volver a llegar a algún tipo de acuerdo con ellos, puedes hacerlo sin tener que imponer un ataque que imponga costos, es decir, una observación no basada en la crítica de las acciones, valores, creencias, virtudes o actitudes de alguien más. No inyectes costos gratuitos en tus intentos de restablecer conexiones en los cuales ambas partes pueden exclusivamente añadir valores a sus vidas, de acuerdo a los términos comunicativos y voluntarios que fueron fijados para hacer una transacción, de modo tal que eso no le imponga costos a tus amigos y familia, o elige simplemente no interactuar en una instancia particular.

  • Los bienes por medio de enseñar lo sagrado

    Texto original de Curt Doolittle Traducido al castellano por Alberto R. Zambrano U. [L]os rituales sagrados (del templo y la iglesia en particular) nos recompensan de la espiritualidad y demás señales influyentes a cambio de aprender la habilidad de suprimir nuestros impulsos. Los rituales más agresivos y exigentes son aquellos que el Islam impone, una multitud de exigencias y repeticiones diarias, el judaísmo impone exigencias intelectuales, el cristianismo lo hace de una forma muy poco exigente y desorganizada, el budismo lo hace de forma espiritual, la forma más ritual son las religiones japonesas del shinto y el budismo, y la forma más difícil y beneficiosa es el estoicismo combinado con el empírico aristotélico de la las leyes y la ciencia. Estos rituales son necesarios en todas las sociedad por ninguna otra razón más que entrenarnos para mostrar piedad (respeto) por nuestros bienes. Los occidentals fueron capaces de desarrollar bienes en algún sentido porque la iglesia suprimió sus impulsos por medio de sus rituales. Lo sagrado es igual a aquello que yo no debo imponer a nadie sin importar el costo.