Curt Doolittle

Form: Argument

  • The Truth: Making Honest Can’t VS Should Arguments


    If you’re making a “CAN’T” argument, then just admit it’s because you can’t. If you’re making a “SHOULD or SHOULDN’T” argument, then state why you should or shouldn’t. But if you’re making a can’t argument while saying it’s because you shouldn’t, then that’s not truth that’s deception.

    It’s true that you CAN’T hold Russia accountable for attacking Ukraine, breaking the postwar consensus, and restarting nuclear proliferation, but that doesn’t me you shouldn’t.

    Truth is true. Lie is Lie. Unknown is Unknown. It’s not complicated.

    CLARITY

    Truth: Testimonial truth. Speaking truthfully.
    Honest: Testimonial truth. Speaking truthfully.
    Under testimonial truth, Honestly and Truthfully are synonymous.

    CONTEXT:
    Diplomats should not posture that they have the capacity to act, and choose not to act under the cover of justifications, when they have no capacity to act. This is dishonest. Politics is a dishonest business.

    ———-
    –“THE TRUTH: MAKING HONEST CAN’T VS SHOULD ARGUMENTS–

    If you’re making a “CAN’T” argument, then just admit it’s because you can’t. If you’re making a “SHOULD or SHOULDN’T” argument, then state why you should or shouldn’t. But if you’re making a can’t argument while saying it’s because you shouldn’t, then that’s not truth that’s deception.
    It’s true that you CAN’T hold Russia accountable for attacking Ukraine, breaking the postwar consensus, and restarting nuclear proliferation, but that doesn’t me you shouldn’t.

    Truth is true. Lie is Lie. Unknown is Unknown. It’s not complicated.
    ———–

    Caine conveniently reduced the scope of the argument to the first sentence in order to remove the information necessary to render the argument correspondent with reality. (Usually this is merely the error of novices, or people who don’t read the entire argument; but it falls under the category of either a fallacy -straw man- or a deception – selective inclusion of information in the argument. I assume that this is merely the error of a novice. As such cain is applying the technique of formal languages to correspondent and natural languages. This is a common error of ‘logicism’ (that is the word Max was looking for). I categorize all these kinds of errors as ’empty verbalisms’. But Max was attempting to say the same thing. (I am more patient – the curse of aspie-ness.)

    —” If one can not do something (it is not reasonably possible)” is no different from “shouldn’t” in the vast majority of cases when people utter those words.—-

    This is yet another fallacy given that the counter argument that Cain put forward was a fallacy of formal language, minus the information necessary for it to be correspondent – then you Greg, counter with an argument to normative speech.

    So now we have gone from a correspondent argument, to an internally consistent argument to a normative usage argument. Now, I suspect that in the end, Neither Cain nor Greg is probably aware of the different properties of these systems and you are justifying intuition not formal criticism.

    I made a rhetorical statement, because i do not make verbalist statements. I am an active opponent of logicism as psuedoscientific when applied outside of formal bounds. I’m an operationalist
    ———–
    I didnt make an absolute statement now did I?
    ———-

    Nope. No hole there at all. Rock solid.

    NOW LETS LOOK AT YOUR ARGUMENTS

    —If Nuclear war is unacceptable for you then in this context it’s both Can’t and Impossible Max, there he can muse on his Moral Should or not, Be or not to be all day long, 24/7—

    FULLY EXPANDED:
    “If you can conduct nuclear war then
    you cant conduct nuclear war and
    its impossible to conduct nuclear war
    but you prefer not to conduct nuclear war.”

    WELL THAT DOESN”T WORK. LETS BE MORE CHARITABLE

    Nuclear war is unacceptable. (Meaning you prefer not to conduct nuclear war.)
    AND
    You can conduct nuclear war, but you prefer not to.
    OR
    You can’t conduct nuclear war, and it’s immaterial whether you prefer to or not.

    “Can’t physically” != “Prefer not to.”

    WELL THAT DOESN”T WORK. SO LETS SEE WHAT ELSE WE HAVE

    … But really we just get back to the central argument which is that you’re holding a double standard. You allow yourself the laxity of informal language with ‘…in this context…’ but do not allow me the same laxity of informal language given the context. Instead, you pull out a sentence and argue that I made a statement I did not. Then, you go and make the statements I just illustrated were nonsense above.

    I made no universal statement. I did not make a statement regarding the necessary membership of sets. I stated that it is dishonest to posture. You may not have understood that. But this is your own hasty reading.

    I then defended my position with an argument over your head.

    And I am back to making the same argument in simple terms.

    NOW LETS SEE ABOUT AD HOMINEM(s)
    —Scholar—
    Well, I don’t see that as an insult. I don’t claim to be an academic. I don’t claim to be any thing. I claim I am correct. Otherwise that would mean I made an appeal to authority, which would be a fallacy. My arguments stand or they don’t, and they stand.

    —Buffoon—
    Says the guy who just made a clown of himself, did so with passion, did so under the cover of ad hominems.

    –Falling back—

    I didn’t make a mistake. My entire argument stands. I am good at what I do. Sorry. Just how it is. Get over it.

    Curt

  • The Truth: Making Honest Can't VS Should Arguments


    If you’re making a “CAN’T” argument, then just admit it’s because you can’t. If you’re making a “SHOULD or SHOULDN’T” argument, then state why you should or shouldn’t. But if you’re making a can’t argument while saying it’s because you shouldn’t, then that’s not truth that’s deception.

    It’s true that you CAN’T hold Russia accountable for attacking Ukraine, breaking the postwar consensus, and restarting nuclear proliferation, but that doesn’t me you shouldn’t.

    Truth is true. Lie is Lie. Unknown is Unknown. It’s not complicated.

    CLARITY

    Truth: Testimonial truth. Speaking truthfully.
    Honest: Testimonial truth. Speaking truthfully.
    Under testimonial truth, Honestly and Truthfully are synonymous.

    CONTEXT:
    Diplomats should not posture that they have the capacity to act, and choose not to act under the cover of justifications, when they have no capacity to act. This is dishonest. Politics is a dishonest business.

    ———-
    –“THE TRUTH: MAKING HONEST CAN’T VS SHOULD ARGUMENTS–

    If you’re making a “CAN’T” argument, then just admit it’s because you can’t. If you’re making a “SHOULD or SHOULDN’T” argument, then state why you should or shouldn’t. But if you’re making a can’t argument while saying it’s because you shouldn’t, then that’s not truth that’s deception.
    It’s true that you CAN’T hold Russia accountable for attacking Ukraine, breaking the postwar consensus, and restarting nuclear proliferation, but that doesn’t me you shouldn’t.

    Truth is true. Lie is Lie. Unknown is Unknown. It’s not complicated.
    ———–

    Caine conveniently reduced the scope of the argument to the first sentence in order to remove the information necessary to render the argument correspondent with reality. (Usually this is merely the error of novices, or people who don’t read the entire argument; but it falls under the category of either a fallacy -straw man- or a deception – selective inclusion of information in the argument. I assume that this is merely the error of a novice. As such cain is applying the technique of formal languages to correspondent and natural languages. This is a common error of ‘logicism’ (that is the word Max was looking for). I categorize all these kinds of errors as ’empty verbalisms’. But Max was attempting to say the same thing. (I am more patient – the curse of aspie-ness.)

    —” If one can not do something (it is not reasonably possible)” is no different from “shouldn’t” in the vast majority of cases when people utter those words.—-

    This is yet another fallacy given that the counter argument that Cain put forward was a fallacy of formal language, minus the information necessary for it to be correspondent – then you Greg, counter with an argument to normative speech.

    So now we have gone from a correspondent argument, to an internally consistent argument to a normative usage argument. Now, I suspect that in the end, Neither Cain nor Greg is probably aware of the different properties of these systems and you are justifying intuition not formal criticism.

    I made a rhetorical statement, because i do not make verbalist statements. I am an active opponent of logicism as psuedoscientific when applied outside of formal bounds. I’m an operationalist
    ———–
    I didnt make an absolute statement now did I?
    ———-

    Nope. No hole there at all. Rock solid.

    NOW LETS LOOK AT YOUR ARGUMENTS

    —If Nuclear war is unacceptable for you then in this context it’s both Can’t and Impossible Max, there he can muse on his Moral Should or not, Be or not to be all day long, 24/7—

    FULLY EXPANDED:
    “If you can conduct nuclear war then
    you cant conduct nuclear war and
    its impossible to conduct nuclear war
    but you prefer not to conduct nuclear war.”

    WELL THAT DOESN”T WORK. LETS BE MORE CHARITABLE

    Nuclear war is unacceptable. (Meaning you prefer not to conduct nuclear war.)
    AND
    You can conduct nuclear war, but you prefer not to.
    OR
    You can’t conduct nuclear war, and it’s immaterial whether you prefer to or not.

    “Can’t physically” != “Prefer not to.”

    WELL THAT DOESN”T WORK. SO LETS SEE WHAT ELSE WE HAVE

    … But really we just get back to the central argument which is that you’re holding a double standard. You allow yourself the laxity of informal language with ‘…in this context…’ but do not allow me the same laxity of informal language given the context. Instead, you pull out a sentence and argue that I made a statement I did not. Then, you go and make the statements I just illustrated were nonsense above.

    I made no universal statement. I did not make a statement regarding the necessary membership of sets. I stated that it is dishonest to posture. You may not have understood that. But this is your own hasty reading.

    I then defended my position with an argument over your head.

    And I am back to making the same argument in simple terms.

    NOW LETS SEE ABOUT AD HOMINEM(s)
    —Scholar—
    Well, I don’t see that as an insult. I don’t claim to be an academic. I don’t claim to be any thing. I claim I am correct. Otherwise that would mean I made an appeal to authority, which would be a fallacy. My arguments stand or they don’t, and they stand.

    —Buffoon—
    Says the guy who just made a clown of himself, did so with passion, did so under the cover of ad hominems.

    –Falling back—

    I didn’t make a mistake. My entire argument stands. I am good at what I do. Sorry. Just how it is. Get over it.

    Curt

  • on Ray Percival’s commitment to reason. STIPULATIONS It is rational to hold opin

    http://www.amazon.com/The-Myth-Closed-Mind-Understanding/dp/0812696859/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top/181-2526688-3304011Thoughts on Ray Percival’s commitment to reason.

    STIPULATIONS

    It is rational to hold opinions.

    It is rational to hold desperately to opinions.

    It is rational to hold desperately to opinions even in the face of overwhelming argumentative evidence that one cannot refute.

    It is rational to hold to opinions and beliefs as a deliberate choice if one prefers to imagine the world as one wishes, versus represent it correspondingly.

    It is rational to hold to opinions and beliefs and to conduct constant selection bias because there exist a multitude of applications in which arational, and seemingly irrational behavior are beneficial strategies, immune to argumentative change.

    THEREFORE

    The rationality of a belief is not a truth proposition post-hoc, but a volitional necessity given the preconditions set by one’s ignorance.

    This constrains rationality to constituent ignorance.

    ??No opinion then is criticizable as irrational?? Or is it that only simple and well constructed ideas are criticizable as irrational.

    ABSENT FROM CONSIDERATION

    The opportunity cost of erroneous ideas is neutral.

    The cost of conducting persuasive argument is immaterial.

    The difference in cost between the construction and distribution of various false and deceptive arguments, and truthful and honest arguments is immaterial.

    The persistence of human cognitive biases, of metaphysical assumptions, of religious, philosophical, intellectual, and normative convictions, are rational tools, and therefore immaterial.

    FALSE DICHOTOMY

    First criticism as a false dichotomy:

    1) Irrational: a statement that is internally inconsistent in construction, and we cannot determine if it would produce desired outcomes, or if it would produce undesirable outcomes.

    2) arational: a statement that is not internally consistent in construction but whose use produces desirable outcomes.

    3) rational: a statement that is internally consistent, and whose use produces desired outcomes.

    As far as I know, an arational argument is scientifically demonstrable (knowledge of use), even if scientifically inexplicable (knowledge of construction).

    As far as I know, a rational argument must be both explicable (knowledge of construction), and demonstrable(knowledge of use).

    As far as I know, an irrational argument is neither explicable (knowledge of construction) nor demonstrable(knowledge of use).

    FURTHERMORE

    The absence of a logic of cooperation renders all moral arguments extant untestable, yet all political arguments are governed by moral constraints. As such no moral arguments can be rational?

    The use of language consisting of aggregated meanings (functions) masks the underlying assumptions and renders arguments untestable, and deceptive.

    The use of in-group identity bias literally ‘pays’ people to believe things that are irrational as stated, but rational to pursue for their group’s purposes. In other words, religious and cultural ‘beliefs’ produce high returns, and therefore may not be rational, or irrational, but arational.

    CONCLUSIONS

    Therefore unlike the calm, timeless, costless world of scientific philosophy, and its pursuit of platonic truth, the opposite is true, particularly under democracy: we are fighting, always, to use the violence of government to extract money from some purpose to apply it to some other purpose, in real time, with real consequences, and ignorance is a luxury in the philosophy of science but not in life.

    Scientists consider the pursuit of truth independent of cost. No one else has that luxury. Scientists are a privileged class and advocate the belief systems of a privileged class. Unlike scientists, who are not temporally bound, or theologians who are neither temporally, or existentially bound, human action requires we compensate for temporal and existential constraints, as well as opportunity costs.

    Because the purpose of thought is action. We do not live in the garden of eden. And that is the culture of the Academy: the Cathedral. The pretense of costlessness in a world constituted of the necessity of human action guided entirely by prices.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-08-22 06:46:00 UTC

  • WHY? THE FALLACY OF NON AGGRESSION AS JUSTIFICATION. Why would you develop an et

    WHY? THE FALLACY OF NON AGGRESSION AS JUSTIFICATION.

    Why would you develop an ethics of non-aggression rather than an ethic of non-theft, for a philosophical framework that purports to reduce all right to property rights, for some reason other than legitimizing deception and forbidding retaliation for deception?

    You see, cosmopolitanism is merely a philosophical framework for justificationism.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-08-15 08:23:00 UTC

  • How Has Civil Society Led To Political Developments?

    This question posits a possible misrepresentation.  No society where government supplies services is categorized as ‘civil’. A ‘civil’ society is one in where we demonstrate civic participation whether in the pre-war or greek sense: where citizens volunteer to participate in the management of the commons and the provision of services.  We live in an managerial society postwar, where the state manages professionals (bureaucrats and their agents) for the provision of services. (See Burnham). 

    The abuse of this term originates in the conflation of treating one another ‘with civility’ (without violence or coercion), with ‘civic society’, in which individuals participate in the voluntary organization and production of commons. 

    We do not live in a civic society, we live in a civil society. 

    Meaning matters.  Ideas produce consequences.

    https://www.quora.com/How-has-civil-society-led-to-political-developments

  • If your civilization cannot produce material commons then you are less moral tha

    If your civilization cannot produce material commons then you are less moral than those that can. This argument is inescapable. you are, by the more moral culture’s standards ‘an immoral people’.

    Locusts. It’s not an opinion. It’s just fact.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-08-10 06:45:00 UTC

  • CENTRAL ARGUMENT: WESTERN TRUTH VS PLATONIC TRUTH (the central argument)( profou

    CENTRAL ARGUMENT: WESTERN TRUTH VS PLATONIC TRUTH

    (the central argument)( profound)

    On this topic, ‘truth’, my central argument…

    1) … is that giving witness to one’s observations, is testable by reproduction of a set of operational definitions. That operational definitions produce the equivalent of names, not descriptions. Such names are insulated from deception, distraction, loading, framing and overloading. Theories are not. While we cannot demonstrate the absolute parsimony of a theory (that we know of), we can demonstrate that we truthfully conveyed our observations. In other words, we can testify truthfully to an ordered set of facts, even if we cannot testify truthfully to parsimony of a theory.

    2) … that physical science is a narrow and special case of human activity, and popper was defining truth for that special case – a definition which is not applicable outside of the special case, and even inside the special case, he made questionable use of the term in order to retain its moral loading for purely social reasons. Justifiable social reasons, but social reasons none the less.

    3) ….that it is possible to state instead that all outputs of scientific investigation are true, if they are truthfully represented – where ‘scientific investigation” refers to the use of the scientific method, regardless of field of inquiry. But that we seek the most parsimonious statement of a theory, and we can never know that we have obtained it, we can only develop consensus that we cannot cause it to fail. This is, as far as I know, the best non-platonic description of truth available. Everything else is a linguistic contrivance for one purpose or another – possibly to obscure ignorance, and possibly to load ideas with moral motivation. Scientists load their contrivance of truth, and mathematicians load their contrivance of numbers, limits, and a dozen other things – most of which obscure linguistic ‘cheats’ to give authority to that which is necessary for the construction of general rules. (ie: the problem of arbitrary precision).

    4) … that popper did no investigation into science or the history of science prior to making his argument, and that as yet, we do not have a systematic account of the history of science. However, what history we do have, both distant and recent, is that science operates as I have suggested: by criticism upon failure via overextension. The reason being that it is economically inefficient (expensive) to pursue criticism rather than to extend a theory to its point of failure then criticize it. And as far as we know, this is how science works, and must work, because it is how all human endeavors must work. Because while a small number of scientists may seek the ‘truth’ whatever a platonist means, what scientists try to do is solve problems – ie: to manufacture recipes for useful cognition.

    5) … that popper’s advice was merely moral given that the scale of inquiry in all human fields had surpassed that of human scale, where tests are subjectively verifiable. (I think this is an important insight because it occurred in all fields.) Einstein for example, operationalized observations (relative simultaneity for example) over very great distances approaching the speed of light using Lorenz transformations. And as Bridgman demonstrated, the reason Einstein’s work was novel was because prior generations had NOT been operationalizing statements ,and as such, more than a generation and perhaps two were lost to failure of what should have been an obvious solution. (See the problem of length, which I tend to refer to often as the best example.) I addressed this in a previous post, and what popper did was give us good advice, and while he made an argument that appears logical, like most rational arguments, unsupported by data, it is not clear he was correct, and in fact, it appears that he was not. The question is not a rational but empirical one.

    6) … and I am not terribly interested in criticizing popper, any more than criticizing any other philosopher I admire, since popper unlike Misesian Pseudoscience, or Rothbardian Immoral Verbalisms, was engaged in a moral attempt both in politics and in science, and perhaps in science as a vehicle for politics, to prevent the pseudoscientific use of science – particularly by fascist and communists, to use the findings of science as a replacement for divine authority by which to command man. What popper did, particularly with his platonism, was to remove the ability for the findings of science to be used as justification for the removal of human choice. Popper, Mises, and Hayek were responsible for undermining pseudoscientific authoritarianism. Of the three popper is perhaps less articulate (possibly to obscure his objective), but certainly not wrong, so to speak. While mises’ appeal to authoritarianism (which is part and parcel of jewish culture) was entirely pseudoscientific, by claiming that economics was deductive rather than empirical, and justifying it under apriorism, instead of as I’ve stated, understanding that he was merely trying to apply operationalism to economic activity, which would merely demonstrate that Keynesian economics was immoral, not unscientific.

    But Popper, Mises, Hayek, Bridgman and Brouwer, did not find a solution to restoring the western aristocratic conditions for public speech.

    They too were a lost in platonism a bit. Bridgman and Brouwer did understand that something was wrong, and were very close,b ut they could not make the moral argument. We have had a century now of attacks by verbal contrivance and we can demonstrate the destruction of our civilization by way of it. So the moral argument is no longer one of undemonstrated results. WE have the results. And we have a generation of men, myself included, trying to repair it.

    One must speak truthfully, because no other truth is knowable. Intellectual products that are brought to market must be warrantied just as are all other products that are brought to market, and the warranty that you can provide is operational definitions (recipes, experience), not theories (psychologism, projections). And if you are not willing to stand behind your product then you should not bring it to market. Because you have no right to subject others to harm.

    Intellectuals produce ideas (myself included), that is our product. We are paid in measly terms most of the time, for our product, but that is what we do. But it is no different from hot coffee or dangerous ladders, or defective gas tanks.

    And given that one particularly prolific group of people has created marxism, socialism, postmodernism, libertine-libertarianism, and neoconservatism, it is about time we stopped allowing them to ship lousy products into society.

    And rather than regulate them by government, the common law and universal standing will allow punishment of those who bring bad products to market.

    OBSCURITY

    I am entirely capable (as above) of writing clearly, but it is tedious when most logical connections appear to be obvious to the informed person. I will cop out to being lazy, particularly when I have no idea whether the others involved in the debate will be worthwhile. But it’s not that I can’t drill down to necessary arguments. OK? It’s just a lot more work than incrementally testing an idea and making sure that others follow the breadcrumbs….

    CLOSING

    I am pretty sure the above analysis is correct. It’s going to be very hard to demonstrate otherwise: that popper used a pragmatic theory of truth, just like all of us do. But there is only one possible extant truth, and that is testimony. All else is but moral rule, not logical necessity. OK? That’s just how it is. Period, end of story.

    And yes it’s not worth your time (or mine) to continue if we must resort to color by numbers. The central argument is either advanced or not. Otherwise it’s just a waste of time. But thank you for your help, as always.

    Curt Doolittle

    Source date (UTC): 2014-07-28 02:22:00 UTC

  • The Propertarian Criticism of Platonic Truth

    (important piece)

    –“We can speak about truth even without a warranty, and we don’t mean truthlike or agreed to be true, just plain true.”—Bruce

    [Y]es, but how do we know you are speaking truthfully? How do we prevent pseudoscience? Or are you, like free speech advocates, saying that the damage that is done by error is less than the good that is achieved by tolerating it? Which is terribly pragmatic. It’s also demonstrably false. Propagating false arguments turns out to be much more effective than true ones. Or do you claim that scientists should be able to engage in untruthful speech? Or are you saying that because truth is unknown and never knowable, that I can never speak the truth? ***What is the material difference between a theory stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent), and a theory not stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent) yet excused as not being possible to be true, and therefore not subject to requirement that it is spoken truthfully?*** This isn’t an immaterial question. It is perhaps THE ethical question facing scientific investigation in ANY field. Evidence is that in hard science this rule is respected. Evidence is that outside of hard science it is not. Then difference is that hard science is a luxury good without opportunity cost, and everything else is — particularly politics and law, where laws do not perish like falsified theories. The communist manifesto, the labor theory of value, the possibility of a universally DESIRABLE moral code vs a universally moral set of laws. These are all false statements, because they are false in construction, not in prediction. You see, science is pretty much ‘irrelevant’ because it is a luxury good, but truth must apply universally no? or it is not truthful definition of truth? ***While it may be true that the ultimate truth (the most parsimonious statement possible) is the optimum definition of true, does that obviate us from pursuing it with truthful statements? Furthermore why not simply state the truth: that all truthfully constructed arguments and theories are true but incomplete, and constantly open to revision, rather than no theories are true except the one most parsimonious statement that we can never make?*** You see, you might think it’s clear and simple – but it’s not. It’s just experience that has convinced you so. You see, popper’s warning is merely moral, not necessary. And I submit, like the ethics of the ghetto peoples whose verbal methodology, and whose ritualistic literature, was purely pragmatic, that there are vast consequences to platonic truth just as there are vast consequences to platonic (false) anything. As far as I know I am correct. I cant get away from it. because we are currently the victims of a century and a half of pseudoscience the immorality of which has not been achieved since the forcible conversion to christianity or the muslim conversion to scriptural perfection. If we look at just the one’s that I see as catastrophic; kant, freud, marx, cantor, russell/frege, keynes, mises, rothbard, then all of these fallacies were preventable by a requirement for operational definitions – proof of internal consistency: proof of existence. Analogy and meaning are properties of myths. Action and measurement are properties of reality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • The Propertarian Criticism of Platonic Truth

    (important piece)

    –“We can speak about truth even without a warranty, and we don’t mean truthlike or agreed to be true, just plain true.”—Bruce

    [Y]es, but how do we know you are speaking truthfully? How do we prevent pseudoscience? Or are you, like free speech advocates, saying that the damage that is done by error is less than the good that is achieved by tolerating it? Which is terribly pragmatic. It’s also demonstrably false. Propagating false arguments turns out to be much more effective than true ones. Or do you claim that scientists should be able to engage in untruthful speech? Or are you saying that because truth is unknown and never knowable, that I can never speak the truth? ***What is the material difference between a theory stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent), and a theory not stated truthfully (internally consistent and externally correspondent) yet excused as not being possible to be true, and therefore not subject to requirement that it is spoken truthfully?*** This isn’t an immaterial question. It is perhaps THE ethical question facing scientific investigation in ANY field. Evidence is that in hard science this rule is respected. Evidence is that outside of hard science it is not. Then difference is that hard science is a luxury good without opportunity cost, and everything else is — particularly politics and law, where laws do not perish like falsified theories. The communist manifesto, the labor theory of value, the possibility of a universally DESIRABLE moral code vs a universally moral set of laws. These are all false statements, because they are false in construction, not in prediction. You see, science is pretty much ‘irrelevant’ because it is a luxury good, but truth must apply universally no? or it is not truthful definition of truth? ***While it may be true that the ultimate truth (the most parsimonious statement possible) is the optimum definition of true, does that obviate us from pursuing it with truthful statements? Furthermore why not simply state the truth: that all truthfully constructed arguments and theories are true but incomplete, and constantly open to revision, rather than no theories are true except the one most parsimonious statement that we can never make?*** You see, you might think it’s clear and simple – but it’s not. It’s just experience that has convinced you so. You see, popper’s warning is merely moral, not necessary. And I submit, like the ethics of the ghetto peoples whose verbal methodology, and whose ritualistic literature, was purely pragmatic, that there are vast consequences to platonic truth just as there are vast consequences to platonic (false) anything. As far as I know I am correct. I cant get away from it. because we are currently the victims of a century and a half of pseudoscience the immorality of which has not been achieved since the forcible conversion to christianity or the muslim conversion to scriptural perfection. If we look at just the one’s that I see as catastrophic; kant, freud, marx, cantor, russell/frege, keynes, mises, rothbard, then all of these fallacies were preventable by a requirement for operational definitions – proof of internal consistency: proof of existence. Analogy and meaning are properties of myths. Action and measurement are properties of reality. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev, Ukraine

  • We Can Prevent Lies Easily If The Normative Commons Is Common (Shareholder) Property

    [S]o, under freedom of speech, libel, slander, defamation, are acceptable to you? So are Keynesian economics, Marxism upon which it is based, Freudian Psychology, Cantor’s sets, Mises’ Praxeology, Rothbard’s Ethics, The Frankfurt School, Feminism (feminist socialism), Boasian Pseudo-Anthropology, Postmodernism (the attack on truth), the marxist attack on education, the marxist attack on art? All of which were constructed of pseudoscientific arguments and all of which were permissible under free speech, but none of which would have been possible if individuals possessed the right of standing to require truth in free speech. It is ok I suspect to pollute the physical commons but not the normative commons? Do you have some evidence that such constraints place such limits on progress rather than improve progress? Or even a rational argument to demonstrate why (because you can’t, which is Bridgman’s position). Calling a woman a whore under anglo saxon law was equivalent to attempted murder that exposed the skull. Words have consequences. Why would some people prefer that words NOT have consequences unless they feared being held accountable for their consequences? THE PEOPLE WHO TAUGHT US TO LIE