Curt Doolittle

Form: Argument

  • Another argument against racism: You know, bitching about other tribes is a litt

    Another argument against racism:

    You know, bitching about other tribes is a little like blaming the messenger. If you aren’t able to compete with other tribes, and they can parasite upon you, invade you, convert you, steal your women’s genes, or conquer you – then you need to look in the mirror at why you are so inferior that they can do so.

    My specialty has become deconstruction and remedy for anglo, german, and jewish failures. But you now WE ARE ALL FAILURES because ALL our enlightenments were failures. Otherwise we would not now be genocidally exterminated.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev Ukraine.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-14 09:58:00 UTC

  • ALL FULL OF SOUND AND FURY SIGNIFYING NOTHING. How can you state that liberty –

    ALL FULL OF SOUND AND FURY SIGNIFYING NOTHING.

    How can you state that liberty – defined as absence of loss of satisfaction caused by the actions others – can be implemented via formal institutions that will allow the formation of a voluntary polity?

    If liberty is synonymous with the absence of such dissatisfying experiences as satisfaction, then what actions can bring about a state of liberty without those undesirable experiences?

    Why is your theory of liberty not merely a description of the experiential state of liberty, and while a true statement, just a restatement of subjective value, expressed from the subjective rather than objective point of view – and therefore not just tautological hand waving without consequence?

    You can claim that your theory of experiential liberty is a solution to the arguments positioned in your paper followed by a criticism of libertarians who are describing institutional rules for construction of liberty, instead of the experience of liberty – but you have not demonstrated either that you have solved the problem of determining the scope of actions that we MUST consider a violation of liberty and those that do not, or why the experiential point of view adds value to the extant proposition that value is subjective, and that the institutional question we are debating is that of the scope of property that we agree to resolve conflicts over, under law?

    The question libertarians ask is how to eradicate need for the state. The problem is that we debate the scope of property rights because we have no non-arbitrary, rationally derived means of knowing the answer. What scope of violation constitutes a lack of imposition of costs?

    Because such violations can include those that are observable and those are not; those that are tolerable and those that are not; those that are errors and those that are not. All libertarians make the same argument that you do, but the contention remains one of how we judge the truth of a claim that one has experienced such a subjective experience of dissatisfaction, so that disputes can be resolved?

    Aren’t you just hand-waving? Isn’t your work irrelevant because it is both obvious, and because it does not solve the problem which you claim that it does? Isn’t your ridicule of libertarians in itself an absurdity? Your definition of, or “theory” of, experiential liberty tells us nothing about resolving the conflict over what actions are and are not permissible, under your self-stated assumption that a state of liberty is that in which we maximize liberty, assuming a state of subjectively maximized liberty is desirable. Isn’t the problem how we maximize liberty? And how does subjective value (an increase or decrease in satisfaction resulting from action) differ from your restatement?

    How does the meaningless term ‘maximizing liberty’ help solve the problem of determining what scope we implement in the rule of law? And how is that any different from the evolutionary progress of the common law ‘s constant discovery of new means of criminal, unethical and immoral conduct?

    Hoppe is correct. The only question we must answer in order to construct a condition of liberty is the scope of property we define as adjudicable under law. His argument (as I believe I understand it), is that intersubjectively verifiable property (prohibition on criminal offenses against extant entities), is the minimum universal scope of property necessary for liberty, and that above that scope, all other possible forms of property so covered under the law are a matter of contractual choice by the polity – not a logical necessity. This limit mirrors Rothbard’s Non-Aggression Principle and the scope of property he defines in The Ethics Of Liberty.

    My criticism of Hoppe’s argument (and of Rothbard’s ethics, and of the fallacy of Non-Aggression reflects a moral proposition), is that the local transaction costs of daily life under intersubjectively verifiable property (mere criminal prohibitions), are sufficiently high that people will prefer an authoritarian state that either imposes additional rules, and/or which suppresses retaliation, because people ACT as if their property has been violated whenever they experience criminal, unethical, immoral or conspiratorial actions. And they will retaliate against them unless the law provides an organized means of restitution, or the state aggressively suppresses retributions. As such only high trust polities that suppress nearly all violations of property as defined by demonstrated human actions. And therefore that non-aggression, and intersubjectively verifiable property are irrelevant because they are insufficient to construct a condition of liberty.

    As such, the definition of property articulated in law must mirror the violations of criminal, ethical, immoral, and conspiratorial actions that people will retaliate against. And a low trust, Rothbardian polity where the minimum scope of property rights is defined as that which is intersubjectively verifiable, is impossible. And that the minimum scope of property is that which people will not desire to retaliate against its violation. That minimum scope of property appears to include not only the intersubjectively verifiable that can be transgressed against, but also unethical, immoral, and conspiratorial actions.

    So your position your theory as a solution to libertarian confusion – however it is merely a restatement of the obvious and already extant: of the invisibly subjective and experiential rather than the observable, objective, and institutional; when subjective value has been stated for a century, and the question remains one of the scope of observable criteria for dispute resolution necessary for the formation of a polity that does not demonstrate demand for a state. We cannot agree on the scope of property and the means of violating it.

    In other words, in your paper “The main philosophical problem with libertarian liberty” (a) you incorrectly state the cause of libertarian confusion as merely a linguistic problem of meaning, (b) and your proposed solution is a mere verbalism: restating the objective description of subjective value as subjective experience, (c) and you have not added clarity nor justified your ridicule, (d) and that the cause of confusion remains: what scope and conditions are permissible and not. 🙂

    I conjecture that (a) the solution to the problem is empirically measurable, (b) that measure will prohibit unethical and immoral impositions, in addition to merely criminal impositions, and (c) the possibility of a condition of liberty increases with normative homogeneity of the polity, and (d) likewise that possibility increases the smaller the family size (the closer to the absolute nuclear family).

    I make this conjecture because (e) transaction costs make liberty non-rational unless nearly equal to kinship transaction costs (trust), (f) tolerance for free riding decrease with kinship distance, and (g) shared norms are perceived as kinship signals.

    It is possible to empirically falsify this argument. And I think that given the evidence it will be very hard to do that.

    I will save my criticism of your misunderstanding of, and abuse of critical rationalism for a later date.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Philosophy of Aristocracy

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev, Ukraine

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-13 08:48:00 UTC

  • (I like this one better as the Aristocratic Egalitarian Challenge) “I do not nee

    (I like this one better as the Aristocratic Egalitarian Challenge)

    “I do not need your permission to attack you.

    I don’t seek your negotiation, approval, or your consent,

    I seek your defeat. And I seek to defeat you completely.

    If you fear your defeat you may seek to understand,

    And if you come to understand, then you may pay restitution;

    And you may end your immoral words and deeds.

    But until you pay restitution, and end your immoral words and deeds,

    I will defeat you by words.

    if I cannot obtain your restitution with words.

    Then I will defeat you with violence, and take it from you.

    Because morality demands that I defeat you.”

    I’ve been working on this for a bit. Not quite there yet.

    It’s all sitting there in history to pick up and be converted into rational language. The problem is it’s wrapped in pseudo-religious poetry of the church. Economics is the language of morality. Even if economists use it to practice immorality.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-08 02:23:00 UTC

  • GETTING THE ARGUMENT RIGHT – CONSTRUCTION OF COMMONS It is not that there is no

    GETTING THE ARGUMENT RIGHT – CONSTRUCTION OF COMMONS

    It is not that there is no common good we can know, it is that, even if we can determine a common good, the monopoly state bureaucracy cannot construct a common good without an equally or worse, damaging set of externalities – by its mere existence. If a common good is truly possible to construct, the government (a body of people negotiating a contract with one another to whom all citizens must agree), can construct it without the aid of a monopoly bureaucracy – assuming that the first common goods that have been constructed are property and rule of law – and then contract out the execution of those commons to individuals who can be fired if they fail to perform, and held accountable for those failures by restitution, punishment or even death.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-07 10:03:00 UTC

  • THE “RUSE” OF MORAL PRINCIPLES LIBERTY CAN ONLY EXISTS UNDER RULE OF LAW, AND TH

    THE “RUSE” OF MORAL PRINCIPLES

    LIBERTY CAN ONLY EXISTS UNDER RULE OF LAW, AND THEREFORE ONLY UNDER EXPRESSION OF GENERAL RULES EXPRESSED AS LAW.

    The only question is the scope of permissible law: the range of property humans intuit to aspire to acquire, that the community agrees to organize and apply violence to defend. And that which we are willing to defend depends entirely upon the marginal indifference of our political needs. Which is why diverse polities have lower trust and higher demand for more authoritarian intervention, and more homogenous polities have higher trust and less demand for authoritarian interventions.

    So no, despite the attempted distraction via overloading and framing of libertines, a ‘moral principle’ is just a deceptive argument, and a ‘guiding principle’ is just a ruse – a justification for not solving the very hard problem: of that which we consider to be property by our actions, and that which we are willing to enforce with our actions.

    Everything else is just an elaborate deception or convenient justification. In the cast of libertines, it’s an excuse to intentionally conflate libertinism with libertarianism. And worse, it’s an attempt to forbid the law from use as a means of retaliating against free riding, imposed costs, and involuntary transfers (all synonyms), each of which makes cooperation irrational.

    So the purpose of libertinism is to use a moral principle as a ruse to define a limit to the law, that specifically licenses free riding, imposed costs, and involuntary transfers – the labels we use for these thefts include unethical, immoral, and conspiratorial actions – by prohibiting both physical and legal retaliation for them.

    Worse, since the western competitive advantage is our ability to construct commons free of privatization, including the commons of property rights themselves, libertinism is an well designed attack on our ability to produce commons, and therefore our reproductive and competitive evolutionary strategy. Libertinism is as genocidal for the west as is the Cathedral’s democratic secular socialist humanism’s universalism.

    And I use the term “justification” as a synonym for self-deception – and yes, it is possible for our genes intuitions to deceive our consciousness through overloading. Just as it is possible for others to deceive us through loading, framing then overloading. That is why religions work in the construction belief despite overwhelming experiential evidence. Unconscious selection bias exists and is testable. Suggestion exists and is testable. There is no reason why evolution would favor a superiority of reason over intuition. That would a losing proposition.

    The only question is, what scope of suppression of involuntary transfers (imposed costs/free riding) is necessary for liberty to be rationally preferable over a state that imposed universal rules? The answer is to the rational question is found in transaction costs. At what point are local transaction costs sufficiently suppressed that the remote explicit costs of a state are no longer preferable?

    The moral ruse has harmed the course of liberty. Thankfully, the question, reframed as transaction costs, and rational choice, necessary to eliminate demand for the state, can restore the course of liberty.

    Curt Doolittle

    The Propertarian Institute

    Kiev Ukraine.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-07 06:55:00 UTC

  • LIBERTY EXISTS ONLY UNDER RULE OF LAW AND THEREFORE ONLY UNDER EXPRESSION OF GEN

    LIBERTY EXISTS ONLY UNDER RULE OF LAW AND THEREFORE ONLY UNDER EXPRESSION OF GENERAL RULES IN LAW.

    As far as I know liberty can only be constructed under rule of law. The only question is the scope of permissible law: the range of property humans intuit to aspire to acquire, that the community agrees to organize and apply violence to defend.

    So no, a ‘moral principle’ is just a deceptive argument, and a ‘guiding principle’ is just a ruse – a justification for not solving the very hard problem: of that which we consider to be property by our actions, and that which we are willing to enforce with our actions.

    Everything else is just an elaborate deception or convenient justification.

    (And I use the term justification as a synonym for self deception)

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-05 10:54:00 UTC

  • NO, MR. LIBERTINE, YOUR OPINION IS IRRELEVANT. 🙂 Your opinion as to whether you

    NO, MR. LIBERTINE, YOUR OPINION IS IRRELEVANT. 🙂

    Your opinion as to whether your a libertarian or a libertine is immaterial. Either you’re a libertarian and the law must suppress all free riding in both public and private spheres; or you are an advocate for the most extensive free riding that is possible without the application of violence – by forbidding the use of violence in retaliation for free riding.

    So you’re a libertarian under rule of law, or a libertine to escape rule of law.

    Your opinion is not material – only your choice of the scope of property to be protected from parasitism.

    It’s that simple.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-05 10:09:00 UTC

  • SELLING DYSGENIA FOR PROFIT You just prohibit lying, by requiring truthful speec

    SELLING DYSGENIA FOR PROFIT

    You just prohibit lying, by requiring truthful speech. We do not allow for fomenting a conspiracy, why should we allow for the fomenting of theft for the purpose of profiting from the sale of dysgenia? I man, that’s the left’s program right? Sell dysgenia for profit? SO, unwind it by merely replacing free speech with free truthful speech. One cannot bring a harmful product, physical, service, or speech, to market without warranty against the production of harm.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-02 16:11:00 UTC

  • IF MORALITY IS UNIVERSAL, THEN SO IS LAW. Given that there is only one law – the

    IF MORALITY IS UNIVERSAL, THEN SO IS LAW.

    Given that there is only one law – the prevention of free riding; and one means of suppressing it – the law. And that humans demonstrate constant innovation to escape the limitations of competitors – market competition. And that humans demonstrate constant innovation in the means of escaping the limits of that law. And as such, preservation of that market, by that law, requires that we match innovation in the law, so that the difference between market innovation to escape competition, free riding to take advantage of new opportunities for free riding, and the legal means of suppressing free riding, preserve confidence in taking risks, and preserve the velocity of the market, and preserve the accumulation of wealth. Then the question remains why we would need competing legal systems any more than we would need competing systems of mathematics. If we separate judiciary from government, meaning that we separate the resolution of disputes and innovation in the law, from the production of commons via a contract, then we may need different governments for the different allocations of control over our individual property rights, in order to produce the commons that are desirable by our individual group members, but I can understand no conditions under which we require competing systems of law, other than to allow different ranges of morality in the creative application of free riding. We may require organic and distributed evolution of the law, much like we use in science today – moving from hypothesis on a law, to theory on a law, to ‘law’ proper by the accumulation of judicial consent. But if these laws diverge, then something is wrong. The reason being that all legal disputes are decidable, and if they are not then they are not matters of property open to decision making.

    As far as I know this is a box and the theory of a market for law is done.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-02 02:07:00 UTC

  • that relies upon statistical correlation is merely a side effect of advancements

    http://bv.ms/1thsTYtScience that relies upon statistical correlation is merely a side effect of advancements in data collection, calculation, and computing by increasingly mechanical means of instrumentation. With these advanced, made possible by instrumentation, collection, analysis and explanation were specialised – but without operationalism as a moral and logical constraint upon scientific statements, pseudoscience has evolved as a specific disciple – and means of fund and attention getting – because it’s easier than practicing science.

    This fallacy is so embedded in western thought at this point it will be as difficult to erase as was anthropomorphism or the act of divine hand.

    It is the phlogiston theory of the 20th century brought about by advances in tools without corresponding advances in reason.

    We can intuit a theory by any possible means. Statistical collection analysis extends our sense, perception, and therefore reduces the imperceptible to an analogy to experience that renders it perceptible.

    And such correlations can help us develop hypotheses, and can invalidate older theories.

    But without converting hypotheses intuited from statistical observations to a series of testable actions on the part of humans, no such pseudoscientific statement can be said to have been tested.

    This is the reason for the fallacies of social science over the past centuries: wishful thinking about human nature in the left and pessimistic thinking about human nature as purely incentive driven if required to pay costs of decisions in the other.

    Mor later. Thanks for the post. – curt.

    Source date (UTC): 2014-11-01 00:18:00 UTC