Category: Law, Constitution, and Jurisprudence

  • It’s sort of like we need a house of Limits for conservatives, a house of Commer

    It’s sort of like we need a house of Limits for conservatives, a house of Commerce for libertarians and a house of Charity for progressives. Commerce and Charity can make contracts with one another, and those contracts must observe strict construction, and under that strict construction limited to observable, demonstrable, voluntary exchanges. The house Limits has the right of veto without comment.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-05-07 08:01:00 UTC

  • Reforming Libertarianism Is Pretty Simple Really

    —“I think it’s pretty simple: the NAP has proven to be demonstrably insufficient to use as the basis of the common law, because it preserves and licenses immoral and unethical behavior, which impose high transaction costs on in-group members. As such, no such polity is possible, and that is evidenced by the fact that no such polity has ever existed. … Rothbard’s ethics license parasitism, and the high trust society that created liberty requires contribution to production. It’s not complicated. Rothbard was wrong. Its impossible to form a polity on rothbardian ethics. Period.”– [I]n-group ethics necessary for the formation of a voluntary polity require the standard of moral action be based upon a requirement for contribution, which mirrors the human moral instincts for cooperation. if you want an involuntary polity then you can choose any property rights (or lack of) that you want. If you want a high trust polity that organizes voluntarily, and in which production is voluntarily organized, then you must find an institutional means of resolving ethical and moral conflicts as well as criminal conflicts. The only institution that we have yet developed that is capable of providing dispute resolution without the presence of a central authority is independent courts under the common law, with articulated property rights. If property is well defined such that it mirrors ethical and moral prohibitions on free riding in all its forms, all that remains is the voluntary, fully informed, warrantied, productive voluntary exchange free of negative externalities. You may choose a less moral and ethical society. And I am not sure at what point all humans will demand the state, or a sufficient number to form a voluntary polity will prefer anarchy, but I do know that regardless of that point of inflection, this is the means by which to achieve it that we know of. Cheers.

  • Where Libertarians Go Wrong

    [L]ibertarians get lost in introspection. The central problem of creating an anarchic society is fully articulating property rights such that they are possible to rationally adjudicate under the common law. It is this rational ability to adjudicate differences under the common law that makes possible ‘rule of law’. Without such rational articulation, rule by man’s discretion is necessary. The sufficiency of that articulated list of property is what determines if transaction costs are low enough that it’s rational for people to voluntarily join a polity in which plans can be made, and disputes can be resolved, according to that list of property rights. As I have written recently, libertarians (foolishly) discount these transaction costs because they tend to be above, and interact above, the threshold at which moral behavior is dominant. [T]he NAP is either an insufficient test, or private property rights that are intersubjectively verifiable are an insufficient scope. Propertarianism extends property to that which people demonstrate they believe is their just property, and places the burden on the individuals with the greater knowledge. “Seller Beware”.

  • Where Libertarians Go Wrong

    [L]ibertarians get lost in introspection. The central problem of creating an anarchic society is fully articulating property rights such that they are possible to rationally adjudicate under the common law. It is this rational ability to adjudicate differences under the common law that makes possible ‘rule of law’. Without such rational articulation, rule by man’s discretion is necessary. The sufficiency of that articulated list of property is what determines if transaction costs are low enough that it’s rational for people to voluntarily join a polity in which plans can be made, and disputes can be resolved, according to that list of property rights. As I have written recently, libertarians (foolishly) discount these transaction costs because they tend to be above, and interact above, the threshold at which moral behavior is dominant. [T]he NAP is either an insufficient test, or private property rights that are intersubjectively verifiable are an insufficient scope. Propertarianism extends property to that which people demonstrate they believe is their just property, and places the burden on the individuals with the greater knowledge. “Seller Beware”.

  • Law Is Synonymous With Morality If All Moral Rules Are Reducible To Property Rights

    (important piece) [T]here is no distinction between legal and moral (criminal, ethical, moral) content in disputes. This fallacy is a central problem of the logic of libertarian property theory. The first question is whether we compensate people for defense of property rights (criminal ethical and moral) or expect them to pay those costs even if they cannot participate in production (which I argue is immoral.) I argue that this is a mere matter of compensating people via commission on overall production for their action in defense of the means of production (a low transaction cost society where voluntary organization of production is possible). And that people who participate in production and who choose to be involved in production should capture their wealth. Our error is in not acknowledging the costs of respecting property rights. Which are very high. And that is why respect for property rights, especially high trust property rights of the protestant northern europeans, is so rare. It’s terribly expensive, even if dramatically more productive. [L]ike all fundamental philosophical questions (of which I only know half of a dozen that exist), the central question is either you have a right to reproduce if you cannot support your offspring. Is that immoral and therefore illegal? That question determines whether your arguments are simple and rational or complex and non-rational (incalculable). This division of labor and compensation does not require nonsense-bullshit moralizing from continental and cosmopolitan schools of thought (ie:deception, obscurantism, authoritarianism, and loading, framing,) to load and frame the argument. It is merely respect for individual property rights through and through. Low property rights with low ethical and moral standards will produce high demand for the state, while high property rights with high ethical and moral standards will produce low demand for the state. As such, for any libertarian order, the relationship between law and morality is one-to-one. There is no difference. However, it is a practical necessity to pay those who cannot engage in production but who can engage in creating the social, legal and economic means of production, for their efforts. And failing to do so is criminal as well as immoral. This approach gives everyone in the society (local polity that facilitates the voluntary organization of production) the same interests: suppression of the predatory state monopoly, while at the same time maintaining parity between law and morality. [T]here is no need for emotional loading and framing if you actually do a bit of thinking. But libertarians are often lighter on the discipline of thinking than they let on. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • Law Is Synonymous With Morality If All Moral Rules Are Reducible To Property Rights

    (important piece) [T]here is no distinction between legal and moral (criminal, ethical, moral) content in disputes. This fallacy is a central problem of the logic of libertarian property theory. The first question is whether we compensate people for defense of property rights (criminal ethical and moral) or expect them to pay those costs even if they cannot participate in production (which I argue is immoral.) I argue that this is a mere matter of compensating people via commission on overall production for their action in defense of the means of production (a low transaction cost society where voluntary organization of production is possible). And that people who participate in production and who choose to be involved in production should capture their wealth. Our error is in not acknowledging the costs of respecting property rights. Which are very high. And that is why respect for property rights, especially high trust property rights of the protestant northern europeans, is so rare. It’s terribly expensive, even if dramatically more productive. [L]ike all fundamental philosophical questions (of which I only know half of a dozen that exist), the central question is either you have a right to reproduce if you cannot support your offspring. Is that immoral and therefore illegal? That question determines whether your arguments are simple and rational or complex and non-rational (incalculable). This division of labor and compensation does not require nonsense-bullshit moralizing from continental and cosmopolitan schools of thought (ie:deception, obscurantism, authoritarianism, and loading, framing,) to load and frame the argument. It is merely respect for individual property rights through and through. Low property rights with low ethical and moral standards will produce high demand for the state, while high property rights with high ethical and moral standards will produce low demand for the state. As such, for any libertarian order, the relationship between law and morality is one-to-one. There is no difference. However, it is a practical necessity to pay those who cannot engage in production but who can engage in creating the social, legal and economic means of production, for their efforts. And failing to do so is criminal as well as immoral. This approach gives everyone in the society (local polity that facilitates the voluntary organization of production) the same interests: suppression of the predatory state monopoly, while at the same time maintaining parity between law and morality. [T]here is no need for emotional loading and framing if you actually do a bit of thinking. But libertarians are often lighter on the discipline of thinking than they let on. Curt Doolittle The Propertarian Institute Kiev

  • If the president can nullify laws, then why can’t the states? or cities? or coun

    If the president can nullify laws, then why can’t the states? or cities? or counties?

    I need a stuffed animal called ‘nullify’ that I can hug at night.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-24 23:12:00 UTC

  • ARISTOCRACY : A KINSHIP OF PROPERTY RIGHTS I think that’s the most reductive sta

    ARISTOCRACY : A KINSHIP OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

    I think that’s the most reductive statement that I can make.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-23 07:23:00 UTC

  • *Best Idea I’ve Heard Today* Disarm every federal agency except the the US Marsh

    *Best Idea I’ve Heard Today*

    Disarm every federal agency except the the US Marshals. Require all US Marshall’s have law degrees. Require all US Marshall’s carry insurance. Separate investigatory power from enforcement power.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-15 08:39:00 UTC

  • RULE OF LAW: IRS ABUSE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ABUSE I worked for the justice depart

    http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/14/how-obamas-justice-department-selectively-blocks-mergers-by-republican-ceos/NO RULE OF LAW: IRS ABUSE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ABUSE

    I worked for the justice department for a very short time. It was so immoral that I couldn’t stand it.


    Source date (UTC): 2014-04-14 12:53:00 UTC