Curt Doolittle

Form: Argument

  • We Can Prevent Lies Easily If The Normative Commons Is Common (Shareholder) Property

    [S]o, under freedom of speech, libel, slander, defamation, are acceptable to you? So are Keynesian economics, Marxism upon which it is based, Freudian Psychology, Cantor’s sets, Mises’ Praxeology, Rothbard’s Ethics, The Frankfurt School, Feminism (feminist socialism), Boasian Pseudo-Anthropology, Postmodernism (the attack on truth), the marxist attack on education, the marxist attack on art? All of which were constructed of pseudoscientific arguments and all of which were permissible under free speech, but none of which would have been possible if individuals possessed the right of standing to require truth in free speech. It is ok I suspect to pollute the physical commons but not the normative commons? Do you have some evidence that such constraints place such limits on progress rather than improve progress? Or even a rational argument to demonstrate why (because you can’t, which is Bridgman’s position). Calling a woman a whore under anglo saxon law was equivalent to attempted murder that exposed the skull. Words have consequences. Why would some people prefer that words NOT have consequences unless they feared being held accountable for their consequences? THE PEOPLE WHO TAUGHT US TO LIE

  • WE CAN PREVENT LIES PRETTY EASILY IF THE NORMATIVE COMMONS IS COMMON PROPERTY. S

    WE CAN PREVENT LIES PRETTY EASILY IF THE NORMATIVE COMMONS IS COMMON PROPERTY.

    So libel, slander, defamation, are acceptable to you, I ‘m sure. So are Keynesian economics, Marxism upon which it is based, Freudian Psychology, Cantor’s sets, Mises’ Praxeology, Rothbard’s Ethics, The Frankfurt School, Feminism (feminist socialism), Boasian Pseudo-Anthropology, Postmodernism (the attack on truth), the marxist attack on education, the marxist attack on art, all of which were constructed of pseudoscientific arguments and all of which were permissible under free speech, but none of which would have been possible if individuals possessed the right of standing to require truth in politics law and commerce.

    It is ok I suspect to pollute the physical commons but not the normative commons?

    Do you have some evidence that such constraints place such limits on progress rather than improve progress? Or even a rational argument to demonstrate why (because you can’t, which is Bridgman’s position).

    Calling a woman a whore under anglo saxon law was equivalent to attempted murder that exposed the skull.

    Words have consequences. Why would some people prefer that words NOT have consequences unless they feared being held accountable for their consequences?

    THE PEOPLE WHO TAUGHT US TO LIE

    Source date (UTC): 2014-07-25 10:32:00 UTC

  • The Propertarian Criticism Of Platonic Truth

    (important piece)

    –“We can speak about truth even without a warranty, and we don’t mean truthlike or agreed to be true, just plain true.”—Bruce

    [Y]es, but how do we know you are speaking truthfully? How do we prevent pseudoscience? Or are you, like free speech advocates, saying that the damage that is done by error is less than the good that is achieved by tolerating it? Which is terribly pragmatic. It’s also demonstrably false. Propagating false arguments turns out to be much more effective than true ones. Or do you claim that scientists should be able to engage in untruthful speech? Or are you saying that because truth is unknown and never knowable, that I can never speak the truth? ***What is the material difference between a theory stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent), and a theory not stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent) yet excused as not being possible to be true, and therefore not subject to requirement that it is spoken truthfully?*** This isn’t an immaterial question. It is perhaps THE ethical question facing scientific investigation in ANY field. Evidence is that in hard science this rule is respected. Evidence is that outside of hard science it is not. Then difference is that hard science is a luxury good without opportunity cost, and everything else is — particularly politics and law, where laws do not perish like falsified theories. The communist manifesto, the labor theory of value, the possibility of a universally DESIRABLE moral code vs a universally moral set of laws. These are all false statements, because they are false in construction, not in prediction. You see, science is pretty much ‘irrelevant’ because it is a luxury good, but truth must apply universally no? or it is not truthful definition of truth? ***While it may be true that the ultimate truth (the most parsimonious statement possible) is the optimum definition of true, does that obviate us from pursuing it with truthful statements? Furthermore why not simply state the truth: that all truthfully constructed arguments and theories are true but incomplete, and constantly open to revision, rather than no theories are true except the one most parsimonious statement that we can never make?*** You see, you might think it’s clear and simple – but it’s not. It’s just experience that has convinced you so. You see, popper’s warning is merely moral, not necessary. And I submit, like the ethics of the ghetto peoples whose verbal methodology, and whose ritualistic literature, was purely pragmatic, that there are vast consequences to platonic truth just as there are vast consequences to platonic (false) anything. As far as I know I am correct. I cant get away from it. because we are currently the victims of a century and a half of pseudoscience the immorality of which has not been achieved since the forcible conversion to christianity or the muslim conversion to scriptural perfection. If we look at just the one’s that I see as catastrophic; kant, freud, marx, cantor, russell/frege, keynes, mises, rothbard, then all of these fallacies were preventable by a requirement for operational definitions – proof of internal consistency: proof of existence. Analogy and meaning are properties of myths. Action and measurement are properties of reality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • The Propertarian Criticism Of Platonic Truth

    (important piece)

    –“We can speak about truth even without a warranty, and we don’t mean truthlike or agreed to be true, just plain true.”—Bruce

    [Y]es, but how do we know you are speaking truthfully? How do we prevent pseudoscience? Or are you, like free speech advocates, saying that the damage that is done by error is less than the good that is achieved by tolerating it? Which is terribly pragmatic. It’s also demonstrably false. Propagating false arguments turns out to be much more effective than true ones. Or do you claim that scientists should be able to engage in untruthful speech? Or are you saying that because truth is unknown and never knowable, that I can never speak the truth? ***What is the material difference between a theory stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent), and a theory not stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent) yet excused as not being possible to be true, and therefore not subject to requirement that it is spoken truthfully?*** This isn’t an immaterial question. It is perhaps THE ethical question facing scientific investigation in ANY field. Evidence is that in hard science this rule is respected. Evidence is that outside of hard science it is not. Then difference is that hard science is a luxury good without opportunity cost, and everything else is — particularly politics and law, where laws do not perish like falsified theories. The communist manifesto, the labor theory of value, the possibility of a universally DESIRABLE moral code vs a universally moral set of laws. These are all false statements, because they are false in construction, not in prediction. You see, science is pretty much ‘irrelevant’ because it is a luxury good, but truth must apply universally no? or it is not truthful definition of truth? ***While it may be true that the ultimate truth (the most parsimonious statement possible) is the optimum definition of true, does that obviate us from pursuing it with truthful statements? Furthermore why not simply state the truth: that all truthfully constructed arguments and theories are true but incomplete, and constantly open to revision, rather than no theories are true except the one most parsimonious statement that we can never make?*** You see, you might think it’s clear and simple – but it’s not. It’s just experience that has convinced you so. You see, popper’s warning is merely moral, not necessary. And I submit, like the ethics of the ghetto peoples whose verbal methodology, and whose ritualistic literature, was purely pragmatic, that there are vast consequences to platonic truth just as there are vast consequences to platonic (false) anything. As far as I know I am correct. I cant get away from it. because we are currently the victims of a century and a half of pseudoscience the immorality of which has not been achieved since the forcible conversion to christianity or the muslim conversion to scriptural perfection. If we look at just the one’s that I see as catastrophic; kant, freud, marx, cantor, russell/frege, keynes, mises, rothbard, then all of these fallacies were preventable by a requirement for operational definitions – proof of internal consistency: proof of existence. Analogy and meaning are properties of myths. Action and measurement are properties of reality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • We Can Prevent Lies Easily If the Normative Commons is Common Property

    [S]o libel, slander, defamation, are acceptable to you, I ‘m sure. So are Keynesian economics, Marxism upon which it is based, Freudian Psychology, Cantor’s sets, Mises’ Praxeology, Rothbard’s Ethics, The Frankfurt School, Feminism (feminist socialism), Boasian Pseudo-Anthropology, Postmodernism (the attack on truth), the marxist attack on education, the marxist attack on art, all of which were constructed of pseudoscientific arguments and all of which were permissible under free speech, but none of which would have been possible if individuals possessed the right of standing to require truth in politics law and commerce. It is ok I suspect to pollute the physical commons but not the normative commons? Do you have some evidence that such constraints place such limits on progress rather than improve progress? Or even a rational argument to demonstrate why (because you can’t, which is Bridgman’s position). Calling a woman a whore under anglo saxon law was equivalent to attempted murder that exposed the skull. Words have consequences. Why would some people prefer that words NOT have consequences unless they feared being held accountable for their consequences? THE PEOPLE WHO TAUGHT US TO LIE

  • We Can Prevent Lies Easily If the Normative Commons is Common Property

    [S]o libel, slander, defamation, are acceptable to you, I ‘m sure. So are Keynesian economics, Marxism upon which it is based, Freudian Psychology, Cantor’s sets, Mises’ Praxeology, Rothbard’s Ethics, The Frankfurt School, Feminism (feminist socialism), Boasian Pseudo-Anthropology, Postmodernism (the attack on truth), the marxist attack on education, the marxist attack on art, all of which were constructed of pseudoscientific arguments and all of which were permissible under free speech, but none of which would have been possible if individuals possessed the right of standing to require truth in politics law and commerce. It is ok I suspect to pollute the physical commons but not the normative commons? Do you have some evidence that such constraints place such limits on progress rather than improve progress? Or even a rational argument to demonstrate why (because you can’t, which is Bridgman’s position). Calling a woman a whore under anglo saxon law was equivalent to attempted murder that exposed the skull. Words have consequences. Why would some people prefer that words NOT have consequences unless they feared being held accountable for their consequences? THE PEOPLE WHO TAUGHT US TO LIE

  • Reading a piece by Block, and exasperated at the amount of verbal justification

    Reading a piece by Block, and exasperated at the amount of verbal justification as a means of producing overloading (deception).

    Let me help you folks: The first rule of cooperation is “why don’t I just kill you and take your stuff?” Now a weakling might not like that, and a coward might not like that, and a free rider might not like that, but that’s simply a fact. It abuses northern european universalism, which is easily susceptible to overloading and suggestion that implies a breach of the universalist’s assumed trust.

    But that is a mere cultural assumption that can be abused by ghetto pragmatism. Instead, we always have the ability to kill and take your stuff. Why wouldn’t we? Mostly because its either too rewarding to engage in trade, or not worth killing you and taking your stuff.

    Verbal contradiction doesn’t hold any weight when the choice is between whether to kill you or to trade with you. Negotiation is not bound by logic. It’s bound by not doing what the other person will kill you for.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-07-18 15:04:00 UTC

  • Property rights defined by aggression are necessary and sufficient for limiting

    Property rights defined by aggression are necessary and sufficient for limiting the state, sure. But they aren’t necessary and sufficient for limiting each other in a voluntary polity.

    If you want a voluntary polity in the absence of a state then you must provide a means of resolving all conflicts with each other.

    We don’t have the privilege of determining what causes conflict – evolution mandated it: we can cooperate if and only if we cannot parasite or prey on each other by doing so. Otherwise evolution will punish us for it.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-07-16 15:28:00 UTC

  • THEFT IS ANYTHING BUT LIBERTARIAN Freedom is evidently obtained and perpetuated

    THEFT IS ANYTHING BUT LIBERTARIAN

    Freedom is evidently obtained and perpetuated at the point of a sword or the barrel of a gun.

    The cosmopolitan myth is that man desires to be free, and the state is his oppressor.

    And true, some of us do desire freedom.

    But the vast majority prefer to free ride and rent seek to their maximum ability, and happily confuse freedom with the possibility of increases in consumption.

    Aristocracy requires property; property requires liberty; liberty requires violence.

    Attempts to obtain liberty otherwise are both futile and all too obviously seeking to obtain liberty at a discount on the efforts of others: theft.

    And theft is anything but libertarian.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-07-13 08:34:00 UTC

  • MAN MUST ACT? Well, sure, but to act one must PLAN at least one step: envision a

    MAN MUST ACT?

    Well, sure, but to act one must PLAN at least one step: envision an alternative and choose it. If that is not the case, one cannot claim to have acted. So action is a two sided coin: we must both plan and act, or acting has no meaning. Man must act, sure, but to act he must perceive and plan (choose) action. Even non sentient beings can react, but only a creature that can forecast the future can ‘act’. Like the golden vs the silver rule, or like liberty and property, both planning and acting are necessary for the consideration of either. As such I don’t find it very useful to rely on the requirement that man MUST act, without also taking into consideration that man must plan in order to act. All plans are theories and all actions are tests. This is an immutable property of reality. It is this relationship between planning (theories) and acting (testing) that leads us all the way to the scientific method, as complexity of that which we seek to act upon exceeds our perceptions. So while action and testimony must be reduced to personal perception, where we are capable of making judgements, we must rely upon empiricism and instrumentalist to reduce that which we cannot sense, perceive, and judge. And we must use operations to test internal consistency and external correspondence where possible. Only if we can reduce operations to the perceptible can we possibly make judgments, and only then can we say we possess the knowledge necessary to levy a truth claim.

    (sketch) (something of that order)

    Source date (UTC): 2014-07-11 04:27:00 UTC